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Should the United States be prohibited from military intervention in the Western Hemisphere?

Intercollegiate Topic
1982-1983

Pursuant to Public Law 88-246

Compiled by the Congressional Research Service
Library of Congress



**PUBLIC LAW 88-246, 88TH CONGRESS, S. 2311,
DECEMBER 30, 1963**

AN ACT To provide for the preparation and printing of compilation of materials relating to annual national high school and college debate topics

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Librarian of Congress is authorized and directed to prepare compilations of pertinent excerpts, bibliographical references, and other appropriate materials relating to (1) the subject selected annually by the National University Extension Association as the national high school debate topics and (2) the subject selected annually by the American Speech Association as the national college debate topic. In preparing such compilations the Librarian shall include materials which in his judgment are representative of, and give equal emphasis to, the opposing points of view on the respective topics.

SEC. 2. The compilations on the high school debate topics shall be printed as Senate documents and the compilations on the college debate topics shall be printed as House documents, the cost of which shall be charged to the congressional allotment for printing and binding. Additional copies of such documents may be printed in such quantities and distributed in such manner as the Joint Committee on Printing directs.

Approved December 30, 1963.

FOREWORD

The Committee on Intercollegiate Debate and Discussion of the Speech Convention of America selected the following topic for the academic year 1982-1983:

Resolved, That the United States should be prohibited from military intervention in the Western Hemisphere.

In compliance with Public Law 88-246, the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress prepared this compilation of materials and bibliographic references to assist collegiate debaters in researching this year's topic. The excerpts from books, periodicals, and other documents were selected to provide background information, an overview of the principal issues, and a balance of opposing views. We also attempted to include some materials that are not readily available to the public. Bibliographic references were also chosen to provide a wide range of information and opinions but were limited to materials that are generally accessible.

U.S. Government documents listed in the bibliography may be found in most U.S. Government depository libraries which can be identified by your local public library. The Library of Congress cannot distribute copies of these or other materials to the debaters.

Information is included at the end of this volume on guides to additional resources and other publications and associations that may be useful in expanding and updating this compilation. Finally, there is included a list of relevant publications that are available for purchase from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office.

Michael Dixon, Analyst in U.S. Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, coordinated the compilation of these materials. Val Leskovsek prepared the bibliography and the guide to additional sources of information. Dagnija Sterne-Perkins, K. Larry Storrs, Nina Serafino, and Marjorie Browne helped with the organization and selection of the bibliographic entries. Richard Gigax, Head, Subject Specialization Section, Library Services Division, did the final editing of the bibliography and the information guide. Barbara Sanders helped obtain copyright releases of reprinted material. John M. White provided production support.

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GILBERT GUDE,
Director, Congressional Research Service.

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TO INTERVENE OR NOT TO INTERVENE

By Hans J. Morgenthau

INTERVENTION is as ancient and well-established an instrument of foreign policy as are diplomatic pressure, negotiations and war. From the time of the ancient Greeks to this day, some states have found it advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf of their own interests and against the latter's will. Other states, in view of their interests, have opposed such interventions and have intervened on behalf of theirs.

It is only since the French Revolution of 1789 and the rise of the nation-state that the legitimacy of intervention has been questioned. Article 119 of the French Constitution of 1793 declared that the French people "do not interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations and will not tolerate interference by other nations in their affairs." This declaration ushered in a period of interventions by all concerned on the largest possible scale. For a century and a half afterwards, statesmen, lawyers and political writers tried in vain to formulate objective criteria by which to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate intervention. The principle of nonintervention was incorporated into the textbooks of international law, and statesmen have never ceased to pay lip service to it. In December 1965, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty," according to which "no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state . . ." and "no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state." Yet again we are witnessing throughout the world activities violating all the rules laid down in this Declaration.

Both the legal commitments against intervention and the practice of intervention serve the political purposes of particular nations. The former serve to discredit the intervention of the other side and to justify one's own. Thus the principle of non-intervention, as formulated at the beginning of the nineteenth

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century, sought to protect the new nation-states from interference by the traditional monarchies of Europe. For the main instrument of the Holy Alliance, openly proclaimed in the treaty establishing it, was intervention. Thus, to give only two examples among many, Russia tried to intervene in Spain in 1820, and actually intervened in Hungary in 1848, in order to oppose liberal revolutions. Great Britain opposed these interventions because it was opposed to the expansion of Russian power. Yet it intervened on behalf of nationalism in Greece and on behalf of the conservative status quo in Portugal because its interests seemed to require it.

What we have witnessed since the end of the Second World War thus appears as a mere continuation of a tradition which was well established in the nineteenth century. There is nothing new either in the contemporary doctrine opposing intervention or in the pragmatic use of intervention on behalf of the interests of individual nations. What Great Britain and Russia were doing in the nineteenth century, the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be doing today. Thus, to cite again two spectacular examples among many, the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary in 1956 as Russia had done in 1848, and the United States intervened in Cuba at the beginning of the sixties as it had done in the first decades of the century. Yet there are fundamental differences between the interventions of the past and those of the present. Five such differences have significantly altered the techniques of contemporary intervention, have drastically reduced the traditional legal significance of the consent of the state intervened against, and have affected in a general way the peace and order of the world.

First, the process of decolonization, which started after the Second World War and is now almost completed, has more than doubled the number of sovereign nations. Many if not most of these new nations are not viable political, military and economic entities; they are lacking in some if not all of the prerequisites of nationhood. Their governments need regular outside support. Thus France subsidizes its former colonies in Africa; all the major industrial nations extend economic and financial aid to the new ones, and the United States, the Soviet Union and China do so on a competitive basis.

What makes this aid a lever for intervention is the fact that in most cases it is not just an advantage which the new nations can

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afford to take or leave, but a condition for their survival. The Indian economy, for example, would collapse without outside support, and in consequence the Indian state itself would probably disintegrate. Large masses of Egyptians would starve without the outside supply of food. What is true of these two ancient and relatively well developed nations is of course true of most of the new nations which are nations within their present boundaries only by virtue of the accidents of colonial policy: the supplier of foreign aid holds the power of life and death over them. If a foreign nation supplies aid it intervenes; if it does not supply aid it also intervenes. In the measure that the government must depend on foreign aid for its own and its nation's survival it is inevitably exposed to political pressures from the supplying government. Many of the recipient governments have been able to minimize or even neutralize these political pressures by keeping open alternative sources of foreign aid and by playing one supplying government against the other. Some nations, such as Egypt, have developed this technique into a fine and highly successful art.

Second, our age resembles the period of history after the Napoleonic Wars, when the theory of nonintervention and the practice of intervention flourished, in that it is a revolutionary age. Many nations, new and old, are threatened by revolution, or are at one time or another in the throes of it. A successful revolution frequently portends a new orientation in the country's foreign policy, as it did in the Congo, Cuba and Indonesia. Thus the great powers, expecting gains or fearing disadvantages from the revolution, are tempted to intervene on the side of the faction favoring them. This is particularly so when the revolution is committed to a communist or anti-communist position. Thus China has almost indiscriminately intervened throughout the world on behalf of subversive movements, very much in the manner in which the Bolshevik government under Lenin and Trotsky tried to promote world revolution. In many nations, the United States and the Soviet Union oppose each other surreptitiously through the intermediary of governments and political movements. It is at this point that the third new factor comes into play.

Of all the revolutionary changes that have occurred in world politics since the end of the Second World War, none has exerted a greater influence upon the conduct of foreign policy than the

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recognition on the part of the two superpowers, armed with a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, that a direct confrontation between them would entail unacceptable risks; for it could lead to their mutual destruction. Both have recognized that a nuclear war fought against each other would be a suicidal absurdity. Thus they have decided that they must avoid a direct confrontation. This is the real political and military meaning of the slogan of "peaceful coexistence."

Instead of confronting each other openly and directly, the United States and the Soviet Union have chosen to oppose and compete with each other surreptitiously through the intermediary of third parties. The internal weakness of most new and emerging nations requiring foreign support and the revolutionary situation in many of them give the great powers the opportunity of doing so. Thus, aside from competing for influence upon a particular government in the traditional ways, the United States and the Soviet Union have interjected their power into the domestic conflicts of weak nations, supporting the government or the opposition as the case may be. While one might think that on ideological grounds the United States would always intervene on the side of the government and the Soviet Union on the side of the opposition, it is characteristic of the interplay between ideology and power politics, to which we shall turn in a moment, that this has not always been so. Thus the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary in 1956 on the side of the government, and the United States has been intervening in Cuba on the side of the opposition. The Soviet slogan of support for "wars of national liberation" is in truth an ideological justification of Soviet support for that side in a civil conflict in which the Soviet Union happens to have an interest. In the Congo, the United States and the Soviet Union have switched their support from the government to the opposition and back again according to the fortunes of a succession of civil wars.

While contemporary interventions serving national power interests have sometimes been masked by the ideologies of communism and anti-communism, these ideologies have been an independent motivating force. This is the fourth factor which we must consider. The United States and the Soviet Union face each other not only as two great powers which in the traditional ways compete for advantage. They also face each other as the fountain-heads of two hostile and incompatible ideologies, systems of

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government and ways of life, each trying to expand the reach of its respective political values and institutions and to prevent the expansion of the other. Thus the cold war has not only been a conflict between two world powers but also a contest between two secular religions. And like the religious wars of the seventeenth century, the war between communism and democracy does not respect national boundaries. It finds enemies and allies in all countries, opposing the one and supporting the other regardless of the niceties of international law. Here is the dynamic force which has led the two superpowers to intervene all over the globe, sometimes surreptitiously, sometimes openly, sometimes with the accepted methods of diplomatic pressure and propaganda, sometimes with the frowned-upon instruments of covert subversion and open force.

These four factors favoring intervention in our time are counteracted by a fifth one, which in a sense compensates for the weakness of the nations intervened in. Having just emerged from a colonial status or struggling to emerge from a semicolonial one, these nations react to their dependence on outside support with a fierce resistance to the threat of "neo-colonialism." While they cannot exist without support from stronger nations, they refuse to exchange their newly won independence for a new dependency. Hence their ambivalent reaction to outside intervention. They need it and they resent it. This ambivalence compels them to choose among several different courses of action. They can seek support from multiple outside sources, thereby canceling out dependence on one by dependence on the other. They can alternate among different sources of support, at one time relying on one, and at another time relying on another. Finally, they can choose between complete dependence and complete independence, either by becoming a client of one of the major powers or by forswearing outside support altogether.

This ambivalence of the weak nations imposes new techniques upon the intervening ones. Intervention must either be brutally direct in order to overcome resistance or it must be surreptitious in order to be acceptable, or the two extremes may be combined. Thus the United States intervened in Cuba in 1961 through the proxy of a refugee force, and the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary in 1956 by appointing a government which asked for its intervention.

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II

What follows from this condition of intervention in our time for the foreign policies of the United States? Four basic conclusions can be drawn: the futility of the search for abstract principles, the error of anti-communist intervention per se, the self-defeating character of anti-revolutionary intervention per se, and the requirement of prudence.

First, it is futile to search for an abstract principle which would allow us to distinguish in a concrete case between legitimate and illegitimate intervention. This was so even in the nineteenth century when intervention for the purpose of colonial expansion was generally regarded to be legitimate and when the active players on the political stage were relatively self-sufficient nation-states, which not only were not in need of intervention but actually were opposed to it as a threat to their existence. If this was so then, it stands to reason that in an age where large segments of whole continents must choose between anarchy and intervention, intervention cannot be limited by abstract principles, let alone effectively outlawed by a United Nations resolution.

Let us suppose that nation A intervenes on behalf of the government of nation B by giving it military, economic and technical aid on the latter's request, and that the government of B becomes so completely dependent upon A as to act as the latter's satellite. Let us further suppose that the local opposition calls upon country C for support against the agents of a foreign oppressor and that C heeds that call. Which one of these interventions is legitimate? Country A will of course say that its own is and C's is not, and vice versa, and the ideologues on both sides will be kept busy justifying the one and damning the other. This ideological shadowboxing cannot affect the incidence of interventions. All nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of the means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests. There is indeed an urgent need for the governments of the great powers to abide by certain rules according to which the game of intervention is to be played. But these rules must be deduced not from abstract principles which are incapable of controlling the actions of governments, but from the interests of the nations concerned and from their practice of foreign policy reflecting those interests.

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The failure to understand this distinction between abstract principles and national interests as guidance for a policy of intervention was in good measure responsible for the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs in 1961. The United States was resolved to intervene on behalf of its interests, but it was also resolved to intervene in such a way as not openly to violate the principle of nonintervention. Both resolutions were legitimate in terms of American interests. The United States had an interest in eliminating the political and military power of the Soviet Union, which used Cuba as a base from which to threaten the security interests of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. The United States also had an interest in avoiding whatever would jeopardize its standing in the new and emerging nations. The United States failed to assign priorities to these two interests. In order to minimize the loss of prestige, the United States jeopardized the success of the intervention. Instead of using concern for prestige as a datum among others in the political equation—that is, as an interest among others—it submitted to it as though it were an abstract principle imposing absolute limits upon the actions necessary to achieve success. In consequence, the United States failed thrice. The intervention did not succeed; in the attempt we suffered the temporary impairment of our standing among the new and emerging nations; and we lost much prestige as a great nation able to use its power successfully on behalf of its interests.

Had the United States approached the problem of intervening in Cuba in a rational fashion, it would have asked itself which was more important: to succeed in the intervention or to prevent a temporary loss of prestige among the new and emerging nations. Had it settled upon the latter alternative, it would have refrained from intervening altogether; had it chosen the former alternative, it would have taken all the measures necessary to make the intervention a success, regardless of unfavorable reactions in the rest of the world. Instead, it sought the best of both worlds and got the worst.

The Soviet Union's intervention in Hungary in 1956 is instructive in this respect. The Soviet Union put the success of the intervention above all other considerations, and succeeded. Its prestige throughout the world suffered drastically in consequence. But Hungary is today a communist state within the orbit of the Soviet Union, and Soviet prestige recovered quickly from the damage it suffered in 1956.

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The interventions of the United States in Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Viet Nam, as well as others less spectacular, have been justified as reactions to communist intervention. This argument derives from the assumption that communism everywhere in the world is not only morally unacceptable and philosophically hostile to the United States, but is also detrimental to the national interests of the United States and must therefore be opposed on political as well as moral and philosophic grounds. I shall assume for the purposes of this discussion that, as a matter of fact, communist intervention actually preceded ours in all these instances, and shall raise the question as to whether our national interest required our counter-intervention.

Ten or twenty years ago, this question could have been answered in the positive without further examination. For then communism anywhere in the world was a mere extension of Soviet power, controlled and used for the purposes of that power. Since we were committed to the containment of the Soviet Union, we were also committed to the containment of communism anywhere in the world. However, today we are faced not with one monolithic communist bloc controlled and used by the Soviet Union, but with a variety of communisms, whose relations with the Soviet Union and China change from country to country and from time to time and whose bearing upon the interests of the United States requires empirical examination in each concrete instance. Communism has become polycentric, that is to say, each communist government and movement, to a greater or lesser extent, pursues its own national interests within the common framework of communist ideology and institutions. The bearing which the pursuit of those interests has upon the interests of the United States must be determined in terms not of communist ideology but of the compatibility of those interests with the interests of the United States.

Subjecting our interventions in Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Viet Nam to this empirical test, one realizes the inadequacy of the simple slogan "stop communism" as the rationale of our interventions. While this slogan is popular at home and makes but minimal demands upon discriminating judgment, it inspires policies which do either too much or too little in opposing communism and can provide no yardstick for a policy which measures the degree of its opposition by the degree of the communist threat. Thus on the one hand, as part of the settlement of the

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missile crisis of 1962, we pledged ourselves not to intervene in Cuba, which is today a military and political outpost of the Soviet Union and the fountainhead of subversion and military intervention in the Western Hemisphere, and as such directly affects the interests of the United States. On the other hand, we have intervened massively in Viet Nam, even at the risk of a major war, although the communist threat to American interests from Viet Nam is at best remote and in any event is infinitely more remote than the communist threat emanating from Cuba.

As concerns the intervention in the Dominican Republic, even if one takes at face value the official assessment that the revolution of April 1965 was controlled by Cuban communists, it appears incongruous that we intervened massively in the Dominican Republic, whose revolution was, according to our government's assessment of the facts, a mere symptom of the disease, while the disease itself—that is, Cuban communism—is exempt from effective intervention altogether.

This type of intervention against communism per se naturally tends to blend into intervention against revolution per se. Thus we tend to intervene against all radical revolutionary movements because we are afraid lest they be taken over by communists, and conversely we tend to intervene on behalf of all governments and movements which are opposed to radical revolution, because they are also opposed to communism. Such a policy of intervention is unsound on intellectual grounds for the reasons mentioned in our discussion of contemporary communism; it is also bound to fail in practice.

Many nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America are today in a pre-revolutionary stage, and it is likely to be only a matter of time until actual revolution will break out in one or another of these nations. The revolutionary movements which will then come to the fore are bound to have, to a greater or lesser degree, a communist component; that is, they risk being taken over by communism. Nothing is simpler, both in terms of intellectual effort and, at least initially, practical execution, than to trace all these revolutions to a common conspiratorial source, to equate all revolutionary movements with world communism, and to oppose them with indiscriminate fervor as uniformly hostile to our interests. The United States would then be forced to intervene against revolutions throughout the world because of the

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ever-present threat of a communist take-over, and would transform itself, in spite of its better insight and intentions, into an anti-revolutionary power per se.

Such a policy of intervention might succeed if it had to deal with nothing more than isolated revolutionary movements which could be smothered by force of arms. But it cannot succeed, since it is faced with revolutionary situations all over the world; for even the militarily most powerful nation does not have sufficient usable resources to deal simultaneously with a number of acute revolutions. Such a policy of indiscriminate intervention against revolution is bound to fail not only with regard to the individual revolution to which it is applied but also in terms of its own indiscriminate anti-communism. For the very logic which would make us appear as the anti-revolutionary power per se would surrender to communism the sponsorship of revolution everywhere. Thus anti-communist intervention achieves what it aims to prevent: the exploitation of the revolutions of the age by communism.

In truth, the choice before us is not between the status quo and revolution or even between communist and non-communist revolution, but between a revolution hostile to the interests of the United States and a revolution which is not hostile to these interests. The United States, far from intervening against revolutions per se, has therefore to intervene in competition with the main instigators of revolution—the Soviet Union, Communist China and Cuba—on behalf of revolution. This intervention should serve two alternative aims: first, to protect the revolution from a communist take-over, and second, if we should fail in this, to prevent such a communist revolution from turning against the interests of the United States. Such a policy, substituting the yardstick of the American national interest for that of anti-communism, would obviously form a complete reversal of the positions which we have taken in recent years and of which our interventions in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic are the recent prime examples.

If this analysis of our policy of intervention is correct, then we have intervened not wisely but too well. Our policy of intervention has been under the ideological spell of our opposition to communism and potentially communist-led revolutions. Yet while this ideological orientation has continued to determine our policy of intervention, the Soviet Union has continued to pay lip service

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to support for "wars of national liberation" but has in practice relegated these wars to a secondary place in the struggle for the world. This softening of the Soviet ideological position has become one of the points of contention in the ideological dispute between the Soviet Union and China. In a statement of June 14, 1963, the Chinese Communist Party declared that "the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of revolutionary struggles" in the "vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America" that are today the "storm centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism." In their reply of July 14 of the same year, the Soviet leaders opposed the "'new theory' according to which the decisive force in the struggle against imperialism . . . is not the world system of socialism, not the struggle of the international working class, but . . . the national liberation movement." The Soviet Union's recent practice of restraint in fomenting and supporting revolution has matched this theoretical position. This ideological "revisionism" has of course not prevented the Soviet Union from intervening, as in Syria and Somalia, when its national interest appeared to require intervention.

One factor which cannot have failed to influence the Soviet Union in toning down its ideological commitment to intervention has been the relative failure of ideological intervention. The United States, China and Cuba have joined the Soviet Union in the experience of that failure. The new and emerging nations have been eager to reap the benefits of intervention, but have also been very anxious not to be tied with ideological strings to the intervening nation. After making great efforts, expending considerable resources and running serious risks, the participants in this worldwide ideological competition are still approximately at the point from which they started: measured against their ambitions and expectations, the uncommitted third of the world is still by and large an ideological no-man's-land.

This experience of failure is particularly painful, and ought to be particularly instructive, for the United States. For we have intervened in the political, military and economic affairs of other countries to the tune of far in excess of \$100 billion, and we are at present involved in a costly and risky war in order to build a nation in South Viet Nam. Only the enemies of the United States will question the generosity of these efforts, which have no parallel in history. But have these efforts been wise? Have the commit-

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ments made and risks taken been commensurate with the results to be expected and actually achieved? The answer must be in the negative. Our economic aid has been successful in supporting economies which were already in the process of development; it has been by and large unsuccessful in creating economic development where none existed before, largely because the moral and rational preconditions for such development were lacking. Learning from this failure, we have established the theoretical principle of concentrating aid upon the few nations which can use it rather than giving it to the many who need it. While this principle of selectivity is sound in theory, its consistent practical application has been thwarted by the harsh political and military realities which may require economic aid which is economically not justified, as well as by political and military considerations derived from the ideological concerns discussed above.

This principle of selectivity must be extended to the political and military sphere as well. We have come to overrate enormously what a nation can do for another nation by intervening in its affairs—even with the latter's consent. This overestimation of our power to intervene is a corollary of our ideological commitment, which by its very nature has no limit. Committed to intervening against communist aggression and subversion anywhere, we have come to assume that we have the power to do so successfully. But in truth, both the need for intervention and the chances for successful intervention are much more limited than we have been led to believe. Intervene we must where our national interest requires it and where our power gives us a chance to succeed. The choice of these occasions will be determined not by sweeping ideological commitments nor by blind reliance upon American power but by a careful calculation of the interests involved and the power available. If the United States applies this standard, it will intervene less and succeed more.

U.S. Military Forces as a Political Instrument since World War II

BARRY M. BLECHMAN
STEPHEN S. KAPLAN

On November 11, 1944, the Turkish ambassador to the United States, Mehmet Munir Ertegün, died in Washington; not a very important event at a time when Allied forces were sweeping across France and Eastern Europe toward Germany, and Berlin and Tokyo were approaching *Götterdämmerung*. Sixteen months later, however, the ambassador's remains were the focus of world attention as the curtain went up on a classic act in the use of armed forces as a political instrument. On March 6, 1946, the U.S. Department of State announced that the late Ambassador Ertegün's remains would be sent home to Turkey aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri*, visibly the most powerful warship in the U.S. Navy and the ship on board which General Douglas MacArthur had recently accepted Japan's surrender.

Between the ambassador's death and this announcement, not only had World War II ended, the cold war—as yet untitled—had begun. In addition to conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union over Poland, Germany, Iran, and other areas, the Soviet Union had demanded from the Turkish government the concession of two of its provinces in the east and, in the west, a base in the area of the Dardanelles.

On March 22, the *Missouri* began a slow journey from New York harbor to Turkey. At Gibraltar the British governor had a wreath placed on board. Accompanied by the destroyer *Power*, the great battleship was met on April 3 in the eastern Mediterranean by the light cruiser *Providence*. Finally, on the

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morning of April 5, the *Missouri* and her escorts anchored in the harbor at Istanbul.¹

The meaning of this event was missed by no one; Washington had not so subtly reminded the Soviet Union and others that the United States was a great military power and that it could project this power abroad, even to shores far distant. Whether the visit of the *Missouri*, or subsequent U.S. actions, deterred the Soviet Union from implementing any further planned or potential hostile acts toward Turkey will probably never be known. What is clear is that no forceful Soviet actions followed the visit. Moreover, as a symbol of American support for Turkey vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the visit of the *Missouri* was well received and deeply appreciated by the government of Turkey, the Turkish press, and presumably by the Turkish citizenry at large. The American ambassador stated that to the Turks the visit indicated that "the United States has now decided that its own interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by the USSR to destroy Turk[ey's] independence and integrity."²

In this incident, as in hundreds of others since 1945, U.S. military forces were used without significant violence to underscore verbal and diplomatic expressions of American foreign policy. Recently we concluded a study concerned with some of these uses of the armed forces: those in which the various branches of the U.S. military were used in a discrete way for specific political objectives in a particular situation.³ Historically, of course, the United States has not been the only nation to use its armed forces for political objectives; all the great powers have engaged in such activity, and in the last three decades the Soviet Union has been a frequent practitioner of the political use of the armed forces.

A principal objective of our study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the U.S. military as a political instrument, in the short term and over a longer period, by analyzing the consequences of such factors as: the size, type, and activity of military units involved in the incident; the nature of the situation at which they were directed; the character of U.S. objectives; the international and domestic context in which the incident occurred; and the extent and type of diplomatic activity that accompanied the use of the armed forces. We concluded, generally, that discrete demonstrative uses of the military were often effective political instruments in the short term, but that effectiveness declined when situations were reexamined after longer periods of time had elapsed. We also found that each of the variables mentioned above had important consequences for the effectiveness of these uses of the military.

¹ Log of the U.S.S. *Missouri*, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.

² U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. 7, *The Near East and Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 822.

³ Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978).

METHODOLOGY

Armed forces serve foreign policy functions in many ways—by their existence and character alone, by their location abroad, by their routine exercises and visits, by their provision of military assistance and other forms of support. The United States has used military units often and in a wide variety of ways since World War II. Most of these uses have had a political dimension; that is, they were liable to influence the perceptions and behavior of political leaders in foreign countries to some degree.

For the purposes of the study described in this article, we define a political use of the armed forces as a physical action taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.

Using this definition, 215 incidents were identified in which the United States used its armed forces for political objectives between January 1, 1946, and December 31, 1975—an arbitrary cutoff date. We are confident that the list of incidents adequately represents all those instances in which U.S. armed forces were used in a way that would fit the terms of the definition.⁴

The use of military power as a tool of diplomacy can risk the security and well being of the United States and importantly affect U.S. and other international relationships both immediately and for a long time afterward. Although on some occasions the risks of intervention may be small, in many instances it is difficult to determine all possible dangers and the likelihood of their being realized. Military action in still other situations may clearly entail great risk—particularly if the USSR is an actor and is committed to a different result, or if another opponent is prepared to use violence as a last resort. The discrete political use of military power may also lead to unwanted dependency on the United States and the hostility, not only of antagonists, but of other nations in the affected region. U.S. relations with the USSR, China, and uninvolved U.S. allies may be made more difficult. In light of the Vietnam War experience, the effects of U.S. military activities abroad on the political culture of the United States and the fabric of American politics should also be considered. Before reaching a judgment that military intervention is necessary for the preservation of important U.S. interests and accepting the immediate and long-term risks that may be apparent, policymakers would be wise to consider also the utility of past political-military operations.

To evaluate this past effectiveness, two approaches, aggregate analysis and

⁴ Analysts undertaking a similar study on a classified basis have indicated that there is a correlation of 0.89 between our incident list and a list of incidents which, under the terms of the definition employed in this study, their data would indicate took place. See Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., "A Comparison of the Brookings and CNA International Incidents Projects," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper 174 (Washington, D.C.: February, 1977), processed.

case study, which present macro- and micro-views of the same phenomena, were adopted. The value of the first is that it permits broad generalizations that might be applicable in the future when the armed forces are used for political objectives. Individual case studies can confirm or disprove these generalizations, allow the inference of propositions related to the peculiarities and complexities of specific situations, and provide a sense of the psychological climate and individual concerns that condition the choices of policymakers. In short, the two approaches are complementary; each has advantages and disadvantages, but together they afford greater understanding than either can provide separately.

For the aggregate analysis, a sample of thirty-three incidents, 15 percent of the total number of cases examined, was selected for systematic and rigorous analysis of outcomes. For each of the incidents in the sample, the available literature, documents, and newspaper accounts were investigated so as to determine:

- U.S. objectives vis-à-vis each participant, and whether those objectives were satisfied within six months and retained over three years following the use of U.S. armed forces;
- the size, type, and activity of U.S. armed forces involved in the incident;
- the character of the targets in relation to U.S. objectives;
- other activities (for example, diplomatic) undertaken in support of U.S. objectives along with the use of the armed forces;
- certain U.S. domestic conditions.

In the analysis, the degree of satisfaction of U.S. objectives was related to each of these other factors with the aim of highlighting the crucial variables determining whether a political use of the armed forces was likely to be successful or not. Five specialists made detailed assessments of the specific mechanisms through which military operations affected the perceptions and decisions of foreign policymakers in ten case studies.³

What have been the results of discrete U.S. political-military operations? Are the prospects for success in such ventures good enough that policymakers should consider the armed forces an important option in these situations? Or should they view use of the military with great caution, since this type of activity often fails to meet its objectives and sometimes backfires? More to the point, under what circumstances are discrete uses of the armed forces for political objectives more likely to succeed, and when are they more likely to fail?

THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE

The evidence supports the hypothesis that discrete uses of the armed forces are often an effective way of achieving short-term foreign policy objectives.

³ David Hall, William Quandt, Jerome Slater, Robert Slusser, and Philip Windsor.

The aggregate analyses show clearly that the outcomes of United States political-military activities were most often favorable from the perspective of U.S. decision makers—at least in the short term.

In a very large proportion of the incidents, however, this "success rate" eroded sharply over time. Thus, it would seem that, to the degree that they did influence events, discrete uses of military forces for political objectives served mainly to delay, rather than resolve, unwanted developments abroad. Though there is some value in "buying time"—that is, keeping a situation open and flexible enough to prevent an adverse fait accompli—it should be recognized that these military operations cannot substitute for more fundamental policies and actions that can form the basis either for sound and successful alliances or for stable adversary relations, such as diplomacy, close economic and cultural relations, an affinity of mutual interests and perceptions. What political-military operations perhaps can do is provide a respite, a means of postponing adverse developments long enough to formulate and implement new policies that may be sustained over the longer term. Or, if that is not possible, the political use of armed forces may serve to lessen the consequences of detrimental events. However, some of the case studies suggest that even these delaying and minimizing accomplishments do not always obtain.

In some cases the discrete use of force clearly has been ineffectual. For example, U.S. support for Pakistan during the 1971 war with India was a relatively empty gesture because the target actors recognized that under virtually no circumstances would the United States become militarily involved in the war. Consequently, the deployment of the *Enterprise* task force to the Indian Ocean had almost no effect on the decisions of either the immediate actors, India and Pakistan, or the actors indirectly involved, China and the Soviet Union.

In other cases, a discrete political application of the armed forces seems to have been associated with the creation of a situation that remained tolerable for a period of months or, in some cases, years. The intervention in Laos in 1962 was such an incident; the landing of U.S. Marines in Thailand coincided with the negotiation of a settlement that kept the peace in Laos for several years. U.S. actions to oust the Trujillo family from the Dominican Republic following Rafael Trujillo's assassination, and subsequent actions to support the new government, were of a similar character. These actions precipitated a more acceptable political situation in the Dominican Republic that persisted for several years, even though it ultimately foundered in 1965.

Was it worthwhile to use armed forces to obtain positive outcomes that could be sustained only temporarily, whether the duration was of several months or several years? We believe the answer is yes, insofar as an opportunity was gained for diplomacy.

When a positive outcome did not endure, it was usually attributable not to an absence of follow-up diplomatic effort, but to the fact that the internal situation within a state, or a specific interstate relationship, was strong and durable and thus not subject to penetration by either single or periodic

U.S. military actions or by the use of other U.S. policy instruments. Realizing that this was the situation in Vietnam in 1964-65, American policymakers chose war as the solution, which contrasts with U.S. policy in the late 1940s in China when Communist forces there triumphed and forced the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek to flee to Taiwan; or in the early 1960s over Cuba when Fidel Castro identified his regime with communism and the Soviet Union; or in the late 1960s against North Korea after the *Pueblo* was seized and a U.S. Navy EC-121 aircraft was shot down.

Finally, in some cases with very special circumstances, discrete political uses of the armed forces contributed to the establishment of new international relationships, such that U.S. interests were protected for decades. For example, following the 1946 visit to Turkey by the battleship *Missouri* and further displays of U.S. military support for Ankara, Soviet pressures on Turkey declined; they have not been renewed in a serious way since. Displays of American military support for Italy prior to the 1948 elections seem to have contributed, along with such other instruments of policy as economic aid and covert support for democratic political parties, to the defeat of the Italian Communist party. The dominance of the Christian Democratic party, which resulted from that election, persisted for more than two decades. Political uses of the armed forces during the Berlin crises of 1958-59 and 1961 helped create stable conditions in Central Europe that continue to exist.

The Effects of the Military Demonstration

What is the mechanism at work here? How do the armed forces play their special role? The process begins when a given framework of relations among several countries, or a domestic political configuration abroad, is disrupted by something unexpected or at least unwelcome: a domestic upheaval, a new departure in a major power's foreign policy, or perhaps an unexpected armed clash between the military units of hostile states. Regardless of cause, this development often creates uncertainties and a distinct psychological unease among interested parties; at other times it leads directly to an unraveling of the fabric of relations that previously had been established and maintained by existing policies. Under such circumstances (and mindful of the fact that even when favorable outcomes do occur they are likely to persist only over the short term), a discrete demonstration of U.S. military capability can have a stabilizing and otherwise beneficial effect, perhaps persuading the target that the wise course of action is to alter the undesirable policy.

The effect of the military demonstration will depend to a large extent on whether the target finds the threat credible. A prime example was the arrival of U.S. military forces off the coast of the Dominican Republic in November 1961, an event that changed the perceptions of the Trujillo family and their lieutenants as to the United States' willingness to act. Coupled as it was with a clear ultimatum, the action seems to have exerted a powerful influence.

Such a military demonstration may be particularly effective when the target state is not fully committed to the course from which the United States hopes to dissuade it. We will never know for sure, but U.S. actions in support of Yugoslavia following President Tito's break with Stalin may have lessened Stalin's inclination to take more aggressive measures against Yugoslavia. Moscow may also have been somewhat deterred from taking action against Rumania following the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. We will return to these distinctions. First, however, it is helpful to examine the mechanisms at work more closely.

In some of the cases studied, the insertion (even symbolically) of U.S. military forces may have provided leverage to U.S. decision makers where previously there had not been any. A U.S. military presence or operation may furnish an incentive to a foreign leader to consider the wishes of U.S. policy-makers. After U.S. Marines landed in Thailand in 1962, and the threat of a U.S. intervention in Laos became credible, for example, the United States may have gained a decided edge at the negotiating table. In such a case the prime result is to lessen the potential U.S. loss. Foreign decision makers may act to avoid those extreme choices that they fear would precipitate a violent U.S. response. Unless the United States is willing to extend its new military presence into a permanent operation, however, any such demonstrative action is likely to be successful, to the degree it is successful at all, only for a limited time.

The intervention in Lebanon in 1958 provides a pointed example of this phenomenon. Although President Eisenhower authorized the landing of U.S. Marines and other forces in Lebanon in July 1958, the president—or at least Secretary of State Dulles—recognized that an American-imposed solution in Lebanon would be unacceptable to most of the Lebanese actors and therefore short-lived. Thus the United States adopted a twofold approach. On the one hand, a massive demonstration of American military power was staged, involving the landing of thousands of American troops. On the other hand, Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy was dispatched to Lebanon, where, recognizing the political realities of the situation, he negotiated a settlement that was probably more favorable to the actors who opposed U.S. policy than to the presumed American client, President Camille Chamoun. In other words, to the degree that it did influence the situation, the U.S. military demonstration seems to have bought sufficient time to reach new political arrangements that more realistically reflected the distribution of power among competing ethnic and political groups in Lebanon. Without the more realistic political solution negotiated by Murphy, the 1958 U.S. intervention in Lebanon would probably have been associated with a much less favorable outcome. At the same time, without the leverage provided by the U.S. military presence in Lebanon, with its implied threat of greater violence, Murphy might well have failed in his attempt to negotiate a political solution.

Military demonstrations also can ease domestic political pressures on the president from groups demanding more forceful action. In less serious incidents,

these pressures—which can originate from ethnic groups, the Congress, friends and political associates of the decision makers, and executive branch uniformed and civilian officials, among others—are directed at lower-ranking foreign policy managers. Insofar as they can help to stabilize a situation, thereby postponing perceived adverse consequences of unexpected changes in international relations or the internal politics of foreign nations, discrete uses of the armed forces may diminish calls for more decisive action. The postponement provides the time needed to gather support within the bureaucracy and in the Congress and the public for the fundamental changes in policy required to accommodate developments. In the absence of the time bought by the military demonstration, these fundamental changes in policy may be more difficult to bring about, and the president might fear that his constituencies, both at home and abroad, will see him as bowing to foreign pressures.

This phenomenon was also demonstrated pointedly by the intervention in Lebanon in 1958. During the spring of 1958, President Eisenhower resisted several requests from President Chamoun for American military assistance. An unexpected event—the coup in Iraq in July—made it impossible to avoid the request any longer. Eisenhower feared that further inaction, after the seeming wholesale defeat of American clients in the Middle East, would have negative effects both on the perceptions of decision makers in foreign nations and on domestic opinion in this nation. American support for the realistic solution to the Lebanese problem negotiated by Murphy might have been difficult to muster without the symbolism of American strength suggested by the military intervention. In the absence of the intervention, President Eisenhower may have feared the effects of such an apparent concession on opinion both at home and abroad.

Similarly, following American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker negotiated an agreement in which it was all but explicit that the president elected the following year would be either Joaquin Balaguer or Juan Bosch. Balaguer was the last president during the Trujillo era, and a person the United States took pains to keep out of the Dominican Republic in later years; Bosch was strongly disliked by many American officials and suspected of tendencies that might allow an eventual takeover by the extreme left. The emplacement of U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic thus not only made an election there possible, it also made it possible for the United States to accept results of that election which it previously could not have tolerated.

None of this is meant to imply that the gains seemingly associated with discrete uses of the armed forces for political objectives have been fraudulent. The amelioration of pressures for extreme actions is an important benefit, as is the provision of time necessary to build a consensus for a new U.S. policy; so too is the provision of leverage to negotiators.

CORRELATES OF SUCCESS

Four groups of factors have been associated with the relative success or failure of political uses of the U.S. armed forces: the type of objective; involvement by the Soviet Union; the context of the incident; and the nature and activity of the U.S. military forces involved. (Unless noted otherwise, these conclusions refer mainly to short-term outcomes.)

U.S. Objectives

The nature of U.S. objectives may be an important determinant of whether a political use of force is successful. Favorable outcomes occurred most often when the objective of U.S. policymakers was to maintain the authority of a specific regime abroad. Such was the case, for example, when naval movements and other activities were undertaken in support of King Hussein during the 1970 civil war in Jordan. Indeed, the aggregate analyses suggest that maintenance of regime authority was the one type of objective associated with the persistence of a favorable outcome over the longer term. The armed forces were least often associated with favorable outcomes when the objectives concerned the provision of support by actors to third parties—for example, the many incidents in which U.S. military activities were undertaken in order to persuade the Soviet Union to cease supporting hostile political initiatives by its allies or clients.

Between these two extremes there were a reasonable number of favorable outcomes when discrete political uses of the armed forces were undertaken to offset the use of force by another actor. Over the longer term, however, frequencies of favorable outcomes were low when discrete political uses of the military were aimed at either the use of force by another actor or another actor's support of a third nation's use of force. Illustrative are the futile attempts during the late 1950s and early 1960s to convince the Pathet Lao and Viet Cong to terminate their insurgencies in Laos and South Vietnam.

Perhaps more significant, the mode in which the armed forces are used as a political instrument may also be an important determinant of success. It is evident from the aggregate analyses that discrete uses of the armed forces for political purposes were more often associated with favorable outcomes when the U.S. objective was to reinforce, rather than modify, the behavior of a target state. This stands to reason. Nikita Khrushchev, no doubt, found it much easier not to follow through on the various threats he made concerning Europe and the Middle East than he did to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba; just as deterring the outbreak of violence is usually an easier task than bringing violence to a satisfactory conclusion.

Human behavior is difficult to change. Individuals tend to be more aware

of the risks of change than they are of the dangers of continuing their prevailing course. After all, established policies are known entities; even when the risks in continuing established policies are evident, the dangers of change will often appear more threatening. More to the point, no one—least of all the head of a nation—can afford to be told publicly what he should be doing. Thus, national leaders will resist demands for policy modifications most strenuously when such demands are made publicly, which is usually unavoidable when military power is used.

In short, whether a discrete application of military power was made in order to coerce a hostile target state to change its behavior or to encourage a friendly target state to change its behavior, the outcomes were similar; most often they were unfavorable from the U.S. perspective. On the other hand, when U.S. policymakers used the armed forces to coerce a hostile target state to continue to do something (for example, stay at peace), or to encourage a friendly state to remain on the same course, military demonstrations were relatively more often associated with favorable outcomes.

Consider, for example, the starkly different outcomes of the Berlin crisis of 1958–59 and 1961 and the several incidents in Southeast Asia in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the former situation the United States sought essentially to assure allies and to deter certain threatened actions by the USSR and East Germany. Both types of objectives required only that the targets not change their behavior, and both were achieved. Not so favorable, especially over the longer term, were the outcomes of the Southeast Asian incidents, in which the United States sought to compel various Communist actors to stop using force and to induce the government of South Vietnam to behave differently (that is, more assertively). Here both types of objectives required a change of behavior on the part of target states, and only rarely were these outcomes achieved.

To some extent this conclusion may reflect Tolstoy's view that the only decisions that are carried out are those corresponding to what would have happened if the decisions had not been made. In many of the incidents, although U.S. decision makers may have thought—or feared—that a target state was prepared or intending to change its behavior, and thus used the armed forces to reinforce existing behavior, the target state actually may have had no such intention. A good example is the U.S. military activity that followed the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, consisting primarily of increases in the readiness for war of U.S. forces in Europe. One objective of that action was to deter a Soviet invasion of Rumania. No invasion occurred; hence the military demonstration appears to have been effective. The question, however, is whether Soviet leaders ever seriously contemplated such an invasion. The same may be said about the Soviet Union not taking violent action against President Tito and Yugoslavia almost two decades earlier. This is not necessarily to discount the importance of the U.S. military activity. U.S. policymakers had other important objectives in mind as well. Still, the proportion of favorable "reinforcement" outcomes that are accounted for by the "unreality" of the feared

target state behavior may be high. Unfortunately, that proportion is impossible to determine empirically.

Political uses of the armed forces were often associated with favorable outcomes when U.S. objectives were at least loosely consistent with prior U.S. policies. The purpose of discrete political uses of force must fit within a fundamental framework of expectations held by decision makers both in this country and abroad if the military activity is to be associated with a favorable outcome. With regard to the incidents in the sample, although prior diplomacy was closely associated with positive outcomes, diplomacy during the course of the incidents themselves was not.

When a treaty exists, or when policymakers have taken pains to make clear that the United States perceives itself to have a commitment, antagonists are less likely to probe, or to probe only within narrower limits than would have been the case otherwise, and to leave themselves a way open for retreat. In other words, antagonists may be less likely to try to present the United States with a *fait accompli* that could be reversed only through a major use of the armed forces. Prior diplomacy may have reinforced the antagonists' continued performance of desired behavior, and thus lessened the significance of a breakdown in relations or the severity of a crisis. Rather than have to cope with hostile actions, policymakers in these cases might have only had to respond to hostile rhetoric; alternatively, the degree of desired behavior modification of foreign decision makers might have been less.

Hence, although China initiated the 1958 Offshore Islands crisis by shelling Quemoy and Matsu, and Khrushchev threatened Berlin on several occasions, both Peking and Moscow carefully controlled their behavior during these incidents because they perceived a prior U.S. commitment (or at least feared the strength of announced U.S. commitments). In the absence of a prior U.S. commitment, as in Korea in 1950, we might surmise that not only would China and the USSR have gone further in their initial actions, but also that sudden U.S. diplomatic action, even if supported by a discrete political use of force, might have had a lesser effect. Skilled diplomacy during incidents—for example, by Robert Murphy in Lebanon, Averell Harriman in Laos, and Ellsworth Bunker in the Dominican Republic—has typically borne fruit only after ambiguous U.S. military commitments have been clarified by the movement of major military units. Thus, the United States should not count on skilled diplomacy as being effective in controlling crises in the absence of prior commitments and reinforcing uses of the armed forces; it should, however, aim to avoid such difficult tests in the first place by being quite clear as to what its commitments are.

Similarly, the aggregate analyses suggest that prior U.S. military engagement in conflicts in a region was often associated with favorable outcomes when subsequent demonstrative uses of military force took place. The fact that the United States previously had been willing to engage in violence in the region may have made the threats or assurances implied by the subsequent military

activity more credible. Much less often associated with favorable outcomes were previous demonstrative uses of force in the region; the willingness to engage in violence seems to have been the key. Previous discrete political uses of force were associated with favorable outcomes more often, however, when the U.S. objective was to assure that a target state would continue to do something. Good examples are provided by U.S. naval demonstrations in the Mediterranean. U.S. military forces have not fought in that region since 1945, yet as concerns the assurance of Israel (and less frequently, Jordan), these displays of naval power were often associated with favorable outcomes. U.S. objectives in situations were far less often attained, however, when the political use of force was meant to modify the behavior of Israel's (or Jordan's) enemies.

In short, prior demonstrative uses of force or even prior military engagements did not seem to be sufficient to compensate for the previously noted difficulty of modifying a target state's behavior. Indeed, very little seemed to compensate for the difficulty of modifying behavior; more than any other factor this was the basic determinant of when a discrete political use of force would or would not be associated with the attainment of foreign policy objectives. It overshadowed the diplomacy that accompanied the military activity, the nature of the situation, and the timing, size, composition, and activity of the military units themselves.

Soviet Activity

A second group of factors that seemed to be associated with favorable outcomes in the aggregate analyses included the character of United States-Soviet relations and the specific role played by the Soviet Union in an incident.

One conclusion that runs counter to prevailing views concerns the possible effects of the United States-Soviet strategic nuclear balance on the relative fortunes of the superpowers. We did not find that the United States was less often successful as the Soviet Union closed the U.S. lead in strategic nuclear weapons that had been maintained for the first twenty or so years following World War II. Whether discrete political uses of U.S. armed forces were associated with positive outcomes seems to have been independent of relative United States-Soviet aggregate strategic capabilities. Of course, the United States may have engaged less often in these incidents since the late 1960s precisely because it understood that its chances of success were smaller; as the USSR closed the nuclear gap, the United States may have chosen to participate in incidents more selectively, choosing only those cases in which its chances of success were greatest.

Since this study was not designed to test the effects of the strategic balance, the findings in this regard are clearly tentative. Still, both the aggregate analyses and the case studies provide little support for the notion that decisions during crises are strongly influenced by aggregate strategic capabilities. Studies of Lebanon and Jordan, for example, indicate that, to the extent

that evaluations of the military balance played any role, decision makers in the United States and Soviet Union, as well as those in the nations directly involved, were more concerned with the local balance of conventional power. More to the point, most local actors in these incidents seem to have had only a rudimentary and impressionistic sense of relative military capabilities in general.

Soviet political and/or military involvement in the incident itself, on the other hand, was clearly associated with the frequency of outcomes favorable to the United States, which were less often favorable when the Soviet Union was involved, particularly when the Soviet Union threatened to employ, or actually employed, its own armed forces in the incident. The seemingly pernicious effect of Soviet involvement was tempered at times when broader United States-Soviet relations had been improving, and outcomes were more often favorable when overall United States-Soviet relations were characterized by greater cooperation. As in the previous finding, this conclusion is stronger when just those incidents in which the Soviet Union participated were considered, and stronger still when just those incidents were considered in which Soviet military forces were involved.

Nature of the Situation

Outcomes were favorable more frequently when discrete political uses of force were directed at intranational, as contrasted to international, situations. We are not confident about this finding, however, because two other factors that are also closely associated with favorable outcomes are highly correlated with intranational situations: lesser amounts of force tend to be used in intranational situations; and the U.S. objective in these situations is more often reinforcement, not modification, of behavior.

In the international situations, a positive outcome was most likely if the United States was involved from the very onset of a conflict. This finding complements the previous finding concerning the need for the U.S. objective and the specific use of force to be consistent with the prior framework of relations between the United States and the nations involved in the incident. In those situations in which the United States was involved initially, such as the Berlin crises of 1958-59 and 1961, U.S. statements of aims and objectives were more likely to be considered seriously. Similarly, U.S. threats or promises implied by the use of armed forces were more likely to be perceived as credible. In international situations where the United States intervened in affairs that did not concern it directly (or at least not initially), however, there seems to have been some question in the minds of the other actors whether U.S. threats or promises were credible. Consider the perceptions of Hanoi in the late 1950s and early 1960s and those of the Gandhi government in India during the crisis and then war with Pakistan in 1971, for example. The U.S. military demonstrations then were not taken too seriously at first. Why, North

Vietnamese and Indian leaders might have asked, would the United States become involved militarily? Such questions were less likely to be raised in those situations in which U.S. interests were directly and obviously threatened.

Boding ill for the future, the proportion of incidents involving hostility between states appears to be increasing, while there is a decline in situations of an intrastate nature. Less and less is the United States being called upon by governments for support against internal dissidents; rather, the trend is toward being asked by one state for support against another. Insofar as such a shift is discernible, the risks of involvement to the United States, especially in a situation of violence, can only increase. The shift away from an intrastate focus means that the instruments brought to bear by regional actors will often be more powerful, both diplomatically and militarily. Allies usually act more overtly when they are supporting a state rather than a subnational group; hence, the facing-off of states is more likely to occasion the facing-off of alliances, whether formal or otherwise. Most important, the likelihood of superpower confrontation is increased.

States, unlike subnational groups, also have air forces, navies, and heavily armed ground forces. Thus the level of violence that can be threatened in a crisis or manifested in a conflict is much greater. For a threat by U.S. policymakers to be credible in these circumstances, large and technologically sophisticated forces must be available. Should these forces be committed in a conflict, they might have to be used in strength and be prepared to take significant casualties. The danger that U.S. action of this sort might stimulate a Soviet military response is obvious.

Size, Activity, and Type of U.S. Military Forces

The firmer the commitment implied by the military operation, the more often the outcome of the situation was favorable to the United States. Forces actually emplaced on foreign soil were more frequently associated with positive outcomes than were deployments of naval forces, which can be withdrawn almost as easily as they can be moved toward the disturbed area. The movement of land-based forces, on the other hand, involves both real economic costs and a certain psychological commitment that are difficult to reverse, at least in the short term. This is an interesting finding, not so much because of its novelty—after all, it only confirms the common perception—but because its implications run counter to common U.S. practice. The navy has been the preeminent military force in discrete political operations. Naval forces participated in more than 80 percent of the incidents; and reliance on the Navy was the case regardless of region, time period, type of situation, and whether or not the Soviet Union participated in the incident.

Naval forces can be used more subtly to support foreign policy initiatives—to underscore threats, warnings, promises, or commitments—than can land-based units, and they can do so without inalterably tying the president's hands.

But it is precisely this last fact that probably diminishes the effectiveness of naval forces in a political role. Foreign decision makers also recognize that warships can be withdrawn as easily as they can enter a region of tension and, hence, that the commitment they imply is not so firm as that implied by land-based units.

Positive outcomes were particularly frequent when land-based combat aircraft were involved in an incident. This would suggest, particularly in view of the much greater mobility of modern land-based tactical air units, that the air force might be used more frequently in political-military operations than has been the case in the past.

Such a shift in U.S. practice would not be without its costs, because the use of land-based forces is perceived by foreign decision makers as greater evidence of commitment. If the U.S. objective is not so certain, if all that is desired is to take an action that signifies interest and concern but leaves room for maneuver—such as U.S. naval deployments during the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974—then the use of land-based forces would not be advisable. Moreover, in situations in which a military move is intended as a bluff or to screen a political defeat—as seems the case in the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971—the use of land-based air forces would not be advisable. In all these types of situations, naval forces would provide greater flexibility to decision makers and thus would be more appropriate even if their probability of succeeding may be less.

There are other ways to enhance the effectiveness of the armed forces. Outcomes were more often favorable when the units involved actually did something, instead of merely emphasizing their potential capability to intervene—for example, by reducing the time delay between a decision to intervene and the actual operation by moving toward the scene of the incident or by increasing their state of alert. The involvement of the military unit in a specific operation, such as mine-laying, or mine-clearing, or patrolling—and certainly when the actual exercise of firepower was involved—seems to have indicated a more serious intent on the United States' part. The movement of the force toward the region of concern by itself could be an ambiguous signal; it might not be clear to foreign decision makers what the United States had in mind, or the movement might pass unobserved. A more specific action, one that gave a clearer signal, thus was more often associated with favorable outcomes.

Positive outcomes were also more likely when the forces involved included strategic nuclear forces. Foreign decision makers seem to have perceived the use of strategic nuclear forces—whether or not it was accompanied by a specific threat to use nuclear weapons—as an important signal that the United States perceived the situation in a most serious way. Thus, the employment of nuclear-associated forces, such as Strategic Air Command aircraft or Sixth Fleet carriers when they were central to U.S. plans for nuclear war, served the same purpose as the involvement of military units in a specific activity or the use of ground forces as compared to naval forces: they bolstered U.S. credibility.

The risks of such a policy should be evident. There is no guarantee that any military demonstration will be successful. When nuclear weapons are involved, and the demonstration is not successful, the result could be disastrous; U.S. policymakers may be faced with the choice of admitting the emptiness of the nuclear threat, and thus undermining the credibility of fundamental U.S. commitments, or actually employing nuclear weapons.

Moreover, it may be that positive outcomes have more often occurred when nuclear forces were involved simply because these weapons have been used infrequently. The more U.S. decision makers turn to nuclear forces, even demonstratively, to ensure the credibility of signals in incidents such as we have described, the more quickly the special message now associated with nuclear weapons might erode. Eventually the movement of nuclear forces would not receive much more attention and would not convey any more credibility than movements of conventional forces.

A LAST WORD

The discrete use of the armed forces for political objectives should not be an option that decision makers turn to frequently or quickly to secure political objectives abroad; it should be used only in very special circumstances. We have found that over the longer term such uses of the armed forces were not often associated with positive outcomes. Decision makers thus should not expect them to serve as substitutes for broader and more fundamental policies tailored to the realities of politics abroad, and incorporating diplomacy and the many other potential instruments available to U.S. foreign policy.

Moreover, there are dangers in using the armed forces as a discrete political instrument. Symbolic low-level uses of force may be disregarded by antagonists or friends in a situation in which U.S. policymakers have not seriously contemplated the need for, or the consequences of, using larger forces in a more manifest way. Foreign decision makers may not perceive important U.S. interests to be involved; the initial U.S. military action may be seen as symbolic of U.S. interest but not of a commitment; foreign decision makers may calculate that they will be able to cope successfully with the forces that they expect the United States to bring to bear; or, when an actor feels its very existence is at stake, the calculus may not matter at all. In all these situations there is a risk that lesser military actions may lead to pressures for greater U.S. involvement.

Case studies bear this out: The Castro regime did not yield at the Bay of Pigs; Hanoi and the Viet Cong were not swayed in the early 1960s; and India dismembered Pakistan in 1971. In each case, either the United States suffered humiliation or the fear of exposure embarrassed decision makers into escalation and war.

Still, in particular circumstances, discrete political uses of the armed forces

often were associated—at least in the short term—with the securing of U.S. objectives or the stabilization of adverse situations while more fundamental policies could be formulated. Thus, at times, and although decision makers should view this option with some caution, the discrete use of the armed forces for political objectives seems to have been a useful step in shoring up situations enough to avoid dramatic setbacks, to mitigate domestic and international pressures for more forceful and perhaps counterproductive actions, and to gain time for sounder policies to be formulated and implemented.

To reach this conclusion about the apparent effectiveness of the armed forces as a political instrument is not to reach any judgment about the wisdom of using the armed forces for these purposes. That is a more difficult question, which can only be answered in the context of the specific choices—and the various costs and benefits associated with each choice—facing decision makers at that time.*

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The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's: International Law, Unilateral Policy, or Atavistic Anachronism?

by David D. Carto*

With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected. . . . The political system of the [European] powers is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . [W]e should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

President James Monroe - December 2, 1823¹

On this side of the Atlantic we must stand together for the integrity of our hemisphere for the inviolability of its nations, for its defense against imported terrorism, and the right of all our citizens to be free from the provocations triggered from outside our sphere for malevolent purposes.

President Ronald Reagan - March 11, 1981²

In the century and a half since the Monroe Doctrine was first pronounced, it has been maligned, misinterpreted, and misunderstood as often as it has been invoked. If its viability today were to be measured by the number of times U.S. policy-makers had invoked it by name in the last 20 years, the Monroe Doctrine would certainly be declared dead. The simple reason for the reluctance of those sensitive to Latin American sensibilities to mention the Monroe Doctrine is that history has cast an unfavorable light on it from a Latin American point of view. One writer has observed that while the United States has historically perceived the Doctrine of 1823 as a safeguard against European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, to Latin Americans "the Monroe Doctrine is a hypocritical statement calculated to conceal the intent of subjugation, which to them has characterized the attitude of the United States in the past."³

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¹ Annual Message to Congress, AM. STATE PAPERS, 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS 250 (Dec. 2, 1823), reprinted in 6 J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1906) [hereinafter cited as Monroe Message].

² Address Before a Joint Session of the Canadian Parliament (Mar. 11, 1981), 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 276, 282 (Mar. 16, 1981).

³ Sarabia, *United States Relations with Latin America*, 51 A.B.A. J. 337, 338-39 (1965). William F. Buckley observed recently that until its "relegitimization" by President Reagan in El Salvador, "the Monroe Doctrine had become, since the October, 1962, Cuban missile crisis, a fugitive term, used only with some embarrassment by historians required to teach atavistic United States diplomacy." Buckley, *Remember the Monroe Doctrine?*, *Newday* (L.I.), Mar. 14, 1981, at 17, col. 4.

Despite the conflicting perceptions induced by the rare mention of the Monroe Doctrine, its principles and reasons for existence have survived into the 1980's. Far from being an atavistic anachronism, the Doctrine is still a basic thread in U.S. foreign policy as a unilateral safeguard of American interests in Latin America. In addition, as concluded by two highly respected Latin American scholars over a decade ago,⁴ the Doctrine has, to a more limited extent, remained the multilateral policy of the Organization of American States (OAS). Moreover, as this note will illustrate, the principles of 1823 have found their way into the framework of international law in the Western Hemisphere. Since the Monroe Doctrine is itself neither a treaty nor a contract between the United States and other nations, its meaning as a principle in international relations is derived largely from its historical origins, interpretations, and applications. Knowledge of the historical background of the Doctrine is therefore essential to understanding its political and legal significance in modern international relations.⁵

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE

A. *Monroe's Proclamation*

The Monroe Doctrine was announced by President James Monroe in a message to Congress on December 2, 1823.⁶ It was actually stated in two separate passages in the message, each passage declaring a distinct principle in different contexts. These principles are commonly known as the "non-colonization principle" and the "non-intervention principle."⁷

The pronouncement of the non-colonization principle arose in the immediate context of the border controversy surrounding the Oregon Territory in 1823 and was directed against the colonial claims of Tsarist Russia in that region.⁸ But President Monroe asserted a broader principle against further colonization in the entire hemisphere, declaring:

[T]he occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the right and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as

⁴ Thomas & Thomas, *The Organization of American States and the Monroe Doctrine—Legal Implications*, 30 LA. L. REV. 541, 580-81 (1970).

⁵ By far the best historical treatment of the Doctrine is found in D. PERKINS, *A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE* (rev. ed. 1963). See also J. MECHAM, *A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS* 54-62 (1965); *THE MONROE DOCTRINE* (A. Rappaport ed. 1964); Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 542-77.

⁶ Monroe Message, *supra* note 1, at 245.

⁷ Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 542.

⁸ D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 29-31.

subjects for future colonization by any European powers.*

The non-intervention principle was specifically aimed at the broader threat posed by the reactionary Holy Alliance of European autocrats and those powers' attempts to stamp out revolution in Europe and elsewhere. To Monroe and his advisors in late 1823, it appeared that the European allies were contemplating the reconquest of the infant republics of Latin America which had recently broken the Spanish and Portuguese colonial grip. Although there is much historical doubt that the threat from the Holy Alliance was real at the time of Monroe's pronouncement,¹⁰ the President made clear the American attitude to any threats from Europe, real or imagined:

Of events in [Europe], with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. . . . In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected. . . . The political system of the allied powers is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.¹¹

In short, the non-intervention principle laid down two basic precepts of U.S. foreign policy—that the United States would not interfere in the affairs of Europe (except when “our rights are invaded or seriously menaced”), and that Europe should not interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. These precepts, supplemented by the non-colonization principle, came to be known, and later reinterpreted and expanded, as the

* Monroe Message, *supra* note 7, at 246. As is clear from the language, the non-colonization principle did not apply to colonies, such as British Honduras (modern Belize), which had not been liberated at the time of the pronouncement.

¹⁰ See O. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 54, 60.

¹¹ Monroe Message, *supra* note 1, at 250.

Monroe Doctrine.¹³

The principles of 1823 were a manifestation, and a strengthening, of a popular stream of political thought in the United States dubbed by historians as the "doctrine of the two spheres."¹⁴ The idea that the nations of the Western Hemisphere—the "New World"—are "essentially different" politically¹⁵ and economically¹⁶ from the nations of Europe—the "Old World"—is a concept that has endured since 1823. It is true, of course, that the separation of the Americas from Europe in 1823 was much wider in many respects than it is today. But the perception of common hemispheric interests among the American nations, while strained at times, is certainly not a myth and is today recognized in international law as well as United States foreign policy.¹⁷ As a policy based on the doctrine of the two spheres, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine has direct relevance to American regionalism as a force in international political and legal relations.

B. Unilateral Application

For the first century of its existence, the Monroe Doctrine was the unilateral policy of the United States. As such, it was enforced and interpreted only when the United States saw fit to apply it, and then only when the United States had the power to do so. It was pressure applied by the United States based on the Monroe Doctrine which led to the ouster of the French puppet Maximilian from Mexico in 1866, but only

¹³ Prior to 1853, Monroe's message was referred to as the "principles" or "declaration" of President Monroe, and not until 1853 did the name "Monroe Doctrine" come into vogue. J. MECHAM, *supra* note 5, at 55 n.2.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 54; D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 315.

¹⁵ Monroe Message, *supra* note 1, at 250.

¹⁶ The non-colonization principle, largely the product of then-Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, had an economic as well as a political basis. The return of European colonialism to the newly-opened Latin American markets was an unthinkable state of affairs to Adams and American mercantile and shipping interests, and Monroe's pronouncement against further colonization was a direct response to their apprehensions. See D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 30.

¹⁷ The OAS is the modern institutional manifestation of the American hemispheric concept and is the type of "regional agency" contemplated under Articles 52-54 of the Charter of the United Nations. See P. COZZETT, *THE GROWTH OF WORLD LAW* 117 n.1 (1971). The pursuit of a single policy toward "Latin America" as a whole, however, has been seriously questioned considering the great diversity of interests, needs, and conditions between the separate nations and regions of Central and South America. See *Latin America: Hearings on Major Trends and Issues in the United States Relations with the Nations of Latin America and the Caribbean Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23* (1978) (statement of Thomas E. Skidmore) [hereinafter cited as *Hearings on Latin America*]; but cf. *id.* at 131 (statement of Abraham Katz).

after the American Civil War had ended was it able to do so.¹⁷

As the United States emerged as a world power in the years prior to World War I, the Monroe Doctrine was expanded and reinterpreted to justify the assertion of U.S. power in Latin America. In 1870 President Grant, in a vain attempt to annex Santo Domingo, added the so-called "no-transfer" corollary to the Doctrine. He stated that "hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject to transfer to a European power."¹⁸ By the close of the century, the Monroe Doctrine had been invoked, for a time unsuccessfully, to protect American interests in the building of a transisthmian canal.¹⁹ To the no-transfer corollary and the desire for an American-controlled canal was added the idea that in disputes between European powers and delinquent Latin American nations, the United States would step in to prevent the use of armed force against the delinquent nation—all in the name of the Monroe Doctrine.

The invocation of the Monroe Doctrine to justify the United States role as the universal arbitrator in European disputes with American nations was done largely to protect U.S. economic, strategic, and political interests in Latin America.²⁰ The Doctrine was a leading consideration in the minds of Washington policy-makers when President Cleveland intervened against Great Britain in the Venezuelan boundary dispute in December 1895.²¹ The intervention in that instance was done in the name of arbitration, but not necessarily according to any binding principle of international law. The unilateral and selective character of U.S. interpositions in Latin American affairs—all in the name of the Monroe Doctrine when European powers were involved—was revealed by the fact that the United States refused to take action to prevent recurrent chastisement and punitive measures taken against such countries as Haiti and Nicaragua by nearly all the colonial powers.²²

Whether or not it is today, the Monroe Doctrine at the end of the 19th century could not in any way be called international law. When acknowledged by other nations at all, it was reluctantly recognized only as the unilateral policy of the United States. And the ways in which the Doctrine was expressed by the United States did nothing to dispell Latin American resentment of their northern neighbor's superior attitude. Sec-

¹⁷ D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 137-38.

¹⁸ *Id.* at 158-59. Although not included in the original Doctrine, the no-transfer principle antedated it by virtue of the passage in Congress in 1811 of a No-Transfer Resolution to forestall British occupation of the Floridas. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, *THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES* 24 n.52 (1963).

¹⁹ D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 161-68.

²⁰ See LaFeber, *The Background of Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy: A Reinterpretation*, 66 AM. HIST. REV. 947 (1961).

²¹ *Id.* at 947-48; D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 173-76.

²² D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 170; LaFeber, *supra* note 20, at 957.

retary of State Richard Olney, who appreciated the Monroe Doctrine for its "practical benefits,"²³ explained the justification for its exercise by stating:

Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.²⁴

Despite the refusal of the European powers to recognize the Doctrine as international law, it is clear from the Olney Fiat and President Cleveland's message to Congress in 1895 that the United States regarded it as such.²⁵ Scholars may differ as to the actual motivations for United States actions in 1895,²⁶ but Latin Americans who may have resented U.S. pretensions were also jubilantly grateful to the United States for the role it had assumed.²⁷ The United States invocation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuelan controversy was an important step in the Doctrine's evolution, if only because Europe and Latin America were made aware of its existence as a *force* in international relations.²⁸ But the full implications of the groundwork laid by the Olney Fiat soon became apparent to Latin Americans in the forms of the Roosevelt Corollary,²⁹ "dollar diplomacy,"³⁰ the Lodge Corollary,³¹ and Wilsonian interventionism.³² During

²³ LaFeber, *supra* note 20, at 948.

²⁴ 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 545-62 (1895). This statement, known as the "Olney Fiat," was part of a diplomatic instruction sent to Great Britain during the early stages of the Venezuelan controversy in 1895. See D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 175.

²⁵ In his message to Congress on December 17, 1895, announcing that the United States would step in as arbitrator in the Venezuelan dispute, President Cleveland declared the Monroe Doctrine to be recognized "in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected, and its just claims enforced." See 12 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 6087, 6089 (1897). The British eventually acquiesced to arbitration by the United States but it cannot be said that they "accepted" the Doctrine as international law at this time, although it may have been recognized as the legitimate policy of the United States. Cf. J. MECHAM, *supra* note 5, at 65. Nor was the Doctrine actually recognized or accepted as international law by Europe in the 1899 Hague Convention, despite the inclusion in that Convention of an American reservation to the effect that "nothing should be considered to require abandonment of the traditional attitude of the United States towards questions purely American." Quoted in D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 204. See *id.* at 205-206.

²⁶ D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 190; but see LaFeber, *supra* note 20, at 947, 967.

²⁷ D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 188-90; J. MECHAM, *supra* note 5, at 65.

²⁸ D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 190-91.

²⁹ In his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt stated: "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." 14 J. RICHARDSON, *supra* note 25, at 6923.

³⁰ The Monroe Doctrine was used by the Taft administration to justify governmental

the period 1905 to 1926 the United States repeatedly intervened, militarily and diplomatically, into the affairs of Latin American nations under the guise of the Monroe Doctrine and its new-found corollaries.

C. Multilateral Development

Yet even as the United States was unilaterally stretching the Monroe Doctrine to unrecognizable dimensions, the groundwork was being laid for its "multilateralization by continentalization"³³ and a return to the original principles of 1823. While the nations of Latin America had been unresponsive to President Wilson's proposal for a Pan American pact based on the fundamental tenets of the Monroe Doctrine,³⁴ the President was determined to make his concept an instrument of world peace. Wilson began the epic fight for the League of Nations in January 1917 with a trumpet call to the Monroe Doctrine:

[T]he people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named.³⁵

.....

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.³⁶

It is ironic to note that the same Monroe Doctrine which President Wilson proposed as the basis for international cooperation was one of the most potent weapons used by the isolationists who opposed U.S. partici-

promotion of private American financial aid to Latin America—thus the term "dollar diplomacy." J. MECHAM, *supra* note 5, at 70.

³³ The so-called Lodge Corollary was the extension of the Monroe Doctrine as applied by the U.S. Senate in preventing the sale of land on Magdalena Bay, Mexico, by an American company to a Japanese company. *Id.* at 70-71.

³⁴ During the Wilson administration, United States armed forces occupied Haiti, in 1915, and the Dominican Republic, in 1916. American troops remained in Haiti until 1934, and in the Dominican Republic until 1924. *Id.* at 71-72. See also A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS *supra* note 18, at 18.

³⁵ Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 544.

³⁶ J. MECHAM, *supra* note 5, at 73. "A startling aspect of the Pact was that it was intended to multilateralize the Monroe Doctrine." A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, *supra* note 18, at 18.

³⁷ The terms of peace proposed by President Wilson in his address included equality of rights, self-determination, freedom of the seas, and arms limitation. 17 J. RICHARDSON, *supra* note 25, at 8199-204.

³⁸ *Id.* at 8203.

pation in the League.³⁷ Indeed, it was the pressure of Wilson's opposition which resulted in Article 21 of the League Covenant, which provided that "nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."³⁸ "Regional understanding" or precept of international law, the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine in the League Covenant, became a Pyrrhic victory when the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

The hopeful spirit of Pan-Americanism which Wilson had raised in the name of the Monroe Doctrine in 1916 was finally resurrected with the renunciation of interventionism by the United States in 1933.³⁹ The adoption of the Good Neighbor policy by the United States and the continentalization of the Doctrine was preceded, however, by a reassessment of its principles by Under Secretary of State J. Reuben Clark in 1928.⁴⁰ The Clark Memorandum argued that the original principles of 1823 were based on the policy of "self-preservation," of self-defense, of the United States against *European* encroachments. The Monroe Doctrine could not therefore be used as justification for United States interventions in purely *inter-American* affairs, thus demanding the abandonment of the Roosevelt Corollary "however much it may be justified by the application of the doctrine of self-preservation."⁴¹ Self-defense may still justify United States intervention in Latin American affairs, but not self-defense in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. "So far as Latin America is concerned," concluded Mr. Clark, "the Doctrine is now, and always has been, not an instrument of violence and oppression, but an unbought, freely bestowed, and wholly effective guaranty of their freedom, independence, and territorial integrity against the imperialistic designs of Europe."⁴²

By returning to the original principles of self-defense which had given rise to the Monroe Doctrine's application against Europe, a radical change was effected in its scope and operation. Whereas the Doctrine had

³⁷ D. PERKINS, *supra* note 5, at 285-86.

³⁸ LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 21.

³⁹ See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933, art. 8, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881. The 1933 Convention was the beginning of the process of the Doctrine's continentalization and the adoption of a policy of non-intervention by the United States. See A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, *supra* note 18, at 22.

⁴⁰ J. R. CLARK, MEMORANDUM ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1930) [hereinafter cited as CLARK MEMORANDUM]. Although the Clark Memorandum became working policy from the time it was submitted in 1928, it did not become publicly known until 1930, when it was officially published. See J. MECHAM, *supra* note 5, at 75.

⁴¹ CLARK MEMORANDUM, *supra* note 40, at xiii-xxiv.

⁴² *Id.* at xxv. For an additional view that the Monroe Doctrine is based on the right of self-defense, either unilaterally or multilaterally on a Pan-American basis, see D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 209-10 (1958).

once been the unilateral policy of the United States based on the individual right of self-defense, by 1940 the Doctrine had become the multilateral policy of the Western Hemisphere based on the collective right of self-defense.⁴³ This was demonstrated most vividly with the onset of World War II and the adoption of the Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas by the American foreign ministers meeting in Havana in July 1940, which provided:

[A]ny attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which sign this declaration.⁴⁴

The Havana Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance was put to the test with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. But for the notable exceptions of Argentina and Chile, the signatories met their obligations by at least severing all relations with the Axis powers.⁴⁵ By the end of the war, however, even the recalcitrant Argentina fell into line by signing the Act of Chapultepec.⁴⁶ Adopted at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at Mexico City in 1945, the Act of Chapultepec expanded on the Havana Declaration by providing for collective sanctions, including the use of armed force, to be taken against any aggressor of an American state—even against an American aggressor.⁴⁷ The process of "Pan-Americanizing" the Monroe Doctrine did not culminate, however, until the terms of the Act of Chapultepec had been formalized by their inclusion in the permanent treaty signed by the American nations at Rio de Janeiro in 1947.⁴⁸

⁴³ D. BOWEN, *supra* note 42, at 210-11. At the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Habana on July 30, 1940, a Final Act was approved which included a resolution called the "Act of Habana concerning the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas." See 3 DEP'T STATE BULL. 127 (1940). A supplementary Convention reiterated the no-transfer principle on behalf of the collective right of self-defense of all the American republics. See 3 DEP'T STATE BULL. 145 (1940).

⁴⁴ *Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas*, reprinted in *THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES* 360-61 (J.B. Scott ed., Supp. 1933-1940). J. MECHAM, *supra* note 6, at 80, argues that the Havana Declaration did not mark the true continentalization of the Monroe Doctrine, since the signatories only agreed to consult in case of aggression by a non-American nation, and had not provided for any mutually-guaranteed sanctions.

⁴⁵ See A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, *supra* note 18, at 24-25.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 28-29.

⁴⁷ Act of Chapultepec, Mar. 8, 1945, res. VIII, 60 Stat. 1837, T.I.A.S. No. 1543.

⁴⁸ Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty].

II. MODERN STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE

A. The Legal Framework

The provisions of the Rio Treaty of 1947 serve as part of the legal framework by which the modern status of the Monroe Doctrine must be assessed. Since Article 3 considers an attack by any state against an American state to be an attack against them all,⁴⁰ it must be conceded that the Rio Treaty goes beyond the original Monroe Doctrine in its application.⁴¹ But the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio Treaty share a mutual basis in that both are grounded in the perception of a common hemispheric interest separate from the rest of the world. Moreover, both find their juridical support in the individual or collective right of self-defense, specifically recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.⁴² It is also important to note in this context that in the exercise of that inherent right, the parties to the Rio Treaty may act independently of the U.N. Security Council until the latter "has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."⁴³

The continentalized Monroe Doctrine, as reflected by the terms of the Rio Treaty, was incorporated into the institutional framework set up by the Charter of the Organization of American States, also known as the Charter of Bogota, in 1948.⁴⁴ Article 28 of the Charter provides for action by OAS member states in response to any "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America . . . in furtherance of the principles of

⁴⁰ *Id.* arts. 3, 6-7; see Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 547-48.

⁴¹ The Monroe Doctrine as originally stated had no application to wars between American states. See CLARK MEMORANDUM, *supra* note 40, at 186; but cf. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, *supra* note 18, at 356-57, where it is argued that the Rio Treaty's application to inter-American aggression represents a new corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, similar to the Roosevelt Corollary, which would allow "collective American counter-intervention in the affairs of an American state to remove a certain type of non-American interventionism" (i.e., communism).

⁴² U.N. CHARTER art. 51, para. 3; see Rio Treaty, *supra* note 48, art. 3, para. 1.

⁴³ Rio Treaty, *supra* note 48, arts. 2, 3, para. 4. The parties are required, however, to send the Security Council "complete information" regarding any actions taken or contemplated in the exercise of the right of self-defense. *Id.* art. 5. But see P. COHEN, *supra* note 16, at 145: "It was . . . to be expected, especially in the exercise of peace-keeping functions, that disputes would occur about the division of competence between [the United Nations and regional organizations]. These have been particularly sharp in the relations between the Organization of American States and the United Nations."

⁴⁴ Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2381, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter cited as OAS Charter]. Article 27 of the Charter provides that: "Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States."

continental solidarity or collective self-defense. . . ."⁶⁴ It is worth to recall at this point that the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 was directed in part against the reimposition of European absolutism in the Western Hemisphere. Its justification was, as noted above, the "doctrine of the two spheres" coupled with the idea that every American nation has the inherent right of political self-determination. Any extracontinental threat to the rights of self-determination of an American state, therefore, falls within the purview of the Monroe Doctrine. The "political independence" of any American state is expressly protected from intracontinental as well as extracontinental aggression by Articles 27 and 28 of the OAS Charter.⁶⁵ At least as applied to extracontinental threats to the internal political structure of an American state, therefore, the principles of 1823 would seem to be clearly expressed in the collective security provisions of the OAS Charter.

The signing of the Rio Treaty and the formation of the OAS completed the international legal framework upon which the multilateralized Monroe Doctrine is based today. The authority of the OAS to act as a regional agency under Article 52 of the U.N. Charter⁶⁶ has been accepted from the beginning by the United Nations.⁶⁷ Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides legal justification for the exercise by a regional agency of the right of individual and collective self-defense.⁶⁸ As we have seen, it is the right of self-defense upon which the Monroe Doctrine, the Rio Treaty, and the OAS are all based in part. In their continentalized form, therefore, the principles of 1823 have the sanction of international law.

B. *The Monroe Doctrine in the Cold War*

Just as the Doctrine in 1823 underwent expansion and permutation in the century following its pronouncement, so has the continentalized Doctrine as expressed in the collective security provisions of the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter undergone revision and broad interpretation. With the onset of the Cold War, a new threat was presented to the Western Hemisphere which the Monroe Doctrine in its multilateralized form was theoretically equipped to handle: the threat of Soviet-inspired Communism. Following the lead of the United States in the early 1950's, the American nations adopted a firm attitude against what was perceived as an international communist movement attempting to infiltrate the gov-

⁶⁴ *Id.* art. 28.

⁶⁵ *Id.* arts. 27, 28.

⁶⁶ *Id.* art. 1 expressly defines the OAS as a regional agency within the United Nations.

⁶⁷ Akehurst, *Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, With Special Reference to the Organization of American States*, 42 *Burr. Y.B. Int'l L.* 175, 178-79 (1967).

⁶⁸ Fenwick, *The Organization of American States: The Transition from an Unwritten to a Written Constitution*, 59 *Am. J. Int'l L.* 315, 317 (1965).

ernments of the Western Hemisphere.⁵⁰ This attitude was formally expressed by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in 1953, which adopted a resolution revealingly entitled the "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism."⁵¹ This resolution declared:

[t]hat the domination or control of the political institutions of any American state by the international communist movement, *extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power*, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American states, endangering the peace of America. . . .⁵² [Emphasis added].

The declaration above was based on a perception, mainly on the part of United States policy-makers, very similar to that of Monroe and his advisers in 1823—that some forms of totalitarianism (i.e., monarchical absolutism or communism) could not be an indigenous phenomenon in Latin America.⁵³ By branding communism as an *extracontinental* threat whenever it appeared in an American state, the Monroe Doctrine and the collective security provisions of the American regional agreements could be invoked to justify some kind of intervention in the "communist-infected" state rather than against the *extracontinental* source of the threat. The Caracas Declaration⁵⁴ therefore represented a "corollary" to the continentalized Monroe Doctrine similar to the Roosevelt Corollary in that it would allow intervention in the internal domestic affairs of an American state in the name of hemispheric stability.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ See Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 545. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles considered the infiltration of "Soviet despotism" to be a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine. See 31 DEP'T STATE BULL. 43 (1954).

⁵¹ Resolution XIII, TENTH INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE 156-57, Dep't. State Pub. 5692 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Caracas Declaration].

⁵² *Id.* This provision, which would allow intervention into the *internal* affairs of an American nation in order to meet the "extra-continental" threat of communism, is arguably a justified interpretation of a "fact or situation" affecting the "political independence" of any American state under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, *supra* note 48, and Article 28 of the OAS Charter, *supra* note 53. See Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 546-47.

⁵³ "It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord." Monroe Message, *supra* note 1, at 250.

⁵⁴ Caracas Declaration, *supra* note 61.

⁵⁵ For a detailed argument that collective OAS intervention in the affairs of a communist-infected American nation is a legal exercise of a broadly-interpreted right of self-defense, despite the U.N. CHARTER art. 51 recognition of such a right only in case of "armed attack," see Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 550-54; see also D. BOWETT, *supra* note 42, at 188.

Events in the years following the Caracas Declaration revealed that despite the continentalization and integration of the Monroe Doctrine into international law, it could still be invoked unilaterally by the United States. The Declaration itself had been strongly pushed by the United States in an effort to deal with the popularly-elected (but communist-supported) President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán.⁶⁶ Following the expropriation of the vast landholdings of the United Fruit Company in March 1953, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) organized and successfully executed a coup of the Arbenz government in June 1954. The dictatorship subsequently installed promptly abolished the Guatemalan communist party, disenfranchised most of the voting population, suspended the Guatemalan Congress and all constitutional rights, and returned all land to United Fruit.⁶⁷ Significantly, the coup was carried out before the consultative provision of the Caracas Declaration was effected; thus the OAS was never faced with having to give its approval to such blatant domestic intervention.⁶⁸ The Guatemalan affair is one episode in inter-American relations which revealed the intrinsic paradox of U.S. foreign policy's support of dictatorships in Latin America in the name of the Monroe Doctrine—a doctrine which was ostensibly designed to protect an American nation's right of self-determination.

The rise of Fidel Castro to power in 1959 revealed that the continentalization of the Monroe Doctrine was stronger in theory than in practice. As the nature of the Cuban revolution and the open support of the Soviet Union became apparent, and as some Latin American Governments began to voice complaints about domestic subversion and terrorism exported from Cuba,⁶⁹ a clear case for collective action under the continentalized Monroe Doctrine (via the Caracas Declaration) seemed to be presented. Indeed, a direct challenge to regional security and the Monroe Doctrine was issued when Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev declared in July 1960 that any attack on Cuba would result in nuclear retaliation against the United States by the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ "The Monroe Doctrine," announced Krushchev, "has outlived its time . . . has died, so to say, a natural death. Now the remains of this doctrine should best be buried as

⁶⁶ See J. NATHAN & J. OLIVER, *UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER* 217, 218 n.90 (1976).

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 217-19.

⁶⁸ Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 549-50. The United States was able to prevent the U.N. Security Council from hearing the Guatemalan complaint against the United States for its role in the overthrow of Arbenz by successfully arguing that the Security Council had no jurisdiction to discuss the complaint until Guatemala had exhausted the corresponding machinery of the OAS. See Akehurst, *supra* note 57, at 181.

⁶⁹ Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 554.

⁷⁰ N.Y. Times, July 10, 1960, at 1, col. 5.

every dead body is so that it should not poison the air by its decay."⁷⁰ The State Department quickly retorted that the "principles of the Monroe Doctrine are as valid today as they were in 1823 when the Doctrine was proclaimed."⁷¹ President Eisenhower indignantly proclaimed that the Doctrine "has by no means been supplanted,"⁷² and that the United States, in conformity with its treaty obligations, would not "permit the establishment of a regime dominated by international Communism in the Western Hemisphere."⁷³

Despite the war of words and brave rhetoric, neither the OAS nor the United States took any effective action to remove the continental threat posed by Castro's Cuba. In August 1960 the OAS denounced communist intervention in the Western Hemisphere, but did not specifically name Cuba or recommend any collective action.⁷⁴ The ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, conceived during the Eisenhower administration and carried out by the CIA with the approval of President Kennedy, was a unilateral action with no OAS support.⁷⁵ Despite the failure of the invasion, President Kennedy subsequently reaffirmed that the United States may still exercise its option of unilateral intervention:

Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside communist penetration . . . this nation will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our nation.⁷⁶

The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, convened at Punta del Este in January 1962, also failed to adopt any collective measures which would effectively eliminate the Cuban threat.⁷⁷ Only Cuba was opposed to the adoption of a resolution stating that the goals of

⁷⁰ N.Y. Times, July 13, 1960, at 1, col. 4.

⁷¹ *U.S. Reaffirms Principles of Monroe Doctrine*, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 170 (Press Release 392, July 14, 1960).

⁷² PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1960-61, at 651 (1961). Indeed, the President declared that the Rio Treaty and "other non-intervention treaties" had "merely extended" the Monroe Doctrine to cover modern types of "penetration and subversion." *Id.*

⁷³ N.Y. Times, July 10, 1960, at 1, col. 8.

⁷⁴ PAU, Final Act, Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OEA/Ser.C./II 7 (1960).

⁷⁵ J. NATHAN & J. OLIVER, *supra* note 65, at 293-94. Nor did the attempted invasion have any support in international legal circles. See Wright, *The Cuban Quarantine*, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 n.4, 555 n.42, 564 n.66 (1963).

⁷⁶ PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, JOHN F. KENNEDY 1961, at 304 (1962).

⁷⁷ See 2 PAU, *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Applications 1960-64*, at 69-80 (1964).

international communism were incompatible with the principles of the inter-American political system.⁷⁸ But a second resolution declaring that Cuban communism was incompatible with Pan-American principles and calling for the exclusion of the Castro government from the OAS was passed by a bare two-thirds majority.⁷⁹ The only collective measures taken under the Rio Treaty at Punta del Este was a recommendation that trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war be immediately suspended.⁸⁰ Thereby was revealed the reluctance of a number of Latin American nations to turn the continentalized Monroe Doctrine inward against another American state, even as expanded by the Caracas Declaration.

The differences revealed at Punta del Este were temporarily set aside with the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The basic facts are well known: on October 22 President Kennedy revealed the existence of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba and ordered an air and naval quarantine of Cuba to halt the buildup.⁸¹ After some very tense days in Washington, Havana, and Moscow, the Russians finally backed down and agreed to remove the offensive weapons in return for a pledge from the United States that it would not invade Cuba. There is some debate as to whether the United States sufficiently defended the Monroe Doctrine in the Cuban crisis,⁸² but it is significant in this regard that the United States took great pains to assure that all its actions were carried out according to international law.⁸³ The Soviet missiles in Cuba constituted a clear "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America" from an extracontinental source—a bold violation of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine.⁸⁴ In gaining

⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁰ *Id.* Such a measure is authorized by Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, *supra* note 48. For a good discussion on the legality of the OAS sanctions adopted at Punta del Este, see Akhurst, *supra* note 57, at 190-96.

⁸¹ Address of October 22, 1962, II PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, JOHN F. KENNEDY 1962, at 808-08 (1963).

⁸² J. MICHAM, *supra* note 5, at 82, argues that the Doctrine was not vindicated by the removal of the missiles, since Cuba remained communist and dominated by the Soviet Union. Cf. Buckley, *supra* note 3, who argues that President Kennedy's agreement not to invade Cuba, impliedly "repealing" the Monroe Doctrine, was not binding on his successors.

⁸³ Oliver, *International Law and the Quarantine of Cuba: A Hopeful Prescription for Legal Writing*, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 376 (1963); Meeker, *Defensive Quarantine and the Law*, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1963).

⁸⁴ P. CORBETT, *supra* note 16, at 149; Akhurst, *supra* note 57, at 197 n.4; but cf. Wright, *supra* note 75, at 549-53, arguing that the installation of the Soviet missiles at Cuba's request violated no international law and that "neither the Monroe Doctrine nor inter-American treaties can impose obligations of international law on the Soviet Union, though politically they constitute a warning to non-American countries of attitudes likely to be taken by the American countries."

the removal of the Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, President Kennedy had gone no further than keep his earlier pledge that if Cuba ever became an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviets, then the United States would take any action necessary to protect itself and its hemispheric allies.⁵⁵ But the Monroe Doctrine was not dead in the minds of Washington policy-makers, at least one of whom felt that the Doctrine was "still an elementary part of the [United States] whole national security interests."⁵⁶

In response to President Kennedy's request,⁵⁷ the Council of the OAS, acting as Provisional Organ of Consultation under Article 12 of the Rio Treaty, met on October 23, 1962, to consider the Cuban crisis. Echoing President Kennedy's call for the removal of the missiles from Cuba, the Provisional Organ also authorized member states to take measures against Cuba, individually or collectively under Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, including the use of armed force, to prevent the missiles in Cuba "from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the continent."⁵⁸ Thus the unilateral quarantine of Cuba by U.S. naval and air forces was ostensibly sanctioned by the OAS as well as the continentalized Monroe Doctrine, at least as applied against the Soviet Union.⁵⁹

The continued existence of the Castro regime in Cuba, however, and that dictator's attempts to export communist revolution to other Latin American countries, constituted a continuing violation of the Monroe Doctrine via the Caracas Declaration.⁶⁰ At the request of Venezuela, an Organ of Consultation was convoked by the OAS in 1963 which condemned and recommended sanctions against Cuba for its subversive intervention in the internal affairs of OAS member states.⁶¹ Cuba was warned that if its subversive actions continued in the future, OAS members intended to take measures of self-defense individually or collectively, even so far as to resort to armed force.⁶²

⁵⁵ 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 450, 481 (1962). On the legality of the quarantine, see Wright, *supra* note 75, at 553-63; Akehurst, *supra* note 57, at 199-203; Oliver, *supra* note 83; Meeker, *supra* note 83; Fenwick, *The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal or Illegal?*, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592 (1963).

⁵⁶ *Situation in Cuba: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Comm. on Armed Services*, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1962) (statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk). See also, Ambassador Stevenson's address to the U.N. Security Council, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 731 (1962).

⁵⁷ Address of October 22, 1962, *supra* note 80, at 807.

⁵⁸ 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 722 (1962).

⁵⁹ See Wright, *supra* note 75, at 559; Thomas & Thomas, *supra* note 4, at 561.

⁶⁰ Caracas Declaration, *supra* note 60.

⁶¹ II PAU, INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE APPLICATIONS 1960-64, at 181-86 (1964).

⁶² *Id.* at 186.

Resort to armed intervention became a reality in April 1965, but it was directed against the Dominican Republic rather than Cuba and initially took the form of unilateral action by the United States. Once again, the excuse for landing 20,000 U.S. marines in the Dominican Republic on April 28 was the threat of communism arising in that nation, ostensibly as a result of Cuban instigation.⁸⁸ This action revealed that the Monroe Doctrine, though not expressly mentioned, could still be used as an instrument for unilateral intervention by the United States into the internal affairs of a Latin American country. The OAS was quick to give its multilateral endorsement to the intervention, however, by convening the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers. One of the measures taken at that meeting was the request to OAS member states to make voluntary contributions to the OAS of military forces in order to form an Inter-American Peace Force.⁸⁹ Subsequently, U.S. forces were partially withdrawn from the Dominican Republic and the remainder were joined with the Peace Force under a unified inter-American aggression against the political independence of an American state was thereby prevented in the name of self-defense by military intervention in the threatened state. This brings to mind some of the interventionist corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine at the turn of the century.

C. *The Paradox of Regionalism and the Doctrine*

The legality of the intervention by the United States in the Dominican Republic, and the authority of the OAS to aid in that intervention without prior U.N. approval, is highly questionable.⁹⁰ Legal or not, the Dominican intervention of 1965 revealed a basic paradox of the Monroe Doctrine as it had existed since 1823—the concept of regionalism in a world where spheres of influence by powerful nations is looked upon with increasing disfavor. It has been argued with compelling force that the so-called “Johnson Doctrine”—which had been manifested in the 1965 Dominican intervention—provided reciprocal justification for the so-called “Brezhnev Doctrine”—which is the asserted justification for the Soviet interventions into Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.⁹¹ The

⁸⁸ PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1965, at 461 (1966); *U.S. Acts to Meet Threat in Dominican Republic*, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 738 (1965); see also A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, *THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965: BACKGROUND PAPER AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH HAMMARSKJÖLD FORUM* 7 (1967).

⁸⁹ I OAS CHRONICLE 19-41 (Aug. 1975).

⁹⁰ See, e.g., A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, *supra* note 93, at 36-59.

⁹¹ See Franck & Weisband, *The Johnson and Brezhnev Doctrines: The Law You Make May Be Your Own*, 22 STAN. L. REV. 979 (1970); Note, *Ideology and the Use of Force*, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77 (1972). The Brezhnev Doctrine, announced by Soviet Premier Brezhnev following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, is translated and reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS. 1323 (1968); see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968, at 3, col. 1.

concept of regional independence expressed in the Monroe Doctrine has, since its pronouncement, depended largely on the power of the United States to enforce its principles. The Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter—the continentalized expressions of the Monroe Doctrine—are both geographically and ideologically based. The Dominican Republic and Cuba are both “in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere.”⁹⁷ As expressed in the Caracas Declaration,⁹⁸ communist control of an American state was deemed incompatible with inter-American principles and institutions. Individual or collective action, so the familiar argument goes, is therefore justified to prevent or eliminate such incompatibility.

Such is the rationale, in reverse, for the exercise and policing by the Soviet Union of a sphere of influence over socialist states on its geographical periphery. On the basis of geographical proximity and ideological compatibility, the Brezhnev Doctrine—like the Monroe Doctrine—calls on the dominant power of a geographical region to exercise an international police power to preserve regional stability.⁹⁹ By asserting the Brezhnev Doctrine as justification for the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion, the Soviets verbalized what they perceived as “established, reciprocal norms of the international system” as pronounced by the United States in the Guatemalan, Cuban, and Dominican crises.¹⁰⁰ It was precisely the above rationale which the Soviet Union presented as justification for the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.¹⁰¹

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that American policy-makers are presently faced with the paradox of justifying the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, be it on a continental or unilateral basis, while simultaneously challenging the right of another regional superpower (the Soviet Union) to maintain a regional sphere of influence.¹⁰² The application of the Monroe Doctrine to “communism” in the Western Hemisphere must be increasingly questioned considering the breakdown of a world-wide “monolithic” communist movement, the indigenous character of most Latin American social unrest, and the unsettling prevalence of U.S.-

⁹⁷ Address of October 22, 1962, *supra* note 81, at 807.

⁹⁸ *Supra* note 60.

⁹⁹ Franck & Weisband, *supra* note 96, at 983-84.

¹⁰⁰ *Id.* at 982.

¹⁰¹ Whitney, *The View From the Kremlin*, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, col. 2, 33, col. 3.

¹⁰² The paradox is starkly revealed by the recent comments of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, who said that the United States might supply arms and aid to the insurgents in Afghanistan if such aid was requested, but would not tolerate similar aid by the Soviet Union to the guerrillas in El Salvador on the ground that such Soviet aid would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1981, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.).

backed military fascism in Latin America.¹⁰⁵ Few attempts have been made to justify the covert interference by the CIA in the 1970 election in Chile of Marxist Salvador Allende and the subsequent operations which resulted in his brutal overthrow and assassination in 1973.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the 1970's witnessed the partial reintegration of Cuba into the economic and political life of the Western Hemisphere. Almost half of the Latin American nations have re-established diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba,¹⁰⁷ and until late 1979 the Carter administration was taking significant steps toward the resumption of some commercial ties with Cuba.¹⁰⁸ It is significant to note, however, that Cuba's *rapprochement* with its neighbors was hesitant and was adopted by Castro only when pressured by the Soviet Union to fall in line with détente.¹⁰⁹

In any case, it is apparent that the multilateral aspect of the Monroe Doctrine which had so adamantly condemned communism in the Western Hemisphere waned considerably in the 1970's. The once-solid support of the United States by Latin American nations on international political, economic, and security issues began increasingly to break down in the early 1970's. This breakdown in continental solidarity was prompted by, among other things, the limited U.S.-Soviet détente, economic conflicts of interest, the shift of many Latin American nations to a so-called "non-aligned" status, and the rise of sub-regional economic mechanisms.¹¹⁰ The failure of the Carter administration to take effective measures in response to the large-scale Cuban military adventures in Africa has also made small Caribbean and Central American republics apprehensive about the willingness of the United States to protect them from "Cuba's militarized communism."¹¹¹ By the end of the 1970's, these factors and more had contributed to the gradual dissolution of one of the basic precepts of the

¹⁰⁵ See *Hearings on Latin America*, *supra* note 16, at 9, 22. But see Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorships and Double Standards*, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at 35-45.

¹⁰⁶ See J. NATHAN & J. OLIVER, *supra* note 65, at 14, 496-97n. See also STAFF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., *COVERT ACTIONS IN CHILE 1963-1973*, at 26-39 (Comm. Print 1975).

¹⁰⁷ *Hearings on Latin America*, *supra* note 16, at 9 (statement of James D. Theberge).

¹⁰⁸ See Salper, *Prospects for Relations and Trade Between the United States and Caribbean Basin Non-Market Economies, Particularly Cuba*, 4 INT'L TRADE L. J. 189, 194 (1978).

¹⁰⁹ *Hearings on Latin America*, *supra* note 16, at 9.

¹¹⁰ *Id.* at 8-9.

¹¹¹ *Id.* at 10. In response to those apprehensions, the Carter administration attempted to dissuade Caribbean fears about Cuba by stating that the United States would "assist those threatened by outside intervention." N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1980, at 5, col. 1. On the Cuban military forces in Africa, see *Impact of Cuban-Soviet Ties in the Western Hemisphere: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations*, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978) (statement of Gen. James A. Williams).

Rio Treaty, the OAS, and the principles of 1823: the perception of common hemispheric interests and goals in relation to the rest of the world community.

D. Change in Outlook: The Carter Administration

Despite, and perhaps as a result of the radical changes in the inter-American system in the 1970's, the Latin American policy of the Carter administration marked a new phase in the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine. In his first address before the Permanent Council of the OAS,¹¹⁰ President Carter made it clear that his administration was adopting a very different attitude toward Latin America from that of his predecessors. In contrast to the long-held "doctrine of the two spheres" upon which the Monroe Doctrine had originally been based, the President said:

As nations of the New World we once believed that we could prosper in isolation from the Old World. But since the Second World War . . . all of us have taken such vital roles in the world community that isolation would now be harmful to our own best interests. . . . The problems and promises of our region have become as diverse as the world itself . . . [and] sometimes defy regional solutions.

In addition to economic diversity, we have all developed widely varied forms and philosophies of government. . . .

In the light of these changes, a single United States policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean makes little sense. . . . Our own goal is to address problems in a way which will lead to productive solutions—globally, regionally, and bilaterally.¹¹¹

President Carter went on to state that the new approach in U.S. policy would be based on a high regard for the individual sovereignty of each nation, respect for human rights, and recognition of the need to equalize relationships between the developed and developing nations on an extra-regional, global scale.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ President's Address Before the Permanent Council of the OAS, April 14, 1977, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 523 (April 18, 1977).

¹¹¹ *Id.* at 523-24.

¹¹² *Id.* at 524. Just as President Monroe's policies were largely the product of his close advisors, such as John Quincy Adams, so does it appear that President Carter's new outlook was partly attributable to the ideas of his foreign policy advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. In 1970, Mr. Brzezinski wrote that the long-standing idea of a U.S.-Latin American "special relationship" was "bound to decay" as Latin American nationalism and its attendant anti-Yankee spirit became more rampant in the 1970's. "Accordingly," he argued, "it would be wise for the United States to . . . abandon the Monroe Doctrine and to concede that in the new global age geographic or hemispheric contiguity no longer need be politically decisive." In order to improve U.S.-Latin American relations, he concluded, the United States should confine its policies to "cultural-political affinities" and "economic-social obligations." Z. BRZEZINSKI, *BETWEEN TWO AGES: AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE TECHNETRONIC ERA* 288 (1970). For

The changes inaugurated in U.S. policy by the Carter administration were a departure from the original precepts of the Monroe Doctrine insofar as those changes recognized divergent intra-continental interests not always separate from the rest of the world as well as political diversity within the hemisphere. But the new policy was not an abandonment of the Doctrine in that it still contained the strains of, and in a sense was a return to, the principles of 1823 insofar as the territorial and political inviolability (i.e., the right of self-determination) of each American nation was strongly reaffirmed. The President also made it clear in later remarks that the United States was firmly committed to its obligations under the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter, and would work positively toward more effective operation of the OAS and U.N. dispute-settling machinery.¹¹² In this regard, therefore, the multilateralized Monroe Doctrine as formally expressed in the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter was once again stripped of the interventionist corollaries which had been added to it since World War II.

The disclosure in August 1979 of the existence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba offered President Carter a chance to reassert the principle of hemispheric security against a tangible extra-continental threat. Without raising the tattered banner of the Monroe Doctrine by name, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance reacted to reports of the brigade by saying that the presence of the Soviet troops in Cuba "runs counter to long-held American policies."¹¹⁴ While Mr. Vance was partly referring to the "bilateral understandings" of 1962 and 1970 between the United States and the Soviet Union,¹¹⁵ he was also responding to critics who viewed the Soviet combat presence in Cuba as a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine.¹¹⁶

Despite the opportunity to invoke the principles of 1823 against the Soviet combat presence in Cuba, the President chose instead to dismiss

an in-depth critical analysis of Brzezinski's thesis and its adoption by the foreign policy establishment of the Carter administration, see Kirkpatrick, *supra* note 103, at 39-41; Kirkpatrick, *U.S. Security & Latin America*, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1981, at 30-33. For a short critique of both Kirkpatrick articles, see Wilde, *Jean Kirkpatrick: Utilitarianism as U.S. Foreign Policy*, 98 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 226 (1981).

¹¹² See 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 1596, 1599 (Oct. 2, 1978); 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 1141, 1143 (June 26, 1978).

¹¹⁴ N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1979, at 8, col. 3.

¹¹⁵ In a letter of July 27, 1978 to Senator Richard Stone of Florida, Vance stated that "the essential understanding is [that] . . . the Soviets agreed in 1962 that offensive weapons could not again be introduced in Cuba. In 1970, it was made clear that this understanding included sea-based systems." N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1979, at 8, col. 2.

¹¹⁶ Upon learning of the Soviet troops in Cuba, Senator Stone stated that their presence "is a base, and our nation's policy for more than a century has been to oppose the establishment of bases in this hemisphere by countries who don't belong here." N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1979, at 3, col. 4.

the troops as not being a viable threat to hemispheric security. In his televised address of October 1, 1979, President Carter explained that the Soviet combat brigade had been in Cuba for several years but did not represent a direct threat to the United States. Nevertheless, the presence of the brigade was "a serious matter" because it contributed to tensions in the Caribbean and Central American region.¹¹⁷ The President went on to explain that Cuba is completely dominated by the Soviet Union and that "the Soviet brigade is a manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba."¹¹⁸ By increasing surveillance and military capability in the region President Carter pledged:

[W]e will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere. Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance to meet any such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces. [Emphasis added].

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the [OAS] and a party to the Rio Treaty. It's a reaffirmation of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 'that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the island of Cuba in an offensive action against any neighboring countries.'¹¹⁹

Like his predecessors since President Kennedy, President Carter appeared to accept the fact that Castro's Cuba was an accomplished and continuing violation of the Monroe Doctrine, about which the United States and the OAS could do very little. Aside from the more tangible "threat" of Soviet domination of Cuba, however, Cuban activities in Central America introduced a potentially more serious threat to the increasingly fragile concept of hemispheric solidarity. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, events in Nicaragua and El Salvador revealed that while the principles of 1823 may have remained theoretically intact under the Rio Treaty and the Caracas Declaration, it was still the policy and perceptions of the United States which were determinative of the Monroe Doctrine's practical efficacy in hemispheric affairs.

The overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua by the Cuban-supported Sandinistas in July 1979 was to many the successful implant of "another Cuba" in the Western hemisphere by the Communist bloc.¹²⁰ To the Carter administration, the Sandinista takeover was nothing more than the exercise by the Nicaraguan people of their inherent

¹¹⁷ Peace and National Security: Address to the Nation on Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, Oct. 1, 1979, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 1802, 1803-04 (Oct. 8, 1979).

¹¹⁸ *Id.* at 1804.

¹¹⁹ *Id.* at 1804-05.

¹²⁰ See N.Y. Times, July 20, 1979, at 4, col. 1; Kirkpatrick, *supra* note 103, at 36.

right of self-determination.¹²¹ On the one hand, the Monroe Doctrine was being violated by Cuban-Soviet aid to the Nicaraguan Marxists, while on the other hand the withdrawal of U.S. support for the Somoza government because of human rights violations represented an effort to cleanse the Doctrine of the unilateral interventionist trapping it had acquired since World War II.¹²² In any case, the fears of "another Cuba" seemed justified when the new government of Nicaragua, "a country whose location gives it strategic importance out of proportion to its size or strength,"¹²³ withdrew from the Central American Defense Council in August 1979, calling the organization an "instrument of U.S. imperialism."¹²⁴ By the end of the Carter administration's days in power, the cry of "no more Cubas" had changed in many circles to "no more Nicaraguas."¹²⁵

E. Revival of the Doctrine: The Reagan Administration

As illustrated above, the Monroe Doctrine had not been completely abandoned by the Carter administration, but it was in a state of considerable disrepair by 1981, particularly as an instrument of unilateral policy by the United States. One of the first foreign policy moves by the Reagan administration was to revive the principles of 1823 and to reassert their primacy in U.S. policy toward Latin America. On a fundamental level and in sharp contrast to the changed outlook of the 1970's, the Reagan Presidency appeared to abandon the "globalist approach" of the Carter administration in favor of the traditional idea of a "special relationship" between the United States and Latin America.¹²⁶ Based as it is on the old doctrine of the two spheres and the perception that the United States is primarily responsible for the security of the hemisphere, the Reagan approach worked an abrupt "relegitimization of the Monroe Doctrine,"¹²⁷ both unilaterally and multilaterally.

El Salvador, the smallest and most densely populated nation in Central America, became the focal point for the revival of the traditional approach toward Latin America as a whole. In October 1979, a military coup had overthrown the repressive regime of General Carlos Humberto Ro-

¹²¹ N.Y. Times, July 26, 1979, at 1, col. 6, 3, col. 6; Kirkpatrick, *supra* note 103, at 36.

¹²² Kirkpatrick, *supra* note 103, at 41.

¹²³ *Id.* at 43.

¹²⁴ N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1979, at 9, col. 1.

¹²⁵ Wilde, *supra* note 112, at 228.

¹²⁶ See Kirkpatrick, *supra* note 112, at 40, who advocated such a change because the Carter approach denied "the realities of culture, character, geography, economics, and history." Ms. Kirkpatrick's ideas, while not definitively authoritative as those of the Reagan foreign policy establishment, have apparently been very influential, particularly with respect to Latin America. See Nossiter, *Mrs. Kirkpatrick Tackles U.N. Job With New Zest*, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1981, at 6, col. 4.

¹²⁷ Buckley, *supra* note 3.

mero and installed a military-civilian junta composed of a coalition of "moderate" political and military elements.¹²⁸ The junta, with the aid of the United States, embarked on a program of economic and social reform, but was opposed in such efforts by both the extreme left and extreme right. As 1980 drew to a close, the situation became more chaotic as guerrilla warfare engulfed the country and U.S. aid was withdrawn. As it became increasingly clear that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua had quietly aligned itself with Cuba and the Soviet Union, many feared that the same fate (i.e. a Communist takeover) lay in store for El Salvador.¹²⁹ Shortly before the inauguration of President Reagan, the leftist coalition of Marxist guerrilla groups in El Salvador launched a "general offensive" against the government, which failed but which prompted the new administration to quickly search for a new policy to deal with the situation.¹³⁰

What the Reagan administration chose to emphasize with regard to the situation in El Salvador was reminiscent of the attitudes of the 1950's concerning Guatemala and the Caracas Declaration. In February 1981, the State Department reported that captured guerrilla documents revealed that the Salvadoran rebels were being covertly supplied with arms, munitions, and equipment through Cuba and Nicaragua from other Communist countries, including the Soviet Union, Vietnam, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.¹³¹ "In short," proclaimed the State Department, "over the past years, the insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively transformed into a textbook case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers through Cuba."¹³² As a result, the United States increased military aid to prevent "outside forces" from accomplishing "a Communist state takeover in El Salvador."¹³³

Although the involvement of extra-continental Communist powers in El Salvador was doubted or denied by some,¹³⁴ it is clear that the evi-

¹²⁸ See *Communist Interference in El Salvador*, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 7 (Mar. 1981); N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1981, at 4, col. 2; Kirkpatrick *supra* note 112, at 39.

¹²⁹ Kirkpatrick, *supra* note 112, at 38-39.

¹³⁰ Shortly before President Carter left office, the United States resumed military aid to the junta in response to reports of increased military aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas from Nicaragua. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1981, at 11, cols. 1, 5. Economic aid to Nicaragua was suspended shortly thereafter. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1981, at 3, col. 1. The failed offensive, however, revealed that the Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador did not enjoy the degree of popular support that similar elements in Nicaragua had. As Robert E. White, former Ambassador to El Salvador, put it, "They gave a war and nobody came." *Arms Aid and Advisers: Debating the New Policy on El Salvador*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 4, at 2, col. 1.

¹³¹ N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1981, at 1, col. 3, 4, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1981, at 1, col. 1.

¹³² *Communist Interference in El Salvador*, *supra* note 128, at 7.

¹³³ N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 2.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, at 1, col. 5; Plain Dealer, Feb. 22, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1981, at 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 3.

dence compiled and the response to that evidence by the United States was an attempt to resurrect nothing less than the Monroe Doctrine itself via the Caracas Declaration. By branding the threat to El Salvador as emanating from outside the hemisphere, "extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental [sic] power," it could be easily argued that "the sovereignty and political independence of the American states was threatened, "endangering the peace of America."¹²⁵ It could also be argued that the Communist interference in El Salvador by Cuba and the Soviet Union was a "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America" in violation of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.¹²⁶ In these respects, therefore, the Communist aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas violated the multilateralized Monroe Doctrine and would provide justification for collective action by OAS member states. In the absence of collective action, of course, unilateral action by the United States was mandated by the Doctrine when hemispheric security interests were at stake.

The attitude and action taken by the United States in El Salvador was done without the strong backing of some important OAS member states. In Mexico, for example, President José López Portillo felt that U.S. military aid and the inordinate attention being paid to tiny El Salvador had turned Central America and the Caribbean into "a zone of hegemonic confrontation" between East and West, elevating the region "to the undesirable category of a strategic frontier."¹²⁷ Indeed, that was precisely what U.S. policy-makers had intended. But, as certain statements indicate, it was less a cold war "containment" of Communist expansion policy than it was hemispheric protectionism based on the Monroe Doctrine. When asked in a March news conference about comparing U.S. involvement in El Salvador with that in Vietnam, President Reagan made an important and revealing distinction:

The situation here is, you might say, our front yard . . . it isn't just El Salvador.

What we're doing in going to the aid of a government that asked that aid of a neighboring country—and a friendly country in our hemisphere—is try to halt the infiltration into the Americas, by terrorists and by outside interference, and those who aren't just aiming at El Salvador but . . . are aiming at the whole of Central and possibly later South

¹²⁵ Caracas Declaration, *supra* note 61.

¹²⁶ Rio Treaty, *supra* note 48, art. 6. Presumably, it was the Rio Treaty and the Caracas Declaration which Secretary of State Alexander Haig felt were being violated by the "illegal Soviet interventionism in El Salvador." See 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1, 11 (May 1981). In Secretary Haig's view, there has been "a fundamental modification of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine" by its extension beyond the Soviet Union's geographical periphery and into the Western hemisphere. *Id.* at 11.

¹²⁷ N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1981, at 6, col. 1.

America and . . . eventually North America. . . . (W)hat we're doing is trying to stop this destabilizing force of terrorism and guerrilla warfare and revolution from being exported in here, backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba and those others that we've named.¹³⁸

While the Reagan foreign policy in many areas is still in its incubation stages, it could not be clearer with regard to Latin America. It has abandoned the emphasis on human rights in Latin America in favor of hemispheric security.¹³⁹ Perhaps most importantly, it appears to have abandoned the "globalist approach" in favor of the doctrine of the two spheres, as pointed out above. In short, the Monroe Doctrine is once again in vogue in United States foreign policy.

III. CONCLUSION

The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's, as it has been in every decade since its pronouncement in 1823, is a product of geography and historical perceptions. Its vitality in any given period is, as we have seen, largely shaped by the attitudes and actions of U.S. Presidents and policy-makers. Though it dare not be mentioned by name in inter-American diplomacy, lest the ghosts of its corollaries be raised, the Monroe Doctrine as a principle in inter-American relations is not an anachronism in the 1980's. It would be naive to think that the United States has forever precluded itself from unilateral intervention when its hemispheric security interests are at stake. If and when the United States ever acts unilaterally against an American state to eliminate what is perceived to be an extra-continental threat, it would be by definition a manifestation of the Monroe Doctrine. By the same token, the Doctrine's multilateral aspect will survive as long as there remains a distinct and viable body of regional international law in the inter-American system.¹⁴⁰

The lawyer involved in inter-American relations must of necessity understand the complex relationship of principles of 1823 to modern hemispheric affairs. It is apparent from the long and tortured history of the Doctrine that its status has depended largely on the actions of the United States and U.S. policy-makers' pronounced justifications for those actions. As Professors Franck and Weisband have warned, the lawyer must be careful not to make "the common jurisprudential error of confusing what the law is with what it ought to be. For evidence of what the law

¹³⁸ The President's News Conference of March 6, 1981, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 245 (Mar. 9, 1981).

¹³⁹ See, e.g., *U.S. Moves to Improve Ties to Latin Military Regimes*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 1, at 8, col. 5; *Repression Increased in Guatemala As U.S. Tries to Improve Relations*, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 2.

¹⁴⁰ See generally Note, *International Law in Latin America*, 7 LAW. AM. 605 (1975).

is, the lawyer must examine the actual practice of nations, which consists, first, of what states do and, second, of their exegetic endeavors to give conceptual definition to their acts."¹⁴¹ The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's will be shaped as it has since 1823: by the actual practice of nations in the Western Hemisphere, particularly the United States. Thus the lawyer's responsibility *vis-a-vis* the Doctrine of Monroe is to assure that its invocation in actual practice conforms more closely to the principles as they were intended in 1823.

¹⁴¹ Franck & Weisband, *supra* note 96, at 979.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE 1980's

By Abraham F. Lowenthal*

SUMMARY

Recent events and trends in the Caribbean and in the broader international system have caused the United States to focus once again on its relationship with the countries and territories of its "third border." Government officials, the media, the foundations, and scholars have all been rediscovering the Caribbean, as has often happened in United States history.

The 32 contemporary Caribbean entities are remarkably diverse, yet overwhelmingly alike: diverse in culture, language, size, economic and political organization, colonial tradition, economic performance, and international links, but similar in their shared experience with colonialism, poverty, dependence, insularity, fragmentation, overpopulation, and—in almost every case—extensive interpenetration with the United States, especially through the massive immigration of people.

With populations continuing to rise, agricultural productivity declining, industry stagnant, and balance-of-payments disequilibria intensifying, the capacity of Caribbean units to secure equity and growth and to incorporate more employed workers—while preserving democracy and without sacrificing autonomy to a metropolitan power—is being questioned. A key issue for the 1980's will be how the United States responds to this quandary.

In approaching this question, the United States must examine its interests and how they are changing. Traditional concepts of security, economic, and political interests are still frequently asserted, but these should be reviewed in the light of changing technologies, trade and investment patterns, and political alignments. The key United States interest in the Caribbean in the years ahead may be none of the traditional ones, but rather the effect of continued migration from the region on our society.

Four different United States approaches toward the Caribbean are defined and discussed. They differ among themselves regarding the relative degree of attention paid to traditionally conceived concerns and the degree and form of United States involvement though likely to be most effective in protecting United States interests.

The two most likely approaches for the United States in the 1980's are the activist and the developmental strategies. Activists are concerned with immediate impact and with countering Cuba's influence

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by stressing bilateral economic assistance, security programs, economic sanctions against Cuba and economic incentives to those who reject Cuba's influence. Developmentalists would emphasize multilateral aid, long-term regional cooperation and integration, and deeper structural issues in the region.

Proximity, dependence, vulnerability, history, and migration make the Caribbean a special region for the United States. How this country should approach the region in the 1980's is open for debate, but the United States should seek ways to make its considerable impact on the region more consistently positive.

INTRODUCTION

The Caribbean is rising once again on the agenda of U.S. foreign policy.¹

Various events have caused the United States to renew its concern with the Caribbean: the Nicaraguan Revolution and that proclaimed in Grenada; Central America's intensifying civil strife; Jamaica's drift toward bankruptcy and polarization; Cuba's stepped-up activity in the region; the achievement of formal independence by several Caribbean mini-states and pressure for independence by others; and extending awareness in the United States of the extent of Caribbean migration to this country.

Whatever the reasons, signs abound that increased attention is being paid to the Caribbean. Early in his administration, President Carter determined that the Caribbean deserved priority. Top U.S. government figures—including then-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, then U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young, and Mrs. Carter herself—all visited the region, and former Undersecretary of State Philip Habib led a high-profile mission there in 1979 to review U.S.-Caribbean relations. The number of foreign service, AID, and ICA staff assigned to the region was expanded and their quality upgraded. The State Department, for the first time, appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State specifically charged with responsibility for overseeing U.S. relations with the Caribbean. A Caribbean Military Task Force facility was established at Key West, and the presence of the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean was made much more evident by a series of port calls and naval maneuvers. The Voice of America is now establishing a powerful transmitter in Antigua, capable of beaming medium-wave broadcasts to the entire region.

The Caribbean (together with Sub-Saharan Africa) has been accorded special emphasis in the programs of the International Develop-

¹ Analysts differ about whether to define the Caribbean primarily in geographical, cultural, or political terms. For the purposes of formulating U.S. policy toward the region, however, the Caribbean is best conceived as that set of insular and dependent territories, in or bordered by the Caribbean Sea, concerning which the United States has historically felt a special security interest, arising primarily from their proximity and their presumed vulnerability to external penetration. All the Caribbean islands, together with Belize on the Central American isthmus and Guyana, Surinam, and French Guyana on the South American mainland would fit this definition of the region.

This essay focuses on the Caribbean region, thus defined, and does not deal with the countries of Central America's isthmus. Central American nations differ importantly from those of the Caribbean in their degree of independent viability, in their social and economic structures and in their degree of interaction with the United States. Although U.S. policies toward Central America and toward the Caribbean affect each other, the problems posed for the United States in each case are different.

ment Cooperation Agency (IDCA), the new coordination unit. Budgets for U.S. economic assistance to the Caribbean have been doubled since 1976. To coordinate and expand foreign aid to the Caribbean, the U.S. Government took the lead in 1977 in establishing the Caribbean Group for Economic Cooperation and Development. This is a consortium of 10 donors and 14 Caribbean countries which reports channeling over \$300 million to the area in 1979. To supplement all this governmental activity, the Carter administration helped to launch, with considerable fanfare, a "private sector entity" (Caribbean/Central American Action) to work on improving U.S. relations with these regions.

President Reagan and his advisers on Latin American affairs have also demonstrated their strong interest in U.S.-Caribbean relations.²

Renewed public interest in the Caribbean has been mirrored on the private side. *U.S. News and World Report*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* have all run feature articles on the Caribbean in the past several months. NBC and CBS have run television "specials" on the region. The *New York Times* has opened a Caribbean bureau, operating from Miami. Foundations and scholars are rediscovering the area.

This turn toward the Caribbean is not without precedent, of course. The United States has long been deeply involved in the Caribbean, America's Mediterranean. It is an involvement that has often been far from happy. One need only think back sixty years to the era when United States had soldiers in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua; virtual protectorates in Cuba and Panama, and a de facto colony in Puerto Rico. Even in the past few years, many "crises" have erupted within the Caribbean basin.

The Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the 1965 U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic provoked a concern in the United States to reexamine the nature of this country's relationships with the area. Studies of Caribbean policy were commissioned by the State Department and by such private organizations as the American Assembly, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Twentieth Century Fund, and the University of Pennsylvania.

Within three or four years, however, interest in Caribbean policy had fallen off once more, as in the past. The recommendations of the State Department's Caribbean Study Report of 1968 were never carried out. The University of Pennsylvania's report was never published. The Twentieth Century Fund's original project was never finished (though a more recent report for the Fund finally was published). The American Assembly's report and Robert Crassweller's study for the Council on Foreign Relations were published, but neither received much attention.

United States foreign policy paid little attention to the Caribbean from the late 1960's until the late 1970's. Official U.S. programs of all kinds were cut back, foundation interest declined, and academic enthusiasm waned. Only at the end of the 1970's—when Fidel Castro's Cuba began to strengthen its Caribbean links, when Central America's

² See, for example, James D. Theberge "Rediscovering the Caribbean," *Commonsense* (Spring, 1980), 1-26 and Roger Fontaine, Celsio DiGiovanni, and Alexander Kruger, "Castro's Specter," *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1980), 3-28.

stability began to crumble, and when Caribbean migration to the United States became more visible in the context of the mainland recession—did official Washington begin to focus again on the Caribbean.

Between bursts of attention, the United States Government tends to treat the Caribbean as a matter of low priority and not to question long-standing assumptions and axioms. When a perceived "crisis" emerges, however, Washington tends to see the Caribbean in terms of traditional premises, and often, therefore, formulates policies that fail to take full account of the region's political and economic dynamics.

The current rekindling of U.S. interest in the Caribbean provides a chance to think through some fundamental questions about U.S.-Caribbean relations: What kind of region is the Caribbean today and how is it evolving? What are U.S. interests in the Caribbean, and how are they changing? What are the different ways in which U.S. aims might be promoted, and the likely risks and benefits of each way? To what extent are special U.S. approaches, specifically designed to affect this particular region, feasible or desirable? What would they entail?

THE CARIBBEAN TODAY

The contemporary Caribbean comprises 32 political entities with a population totalling some 30 million people. Thirteen of these units are not independent countries, ten having achieved independence since 1960. Several territories (including Antigua, Monserrat, Anguilla, and St. Kitts-Nevis) are actively seeking independence in the next five years. Some (Guadeloupe and Martinique, for example) seem ensconced in their long-standing colonial relationship. Puerto Rico's status, a perennial subject of discussion, is less clear than ever, after the nearly equal vote registered in 1980 by the pro-statehood and pro-commonwealth forces.

The Caribbean territories are remarkably diverse, yet overwhelmingly alike.

Most are tiny; two-thirds of the islands of the Caribbean could fit simultaneously into the King Ranch in Texas. Cuba is by far the largest island, occupying more than half the area of all the other Caribbean islands combined, but even Cuba is smaller than the state of Ohio.

Five different basic racial groups (black, white, oriental, native Indian, and East Indian)—and their numerous subgroups and combinations—mingle with varying degrees of integration and hostility. Even more different languages are spoken within the region, including European languages and their derivatives, plus the creole mixtures with African and Indian tongues. Caribbean religious sects include mixtures of the borrowed and the invented, the traditional and the ultramodern, and of indigenous, European, African, North American, and Asian influences.

Economic organization runs the gamut from the tax havens of the Bahamas—reportedly the largest single Eurocurrency market outside London—to Cuba's institutionalized socialism (where free market transactions are beginning to be permitted again), with all manners of hybrid in between. The Dominican Republic, where long-time dictator Rafael Trujillo's vast personal fiefdom passed to government

ownership after his assassination in 1961, has a very high share of its economy in the public sector, but tries through generous incentives to encourage private investment, domestic and foreign. Jamaica's previously strong private sector became massively disgruntled during the 1970's; both Jamaica and Guyana, which chose to build various forms of socialist-oriented (or at least state-capitalist) mixed economies, are now concerned about how to re-attract and stimulate private investment. Grenada, where the principal exports are bananas and nutmeg and the main economic potential is tourism, is apparently opting for "socialism" in a ministate where no form of economic organization can much alter the obvious constraints on growth.

Economic productivity ranges from the depth of Haiti, the only nation of the Americas to rank among the very poorest countries of the world, to the relatively high but uneven performance of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, Trinidad-Tobago, and Barbados. The region includes four out of six of the countries with the lowest per capita GNP in the Americas (Haiti, Dominica, Grenada, and Guyana) as well as eight units with per capita GNP among the highest (Martinique, Trinidad-Tobago, Dutch Antilles, Guadeloupe, Puerto Rico, Surinam, Bahamas, and Barbados).

Although the overall per capita income figures in most of the region are high by comparative LDC standards, bitter poverty is widespread. Seventy-five percent of pre-school children in the Dominican Republic suffer from malnutrition, for example. One-third of Jamaica's people have annual per capita incomes under \$200; two-thirds of Haiti's rural population were reported in 1978 to have annual per capita incomes below \$40. The region's poverty is highlighted, and its effects aggravated, by its juxtaposition—through migration, tourism, and the media—with prevalent living standards in the United States and other industrial countries. This juxtaposition, and the Caribbean's striking dependence, make plausible (if not entirely warranted) V.K. Naipaul's characterization of the region as the "Third World's Third World."

Most of the Caribbean economies are in deep trouble. Higher prices for petroleum and other vital imports pose additional strains on the economies. Jamaica has had seven consecutive years of negative growth, even by the Castro's government own account, is not much more impressive. Barbados' gains and significant growth in the Dominican Republic counter the regional trends, but the latter country has been hard hit by the exploding price of oil. In 1973, the Dominican Republic made almost twice as much from sugar exports as it spent on oil imports; by 1979 oil imports cost about \$75 million more than the country's income from sugar.

The Caribbean countries share, apart from natural beauty, a number of painful characteristics. They are small, mostly densely populated, and heavily dependent on exporting a few primary products. They are extremely susceptible to international economic fluctuations and also to the vagaries of the weather. (The path of Hurricane David in 1978, sparing Barbados at the last moment and devastating Dominica instead, vividly illustrates this last point.) Most have relatively few known resources beyond the sun; those with a broader resource base—Jamaica, for example—have often been unable to capitalize fully on their advantages. All the islands have limited

domestic markets and insufficient savings and financial capacity. Agriculture is weak and declining through most of the region. Per capita food production in Jamaica, for example, was 11 percent lower in 1974-76 than it had been in the mid-1960's.

But while agriculture is declining, so is the push toward industrialization. The region-wide burst of "industrialization by invitation" during the 1960's has run out of steam. The major Caribbean islands (except Puerto Rico) show a stability in the share of national production accounted for by manufacturing and a declining trend in employment accounted for by manufacturing. Unemployment and underemployment are distressingly high across the region. Even official statistics show unemployment rates exceeding 30 percent in some countries despite the fact that a relatively low share of the population is considered economically active (about 30 percent in most Caribbean territories compared with almost 45 percent in the United States).

Socially and culturally, the Caribbean territories are insular; even in those (Belize, Guyana, Surinam, and French Guyana) physically situated on the mainland, 90 percent of the population live in coastal enclaves. Most are searching for identity and meaning, trying to draw on the shared and exceptional experiences of slavery, migration, and colonialism to derive an acceptable heritage. Their social structures, economies, patterns of race relations, and modes of interaction with the external world all bear the mark of centuries of colonial rule and of plantation societies.

The Caribbean's history has always been largely shaped, and even written, from outside; the very concept of the area as a region is largely an externally imposed idea. A few outstanding Caribbean intellectuals—Naipaul, Franz Fanon, Aime Césaire, C. L. R. James, Eric Williams, Juan Bosch, William Demas, and Arthur Lewis among them—have projected Caribbean experience onto a much broader canvas. Their work, and the lives of Caribbean peoples, have reinforced the notion of this as a region, with common problems and opportunities despite different cultural and colonial backgrounds.

Most Caribbean territories are still not well integrated internally (an exception is perhaps Cuba since its revolution, and there in part by exiling over one-tenth of the nation). Many, indeed, are more fragmented now than a generation ago; the Dominican Republic's civil war of 1965, Trinidad's 1970 Black Power uprising, Bermuda's race riots, Jamaica's urban violence, Guyana's political strife, and the constant struggle over status in Puerto Rico all exemplify this point.

Even less are the Caribbean territories integrated regionally. The West Indies Federation of 10 territories established in 1958 lasted only until 1961; it could not survive parochial rivalries, especially between Jamaica and Trinidad (and their respective leaders). The Eastern Caribbean, most recently under colonial rule, is fragmenting into ministates so small as to raise the real possibility that one or another could be taken over relatively easily by international criminal elements, such as those involved in the narcotics trade. Interchange between the Commonwealth Caribbean countries and the Spanish, Dutch, and French-speaking countries is still minimal. Cuba, effectively isolated by U.S. policy from the rest of the Caribbean from 1960 until the mid-1970's, has expanded and strengthened its relation-

ship with both the English-speaking Caribbean and the rest of the region in recent years, as has Venezuela, but pan-Caribbean movements are still incipient and fragile.

Politically, the Caribbean territories face contradictory currents and tensions. Most of the independent countries are formal democracies, but the institutions of representative government are severely strained, as has been shown by the coups in Grenada and Surinam and, in different ways, in Jamaica and Guyana, where political violence has intensified. An extended period of deceptive political "stability," at least in the sense of long-lasting governments, may be coming to an end in several countries. Long-standing practitioners of "doctor politics,"—Lloyd Best's unimprovable phrase to describe the role of Caribbean scholar-statesmen—are at or near the ends of their careers with the next stage of politics consequently hard to predict, but almost certainly volatile.

Jamaica, once considered politically highly developed, seemed close to social implosion during the 1980 election campaign; the possibility of a military coup there was no longer unthinkable. In the Dominican Republic, where the first peaceful transition in its history from one elected president to another in 1978 was achieved only with significant involvement by Washington at the crucial moment, constitutional government is still fragile. The governments in several small islands of the Eastern Caribbean—St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica, and Antigua—are shaky. Even Barbados, the epitome of stable politics, is nervous about the influence of leftist activists, at least on neighboring small islands. Puerto Rico, generally considered a successful case of modernization, faces a real possibility that deepening economic problems and the continuing impasse over status will eventually lead to an intensification of the now sporadic violence. Haiti, long ruled by "Papa Doc" Duvalier, is now ruled by his son "Baby Doc"; no one knows when this dynasty will end, but it surely will do so. And in Cuba, where Fidel Castro has directed a highly institutionalized authoritarian regime for twenty-one years, overt dissidence is increasingly evident.

Polarization, rather than regional consensus, seems to be the prevailing political trend. Grenada's leftist coup and the quasi-leftist coup in Surinam have been matched by a rightward swing (albeit through elections) in the politics of Dominica, St. Kitts, and Antigua, and most recently by the decisive election of Edward Seaga in Jamaica. Pan-Caribbean unity is increasingly unlikely as several of the islands move in sharply divergent directions.

Internationally, most of the Caribbean units are satellites in search of an orbit, or perhaps of multiple orbits, in the sense of regular and predictable relationships with central powers. The United States acts increasingly as the principal metropole, as the Western European nations have been withdrawing from the area. Mexico and especially Venezuela have shown some interest in expanding their relations with the Caribbean, an interest which has reached its most concrete expression to date in mid-1980 with the signing of a Venezuela-Mexican commitment to sell oil to several Caribbean and Central American states on favorable terms that contribute to long-term development projects. The Soviet Union's close relationship with Cuba makes Russia a Caribbean actor, although Soviet influence has so far been small outside of Cuba itself.

Almost all the island states have preferential trading agreements with various metropolitan powers. All Caribbean units are heavily dependent on foreign commerce; for many, that means trade primarily with the United States. Cuba and Puerto Rico each receive massive subsidies (at roughly comparable levels) from their respective metropolitan sponsors, as do Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guyana. Foreign aid to the other independent Caribbean islands is higher on a per capita basis than to any other group of countries, but much less than what Puerto Rico receives from the U.S. government, Cuba from the Soviet Union, and the French colonies from France.

The high volume of trade with the United States—eight billion dollars worth of trade take place each year between the United States and the Caribbean—is an example of another shared characteristic of most of the Caribbean units: the high degree of interdependence with the United States. Not counting Puerto Rico, the United States has over \$4.3 billion in direct private investment in the region, (of which over \$1.2 billion took place in the past decade); 25 percent of U.S. worldwide investments protected by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) are in the Caribbean. More than 75 percent of the bauxite the United States currently imports (more than half of our total consumption) comes from the Caribbean; and about \$4 billion of refined petroleum products.

The most significant links, however, between the United States and the Caribbean are people. Most of the Caribbean economies depend heavily on tourism, and cater primarily (and increasingly) to U.S. travelers. Some countries are even attracting significant numbers of retired Americans as permanent residents. Thousands of young Americans attend marginal medical schools in the Caribbean. U.S.-based criminal syndicates find the Caribbean a congenial base for narcotics and gambling operations (following in the wake of numerous U.S. based "buccaneers" of various types who have roamed the Caribbean since the colonial period). And American culture—high and low—pervades the area, at all levels and in all classes.

The most dramatic and expanding tie between the United States and the Caribbean is provided by the region-wide stream of migrants to the United States. Over 4 million Caribbean citizens have entered the United States, mostly since World War II. Close to 20 percent of all living Caribbean-born people reside in the United States by now. In the last few years, more than half the annual population increase of most of the region's countries—over 80 percent of the annual increase in the labor force in some—has entered and stayed in the United States, legally and illegally.

Many of the Caribbean immigrants have been from Puerto Rico, which has exported more than 40 percent of its total population to the mainland since World War II. Puerto Rican migration has slowed notably in the past fifteen years, but the dip in Puerto Rican migration has been more than compensated for by the increase from other Caribbean sources. The flow to the United States is unquestionably region-wide, and appears to be intensifying. Five of the six countries in the world with the highest per capita rates of legal migration to the United States are Caribbean, and illegal migration is at least equally intensive from the region. Over a million Cubans have come since 1960, more than 400,000 Dominicans, at least 300,000 Haitians, and about a million West Indians.

What might have seemed at one time like a series of unrelated events—the influx of Puerto Ricans to a booming postwar United States; the exodus of Cubans, in various waves, fleeing Havana under Castro; the surge of Dominicans escaping the country's turbulent political struggles during the mid-1960's; the stream of Haitian "boat people" risking death to find work; the flight of Jamaicans fearing radicalism at one level and those seeking jobs at another; the stream of students coming to study in U.S. universities—appears increasingly to reflect a more fundamental, continuous, and probably irreversible response both to regional population pressures and the demand for cheap labor of the U.S. economy.

What underlies the contemporary crisis in the Caribbean is the ever deeper and more obvious tension among different goals. Caribbeans from different backgrounds and tendencies all want economic growth, improved equity, fuller employment, political participation, enhanced autonomy, and more confident self-respect. But these goals may not be simultaneously compatible. The region's experience suggests that development strategies which emphasize growth often undercut equity and autonomy, that efforts to expand employment undermine efficiency, and that a stress on national autonomy may threaten prospects for economic expansion.

With populations continuing to rise, agricultural productivity declining, industry stagnant, and balance-of-payments disequilibria intensifying, the capacity of Caribbean units to secure equity and growth and to incorporate more employed workers—all while preserving democracy and without sacrificing autonomy to a metropolitan power—is being questioned. The central issue in U.S.-Caribbean relations for the 1980's will be how the United States responds to the turmoil in the Caribbean, brought about by the region's political and economic troubles, shifting external alignments and massive migration.

U.S. INTERESTS

What is at stake for the United States in dealing with the Caribbean? What are U.S. interests, and how are they changing?

Traditional discussions of U.S. interests in the Caribbean mainly emphasize military security and economic concerns. The military security interest has usually been conceived in terms of keeping hostile political and military influences away from this country's "third border." That was the aim of both the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary, landmarks in U.S. foreign policy. It is also usually emphasized that various, long-significant U.S. military assets dot the region; that some 7 percent of this country's imported oil comes from or is refined in the Caribbean; that the Caribbean provides access to the Panama Canal, long considered vital for U.S. commerce and defense; and that key sea lanes through which U.S. trade passes, cross through or near the Caribbean. The economic interest, as traditionally conceived, involves U.S. investment in and trade with the region, as well as secure access to various mineral and raw materials. From the mid-19th century until World War I, the period when many of the current axioms of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean were fashioned, the region accounted for a high share of this country's foreign commerce and investment, and U.S. policy aimed to protect and expand U.S. economic interests.

Some analysts continue to think of the Caribbean and the challenges it poses for U.S. foreign policy in these familiar terms. They stress the continued relevance of long-standing security doctrines which make it imperative for the United States to maintain friendly border regions. Some may argue that important U.S. business and financial interests are threatened by recent trends in the Caribbean, and that the United States should reassert its regional leadership in the 1980's, particularly in the context of a deteriorating international situation.

Other analysts doubt that the Caribbean is still very important to the United States in these traditional terms. They see changing technology and shifting geopolitics as having altered the strictly military significance of the Caribbean as well as the feasibility of excluding foreign influence. They argue that U.S. naval bases and other military assets in the region are no longer vital; indeed, most of the remaining U.S. military installations in the Caribbean are currently due to be closed by the mid-1980's. They point out that the Panama Canal, although still useful, is no longer essential in the sense it used to be. A shrinking share of U.S. trade passes through the Canal; some of the world's increasingly vital oil super-tankers are too big to enter the Canal, as are the aircraft carriers around which U.S. fleets are organized.

Nor, they observe, can the United States any longer exert the total control of this region it once enjoyed. From 1898 to 1969, no hostile naval force ever entered Caribbean waters, but Soviet naval formations have been doing so regularly since 1969 and obviously can and will continue to do so. Although the United States retains its interest in preempting potential military threats posed from or through the Caribbean, these analysts suggest that the primary means for protecting that interest is not in Caribbean policy but in great agreements, as exemplified by the U.S.-U.S.S.R. "understanding" keeping nuclear-equipped submarines (and apparently submarine tenders) out of Cuba.

In economic terms, too, they stress that the relative significance of the Caribbean for the United States has declined steadily since before World War II, when it accounted for more than 11 percent of U.S. direct foreign investment and an even higher share of foreign commerce. By 1978, U.S. investment in the Caribbean (exclusive of Puerto Rico) amounted to only 2.5 percent of U.S. foreign direct investment. The share of U.S. petroleum imports coming from or through the Caribbean has been declining over the past several years, not increasing. Nor does the United States depend in any meaningful sense on any other commodity imported from the Caribbean; bauxite, by far the principal import from the region, is available from many countries.

However one evaluates this debate on security and economic interests, three facts surely will make the Caribbean important to the United States in the 1980's.

First, the cluster of such a considerable number of like-minded sovereign nations, comprising the largest bloc of democratic government in the world, gives the Caribbean a weight in international forums far outweighing the region's demographic or military weight. The fact that various Caribbean statesmen have taken a leading role in international forums underlines and reinforces this point. Cordial relations between the United States and the Caribbean are likely to

draw their support for U.S. foreign policy initiatives; conflictive relations, or outright hostility, would array them against the United States. Caribbean nations provided nine votes to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example, and almost as many votes to support Israel's position. Were the United States to be ringed instead by a cluster of hostile states, its international situation would become more difficult.

Second, the Caribbean's relations with the United States makes this region, in the eyes of many, a kind of litmus test of the attitudes and policies the United States will adopt toward Third and Fourth World countries generally. How the United States responds to the needs and priorities of its closest neighbors in the developing world is important as a symbol of the kind of country the United States is.

Finally, and most important, the Caribbean will be significant to the United States because of increasing interpenetration between the two. Except for Mexico and Canada, no other region is so closely bound to the United States. The large and active Caribbean community resident in this country, linked to the home countries by return visits, continuing migration, remittances, and the like is already a fact in the political life of Miami and New York and not a negligible factor in the foreign and immigration policy debates.

How the United States treats the Caribbean, through conscious policy or by inadvertence, will affect the region greatly, for no other set of countries is as dependent on its relationship with the United States as the Caribbean group. What happens in the Caribbean, in turn, will inevitably affect the size, composition, and character of the emigration from the area, and thus the quality and character of life in the United States.

The degree of inevitable U.S. involvement in Caribbean affairs occasioned by this interpenetration—including the mutual importation of cuisine, music, dance, cinema, literature, political ideas, crime, and even political techniques—converts U.S. "foreign policy" problems into domestic or "intermestic" ones, and vice versa. Immigration policy—what to do about the many thousands of Caribbean people who enter the United States each year—illustrates this point most obviously, but the same merging of domestic and foreign phenomena occurs with health care, narcotics regulation, education, youth unemployment, and other issues.

What occurs in the United States is often echoed in the Caribbean. The economic, political, and cultural processes of the region are profoundly influenced by proximity to the United States. Grenada's New Jewel Movement—to take a dramatic example—is led primarily by returned students influenced by Black Power movements in U.S. universities in the 1960's; their coup used arms imported from the United States. Jamaica's newly-elected president, Edward Seaga, was born and educated in the United States; many other leaders—in politics, business, and education—have been trained in this country, and Americans of Caribbean descent are making their presence felt in business, politics, and the professions.

ALTERNATIVE U.S. APPROACHES TO THE CARIBBEAN

Four different approaches to U.S. policy toward the Caribbean may be distinguished.

The traditional approach, not in vogue for some years but imaginable in the 1980's, would be essentially to ignore the Caribbean region except for continuing vigilance against the possibility of a direct military security threat in the region (with a low tolerance for ambiguity on that score).

A second approach would be for the United States to disengage from the region. Under this approach, Washington would cease not only to send in the Marines and AID missions but also cease to preoccupy itself with the region's political or economic trends.

A third approach, essentially that of the Carter administration, is for the United States to do whatever it can to maintain political stability and military security in the Caribbean, including increased support for economic development in the Caribbean, through bilateral and/or regional aid programs, and encouragement of private investment.

A fourth policy, recommended by many leaders in the Caribbean itself, would be for the United States to transform the nature of its Caribbean involvement and concentrate on long-term economic and social development, even if this should mean continuing to tolerate divergent models and ideologies in the region. In schematic form, these options are recapitulated below.

4 ALTERNATIVE U.S. APPROACHES TO THE CARIBBEAN

	High	Low
I. Traditional:		
Degree of concern with military security.....	X	
Degree of concern with other issues.....		X
II. Disengagement:		
Degree of concern with military security.....		X
Degree of concern with other issues.....		X
III. Activist:		
Degree of concern with military security.....	X	
Degree of concern with other issues.....	X	
IV. Developmental:		
Degree of concern with military security.....		X
Degree of concern with other issues.....	X	

THE TRADITIONAL POLICY

The historic U.S. approach to the Caribbean combines studied indifference to the region's underlying economic and social realities with keen sensitivity to potential military security threats to the United States and a consequent aversion to political instability. This is the policy that has been in effect for decades, with intermittent exceptions. Under this policy, the United States government concerns itself little with the Caribbean colonies of other countries, the Caribbean territories under dictatorship, and politically stable countries with constitutionally elected governments. Under the policy, then, the United States would focus only on countries moving to the pro-Cuban left or internal anarchy. Even in the latter case, however, the United States would not concern itself deeply until and unless conditions suggest the possible onset of a threat to unquestioned U.S. interests. At that point, the United States would use whatever means are needed—including military intervention—to neutralize the threat.

The historic policy's attraction derives from its apparent low cost and from its simplicity. It provides criteria which allow top policy makers to concentrate on other regions except under (more or less)

clearly defined circumstances: when events in the Caribbean pose the danger that hostile extra-hemispheric influence might increase their presence and influence within the region.

One key difficulty has always plagued the traditional U.S. approach to the Caribbean, however. Although it is precisely the weak, dependent entities like those dotting the Caribbean which experience instability and provide recurrent openings for the exertion of outside influence, U.S. government policy has done little until recently under the traditional policy to help the Caribbean territories (aside from Puerto Rico) overcome their disadvantaged condition. The Caribbean units have never been able to resist by themselves the encroachment of external power, which Washington considers threatening, but neither have they been able by themselves to undertake the processes of national and regional development and integration which might help make them less vulnerable to foreign penetration.

The United States has taken an exceptional interest in domestic political changes within the Caribbean, but has resisted engaging itself in a more fundamental and continuing way. The United States has so often been drawn into unpleasant Caribbean entanglements, including military interventions, because while it had traditionally regarded the area as of strategic concern, it never adopted the kind of positive, long-term measures such a concern might imply.

The fitful nature of U.S. policy towards the Caribbean has had its costs. Each U.S. intervention tends further to undermine self-confident national development. Each U.S. intervention—overt or covert—fuels anti-American movements across the region, as the cases of Guatemala and Santo Domingo exemplify. Each also strains the domestic consensus on foreign policy. And each makes more distant the day when international laws against military coercion and intervention will have real force.

THE DISENGAGEMENT ALTERNATIVE

An approach to the Caribbean, based on premises opposed to those of the historic U.S. policy, would be for the United States to attempt to disengage itself as much as possible from the Caribbean.

Underlying this approach, expressed in some academic circles if rarely debated in official Washington, is the premise that the U.S. has little or nothing to worry about in the Caribbean and can safely disregard the area, and that the Caribbean itself might well be better off if Washington left it alone. Strategic threats in the Caribbean, it is argued, can only be dealt with by negotiations and understandings between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet bloc on the other. This view holds that U.S. economic interests in the region are neither overwhelmingly important nor likely to be substantially affected even if some Caribbean government became hostile to the United States. Those countries will sell to and buy from the United States almost inevitably, unless Washington itself imposes economic sanctions, as it did with Cuba. American policy makers, attentive publics, and eventually the electorate at large, should be educated, therefore, to accept a substantial U.S. withdrawal from Caribbean involvement. U.S. officials, it is further argued, should rid themselves of their traditional nervousness about Caribbean turbulence and leave the people there alone, to develop or to stagnate, to revolt or to ally, or to stew in their own juices, whatever the flavor.

However impractical the disengagement formula for the Caribbean may seem in the present U.S. political climate, it does have some attractive features. Certainly, the United States has often acted in the Caribbean on the basis of shibboleths sanctified by repetition but unsubstantiated by analysis. Surely the kind of U.S. intervention in Caribbean affairs which characterized the 1920's and the 1960's has been counterproductive. Furthermore, it may be persuasively argued that U.S. disengagement, if it could be sustained, would even enhance U.S. security. Given the predictable instability of Caribbean politics and the likelihood (and indeed the possible beneficial effects) of substantial socioeconomic transformations there, one advantage of disengagement would be to facilitate routine diplomatic, cultural, and commercial relations with all Caribbean territories. Each Caribbean nation's own urge to avoid both confrontation with the United States and the consequent option of dependence on another world power, would thereby be reinforced. Nationalist regimes in the Caribbean would arguably reject foreign alliances if they did not regard these as a necessary defense against U.S. hostility.

Disengagement by the United States from the Caribbean, however, is probably not really feasible. It is not clear, furthermore, that its implications for the Caribbean would be unambiguously benign.

The fact is that the United States cannot withdraw from involvement in its own border region by a unilateral act of will, as it could (though even then with some difficulty) from Vietnam. Geography—strongly reinforced by history, politics, and economics—makes the United States a major presence in the Caribbean. The Caribbean territories cannot escape the shadow of the United States, whether benign or stifling. Nor can the United States easily escape the presence and influence of the Caribbean, especially because of sustained immigration, which brings the region's problems to our shores.

Given the proximity and vulnerability of the Caribbean territories and the indifference toward them of the Latin American countries (with the significant exception of Venezuela, and lately of Mexico), the United States is bound to be involved in the region and to have a major impact, no matter what policy is adopted by an administration in Washington. Moreover, were the U.S. government to attempt to remain only minimally involved in Caribbean affairs, it might find itself unable to remain so because of the significant American private sector's engagement in most of the major areas of the Caribbean economy.

Finally, the fact is that President Reagan as well as former President Carter in the 1980 electoral campaign, called for expanded public and private involvement by the U.S. in the Caribbean. Moreover the legacy of two centuries of U.S.-Caribbean relations make it unlikely that Washington, in the near term, could adopt and implement a consistent policy of disengagement. The challenge for U.S. policy is how to relate to the Caribbean nations, not whether to do so.

AN ACTIVIST CARIBBEAN POLICY

A third approach to U.S.-Caribbean relations—essentially that adopted by the Carter administration and earlier by the Alliance for Progress is for the United States to retain its long-standing special

concern with Caribbean military security and political stability, but to couple that concern with increased economic and technical aid to achieve economic and social development. Rather than wait for anti-American trends in the region to worsen, it is argued, the United States should head off problems by helping the Caribbean nations to deal with the issues that face their societies.

More concretely, the activist U.S. approach to the Caribbean stresses augmenting U.S. economic assistance to the region, especially through bilateral accords intended to highlight the visibility of the U.S. government. It implies beefing up the U.S. presence throughout the area: politically, militarily, culturally, as well as through the private sector. Activists also advocate using non-aid instruments—trade and tariff policies, and other measures to facilitate the transfer of capital and technology—to support the region's development. The "activist" approach aims to turn the Caribbean away from Cuba's influence and instead to improve bilateral and subregional relationships with the United States. Efforts (of various kinds) to counter Cuba initiatives, and even to isolate Cuba, mark the "activist" approach.

The advantages of the activist approach to U.S.-Caribbean relations are obvious. Focusing more attention and resources on the region should enable the U.S. government to affect U.S.-Caribbean relations in a more timely and effective way. The scale of Caribbean entities is such that even limited U.S. moves can have an immediate and perceptible impact. The Caribbean is so dependent that an infusion of U.S. resources is likely, at least in the short run, to fix the region even more firmly in the U.S. orbit. The timing of an activist initiative toward the Caribbean is attractive: Cuba's internal difficulties are growing, while internal Caribbean trends are toward cooperation with the United States.

The risks of the activist approach should also be emphasized, however. One danger, already evident by 1980, is that unrealistic expectations may be aroused within the region. Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica, for instance, has already called for a sustained program of aid to Central America and the Caribbean at the level of \$3 billion per year. Sober assessments about the resources likely to be available to U.S. aid agencies in coming years suggest that aid to the Caribbean will be much more modest. There is a risk, therefore, that focusing attention on the Caribbean will produce a troublesome gap between rhetoric and expectations on the one hand and implementation and impact on the other.

Second, the preoccupation of U.S. policy makers with Fidel Castro's Cuba provoke, or at least exacerbate, deep strains. Caribbean leaders typically perceive Castro as primarily a Caribbean actor, not mainly as a Cold War instrument. At times they find it useful to "play the Cuban card" to derive increased legitimacy with certain domestic constituents or to strengthen Third World ties. Some leaders argue that U.S. readiness to give the Cuban issue priority leads to recurrent tensions. Intensifying Cold War measures in the Caribbean could damage U.S.-Caribbean relations directly and reduce the chances of cooperating with other external powers—Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, the OECD donor countries—to promote Caribbean development; on the other hand, the United States has successfully increased World Bank lending to the Caribbean partly, no doubt, to diminish Castro's influence.

More generally, the activist approach to the Caribbean carries the risk that Washington will become interventionist. Even assuming benign intent, active U.S. pursuance of political goals in Caribbean affairs may stifle local initiative or provoke nationalist reactions. Moreover, to the extent that U.S. interest in the Caribbean appears to be instrumental—not really concerned with the region's people but rather only with threats posed to the United States—the chances increase that an active U.S. presence in the Caribbean would backfire.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

The fourth alternative U.S. approach—one not surprisingly favored by many Caribbean leaders—is the adoption by Washington (and others) of a sustained commitment to Caribbean development. Such a commitment—a decision to take a continuing interest in the whole region's intermediate and long-term development prospects—would differ from the "activist" approach mainly because it would emphasize economic development rather than military security, concentrate on longer-term processes rather than on immediate impact, and because it would feature increased tolerance for a diversity of political and economic approaches in the region.

Operationally, a sustained U.S. commitment to Caribbean development would involve a significant increase in aid, primarily through multilateral as opposed to bilateral channels; non-aid concessions to help Caribbean development; a lower U.S. profile in the region; and an abandonment by Washington of efforts to reverse or at least contain the Cuban revolution. Rather than build up the visible U.S. presence in the region, Washington would downplay its own role and lay the foundations for a healthier U.S.-Caribbean relationship in the future by focusing on the region's underlying social and economic dilemmas. Rather than worry about countering Cuba, this approach would stress attacking the problems for which Cuba's proposed solutions are finding responsive constituencies: inequity, malnutrition, illiteracy, and poor social and health services, especially in the rural areas. This approach would support moves to bring the region into better touch with itself; closer economic cooperation and interchange among all the countries of the region, including Cuba, would be considered desirable under this approach, not as something to be thwarted.

According to its advocates, the developmental approach responds to a fundamental U.S. interest—a "security" concern in a much broader sense—in having viable, effective societies on our Third Border, societies which meet the needs of increasing numbers of their citizens. The approach reflects the moral concern that one should care about how he affects his neighbors, and on the practical realization that festering problems in societies so intertwined with our own will eventually affect this country.

A long term developmental approach would avoid preoccupation with the momentary twists of the Caribbean kaleidoscope in order to allow policy makers to concentrate on underlying issues. Enough consensus exists within the Caribbean on the nature of the region's problems and on how the United States could help that it is plausible to believe that a sustained U.S. commitment would make a difference.

A few U.S. initiatives—to help improve the region's agriculture, to improve the Caribbean's access to U.S. markets, and to regularize Caribbean migration to the United States—could have a major impact on the region.

Three drawbacks affect the developmental approach:

One problem is the danger of exaggerated expectations discussed in connection with the activist stance. It is not clear that the aspirations of Caribbean peoples can all be achieved, even with substantial foreign assistance. Some of the obstacles to sustained, equitable growth in the Caribbean may be inherent in the situations of at least some of these islands. No set of U.S. programs is likely to satisfy the aims of all Caribbeans. What is more, even successful economic growth would not by itself necessarily produce an environment congenial to U.S. values and interests.

Second, there is an inherent contradiction between populist and even more so, Castorite, economic and social organization and expecting domestic and foreign persons and businesses to continue investing in the area. Even trade can be expected to suffer once a government's ties with the international financial community are broken.

Finally, it is obvious that the developmental approach would be hard to adopt within the U.S. political process. The U.S. Congress is not likely to favor an open-ended, no strings commitment to support socio-economic development in a number of small countries, particularly if the case is made that they are insignificant in strategic terms. Only if the national political leadership were to succeed in convincing the American people that their welfare depends in part on Caribbean development could one imagine public support for a U.S. policy toward the Caribbean based on regional development rather than on containing Cuba and its challenge.

SKETCHING OUT A POSITIVE U.S. APPROACH

The first two approaches this essay discusses—the traditional one and its obverse—are ideas lacking substantial support among policy makers in the early 1980's.

Near term policy-relevant analysis should focus on how to implement a positive U.S. policy toward the Caribbean in the 1980's—either an activist concern aimed first, but not exclusively, at containing Cuban-Soviet influence, or a developmental approach emphasizing longer run socioeconomic processes.

Under either concept, one can identify a number of key points on which changed U.S. policies could favorably affect the Caribbean and Caribbean-U.S. relations in the 1980's. These would involve the following measures:

The United States and other donors could strengthen Caribbean agriculture, allocating funds for adaptive research and technology, expanding the availability of and improving access to credit, encouraging investment in rural areas, and enhancing local and foreign marketing procedures. Special incentives might be devised to encourage Caribbean production of winter fruits and vegetables for which the region has a natural comparative advantage vis-a-vis the U.S. market.

Access to U.S. markets could be improved, both for agricultural and other primary products and for manufactured goods.

Tariff and non-tariff barriers could be lowered within the GATT/MFN framework or on the basis of a special negotiated set of regional arrangements. (A reduction of the U.S. tariffs on rum and cigars would have a more positive effect on several Caribbean countries than any other immediately implementable steps, for instance.) Marketing arrangements for sensitive products such as textiles and beef could be renegotiated to favor Caribbean exports. And assistance could be provided to Caribbean countries to improve their marketing capacity in the United States.

The export earnings of Caribbean countries mainly dependent on the export of one or two major products might be stabilized through stronger support of international commodity and stock-piling arrangements.

Better provisions could be made to help the Caribbean territories cope jointly (with external assistance) with hurricanes and other natural disasters, as predictable as they are unexpected.

Tourism, mainly from the United States, to the Caribbean could be expanded by a variety of joint actions—for example, shared air transport facilities, jointly agreed routings, increases in duty-free imports for tourists, a change in U.S. income tax provisions to allow expenses for business-related conventions held in the Caribbean to be treated as are conventions in Canada and Mexico.

U.S. investors could be encouraged both by specific U.S. policies and by the general U.S. government approach to the Caribbean to view the region as a secure forum for investment. This could encourage increased transfers of U.S. capital and technology.

Present temporary workers' programs could be expanded and special, larger immigration quotas might be legislated to increase emigration from the Caribbean areas to the United States, especially from islands where unemployment is particularly high.

Priority could be given to helping the Caribbean cope with its extremely critical energy problems. Perhaps no other region of the world has been harder hit by the oil price rise since 1973 than the Caribbean, where almost all energy comes from oil. A major breakthrough in solar energy production, one unlikely to occur without major technological investments from the U.S. and other advanced industrial countries, would probably mean more for Caribbean development than all other imaginable innovations combined.

Most of these resources would cost money, either to U.S. taxpayers or to particular U.S. interests. Expanded Caribbean agricultural exports might hurt producers in Florida and elsewhere, a lowered tariff on Caribbean rum would hurt Puerto Rican firms, and a tax break on conventions in the Caribbean could hurt U.S. hotels, for example. Various measures would cost the U.S. taxpayers, as well. An international aid package at twice current levels would be required to implement these policies, and a substantial share of the increases would have to come from the United States.

Against these undoubted costs, one should note that the gains to tiny Caribbean economies of these concessions would be very large as compared with their cost to this country. One should emphasize, too, that perpetuating the status quo also has its costs—in terms of migra-

tion and of opportunities for anti-U.S. movements, and the less tangible cost of the discredit into which the market approach to development would fall as a result of further failure of status quo policies to bring about faster and sounder economic growth.

SOME KEY ISSUES FOR THE 1980's

Whether the U.S. government adopts an "activist" policy toward the Caribbean or prefers the "developmental" approach, Washington will have to deal in the 1980's with at least eight specific issues:

(1) Whether to continue the recent cool and restrained pattern of relations with Cuba, to return to more hostility between Washington and Havana, or to try to improve relations between the two countries;

(2) How to respond to the possible emergence in the Caribbean of other regimes committed to socialist forms of economic organization and/or to close relations with Cuba or even directly with the Soviet Union;

(3) How to respond to the demands for increased foreign aid from countries in the region (such as Jamaica) newly committed to a market economy and to expanded foreign investment;

(4) How to treat the question of Puerto Rico's status;

(5) How to respond to continuing pressures to "decolonize" the remaining non-independent territories in the Caribbean;

(6) Whether to favor bilateral or multilateral means for implementing U.S. policies toward the Caribbean, and how to engage other powers in a constructive way;

(7) How to deal with authoritarian regimes of the right; and

(8) Whether to fashion preferential policies toward the Caribbean contrary to universal policies on trade, finance, immigration, etc., or to confine its Caribbean initiatives to measures consistent with global U.S. policies and practices.

Responses to these central questions are likely to be linked.

Contemporary Cuba poses three challenges to U.S. foreign policy: a socialist approach to development and politics; political alignment with the Soviet bloc and other anti-U.S. groupings; and the pursuit of military cooperation with the Soviet Union. The third point—the real sticking point in U.S.-Cuban relations—is a major question and deserves fuller treatment than can be given here. Activists and developmentalists generally agree that Cuban military interventionism should be discouraged, but they differ regarding the weight they give to Cuba's economic and political challenge and on how they would respond.

Those who view Cuba as America's principal antagonist in the Caribbean, as a hostile influence to be countered and contained, argue that Washington should take no (further) steps to legitimize the Castro regime's hold on Cuba or its influence in the region, given that regime's current policies. On the contrary, the United States should hold out, it is argued, for significant changes in Cuban policy, including the withdrawal of its forces from Africa, and particularly those oriented toward the Caribbean (including Puerto Rico) and to Central America—as a condition precedent for any moves to normalize U.S.-Cuban relations.

Similarly, activists assert that the United States should discourage Caribbean nations from following Cuba's approach to development. Opinions differ considerably, however, about how far the U.S. government should go to discourage Caribbean units from emulating Cuba. Activists in general would at least use political and diplomatic influence to prevent "second Cubas" (like Grenada) from proliferating. Some would favor using economic sanctions against those who cooperate with Cuba and would offer economic assistance to those who resist Cuba's blandishments. Some would probably favor the exercise of military force or covert action to prevent a Castroist takeover in the Caribbean, or to reverse one. Some, indeed, might favor U.S. efforts to topple the Castro regime itself.

As for implementation, activists tend to favor bilateral ways and means to heighten U.S. visibility and leverage.

The developmental approach differs on these issues. Because it concentrates on underlying social and economic problems, not on Cuba or on pro and anti-U.S. turns, the developmental approach favors steps to lower the region's political temperature and to improve the prospects for regional integration. Cuba's re-entry into the Caribbean and the normalization of its relations with the United States would therefore be favored by developmentalists. Decisions by other Caribbean islands to adopt Cuba's path or coloration would not lead to ostracism unless those islands chose to isolate themselves from the rest of the Caribbean community. Developmentalists would have the donors decide how much assistance to provide a Caribbean nation not on the basis of their nation's attitude toward Cuba, the U.S., or private investment, but on the efficacy of its development programs and projects. Some envision a future time in which Cuba and Puerto Rico, as the more highly industrialized countries of the region, would become the engines of development in an integrated Caribbean community.

Whether and how other powers external to the Caribbean—primarily Mexico, Venezuela, and Canada—can and should be asked to join efforts to assist Caribbean development depends in part on the approach Washington adopts. Mexico and especially Venezuela are already and increasingly engaged in the Caribbean in commercial, financial, and even political affairs. Each has its own perceived interests which do not necessarily coincide with each other's, let alone with those of the U.S. government. Neither government, for example, shares Washington's preoccupation with isolating Castro's Cuba (though neither, on the other hand, is very friendly with Cuba—Venezuela, in fact, is now rather distant). To the extent that the United States brings to the Caribbean its global Great Power concerns, Mexico and Venezuela, and perhaps Canada as well, will understandably shy away from overt cooperation with U.S. policies. To the extent, however, that the United States relaxes its overt security and political concerns, it may be possible not only to induce significant cooperation by these other countries but to get them to take leading roles in assisting Caribbean development, thus circumventing some of the fears and resentments that the United States engenders in the Caribbean:

Does the unique character of the Caribbean (and of U.S.-Caribbean relations) warrant regional preferences that conflict with broader U.S. policies on trade, finance, immigration, and the like? There can be no doubt that the Caribbean is special, and that its rela-

tionship with the United States is unique. Proximity, dependence, vulnerability, history, and migration make it so. For some, activists and developmentalists alike, these qualities justify a "special relationship" between the United States and the Caribbean. Other analysts argue, however, that unique qualities do not necessarily warrant special U.S. policies explicitly contradicting broader U.S. policies or agreed international instruments. Whatever Washington's rhetoric about "special relationship," history suggests that this country's stakes in the Caribbean will not long sustain the adoption of policies and practices which contravene its worldwide interests.

What can be sustained, if U.S. leaders wish, is a commitment to seek out ways to affect the Caribbean area positively, within a consistent global policy framework. Considerable scope for such positive impact exists, with small adjustments—on tax provisions, air traffic agreements, travel regulations, etc.—that may have large consequences in a region so dependent on the United States.

The challenge for U.S. policy toward the Caribbean is to be sensitive to the effects the United States has on the region and vice versa, and to make those effects more consistently positive. However that challenge is dealt with, it will have to be faced in the 1980's.

U.S. Security & Latin America

Jean Kirkpatrick

WHILE American attention in the past year has been focused on other matters, developments of great potential importance in Central America and the Caribbean have passed almost unnoticed. The deterioration of the U.S. position in the hemisphere has already created serious vulnerabilities where none previously existed, and threatens now to confront this country with the unprecedented need to defend itself against a ring of Soviet bases on and around our southern and eastern borders.

In the past four years, the Soviet Union has become a major military power within the Western hemisphere. In Cuba, the Soviets have full access to the naval facilities at Cienfuegos, nuclear submarines, airstrips that can accommodate Backfire bombers. From these, Soviet naval reconnaissance planes have on several occasions flown missions off the east coast of North America. They also have electronic-surveillance facilities that monitor American telephone and cable traffic and a network of intelligence activities under direct Soviet control. And, of course, a Soviet combat brigade.

During the same four-year period the Soviets have continued to finance, train, and staff a Cuban military establishment which has by now become a significant instrument of Soviet expansion in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia as well as throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America. Today Cuba possesses a small navy; a sizable number of supersonic aircraft—including Il-14's and MIG 21's and 23's—that can be quickly armed with nuclear weapons; modern transport planes capable of airlifting Cuban troops anywhere in the area; a huge army; and an estimated 144 SAM-2 anti-aircraft missile sites. The presence of more than 50,000 Cuban troops and military advisers in Africa and the Middle East provides one measure of the size and utility of Cuba's armed forces. The Cuban role in training, supplying, and advising revolutionary groups throughout the Caribbean and Central America illustrates the hemispheric implications of this build-up.

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The first fruits of these efforts are the new governments of Grenada and Nicaragua, whose commitment to Marxist-Leninist principles and solidarity with Soviet/Cuban policies led Castro to brag on returning from Managua, "Now there are three of us." There may soon be four. El Salvador, having arrived now at the edge of anarchy, is threatened by progressively well-armed guerrillas whose fanaticism and violence remind some observers of Pol Pot. Meanwhile, the terrorism relied on by contemporary Leninists (and Castroites) to create a "revolutionary situation" has reappeared in Guatemala.

Slower but no less serious transformations are under way in Guyana, where ties to Castro have become extensive, tight, and complex, and in Martinique and Guadeloupe, where Castroite groups threaten existing governments. (In Dominica and Jamaica, the recent electoral victories of Eugenia Charles and Edward Seaga have for the moment reversed the Castroite tides there.) Fidel Castro is much clearer than we have been about his interests and intentions in the area, and frequently declares, as at last year's meeting of the nonaligned in Havana, "I will pursue to the end the anti-imperialist struggles of the Caribbean peoples and especially those of Puerto Rico, Belize, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guyana."

American policies have not only proved incapable of dealing with the problems of Soviet/Cuban expansion in the area, they have positively contributed to them and to the alienation of major nations, the growth of neutralism, the destabilization of friendly governments, the spread of Cuban influence, and the decline of U.S. power in the region. Hence one of the first and most urgent tasks of the Reagan administration will be to review and revise the U.S. approach to Latin America and the Caribbean.

Such a review should begin not just with the previous administration's policy in the hemisphere, but with the quiet process by which new theories of hemispheric relations came to preempt discussion within that somewhat amorphous but very real group known as the foreign-policy establishment. For to an extent unusual in government, Carter administration policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean (as in the world more broadly) were derived from an ideology rather than from tradition, habit, or improvisation.

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Indeed, nothing is as important as understanding the relationship between the recent failures of American policy—in Latin America and elsewhere—and the philosophy of foreign affairs that inspired and informed that policy. Such an effort of understanding requires, first, that we disregard the notion that the failure of the Carter policy was the personal failure of a man unskilled in the ways of diplomacy; and, second, that we look beyond superficial day-to-day policy changes to the stable orientations that reasserted themselves after each discrete crisis in world affairs.

Those orientations had their roots in the Vietnam experience, less as it was fought in Southeast Asia than as it was interpreted in Washington and New York. President Carter, after all, was not the only political leader in America to have lost his "inordinate" fear of Communism, lost his appetite for East-West competition, grown embarrassed by the uses of American power, become ashamed of past U.S. policies, and grown determined to make a fresh start. By the time Richard Nixon had left office, a large portion of the political elite in America, including a majority of the Congress, had drawn away not only from Vietnam but from what was more and more frequently called the cold war—the revisionists' preferred term for U.S. determination to resist the expansion of Soviet power.

From these feelings were inferred the famous "lessons" of Vietnam—that the cold war was over, that concern with Communism should no longer "overwhelm" other issues, that forceful intervention in the affairs of another nation is impractical and immoral, that we must never again put ourselves on the "wrong side of history" by supporting a foreign autocrat against a "popular movement," and that we must try to make amends for our deeply flawed national character by modesty and restraint in the arenas of power and the councils of the world. Underpinning these "lessons" was a new optimistic theory of historical development which came in the decade of the 70's to focus the discussion of the future within the dominant foreign-policy elite.

No one expressed the new spirit better than Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose book, *Between Two Ages* (sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations), spelled out the implications of the new spirit for Latin American policy. Brzezinski argued that U.S. Latin American policies were inappropriate to the new realities of declining ideological competition, declining nationalism, increased global interdependence, and rising Third World expectations. The U.S. should therefore give up its historic hemispheric posture, which had postulated a "special relationship" with Latin America and emphasized hemispheric security and, since World War II, anti-Communism. We should, instead, make an explicit move to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, "concede that in the new global age, geographic or hemispheric conti-

guity no longer need be politically decisive," adopt a "more detached attitude toward revolutionary processes," demonstrate more "patience," and take an "increasingly depoliticized" approach to aid and trade.

The views of hemispheric policy expressed in *Between Two Ages* were further elaborated in two other documents born in the bosom of the foreign-policy establishment: the reports issued in the name of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations headed by Sol Linowitz and composed of "an independent, bipartisan group of private citizens from different sectors of U.S. society" funded by the Ford, Rockefeller, and Clark foundations. The intellectual framework and most of the specific recommendations of the two Linowitz reports were identical. Both affirmed that economic and technological developments had created new international problems, and that interdependence had generated a pressing need for a new global approach to those problems. U.S. policy toward Latin America, "from the Monroe Doctrine through the Good Neighbor Policy to the Alliance for Progress and its successor, the Mature Partnership," was outmoded because based on assumptions which had been overtaken by history. Earmarked for the dustbin were the beliefs that the United States should have a special policy for Latin America; that Latin America constituted a "sphere of interest" in which the U.S. could or should intervene (overtly or covertly) to prevent the establishment of unpalatable governments; and that national security should be an important determinant of U.S. policy toward that area. Now, the first Linowitz report counseled:

It [U.S. policy] should be less concerned with security in the narrowly military sense than with shared interests and values that would be advanced by mutually satisfactory political relations.

The new approach was to be free of paternalism, "respectful of sovereignty," tolerant of political and economic diversity. Above all, it was to be set in a consistent global framework.

Most of the specific recommendations of the two Linowitz reports—negotiating the Panama Canal treaties, "normalizing" relations with Cuba, "liberalizing" trade and "internationalizing" aid, promoting human rights, and never, ever, intervening militarily—flowed from these new assumptions. Given détente, the U.S. could and should "keep local and regional conflicts outside the context of the superpower relationship" and no longer "automatically" see "revolutions in other countries and intraregional conflicts . . . as battlefields of the cold war." And given interdependence (manifested in global phenomena like inflation and multinational corporations), the U.S. should no longer hope for or seek "complete economic and political security. . ." but instead participate in the new international agenda.

Despite the commission's determined globalism,

it recognized that Cuba constituted a special case. Both reports recommended U.S. initiatives toward "normalization" of relations with Cuba and some acts (removing restrictions on travel, increasing scientific and cultural exchanges) regardless of overall progress on normalization. But the second report also noted Cuba's military involvement in Africa and its support for "militant" and violence-prone Puerto Rican *independistas*, and concluded that full normalization of relations, however desirable, could take place only as Cuba gave assurances that its troops were being withdrawn from Angola and that it had no intention of intervening elsewhere.

THE most striking characteristic of the Linowitz recommendations was their disinterested internationalist spirit. U.S. policy, it was assumed, should be based on an understanding of "changed realities" and guided by an enlightened confidence that what was good for the world was good for the United States. Power was to be used to advance moral goals, not strategic or economic ones. Thus sanctions could be employed to punish human-rights violations, but not to aid American business; power could be used "to the full extent permitted by law" to prevent terrorist actions against Cuba, but not to protect U.S. corporations against expropriation. Nor was power to be a factor in designing or implementing economic aid or trade programs *except* where these were intended to promote human rights, disarmament, and nuclear non-proliferation.

Like Brzezinski's *Between Two Ages*, the Linowitz reports were, in the most fundamental sense, utopian. They assumed that technological change had so transformed human consciousness and behavior that it was no longer necessary for the United States to screen policies for their impact on national security. To be sure, neither argued that self-interest, conflict, or aggression had been entirely purged from the world. But Brzezinski asserted (and the Linowitz commission apparently believed) that only the Soviet Union was still engaged in truly "anachronistic" political behavior against which it was necessary to defend ourselves. Since no Latin American nation directly threatened the position of the United States, relations with them could be safely conducted without regard for national security.

Adopting the Linowitz commission's recommendations thus required abandoning the strategic perspective which had shaped U.S. policy from the Monroe Doctrine down to the eve of the Carter administration, and at the center of which was a conception of the national interest and a belief in the moral legitimacy of its defense. In the Brzezinski-Linowitz approach, morality was decoupled from the national interest, much as the future was divorced from the past. The goals recommended for U.S. policy were all abstract and supranational—"human rights," "development," "fairness."

Still, if the Linowitz reports redefined the na-

tional interest, they did not explicitly reject it as a guide to policy or name the U.S. as the enemy. This was left to the report of yet another self-appointed group whose recommendations bore an even closer resemblance to the actual policies of the Carter administration. This report, *The Southern Connection*, was issued by the Institute for Policy Studies Ad Hoc Working Group on Latin America. The group included key personnel of the Linowitz commission, and it endorsed most of the specific recommendations of the second Linowitz report—divestment of the Panama Canal, normalization of relations with Cuba, strict control of anti-Castro activists, aid through multilateral institutions, limitations on arms sales and nuclear proliferation, and systematic linkage of human-rights concerns to all other aspects of policy. But the IPS report went beyond these in various respects.

First, it not only proposed a break with the past, but contained a more sweeping indictment of past U.S. policy as reflecting an "unquestioned presumption of U.S. superiority" and an "official presumption of hegemony" which was not only outdated but also "morally unacceptable."

Second, it went beyond the call for normalization of relations with Cuba to a demand that the U.S. "support the ideologically diverse and experimental approaches to development" (emphasis added), recognizing that "both the need for change and the forces propelling such change in the developing areas are powerful and urgent." Latin America's "most challenging development experiments" were identified as Cuba, Jamaica, and Guyana.

Third, the IPS report located the ground of human-rights violations and "institutionalized repression" throughout Latin America in U.S. interests, "virulent anti-Communism," and "national development based on free play of market forces." The remedy: "practical steps to reduce [socio-economic] inequities are . . . steps toward the mitigation of the broader human-rights crisis of our times." That is, fight for human rights with socialism.

The ease with which the Linowitz recommendations were incorporated into the IPS analysis and report demonstrated how strong had become the affinity between the views of the foreign-policy establishment and the New Left, how readily the categories of the new liberalism could be translated into those of revolutionary "socialism," and how short a step it was from utopian globalism and the expectation of change to anti-American perspectives and revolutionary activism. And the impact of these ideas on the Carter administration was enhanced by the appointment of members and associates of the IPS group (such as Robert Pastor, Mark Schneider, and Guy Erb) to key Latin American policy positions. In the administration these officials joined others with like-minded approaches to the Third World, including Ambassador Andrew Young and his deputy Brady Tyson.

THIS whole cluster of ideas—of facing painful truths, making a fresh start, forswearing force, and pursuing universal moral goals—was enormously attractive to Jimmy Carter. No sooner was he elected than he set out to translate them into a new policy for dealing with the nations of the hemisphere.

The repudiation of our hegemonic past was symbolized by the Panama Canal Treaties, to which the Carter administration—from the President on down—attached great importance and of which it was inordinately proud. As Vice President Mondale put it in Panama City, the treaties symbolized “the commitment of the U.S. to the belief that fairness and not force should lie at the heart of our dealings with the nations of the world.”

Anastasio Somoza's Nicaragua had the bad luck to become the second demonstration area for the “fresh start” in Latin America. Just because the regime had been so close and so loyal to the U.S., its elimination would, in exactly the same fashion as the Panama Canal Treaties, dramatize the passing of the old era of “hegemony” in Central America and the arrival of a new era of equity and justice. As the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, William Bundy, noted, “Somoza [was] as good a symbol as could have been found of past U.S. policies in Latin America.”

The “global” approach adopted by the Carter administration constituted another sharp break with past U.S. practice. The “special relationship” with Latin America was gone. In speech after speech, the President, the Vice President, Secretary of State Vance, and Assistant Secretaries for Inter-American Affairs Terrance Todman and Viron Vaky explained that henceforth there would not be a U.S. policy toward Latin America. Instead, hemispheric policy would be incorporated into a global framework and Latin America would be treated in the context of the “North-South” dialogue. “What we do in Latin America,” Vaky asserted, “must be a consistent part of our global policies.”

Incorporating the nations of Latin America into a “global framework” meant deemphasizing U.S. relations with them. Especially, it meant reducing U.S. assistance to the area, since from the perspective of North-South relations, Latin America's claim to assistance was not nearly as impressive as that of most other nations of the so-called Third World. And, once the strategic perspective was abandoned, there was no reason at all for military assistance.

Not surprisingly, therefore, U.S. assistance to the countries of Latin America declined steadily during the Carter years. By 1980, the administration was requesting only half as much economic aid for Latin America as a decade earlier. Military assistance declined even more drastically—both quantitatively and qualitatively. Fewer countries were slated to receive military assistance and more strings were attached to how they could use the

amounts received. No new weapons systems could be purchased; instead, everyone was to be encouraged to acquire non-lethal weapons. Assistance in military training (which had produced many personal and professional ties between U.S. and Latin American officers) was cut sharply.

The “global” approach also encouraged the imposition of unprecedented curbs on the sale of arms. By 1978, the U.S., long the most important supplier to Latin America, accounted for only 10 percent of arms sales. President Carter bragged to the OAS, “We have a better record in this hemisphere than is generally recognized. Four other nations of the world sell more weapons to Latin America than does the United States.”

The impact of the global approach was felt beyond arms sales. Although the nations of Latin America are major trading partners of the United States, and in 1979 accounted for one-sixth of total U.S. exports, and 80 percent of U.S. private investment in the developing world, the Carter administration's manifest unconcern for hemispheric economic ties (as recommended in the Linowitz and IPS reports) resulted in a steady loss of ground to European and Asian competitors, all of whom enjoyed heavy support from their governments.

The global approach involved deemphasizing Latin American relations, not destabilizing governments. But other aspects of the Carter doctrine committed the administration to promoting “change.” “Change,” indeed, was the favorite word of administration policy-makers. In speeches with titles like “Currents of Change in Latin America,” Carter, Vance, and their associates reiterated their conviction that the world was in the grip of an extraordinary process of transformation which was deep, irresistible, systematic, and desirable. Administration spokesmen reiterated in the fashion of a credo that “our national interests align us naturally and inescapably with the forces of change, of democracy, of human rights, and of equitable development” (Philip Habib). And the belief that the whole world was caught up in a process of modernization moving it toward greater democracy and equality subtly transformed itself into an imperative: the U.S. should throw its power behind the “progressive” forces seeking change, even if they “seemed” anti-American or pro-Soviet.

IF COMMITMENT to “change” was the rock on which Carter's Latin American policy was built, his human-rights policy was the lever to get change started. Two aspects of the Carter approach to human rights are noteworthy. First, concern was limited to violations of human rights by governments. By definition, activities of terrorists and guerrillas could not qualify as violations of human rights, whereas a government's efforts to repress terrorism would quickly run afoul of Carter human-rights standards.

Secondly, human rights were defined not in terms of personal and legal rights—freedom from

torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and arrest, as in the usage of Amnesty International and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Acts of 1961 and 1975—but in accordance with a much broader conception which included the political “rights” available only in democracies and the economic “rights” promised by socialism (shelter, food, health, education). It may be that no country in the world meets these standards; certainly no country in the Third World does. The very broadness of the definition invited an arbitrary and capricious policy of implementation. Panama, for instance, was rather mysteriously exempt from meeting the expansive criteria of the State Department’s human-rights office, while at the same time the other major nations of Central America were being censored (and undermined) for violations.

Why Panama, a dictatorship with a higher per-capita income than Nicaragua, El Salvador, or Guatemala, did not qualify as a gross violator of human rights while the latter countries did; why and how an administration committed to nonintervention in the internal affairs of nations could try to replace an unacceptable government in Nicaragua with one more palatable to it; why such an administration should attempt not only to “normalize” relations with Cuba but also to destabilize the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala—to answer these questions required on the part of policy-makers an inquisitive understanding of which governments were outmoded and which reflected the wave of the future. What was *not* required was an ability to distinguish between which were Communist and which non-Communist. The President and other members of his administration apparently believed with Brzezinski that in most of the world ideological thinking had already given way to pragmatism and problem-solving, and that a concern with Communist ideology was therefore just another artifact of a past epoch, “the era of the cold war.”

Ignoring the role of ideology had powerful effects on the administration’s perception of conflicts and on its ability to make accurate predictions. Although Fidel Castro has loudly and repeatedly proclaimed his revolutionary mission, and backed his stated intentions by training insurgents and providing weapons and advisers, Carter’s Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, William Bowdler, described Cuba as “an inefficient and shabby dictatorship”—a description more appropriate to, say, Paraguay, than to an expansionist Soviet client state with troops scattered throughout the world. The refusal to take seriously, or even to take into account, the commitment of Fidel Castro or Nicaragua’s Sandinista leadership to Marxist-Leninist goals and expansionist policies made it impossible to distinguish them either from traditional authoritarians or from democratic reformers, impossible to predict their likely attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union, impossible to understand why in their view Costa Rica and Mexico as well as Guatemala and Hond-

uras constituted inviting targets. Ignoring the force of ideology—and its powerful contemporary embodiments—fatally distorted the Carter administration’s view of politics in Central America and elsewhere.

THE policies which grew out of these expectations have had a large impact on U.S. relations with most nations of South America. In Central America in particular, the direction of administration policy interacted with the presence there of weak regimes and Cuban-supported insurgents to transform the region into a battleground in an ideological war that the administration did not understand and could not acknowledge.

Except for Mexico, the nations of Central America are quite small, and, by North American standards, quite poor. There are significant social and economic differences among them. Guatemala’s large traditionalist Indian population and multiple linguistic groups are unique in the region, and bring with them special problems of economic, social, and political integration. El Salvador’s overcrowding places especially heavy strains on its institutions. Revenues from the Canal and the Canal Zone give Panama a higher per-capita income than any of its neighbors except Costa Rica and about twice that of the sparse, scattered people of Honduras.

Despite their differences, these countries also share a good many social and economic characteristics. All are “modernizing” nations in the sense that in each, urban, industrial, mobile, “modern” sectors coexist with traditional patterns of life. In each, a large portion of the population is still engaged in agriculture—most often employed as landless laborers on large estates and plantations that have long since made the transition to commercial agriculture. Economic growth rates in Central America have been above the Latin American average and per-capita income is high enough to rank these nations among the “middle-income” countries of the world. But in all of them wealth is heavily concentrated in a small upper class and a thin but growing middle class, and large numbers live as they have always lived—in deep poverty, ill-nourished, ill-housed, illiterate.

Things have been getting better for the people of Central America—infant mortality rates have dropped, years in school have increased—but they have been getting better slowly. It has been easier to break down the myths justifying the old distribution of values in society than to improve access to education, medical care, decent housing, good food, respect, and political power.

There are also political differences among the small nations of Central America. Costa Rica has managed to develop and maintain (since 1948) a genuine democracy. Honduran politics have been especially violent, while Nicaragua (under the Somozas) was the most stable political regime. But again despite differences, Guatemala, Honduras,

El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama (like Costa Rica before 1948) share several characteristics with one another and with most of the nations of Latin America. These include a continuing disagreement about the legitimate ends and means of government, a pervasive distrust of authority, a broad ideological spectrum, a low level of participation in voluntary associations, a preference for hierarchical modes of association (church, bureaucracy, army), a history of military participation in politics, and a tradition of *personalismo*.

The boundaries between the political system, the economy, the military establishment, and the Church are often unclear and unreliable. Weak governments confront strong social groups, and no institution is able to establish its authority over the whole. Economic, ecclesiastical, and social groups influence but do not control the government; the government influences but does not control the economy, the military, the Church, and so on.

A DEMOCRATIC façade—elections, political parties, and fairly broad participation—is a feature of these systems. But the impact of democratic forms is modified by varying degrees of fraud, intimidation, and restrictions on who may participate. Corruption (the appropriation of public resources for private use) is endemic. Political institutions are not strong enough to channel and contain the claims of various groups to use public power to enforce preferred policies. No procedure is recognized as the legitimate route to power. Competition for influence proceeds by whatever means are at hand: the Church manipulates symbols of rectitude; workers resort to strikes; businessmen use bribery; political parties use campaigns and votes; politicians employ persuasion, organization, and demagoguery; military officers use force. Lack of consensus permits political competition of various kinds in various arenas, and gives the last word to those who dispose of the greatest force. That usually turns out to be the leaders of the armed forces; most rulers in the area are generals.

Violence or the threat of violence is an integral, regular, predictable part of these political systems—a fact which is obscured by our way of describing military “interventions” in Latin political systems as if the system were normally peaceable. Coups, demonstrations, political strikes, plots, and counterplots are, in fact, the norm.

Traditionally, however, actual violence has been limited by the need to draw support from diverse sectors of the society and by the fact that politics has not been viewed as involving ultimate stakes. The various competitors for power have sought control of government to increase their wealth and prestige, not for the “higher” and more dangerous purpose of restructuring society. In traditional Latin politics, competitors do not normally destroy each other. They suffer limited defeats and win limited victories. The habit of permitting op-

ponents to survive to fight another day is reflected in the tendency of Latin regimes to instability. In such a system a government normally lasts as long as it is able to prevent a coalition from forming among its opponents. Because there is no consensus on what makes government itself legitimate, successive regimes remain vulnerable to attacks on their legitimacy. They are also especially vulnerable to attacks on public order, which tends to be tenuous and to lack a firm base in tradition, habit, and affection.

To these patterns of political interaction there has been added in recent years the unfamiliar guerrilla violence of revolutionaries linked to Cuba by ideology, training, and the need for support, and through Cuba to the Soviet Union. Such groups rely on terrorism to destroy public order, to disrupt the economy and make normal life impossible, to demoralize the police, and mortally wound the government by demonstrating its inability to protect personal security and maintain public authority. As Robert Chapman has emphasized, with the advent of terrorism as a form of revolution, a revolutionary situation can be created in any country whose government is weak or whose economy is vulnerable or dependent, with or without the participation of the masses.*

The nations of Central America (including Mexico) and the Caribbean suffer from some form of institutional weakness—because significant portions of the population have not been incorporated into the political system, and/or because political action is not fully institutionalized, and/or because the legitimacy of the government is in doubt, and/or because there is no consensus concerning legitimacy within the political elite, and/or because the economy is vulnerable to shifts in the international market, and/or because regular infusions of aid are required, and/or because rising expectations have outstripped capacities. All are vulnerable to disruption, and must rely on force to put down challenges to authority.

It is at this point that the roles of Cuba on the one hand, and the U.S. on the other hand, become crucial. Cuba stands ready to succor, bolster, train, equip, and advise revolutionaries produced within these societies and to supply weapons for a general insurgency when that is created. The U.S. is im-

* Other new participants in the traditional pattern of political competition include the Socialist International and the Catholic Left. A number of socialist leaders (Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, François Mitterrand, Michael Manley), unable to win popular support for peaceful revolution in their own countries, have grown progressively enthusiastic about revolution elsewhere and less fastidious about the company they keep and the methods utilized. As for the Catholic Left, its interest in revolution on this earth has waned as its concern with salvation in heaven has waned. Both the Socialist International and the radical Catholics conceive themselves as specialists in political rectitude, and their participation in Central American politics has enhanced its moralistic content at the same time that Cuban/Soviet participation has enhanced its violence.

portant as a source of economic aid and moral and military support. Traditionally it has also exercised a veto power over governments in the area and reinforced acceptable governments with its tacit approval. Thus, to the objective economic and political dependency of nations in the area has been added a widespread sense of psychological dependency. When aid and comfort from the U.S. in the form of money, arms, logistical support, and the services of counterinsurgency experts are no longer available, governments like those of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala are weakened. And when it finally sinks in that the U.S. desires their elimination and prefers insurgents to incumbents, the blow to the morale and confidence of such weak traditional regimes is devastating.

THE case of Nicaragua illustrates to perfection what happens when "affirmative pressures for change" on the part of the U.S. interact with Cuban-backed insurgency and a government especially vulnerable to shifts in U.S. policy.

The Nicaraguan political tradition combined participatory and autocratic elements in a characteristic Latin mix. *Personalismo*, popular sovereignty, and brute force were present in the politics of Nicaragua from its founding as a separate nation in 1938 to the Sandinista triumph in July 1979. Throughout the 19th century and the first three decades of the 20th, geographically-based political factions representing a single, small ruling class competed under a symbolic two-party system in elections in which neither contender was willing to accept an unfavorable outcome. Frequently victory was obtained by enlisting the help of foreign governments and/or financial interests.

The United States was repeatedly called on by incumbent governments for assistance in maintaining peace. In 1910 it was the Conservatives who requested financial assistance and advice, and in 1912, again at their request, the U.S. posted a 100-man legion guard to Nicaragua. From then until 1933 an American military presence was a regular feature of the Nicaraguan political system. These U.S. troops (who at their height numbered about 2,700) supervised presidential elections and organized a National Guard which was conceived as a professional national police force that would remain aloof from politics. In 1936, less than three years after American military forces had withdrawn, the leader of this "non-political army," Colonel Anastasio Somoza García, ousted the Liberal president, Juan B. Sacasa. In this manner began the more than four decades of Nicaraguan politics dominated by the Somoza family.

Somocismo was based in the first instance on the military power of the National Guard. Its durability, however, also owed much to the political skills of the successive Somozas who ruled the country and headed its armed forces. These skills were reflected in the construction of an organizational

base to support their personal power, long-standing success in exploiting divisions among their opponents, and the ability to retain U.S. support. The organizational basis of the Somozas' power is the most interesting factor because, like that of Juan Perón, it was largely created rather than captured.

The Somoza organization rested on four pillars: a hierarchically structured national party forged on the base of the traditional Liberal party; an expanded bureaucracy whose members also served as party workers; a national federation of trade unions created by the Somozas; and the National Guard. The whole operated rather like an efficient urban political machine, oiled by jobs, pensions, profits, and status, and perquisites of various kinds. Most urban machines, however, do not have a private army. The loyalty of the National Guard is the most powerful testimony to the Somozas' political skill, for in Latin America armed forces are more easily won than retained. Nicaragua's National Guard remained loyal until after the last Somoza had fled.

Nicaraguan politics in the Somoza period featured limited repression and limited opposition. Criticism was permitted and, in fact, carried on day after day in the pages of *La Prensa* (whose editor was an opposition leader). Although the Somozas had large landholdings, the government enjoyed no monopoly of economic power, and made no serious effort to absorb or control the Church, education, or the culture. The government was moderately competent in encouraging economic development, moderately oppressive, and moderately corrupt. It was also an utter failure at delivering those social services American and Europeans have come since the Depression to regard as the responsibility of government.

Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a West Point graduate with an American wife and an expansive appetite for women and alcohol, had accommodated successive American administrations and received aid from successive Congresses. He had every reason to suppose that his regime would continue to enjoy U.S. favor, and no reason to suppose that his power could be brought down by the small group of Cuban-backed terrorists who periodically disturbed the peace with their violence.

Three things seem to have disturbed these calculations. One was the progressive alienation of certain members of the country's *oligarchia* and business class when, after the earthquake of 1973, *Somocistas* raked off too large a share of the international relief; a second factor was Somoza's heart attack; the third and most important factor was the election of Jimmy Carter and the adoption of an all-new Latin American policy.

AT THE time the Carter administration was inaugurated in January 1977, three groups of unequal strength competed for power in Nicaragua: the President and his loyal lieutenants—who enjoyed the advantages of

incumbency, a degree of legitimacy, a nationwide organization, and the unwavering support of the National Guard; the legal opposition parties which had been gathered into a loose coalition headed by Joaquín Chamorro, editor of *La Prensa*; and several small revolutionary groups whose Cuban-trained leaders had finally forged a loose alliance, the FSLN (Sandinist National Liberation Front).

From the moment the FSLN adopted the tactics of a broad alliance, the offensive against Somoza was carried out on a variety of fronts. There was violence in the form of assassinations and assaults on army barracks. When the government reacted, the U.S. condemned it for violations of human rights. The legal opposition put forward demands for greater democracy which had the endorsement of the FSLN, thus making it appear that democracy was the goal of the insurgency.

Violence and counterviolence weakened the regime by demonstrating that it could not maintain order. The combination of impotence and repression in turn emboldened opponents in and out of the country, provoking more reprisals and more hostility in a vicious circle that culminated finally in the departure of Somoza and the collapse of the National Guard.

What did the Carter administration do in Nicaragua? It brought down the Somoza regime. The Carter administration did not "lose" Nicaragua in the sense in which it was once charged Harry Truman had "lost" China, or Eisenhower Cuba, by failing to prevent a given outcome. In the case of Nicaragua, the State Department acted repeatedly and at critical junctures to weaken the government of Anastasio Somoza and to strengthen his opponents.

First, it declared "open season" on the Somoza regime. When in the spring of 1977 the State Department announced that shipments of U.S. arms would be halted for human-rights violations, and followed this with announcements in June and October that economic aid would be withheld, it not only deprived the Somoza regime of needed economic and military support but served notice that the regime no longer enjoyed the approval of the United States and could no longer count on its protection. This impression was strongly reinforced when after February 1978 Jimmy Carter treated the two sides in the conflict as more or less equally legitimate contenders—offering repeatedly to help "both sides" find a "peaceful solution."

Second, the Carter administration's policies inhibited the Somoza regime in dealing with its opponents while they were weak enough to be dealt with. Fearful of U.S. reproaches and reprisals, Somoza fluctuated between repression and indulgence in his response to FSLN violence. The rules of the Carter human-rights policy made it impossible for Somoza to resist his opponents effectively. As Viron Vaky remarked about the breakdown in negotiations between Somoza and the armed opposition: "... when the mediation was suspended we

announced that the failure of the mediation had created a situation in which it was clear violence was going to continue, that it would result in repressive measures and therefore our relationships could not continue on the same basis as in the past." When the National Palace was attacked and hostages were taken, Somoza's capitulation to FSLN demands enhanced the impression that he could not control the situation and almost certainly stimulated the spread of resistance.

Third, by its "mediation" efforts and its initiatives in the Organization of American States (OAS), the Carter administration encouraged the internationalization of the opposition. Further, it demoralized Somoza and his supporters by insisting that Somoza's continuation in power was the principal obstacle to a viable, centrist, democratic government. Finally, the State Department deprived the Somoza regime of legitimacy not only by repeated condemnations for human-rights violations but also by publishing a demand for Somoza's resignation and by negotiating with the opposition.

Without these "affirmative pressures," William Bundy concluded in *Foreign Affairs*:

It seems a safe bet that Tacho Somoza would still be in charge in Nicaragua and his amiable brother-in-law still extending abrazos to all and sundry in Washington as dean of the diplomatic corps.

Why did the Carter administration do these things? Because it thought the fall of Somoza would bring progress to Nicaragua. Viron Vaky put it this way:

Nicaragua's tragedy stems from dynastic rule. Times have changed. Nicaragua has changed, but the government of Nicaragua has not.

History was against Somoza. He was an obstacle to progress. He should relinquish power to make room for "change." When he declined to do so, the Carter administration accused him of "polarizing" the situation. When the National Guard responded to FSLN violence with violence, the State Department said that the National Guard had "radicalized the opposition."

On the other hand, the fact that Cubans were supplying arms to the FSLN was not regarded as being of much importance. Brandon Grove, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, explained to the Committee of the House (June 7, 1979):

The flow of such supplies is a symptom of the deeper problem in Nicaragua: polarization and its attendant violence that day by day are contributing to the growing alienation of the Nicaraguan government from its people. . . . The real cause for concern today should be the breakdown . . . of trust between government and people essential for the democratic process to function.

Since the "real" problem was not Cuban arms but Somoza, obviously the U.S. should not act to reinforce the regime that had proved its political and moral failure by becoming the object of attack. Because the State Department desired not to "add to the partisan factionalism," it declined to supply arms to the regime. "The supplying of arms in a war situation we feel only adds to the suffering. We have urged others not to do that."

In the event, the Carter administration did a good deal more than "urge." In June 1979, after the U.S. and the OAS had called for Somoza's resignation, and U.S. representatives William Bowdler and Lawrence Pezzulo had met with the FSLN, the State Department undertook to apply the final squeeze to the Somoza regime—putting pressure on Israel to end arms sales, and working out an oil embargo to speed the capitulation of Somoza's forces. They were so successful that for the second time in a decade an American ally ran out of gas and ammunition while confronting an opponent well armed by the Soviet bloc.

The FSLN were not the State Department's preferred replacement for Somoza. Nevertheless, from spring 1977, when the State Department announced that it was halting a promised arms shipment to Somoza's government, through the summer of 1980, when the administration secured congressional approval of a \$75-million aid package for Nicaragua, U.S. policy under Jimmy Carter was vastly more supportive of the Sandinistas than it was of the Somoza regime, despite the fact that Somoza and his government were as doggedly friendly and responsive to U.S. interests and desires as the Sandinistas have been hostile and non-responsive.

The Carter administration expected that democracy would emerge in Nicaragua. Their scenario prescribed that the winds of change should blow the outmoded dictator out of office and replace him with a popular government. Even after it had become clear that the FSLN, which was known to harbor powerful anti-democratic tendencies, was the dominant force in the new regime, U.S. spokesmen continued to speak of the events in Nicaragua as a democratic revolution. In December 1979, for example, Warren Christopher attempted to reassure doubting members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "the driving consensus among Nicaraguans" was "to build a new Nicaragua through popular participation that is capable of meeting basic human needs."

The expectation that change would produce progress and that socialism equaled social justice made it difficult for Carter policy-makers to assess Nicaragua's new rulers realistically, even though grounds for concern about their intentions, already numerous before the triumph, continued to multiply in its aftermath.

REVOLUTION begins with destruction. The first fruit of the destabilization of Somoza and the reinforcement of his opponents

was a civil war in which some 40,000 Nicaraguans lost their most basic human right (life), another 100,000 were left homeless, and some \$2-billion worth of destruction was wrought. Nicaragua was left in a shambles.

Where did the expectations, the hopes, the intentions of the Carter administration then lead us, and the Nicaraguans who took the consequences? Although the FSLN had solemnly committed itself to hold free elections, its leaders have shown no disposition to share the power they seized in July 1979. To the contrary, the consolidation and centralization of power have moved steadily forward. Despite the strenuous opposition of the two non-FSLN junta members, the Sandinista directorate which has effectively ruled Nicaragua since the fall of Somoza moved in the spring of 1980 to institutionalize its control of Nicaragua's Council of State by expanding and "restructuring" it to insure the Sandinistas a permanent majority. (Under the reform they would be assured of 24 of 47 seats where previously they had been entitled to only 13 of 33.)

Meanwhile, the election to which the FSLN had committed itself has been pushed further and further into a receding future, even though the new rulers, who need all the help they can get, have been under heavy pressure from the governments of Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the United States to set a date. Sandinista leaders have made no secret of their opinion that competitive elections are an unsatisfactory and unnecessary mechanism for choosing rulers. Junta members have asserted that the people spoke through the revolution—"with their blood and with the guns in their hands the people have cast their votes" (as a junta member told the *Economist*)—and that anyway, having been brainwashed by forty years of Somoza rule, they are not capable of choosing among candidates—at least not until they have been "reeducated."

In the last days of August 1980, the restructured Council of State announced that elections will not be held before 1985. And those elections, declared Humberto Ortega Saavedra (Minister of Defense), "will serve to reinforce and improve the revolution and not to give just anyone more power, which belongs to the people." Meanwhile, no "proselytizing activities" on behalf of any candidate will be permitted before candidates are officially designated by an electoral agency which itself will be created in 1984 (and violations will be punished by terms of three months to three years in jail).

Decrees accompanying these decisions have underscored the junta's distaste for criticism. Henceforth, dissemination of news concerning scarcities of food and other consumer goods is prohibited on pain of imprisonment (from two months to two years), as is "unconfirmed" information concerning armed encounters or attacks on government personnel.

These restrictions constitute one more significant step in the Sandinistas' gradual campaign to con-

trol the climate of opinion. The television and radios had already been brought under control. Among opposition newspapers, only *La Prensa* remains, it has already come under pressures more harsh than those applied to the media during the Somoza era, and its continuation as an independent critical voice is at best uncertain. The requirement that all professional journalists join a new government-sponsored union as a condition of employment represents yet another move to bring the press under control. The literacy campaign has extended the junta's reach further into the minds of Nicaragua's people as well as into the countryside. Every lesson in the literacy textbooks instructs students (and teachers) in the prescribed interpretation of Nicaragua's past, present, and future.

PARALLEL efforts to organize and coordinate other traditionally non-governmental associations reflect the characteristic totalitarian desire to absorb the society into the state, to transform social groups into agencies and instruments of the government. This has required taking over some existing institutions (banking, industries, television and radio, trade unions), coopting and/or intimidating others (the private sector, trade unions, the educational establishment, portions of the press), and forcibly eliminating still others—such as the National Guard, whose members have either fled into exile or remain in prison with little prospect of ever being tried, much less released.

When, in early November 1980, representatives of the private sector (COSEP) and the labor federation (CUS) withdrew from the State Council to protest the Sandinistas' ever-tightening grip on all aspects of the economy, no concessions were forthcoming. Instead, the offices of the leading opposition party, the social-democratic MND, were sacked, and an unarmed leader of the private sector, Jorge Salazar, was gunned down by Sandinista police.

Among the traditional pillars of Nicaraguan society only the Church remains relatively intact. While the presence of priests in prominent roles in the Sandinista directorate has facilitated communications between the two groups, this has not been translated into political domination of the Church hierarchy.

But the Sandinistas do not rely on control of these agencies or rules to preserve their power. To accomplish that task new institutions have been forged, the most important of which are an enormous, all-new revolutionary army whose training (military and political) and equipment have been provided by Cubans, and a new internal police force which is already more extensive and effective than Somoza's.

Other institutions developed to support the new government include the "block" committees which were found to be so useful in Cuba (and in Nazi Germany), and the revolutionary brigades initially assigned to the literacy campaign.

The most telling indicator of Sandinista intentions and commitments is their unambiguous identification of Nicaragua with the foreign policy and perspectives of the Soviet Union. The first step was somewhat tentative: Nicaragua only "abstained" on the UN resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Subsequent moves have left less room for doubt. At the Havana conference for the nonaligned nations, Nicaragua became one of the few countries in the world to recognize Kampuchea (the regime imposed by North Vietnam on Cambodia), an act which Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto explained as "a consequence of our revolutionary responsibility as Sandinistas to recognize the right of the peoples of Kampuchea to be free." In Pyongyang, another Sandinista leader, Tomás Borge, assured the North Koreans of Nicaraguan solidarity, and promised, "The Nicaraguan Revolution will not be content until the imperialists have been overthrown in all parts of the world."

In March 1980 the Sandinista directorate offered a public demonstration that its ties extended beyond Cuba to the Socialist Fatherland itself when four top leaders—Moises Morales Hassan, Tomás Borge, Henry Hernandez Ruiz, and Humberto Ortega Saavedra—paid an official visit to the Soviet Union. A joint communiqué formalized the attachment of Nicaragua to Soviet global policy. In addition to signing multiple agreements concerning trade and cooperation, condemning South Africa and Chile, applauding Zimbabwe, Khomeini's Iran, and the "legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine," the "two sides" strongly attacked the NATO decision to deploy medium-range nuclear missile weapons and condemned the "mounting international tension in connection with the events in Afghanistan, which has been launched by the imperialist and reactionary forces aimed at subverting the inalienable rights of the people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and of other peoples . . . to follow a path of progressive transformation."

Since "Zionism's loss of a bastion in Nicaragua" (Moises Hassan), the ties with the "Palestinian people" have become not closer, but more public. The PLO and the Sandinistas have long enjoyed a relationship of mutual support, we are now told. Sandinistas trained in Palestinian camps, and participated in PLO raids; the PLO reciprocated by ferrying arms to the Sandinistas in their hour of need. Yasir Arafat received high honors when in July 1980 he opened a PLO embassy in Managua where he assured the "workers" that "the triumph of the Nicaraguans is the PLO's triumph."

"We have emerged from one dictatorship and entered another," asserted MND leader Alfonso Robelo recently. "Nicaragua has become a satellite of a satellite of the Soviet Union."

NOTHING that happened in Nicaragua seemed able to dampen the Carter people's enthusiasm for "change" in Central

America. In El Salvador, Guatemala, Bolivia, and wherever else the opportunity presented itself, the administration aligned the United States with the "forces of change." "The fundamental problem we share with our neighbors," Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher explained, "is not that of defending stability in the face of revolution. Rather, it is to build a more stable, equitable, and pluralistic order. That is the challenge of Nicaragua in the present day and that is the challenge of the whole region."

To meet the challenge the administration welcomed with enthusiasm a military coup in El Salvador which, in October 1979, overthrew President Carlos Humberto Romero, an event the State Department described as a "watershed date" on which "young officers broke with the old repressive order" and along with "progressive civilians" formed a government committed to "profound social and economic reforms, respect for human rights and democracy."

Until the violent events of November-December 1980, which also saw the suspension of U.S. aid, the Carter administration backed the new Salvadoran junta in the only way it knew how: by helping it to bring about "profound social and economic reforms." In the effort to preempt the revolution and expedite the achievements of "social justice," the administration supplied experts who have planned the most thoroughgoing land reform in the Western hemisphere. To encourage and finance these and related reforms, the U.S. embassy provided nearly \$20 million in long-term loans at very low interest. Under the direction of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, an AFL-CIO-sponsored group, a plan was drafted to transfer to some 250,000 of El Salvador's 800,000 peasants ownership of the land they work.

So far, not all the land has been transferred, and titles have not been delivered for much of what has been transferred. Few of the former owners have yet received any significant compensation. In theory, the reforms will vaccinate the masses against Communism by giving them a stake in the society. In practice, as was made dramatically clear by the murder of three American nuns and a social worker in early December, continuing violence from Communists, anti-Communists, and simple criminals has brought death and destruction to El Salvador. Under the pressure of that violence, the society has begun to come apart. "There is no name for what exists in my country," commented a Salvadoran, describing the almost random murder, intimidation, and looting. But there is a name; it is anarchy.

The U.S. under Carter was more eager to impose land reform than elections in El Salvador. Although claims and counterclaims have been exchanged, there is no way of knowing whether the junta (in any of its manifestations) has enjoyed much popular support. It combines Christian Democrats, committed to finding a middle way

of "true democracy" between capitalism and Communism, with representatives of various tendencies within the armed forces. It is chronically threatened with schism from within and coup from without. Though its civilian members and their State Department supporters have consistently emphasized the danger from the Right—that is, from authoritarian, intensely anti-Communist defenders of the status quo—El Salvador is more likely in the long run to fall to a coalition of revolutionaries trained, armed, and advised by Cuba and others. The cycle of escalating terror and repression is already far advanced. By failing to offer the junta the arms and advice required to turn back the well-equipped insurgency, the Carter administration undermined the junta's ability to survive and encouraged the insurgents in their conviction of ultimate victory.

CENTRAL AMERICA was not the only target of the Carter administration's restless search for "constructive change" in the hemisphere. Pressures were applied, and resisted, in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia. In Bolivia, the State Department withdrew our ambassador, "drew down" the embassy staff to approximately half its normal size, cancelled U.S. aid, terminated the Drug Enforcement Agency's program that aimed at reducing the production of coca (and cocaine), and indicated in a dozen other ways its determination not to accept the military junta whose seizure of power prevented the inauguration of Hernan Siles Zuazo as President.

Why did the U.S. work so hard to undo a coup which had prevented the accession to power of a man whose vice president had strong Castroite leanings and ties, whose coalition included the Communist party of Bolivia and the Castroite MIR, and whose elevation had been strongly supported by the Soviet Union? When Siles Zuazo polled 38 percent of the vote in a race against moderate socialist Victor Paz Estenssoro, and the more conservative Hugo Banzer Suárez, the selection of the President was left to the Congress. No legal or conventional niceties required that U.S. influence be exerted on behalf of the selection of Siles Zuazo rather than one of the other candidates. Yet Siles Zuazo became "the American candidate" even though the military had made clear that his selection would not be tolerated. After conversations with the U.S. ambassador that included both threats and promises of aid, Paz Estenssoro withdrew and Siles's selection was insured. The predictable coup occurred.

Even five years ago, the U.S. would have welcomed a coup that blocked a government with a significant Communist/Castroite component. Ten years ago the U.S. would have sponsored it, fifteen years ago we would have conducted it. This time, however, the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia and the State Department lobbied hard in Washington and with the press against the new military rulers, insisting that what had occurred was not a coup

like the two hundred previous ones, but a singularly objectionable coup marked by unique violence, engineered by foreigners, and led by drug traffickers. The State Department's campaign coincided with a Soviet press offensive, resulting in a sustained international campaign bent on bringing Siles to power.

One understands the desire to see constitutional democracy replace authoritarian governments in Bolivia. Despite a good deal of recent myth-making to the contrary, Americans have always believed that democracy is the best government for everyone. What was unusual about the Carter policy was the *intensity* of the expressed disapproval and of the administration's preference for a government that included in its leadership persons effectively attached to Soviet policies and hostile to the United States. The decision to throw its weight behind Siles reflected the characteristic predilections of the Carter administration in Latin America, including its indifference to strategic concerns and its tendency to believe that leftists were more likely than any other group to bring democracy and social justice to the area. Supporting Siles seemed to offer the Carter administration an opportunity to assume its preferred role: trying to "moderate," by its good will and friendship, the "extreme" elements in a governing coalition committed to "basic" social change.

BECAUSE it failed to take account of basic characteristics of Latin political systems, the Carter administration underestimated the fragility of order in these societies and overestimated the ease with which authority, once undermined, can be restored. Because it regarded revolutionaries as beneficent agents of change, it mistook their goals and motives and could not grasp the problem of governments which become the object of revolutionary violence. Because it misunderstood the relations between economics and politics, it wrongly assumed (as in El Salvador) that economic reforms would necessarily and promptly produce positive political results. Because it misunderstood the relations between "social justice" and authority, it assumed that only "just" governments can survive. Finally, because it misunderstood the relations between justice and violence, the Carter administration fell (and

pushed its allies) into an effort to fight howitzers with land reform and urban guerrillas with improved fertilizers.

Above all, the Carter administration failed to understand *politics*. Politics is conducted by persons who by various means, including propaganda and violence, seek to realize some vision of the public good. Those visions may be beneficent or diabolic. But they constitute the real motives of real political actors. When men are treated like "forces" (or the agents of forces), their intentions, values, and world view tend to be ignored. But in Nicaragua the intentions and ideology of the Sandinistas have already shaped the outcome of the revolution, as in El Salvador the intentions and ideology of the leading revolutionaries create intransigence where there might have been willingness to cooperate and compromise, nihilism where there might have been reform.

The first step in the reconstruction of U.S. policy for Latin America is intellectual. It requires thinking more realistically about the politics of Latin America, about the alternatives to existing governments, and about the amounts and kinds of aid and time that would be required to improve the lives and expand the liberties of the people of the area. The choices are frequently unattractive.

The second step toward a more adequate policy is to assess realistically the impact of various alternatives on the security of the United States and on the safety and autonomy of the other nations of the hemisphere.

The third step is to abandon the globalist approach which denies the realities of culture, character, geography, economics, and history in favor of a vague, abstract, universalism "stripped," in Edmund Burke's words, "of every relation," standing "in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction." What must replace it is a foreign policy that builds (again Burke) on the "concrete circumstances" which "give . . . to every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect."

Once the intellectual debris has been cleared away, it should become possible to construct a Latin American policy that will protect U.S. security interests and make the actual lives of actual people in Latin America somewhat better and somewhat freer.

5. Reagan's Latin America *

BY TOM J. FARER

Tom J. Farer is Distinguished Professor at Rutgers-Camden Law School and President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States. Professor Farer's re-election in June 1981 as head of the Commission—he is the first U.S. citizen to hold elected office in the O.A.S.—was unanimous despite an attack on him by the Chilean government for views expressed in the following article. Chile also announced it was suspending cooperation with the Human Rights Commission because of the article. In a written response, Professor Farer pointed out that the facts he cited were consistent with conclusions in a Commission report on Chile.

SOME of President Reagan's advisers believe that Jimmy Carter had a clear policy for dealing with Third World countries, and that it was wrong, above all in Latin America. Probably the most detailed and influential statement of their view is the article "Dictatorships and Double Standards." The central problem, according to Professor Kirkpatrick, is "that of formulating a morally and strategically acceptable, and politically realistic, program for dealing with

* *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, March 19, 1981, pp. 10-16. For convenience, some of the author's footnotes have been bracketed into the text by the Editors.

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non-democratic governments who are threatened by Soviet-sponsored subversion."

Drawing principally on Iran and Nicaragua, she describes what she takes to be a typical "non-democratic" government and the wrong-headed response to it she had come to expect from the Carter administration.

In such a government, a long-established autocrat is supported by a private army—which owes allegiance to him and his family rather than to some abstract idea of the state. The autocrat tolerates "limited opposition, including opposition newspapers and political parties." But because he is "confronted by radical, violent opponents bent on social and political revolution," he must sometimes invoke martial law to arrest, imprison, exile, "and occasionally, it was alleged" (Kirkpatrick says, referring to the specific cases of Iran and Nicaragua) "torture [his] opponents." The autocrat enriches himself in large part by confusing his own resources with those of the state and makes no attempt "to alter significantly the distribution of goods, status, or power."

In the past, this model autocrat was a good friend of the United States and successive American administrations gave him tangible and intangible support. But then came Jimmy Carter. . . .

Kirkpatrick's remedies follow ineluctably from her diagnosis of Carter's errors. The United States must not undermine friendly authoritarian governments. It may encourage a "process of liberalization and democratization, provided that the effort is not made at a time when the incumbent government is fighting for its life against violent adversaries, and that proposed reforms are aimed at producing gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight." When Marxists or other enemies of the United States seek violently to overthrow the traditional order, the United States should send aid, not excluding the Marines.

Of this proposal, it may be said, first, that it rests on an almost demented parody of Latin American [and Caribbean] political realities as well as on a grave misperception of Carter's policies and achievements. On the most elementary facts Kirkpatrick is misinformed, for example when she claims that Carter "disarmed" Somoza. Before the last round of the Nicaraguan conflict, Somoza's National Guard bristled with weapons supplied by Argentina and Israel. Passing to more important misconceptions, dictatorial regimes of the Somoza type are far less common today than they were twenty or thirty years ago when Kirkpatrick's views seem to have been formed. A few relics survive: Duvalier, Jr., in Haiti, Stroessner in Paraguay. But in number, population, resources, and strategic importance,

such countries are inconsequential compared to the Hemisphere's other nondemocratic, anticommunist governments, including those in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay. Nor, despite his success in eliminating all personal rivals, does her model apply to Pinochet's Chile.

In these authoritarian countries, the names at the top can and generally do change without any shifts in the pattern of wealth and political power. Formidable institutions are in control, usually the armed forces, a notable exception being Mexico's dominant political party, [the Institutional Revolutionary Party], and the huge state bureaucracy dependent on it. And these institutions work within a complicated setting of interest groups—including various sectors of the national business community, multinational corporations, the Catholic Church, professionals' guilds, the state bureaucracy, and occasionally (and in most cases marginally) trade unions—all struggling to influence the regime's economic and social policies. It is a political world very different from the one conjured up by Kirkpatrick. [Even outside Latin America, Kirkpatrick's model fits reality poorly. While it covers the little states of the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia, and a few African states like Zaïre and the Ivory Coast, it does not apply to such "Free World" allies as Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea.]

While the eccentricity of Kirkpatrick's account may raise doubts about her competence for public service, what matters more is the effect her account is likely to have on policy makers who confuse it with reality. Any political order sustained by little more than the force of a single autocrat's or family's prestige is bound to be precarious, especially where that prestige is linked to the ruler's bestial behavior or his special relationship with a feared or admired great power. Regarding such cases as the norm, Kirkpatrick not surprisingly demands we form a circle of fire around our protégés as soon as reformers of any kind appear armed in the street. What would she do about those missionaries (nuns?) and other "activists" as she calls them who get in the way of hard-nosed policy? One possible hint appears in an interview Kirkpatrick gave after the election. Commenting on the torture, mutilation, and summary execution of the civilian leaders of El Salvador's left-wing coalition, she said that "people who choose to live by the sword can expect to die by it." [*The New York Times*, December 7, 1980] So apparently any form of association with rebels makes one fair game.

If we turn from Kirkpatrick's model to the real world, we find instead of the old-style caudillos, regimes of a very different character. Roughly half the members of the Organization of American States are recognizable democracies, including, for example, Venezuela,

Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and most of the Anglophonic states of the Caribbean. Kirkpatrick has little to say about democracy in such Third World countries other than to doubt its existence when it elects leaders who practice socialism, criticize the United States, and talk with Castro. While castigating Carter for tolerating the Manley regime in Jamaica, she refers to it as a "so-called democracy." One wonders whether the recent transfer of power there has shaken her implied assumption that socialism is totalitarianism aching to be born. For her, the heart of our Third World problem is the regime that is anticommunist, but authoritarian, brutal, poor, corrupt, and hence unloved by the liberals.

One redeeming feature of Kirkpatrick's essay is its demonstration of how a distinction that could be useful, between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, is being subverted by dogmatists who assign practically all rulers professing capitalism and trying to liquidate leftists to the category of "merely authoritarian" while coincidentally expelling every revolutionary government and movement into the outer darkness of totalitarianism. In this way the distinction has become simply a polemical weapon, useful for attacking Carter's human rights policy and for countering criticism of regimes that brutally crush proponents of reform, liberals, socialists, and Marxists alike.

In order to maintain their Manichaean vision, former liberals like Kirkpatrick must practice a heroic indifference to detail. The revolutionary who haunts their hysterical prose never acquires a face. Neo-conservatives ask no questions about the particulars of time and place and program, about why a man or woman has assumed the awful peril of rebellion; they never ask because, for their crabbed purposes, they have all the necessary answers. Having taken up arms—some of them Cuban or Russian or otherwise tainted—against an anticommunist government, the revolutionary is either a totalitarian communist or a foolish tool, not to mention a "terrorist."

You find an equivalent coarseness of thought in the pages of *Pravda*, where the Soviet counterparts of our intellectual thugs ask not, "Who is Lech Walesa?" but rather, "Whom does Walesa consciously or unconsciously serve?" Since his opponent is a loyal communist government, for *Pravda* the only possible answer is "U.S. Imperialism."

Kirkpatrick herself admits that absolute monsters such as Hitler and Stalin or Pol Pot and Papa Doc Duvalier will occasionally appear at both ends of the imagined political spectrum. What concerns her, however, are the

systemic differences between traditional and revolutionary autocracies that have a predictable effect on their degree of repressiveness. Generally

speaking, traditional autocrats tolerate social inequities, brutality, and poverty while revolutionary autocracies create them.

Traditional autocrats . . . do not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of residence, habitual patterns of family and personal relations. Because the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people who, growing up in the society, learn to cope, as children born to untouchables in India acquire the skills and attitudes necessary for survival in the miserable roles they are destined to fill.

The other presumed moral advantage of anticommunist autocracies is their capacity for evolution toward more humane societies.

Nothing so well illustrates the stupefying power of dogma than this attribution of permanence to revolutionary regimes and of an always latent fluidity to most conservative ones. In any fair test of durability, the latter make an impressive showing. The Somoza family, for example, lasted forty-five years. By monopolizing so much of the nation's economy, it had, by the time of its overthrow, actually reduced the possibility of democratic evolution.

Military rule in El Salvador, to take another current example, has endured since Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first election. If we use a measure more relevant to human rights and equate the "regime" with a very rigid structure of power and wealth and opportunity, then El Salvador had a stable autocracy from its independence in the early nineteenth century at least until the armed forces coup of 1979. What was characteristic of this period was not "evolution" toward democracy but prevention of that evolution. In Peru, one hundred and fifty years of oligarchic control ended in 1968 not through democratic evolution but by means of reforms imposed by the armed forces.

Authoritarian governments of every ideological hue extend their jurisdiction as far as necessary to achieve their ends. They tolerate autonomous activity outside the formal state structure only when it is harmless or when it is informally but effectively integrated with the regime. In El Salvador before 1979, the military government and a small group of capitalists ("the fourteen families") consciously shared virtually the same interests and acted together. Though the press was nominally free, mass circulation newspapers in San Salvador conformed to the policies of the ruling groups.

"Preserving the existing distribution of wealth and power and poverty" is a deceptive summary of the goals of Kirkpatrick's "traditional autocrats." It is deceptive in that it implies that Latin American nations exist in a state of muscular placidity, as if society were ruled by a group of not necessarily good-natured but decidedly unam-

bitious thugs who have no serious ambition beyond retaining control of their privileges and extorting protection money and are willing to live and let live. When threatened by violent assault, of course they will actively hurt people—the violent malcontents and their sympathizers. But once the problem is liquidated, the “ordinary people” who want only to be left alone will come out of the cellar, where they have been hiding to avoid getting caught in the cross-fire, and docilely resume their “habitual rhythms.”

This image is unreal because it misses the dynamic character of contemporary Latin American societies. When the masses are quiet, unambitious rulers can be placid. Today their serenity is constantly disturbed. All the interconnected tendencies of recent years—urbanization, industrialization, rapid population increase, the vast spread of TV and transistor radios, revolutionary ideas about man and society—have unleashed a torrent of demands that may seem all the more terrifying because they cannot be suppressed by a government's administering exemplary punishment from time to time. Feeling a consequent need for sterner and more sweeping measures, rulers claim that national security requires them to impose comprehensive surveillance and more tightly controlled social institutions by increasing the power and reach of public authority.

This political project is “corporatism,” fascism's cousin. As the Yale political scientist Alfred Stepan notes in his penetrating study of Peru's corporatist experiment, it has two poles. At the “inclusionary pole,” the state offers working-class groups positive inducements to take part in its political and economic plans, as did the first Perón regime in Argentina, Lázaro Cárdenas in pre-war Mexico, and Peru's military government before it turned to the right in 1975. At the “exclusionary pole,” the state elite relies heavily on coercion to break up existing working-class organizations and then to institutionalize docility. Chile under Pinochet is a particularly harsh example.

When the second of the two patterns predominates, as in Brazil and Chile following their respective military coups [Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973], it follows that universities are purged, political parties dissolved, unions reorganized, dissidents murdered, the Church harassed, all as part of a huge effort first to demobilize the popular classes, and then to direct and strain their demands through new, purified institutions subject to manipulation by the state. In this effort, which has been analyzed with particular brilliance by the Argentine social scientist Guillermo O'Donnell, the ruling groups can be said to be following, consciously or not, the example of empires like that of Rome which for several centuries aggressively expanded its domain in a furious effort to liquidate threats to the status quo before they became unmanageable.

Seeking to preserve their own status quo, uncompromising right-wing governments ape the campaigns of classical revolutionary regimes to remove every source of dissent. They call themselves conservative. They are anticommunist. They will say nice thing about the Free World. And contrary to Kirkpatrick's optimistic speculations, they often take society on a road without any democratic exit.

The defense of right-wing authoritarian regimes finds a receptive, uncritical audience among many Americans because deeply ingrained ideological commitments affect their moral sensitivity. Anyone familiar with conditions in Haiti, for example, knows that its desperately hungry people would emigrate en masse if only a country able to provide life's basic needs would open its doors. Although poverty and the nature of the Duvalier regime are linked, since that autocracy is noncommunist the U.S. government presumes that its refugees who reach our shores merely flee economic "conditions" and must therefore be turned back. On the other hand, practically all Cubans who arrive here are presumed to be fleeing political persecution rather than economic privation.

Another case of selective perception: If a revolutionary state commands people to move from one section of a country to another, we naturally condemn this ugly act as violating the right to travel freely and choose one's place of residence. But if the state enforces an absentee landowner's decision to expel sharecroppers, who have tilled the land for generations, and if the landowner's choice was a rational response to market forces, even if those forces were themselves determined by political decisions about subsidies or the tariff on imported farm equipment, many economists will applaud it. Farming will be more efficient, free marketeers will say, and sharecroppers will eventually find employment in more productive and hence better-paying activities. Or at least, it is claimed, they would if only markets could be manipulated to function in accordance with theory.

The account of the Third World provided by Kirkpatrick and those who think like her obscures the realities of life under authoritarian governments—not only the torture and murder of political dissidents but also the more subtle yet often more comprehensively destructive acts carried out through the operation and manipulation of economic forces in societies with vast gaps between the power and education and wealth of relatively few people and the rest of the population, a pattern of inequality often inherited from a precapitalist era. In countries like Brazil and Guatemala, these differences and the statist tradition that goes with them multiply the community-shattering impact of capitalism by placing the state at the service of a relatively few powerful people.

Acting through the state, the few can require proof of land tenure

which illiterate peasants cannot produce. They can manipulate the exchange rate to encourage high technology imports at the expense of high employment. They can prohibit strikes and hold wage increases below the rate of inflation. They can subsidize large-scale agriculture and monopolize irrigation, while withholding subsidies for basic consumption goods. They can and do intervene in a thousand ways which have the predictable effect of uprooting whole communities because neither they nor the state apparatus is a neutral arbiter guided by some abstract calculus of national interest. One certainly need not be a Marxist to see this. And one needs only a minimum of candor to admit it.

Quietly and anonymously, economic and social forces unleashed or at least aided by the state can eliminate entire cultures. Sylvia Hewlett notes in her recent study of Brazil that there remained during the 1950s "a major concentration of indigenous tribes (numbering approximately 200,000 people) in the Amazon and central regions. . . ." [*The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth Century Brazil* (New York, 1979), p. 171] As a consequence of the decision to open up these regions through highway building, colonization schemes, and other means, the indigenous population is disappearing. Some Indians will survive disoriented, adrift on the edge of an alien world. As for their "habitual patterns of family and personal relations," soon the world will forget that they ever existed.

Honest scholarship would have to ask what is the difference between a revolutionary state that decides to eliminate a group with bayonets and one that proceeds to do so by indirection. Both claim that they are promoting modernization and advancing national interests as defined by those who rule. Yet one case rightly horrifies us and will command the attention of Walter Cronkite while the other passes almost unnoticed.

Conservatives are properly impressed by Brazil's rapid expansion and the deepening of its industrial base during the era of intense political repression—1968-1973. They tend to be silent about its record in producing equity or welfare. A recent World Bank study using 1977 figures estimates that 65 percent of the Brazilian population age fifteen and above is functionally illiterate; the figure runs close to 90 percent in rural areas. ["Brazil: Human Resources Special Report," World Bank Staff Working Paper (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 28-31] Roughly 20 percent of the children in Brazil are in a state of second or third degree malnutrition (body weight 25 percent or more below normal).

According to figures cited by Hewlett, between 1960 and 1973 the rate of infant mortality in São Paulo (the richest part of Brazil) in-

creased 45 percent to a high of ninety-seven deaths per thousand live births.

[This might have something to do with the fact that in the ten years following the coup of 1964, the percentage of national income obtained by the wealthiest 10 percent of the population increased from 39 to 50. Sri Lanka's per capita income is roughly one-eighth of Brazil's, or about the same as that of a town in the rural northeast of Brazil; its infant mortality figure is about half of São Paulo. Life expectancy in Sri Lanka is sixty-eight. See tables in James P. Grant's *Disparity Reduction Rates in Social Indicators*, Overseas Development Council, Monograph No. 11, 1978.] Life expectancy for the middle and upper classes of São Paulo is estimated to be around sixty-seven. The poor in parts of the rural northeast still have a life expectancy of only about forty years. Such misery is no doubt "familiar," as Kirkpatrick claims, but unlike our new ambassador to the U.N., even a minister in the Brazilian government wonders if it is bearable. In a recent interview with *Veja*, Brazil's equivalent of *Newsweek*, the present Minister of Industry and Commerce, João Camilo Penna, said:

The country possesses today a social stratum with high managerial capacity that has, however, a great debt with 40 million humble Brazilians. A debt that, if it is not paid, will result in these humble people being turned into humiliated people. And after humiliated people, I don't know.

Preoccupied with such games as distinguishing between the "authoritarian" and the "totalitarian," many people concerned with U.S. diplomacy have failed to notice changes in Latin American institutions that have been unfolding in the shadows cast by state and private terrorism. Perhaps the most important of these is the emergence of national human rights movements. Under a variety of names, often supported by the Catholic Church, these movements have united hereditary political enemies in alliances reminiscent of wartime France. In countries where the armed forces agree to return to their barracks, these Latin analogies to the Resistance could emerge as stable, center-to-left political coalitions able to carry out orderly programs of economic and social reform. In most of the Western hemisphere today, moreover—unlike postwar Western Europe—the orthodox Moscow-oriented party is only a fragment of the left, in many countries a trivial one. [Moreover, unlike some leftist groups, the communist party during the past two decades with few exceptions—e.g., recently in El Salvador—has generally sought popular front alliances and opposed armed revolution. For that reason, particularly during the 1960s, romantic followers of Che Guevara despised

the orthodox communists. In the El Salvador case, most of the likely participants in a conventional popular front, including the social democrats, had already decided to back an armed struggle for social change.]

The experience of modern authoritarian government has enhanced the prospects for such coalitions. Frustrated in the 1960s by the obduracy of vested interests, their imagination fired by illusions about the Cuban revolution, susceptible to a rigidly Marxist view of norms and political institutions, reformers in such countries as Brazil, Colombia, and Chile tended to see democratic politics only as the means of preserving privilege. They became correspondingly insensitive to the violence lying beneath the accumulated restraints and tolerance of relatively decent social orders.

They have since learned how ferociously competent modern security forces can be and how private leftist terrorism can evoke deep antipathy throughout societies with liberal if not always strictly democratic traditions; the result in such countries as Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil has been increased support of unrestrained counterterrorism. However, moderates and conservatives who have seen their children ground up in the state's security machine also have had a lesson in the difficulty of stopping violence once it rushes into the streets.

The failure of Cuba's economic model is another factor in the education of the left. Fidel Castro himself has helped to disseminate the bad news and has drawn one of the appropriate conclusions. In conversations with Alfonso Robelo, leader of the political opposition to the present Nicaraguan government, and with Sandinista leaders, Castro emphasized the importance of preserving a significant private business sector. Some Central and South American leftists may still be reluctant to admit it, but they cannot indefinitely evade the fact that a commitment to a private sector is also a commitment to some species of political pluralism.

Advocates of democratic reform face enormous difficulties. In many Latin American countries a demographic explosion is taking place while the economy relies on a capital-intensive technology that was developed in the labor-scarce states of Europe and North America—a combination that usually creates very high levels of unemployment. Also imported from the developed states are consumer appetites that stimulate the greed of the well-to-do. Because international capital is hard to obtain, politicians and businessmen feel they must compete for it by suppressing every sign of social disorder; and modern technology provides an apparatus for official terror beyond the dreams of nineteenth-century rulers. Western stagflation meanwhile threatens export markets and consequently the ability to finance growth of any kind.

The rush to authoritarian governments in the Sixties and early Seventies heightened academic appreciation of these and related obstacles, and encouraged a pessimistic determinism about projects for social and political reform. But the failure of countries like Chile and Uruguay to reproduce the Brazilian economic "miracle" by combining assaults on the working class with an open door to international capital has helped to undermine confidence in the stability of that formula for social order. It received another blow recently when Uruguayan voters rejected a constitution designed by the armed forces to perpetuate their rule. The democratic impulse has not yielded to competing claims to legitimacy.

The great question is whether reform coalitions can increase equity and welfare without sacrificing the long-term growth necessary for peaceful relations between classes. If they can, they should satisfy the demands of the Latin American military officers who have seized power in order to halt class warfare and the consequent disintegration of all traditional institutions, including the armed forces themselves. Plausible blueprints are available. In the case of Brazil, for instance, a recent confidential study shows how moderate changes in government policy designed substantially to reduce inequality could also do much to relieve the shortages of energy and foreign exchange that threaten the country's future. A more equitable distribution of income would coincidentally benefit domestically controlled private businesses because they enjoy a comparative advantage over multinational corporations in producing basic consumer goods.

Most of Latin America is now open to renewed projects for democratic social reform, or could soon become so. Carter helped to shape this more promising situation by insisting that the way a regime treats its own people has to affect the quality of its relations with the United States. Having initially disarmed himself by forswearing intervention in trade or private capital as a means of defending human rights, he could, however, offer few incentives and he used few convincing threats. By 1977, only a derisory amount of bilateral economic aid was available to reward good behavior.

In a few cases Carter could and did block or delay aid to authoritarian states such as Argentina from international financial institutions; but various, partially self-imposed, constraints made this a rarely used and only marginally threatening weapon. In cautioning authoritarian governments against repression, Carter drew mainly on the accumulated prestige of the United States among Latin American military establishments and the upper classes. His considerable achievements, including fair elections in the Dominican Republic, are partly owing to the weight of American influence, but primarily to the gathering force of human rights as an ideal that cuts across deep divisions of

class and ideology in Latin America. That force powerfully multiplied the effect of Carter's efforts.

Simply by acting to demonstrate some continuity in Washington's support for human rights, Ronald Reagan could easily match Carter's achievement. He needs to act quickly. His victory has particularly encouraged the predators in those few remaining social jungles where an alliance of corrupted soldiers, industrialists, and landowners would rather fight to the last worker, peasant, politician, and priest than accept reform.

While campaigning for the presidency, Mr. Reagan allowed certain ideologues who were vindictive toward all critics of traditional capitalist order to speak in his name. Responsible Republicans such as Congressman Jack Kemp should urge the president to reject association of American power with conservatism that relies on vicious repression. They should act because it is the right thing to do; and because it is in the national interest that Latin Americans succeed in establishing capitalism with a human face.

CONGRESS AND EL SALVADOR*

OVERVIEW

During 1981 the Congress supported President Reagan's provision of increased military and economic assistance to the civilian-military junta facing guerrilla warfare in El Salvador, but it insisted on placing explicit conditions on the aid to insure that congressional concerns were taken into account. With the initial options of banning all aid to El Salvador, as proposed by a segment of Congress, or of approving unrestricted aid to El Salvador, as urged by the administration, the Congress adopted a compromise. It approved the increased aid requested by the administration, while requiring a presidential certification that the Salvadoran Government was improving the human rights conditions in the country, was continuing the political and economic reforms, and was seeking a political resolution of the conflict.

Some observers argued that congressional opposition to U.S. policy in El Salvador and the insistence on conditions had the effect of restraining the administration, forcing it to keep military advisers out of combat areas, to emphasize economic assistance and reforms, and to modify the tone of the policy by stressing junta-held democratic elections. Others argued that the certification requirement had been an inadequate mechanism to modify administration policy, especially after President Reagan made the first congressionally-required certification on January 28, 1982, despite several reports on continuing human rights violations.

BACKGROUND

The provision of U.S. military and economic aid to the various governments in El Salvador has been controversial in Congress for the last several years. The central debate has focused on the nature of the regime and whether or not the United States should be associated with it.

In the early years of the Carter administration, the United States provided no military assistance and approximately \$10 to \$15 million per year in economic assistance to the government of General Carlos Humberto Romero. This position was taken on the grounds that the Romero government represented a continuation of the military-elite alliance that had controlled Salvadoran politics for more than 30 years partly by repressing some emerging opposition forces and by manipulating the electoral results in 1972 and 1977 to prevent a victory by a coalition of parties dominated by the Christian Democrats. When congressional hearings were held in March 1977¹ on alleged electoral and

*Prepared by K. Larry Storrs, Analyst in Latin American Affairs.

¹U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Inter-American Affairs, *The Recent Presidential Elections in El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy*, Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st sess., Mdr. 9 and 17, 1977, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

Reproduced from U.S. Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, *Congress and Foreign Policy—1981*, Committee Print, 97th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982, p. 115-131.

human rights abuses in the country, including the persecution of reform-minded clergy, El Salvador followed Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Guatemala in refusing further military aid from the United States.

After the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in July 1979, the Carter administration was particularly concerned about the mounting violence by rightwing and leftwing groups in El Salvador and the escalating killings attributed to Salvadoran security forces. It encouraged the Romero government to enact moderate reforms and to advance the presidential elections to contain the explosive situation.²

When junior military officers overthrew the Romero government in October 1979 and set up a civilian-military junta that promised extensive reforms, including land reform, the Carter administration welcomed the change. After the first junta collapsed, the military made a pact with the Christian Democratic Party in January 1980, and shortly thereafter the civilian-military junta launched extensive reforms, including a land reform and a banking reform. By March of 1980, important civilian supporters, including the social democratic MNR and the left wing of the Christian Democratic Party, had resigned, charging that the junta was unable to control security force repression. A short time later, these moderate left groups joined forces with the militant left "popular organizations" to create the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) which became aligned with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas in the effort to topple the junta.

The Carter administration acted quickly to aid the civilian-military junta, arguing that it was preferable to the leftwing guerrillas or to rightwing forces associated with the Romero government.³ Largely through reprogramings, approved or accepted by Congress, the administration provided \$5.9 million in military assistance, \$9.1 million in economic support funds (ESF), and \$49.9 million in economic aid in fiscal year 1980 funds. It also requested \$5.5 million in military assistance and over \$20 million in economic assistance for fiscal year 1981. The military assistance package was particularly controversial in Congress, especially after Archbishop Romero wrote President Carter in February 1980 urging him not to provide U.S. military aid because it would increase the injustice and repression practiced by the Salvadoran security forces. In the end, the military assistance was approved with the understanding with the Senate Appropriations Committee that it was not to include any "lethal" military equipment.

Concern over U.S. aid to El Salvador mounted when Archbishop Romero was assassinated in March 1980, when leftists sponsored massive general strikes and seizures of buildings in June, July, and August, and when six key leaders of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) were murdered near San Salvador in November 1980. This concern peaked when four American churchwomen were killed in December 1980, and when the head of El Salvador's agrarian reform program

² U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. *Central America at the Crossroads*. Hearings, 96th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 11 and 12, 1979. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 3, 8.

³ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. *Assessment of Conditions in Central America*. Hearings, 96th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 29 and May 20, 1980. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. 46-48.

and two U.S. advisers on agrarian unionization were killed in January 1981.

After the deaths of the U.S. nuns, the Carter administration suspended aid to El Salvador and sent a special delegation to the country to investigate charges that Salvadoran security forces were responsible for the murders. About two weeks later, after Christian Democratic leader Napoleon Duarte was named President of the junta in a major reorganization, the United States restored economic aid, but conditioned resumption of military aid on reduction in violence in the country and progress in the investigation of the murdered churchwomen. A month later, when FMLN guerrillas launched a "final offensive" on January 10, 1981. President Carter resumed the \$5 million in "non-lethal" military aid. A few days later, he added another \$5 million of emergency military assistance, under the provisions of section 506A of the Foreign Assistance Act, consisting of arms and ammunition and the leasing of six U.S. Army helicopters.⁴

THE CENTRAL DEBATE IN 1981 OVER U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY JUNTA

As President Reagan took office in January 1981, the situation in El Salvador was changing dramatically, focusing public attention on the issue. While the civilian-military junta was headed by Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte, giving it a more moderate image, it was confronting for the first time a serious guerrilla offensive mounted by the FMLN guerrillas with the support of the FDR. Moreover, this was occurring at a time when U.S. public support for the junta was diminishing as a result of the killings of the U.S. nuns and agrarian advisers.

The Reagan administration immediately supported the Duarte-led junta in El Salvador and characterized the issue as a test case in the struggle against communism. After issuing a "white paper" in February to support its charges that the Salvadoran guerrillas were receiving military aid from Soviet bloc countries through Cuba and Nicaragua, it increased United States economic and military aid to the junta and sent three teams of high level envoys to brief European and Latin American leaders on what it saw to be "indirect aggression" against the country.⁵ Using section 506A of the Foreign Assistance Act, President Reagan provided \$25 million in emergency military assistance in March 1981, increasing the total of fiscal year 1981 military assistance from \$10.4 million to \$35.4 million. In addition, about 40 additional U.S. military advisers were sent to El Salvador to train the Salvadoran Armed Forces in counterinsurgency methods. Primarily by reprogramings, approved or accepted by Congress, the administration also significantly increased fiscal year 1981 economic assistance, providing a total of \$33.3 million in developmental assist-

⁴ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Assistance to El Salvador, May 1981 (Gist Series). Under the Special Authority of Section 506(a), the President, after determining that "an unforeseen emergency exists which requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country * * *" that cannot otherwise be provided, was permitted to provide emergency military aid of up to \$30 million, later increased to \$75 million, in any fiscal year.

⁵ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Communist Interference in El Salvador," Special Report No. 80, Feb. 23, 1981, Washington, 1981. When articles appeared in the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post in June 1981 questioning the accuracy of the white paper, the State Department issued a detailed rebuttal that admitted some "misstated detail" but reaffirmed the main conclusions.

ance, \$26.3 in Public Law 480 aid, and \$44.9 million in economic support funds during the fiscal year. Simultaneously, the administration requested \$26 million in military assistance, \$40 million in ESF funds, and \$51.1 million in economic assistance for fiscal year 1982.

THE BASIC APPROACHES

Within Congress, opinion was sharply divided on aid to El Salvador. One sector of the Congress was alarmed by the evidence of Soviet support for insurgency in a traditional region of U.S. security concern and was fully prepared to support the Reagan administration efforts to aid the Salvadoran Government. This sector argued that the alternative would be a Communist-style government that, in concert with Nicaragua and other militant guerrilla movements aided by Cuba, would pose a security threat to the rest of Central America and to the United States.

Critics within Congress argued that the Duarte government was a captive of the military and rightwing groups responsible for killing thousands of people, including American nuns and agrarian experts. Fearing that military involvement by the United States would draw the country into a Vietnam-type quagmire, these critics tried to block United States aid to El Salvador. They argued that consultation was required under the War Powers Act prior to the introduction of U.S. troops into a situation of imminent hostilities, and that the provision of military assistance to El Salvador was contrary to law since the Salvadoran Government was consistently pursuing a policy of gross violation of internationally accepted human rights. They tried to block future administration action in support of the Salvadoran junta by denying authorization or appropriations for fiscal year 1982 foreign assistance.

Early in the Congress, Representative Gerry Studds introduced H.R. 1509 in the House, and Senator Edward Kennedy introduced S. 720 in the Senate to prohibit military aid and sales to El Salvador. About the same time, Representative Michael Lowry submitted House Concurrent Resolution 67 to support a negotiated settlement of the conflict, while Representative Richard Ottinger introduced House Concurrent Resolution 87 which called upon the President to comply with the War Powers Resolution in connection with the sending of additional military advisers to El Salvador.

Over the next few months an extensive debate was carried out on the floors of the House and Senate and in hearings held by the Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committees.* At several of these hearings, former Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White, who had been relieved by the Reagan administration, expressed opposition to continuing military aid to El Salvador on grounds that the leftists' "final offensive" had failed. He called for a political solution to the conflict through negotiations between the Duarte-led junta and the Democratic Revolutionary Front [FDR]. Public opinion in opposition to Reagan administration policy also appeared to be mounting when a Gallup poll showed in March 1981 that only half of those familiar with United States policy toward El Salvador supported the

* See congressional publications listed at the end of this chapter.

President's handling of the issue, and only 2 percent of the public favored the sending of United States troops to El Salvador.

In early April a compromise position emerged when Representatives Bingham and Solarz introduced H.R. 3009 in the House, and Senator Dodd introduced a similar measure—S. 869—in the Senate. These measures would have authorized the military assistance and sales to El Salvador requested by the President, but only so long as the President could certify every 6 months that the Salvadoran Government was pursuing the investigation of the murdered nuns; was improving the human rights record by controlling indiscriminate violence by the armed forces; was committed to land reform and early elections; and was seeking a political resolution to the conflict in the country. This was conceived as a measure to give the United States the leverage to insure that U.S. assistance was being used for appropriate purposes, while giving President Duarte the ability to demand the termination of security force violence. In the event that the President was unable to make the required certification, aid to El Salvador would cease.

HOUSE ACTION

The first congressional test of administration policy toward El Salvador came when the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee considered the fiscal year 1982 foreign aid authorization bill on April 1, 1982. The subcommittee rejected by a 4-4 vote an amendment by Representative Gerry Studds to prohibit military aid to El Salvador and an amendment by Chairman Michael Barnes to withdraw all United States military advisers from El Salvador. It then rejected by a 4-4 vote the Bingham-Solarz amendment requiring a semiannual certification by the President on the improvement of conditions in El Salvador. Instead the subcommittee approved an amendment proposed by Representative Dan Mica, with the support of the administration, stating the "sense of Congress" that aid to El Salvador should be used to encourage full respect for human rights, continued progress in implementing essential economic and political reforms, a full investigation of the murders of the U.S. nuns, and free and open elections at the earliest possible date.⁷

When the full Foreign Affairs Committee considered the foreign aid authorization bill on April 29, 1981, essentially the same amendments were presented, but the outcome was slightly different. Representative Studds' amendment to prohibit military aid and sales to El Salvador was defeated by a 9-22 vote, and Representative Barnes' amendment to withdraw all United States military advisers from El Salvador was rejected by a 11-19 vote. Most of the discussions focused on the Bingham-Solarz amendment to set conditions on military aid to the country. The sponsors of the amendment pointed out that the certification requirement was very similar to the conditions placed on aid to Nicaragua the previous year and asked for approval for the sake of consistency. Opponents countered that the amendment was

⁷ U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982 (Part 7). Hearings and Markup, 97th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 23, 26, 30, and Apr. 8, 1981. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 247-256.

considerably stronger since it contained a legislative veto provision which permitted the Congress, by adopting a resolution of disapproval in both houses, to disapprove the President's certification and thereby terminate aid to El Salvador. Faced with opposition to the legislative veto provision, the authors agreed to delete that section of the amendment. In modified form the Bingham-Solarz amendment requiring a semiannual Presidential certification for the continuation of aid to El Salvador passed by a vote of 26-7, demonstrating widespread support for the measure on the committee.⁸

With little debate, the House passed the foreign aid authorization—H.R. 3566—on December 9, 1981, containing the committee-recommended conditions on military aid to El Salvador requiring the President to certify improvement by the Salvadoran Government in several specified areas. It also passed two related amendments expressing the sense of Congress that economic assistance to El Salvador should emphasize revitalization of the private sector, and that Salvadoran refugees in the United States should be granted extended voluntary departure status until they could safely return to El Salvador.

SENATE ACTION

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out in Senate Report 97-83 the Senate version of the foreign aid authorization bill—S. 1196—on May 15 with conditions on aid to El Salvador almost identical to those passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Several months later, the Senate, on September 24, 1981, voted 51 to 47, following a 54 to 42 vote the previous day, to approve a slightly softened version of the committee-recommended conditions on military aid to El Salvador, and rejected an administration-backed amendment by Senators Lugar and Helms to change the conditions into a series of nonbinding goals for the Salvadoran Government. The measure would have authorized military aid to El Salvador only if President Reagan certified 30 days after enactment and every 6 months thereafter that the Salvadoran Government, "to the extent not precluded by forces outside its control," was making progress to reduce human rights abuses, control the indiscriminate terror by the armed forces, implement essential political and economic reforms, including land reform, and hold early elections and negotiate a political resolution of the conflict with any group that renounces violence.

When the Senate completed action on the foreign aid bill on October 22, 1981, it included two other provisions dealing with El Salvador. One provision, proposed by Senator Hatfield, required the administration to report to Congress within 90 days after enactment on the viewpoints of democratic Latin American states, European allies, Canada, and all major Salvadoran actors regarding the potential for a political resolution of the conflict in El Salvador. It also expressed the sense of the Senate that the President should appoint a special envoy to consult with and gather information from the appropriate parties on this issue. The other provision, proposed by Senator Percy as a substitute for an amendment by Senator Helms that prohibited the use

⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982* (Part 9), Markup, 97th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 28, 29, 30 and May 5-7, 12-13, 1981. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 13, 38-81, 325.

of United States funds in the land reform program, provided that United States funds would not be used to provide compensation for expropriated property in El Salvador.

CONFERENCE ACTION

The Senate and the House approved the compromise conference report—House Report 97-413—on S. 1196 on December 15 and 16, 1981, with five provisions dealing with El Salvador. Section 727 retained the House provision expressing the sense of the Congress that economic assistance to El Salvador should emphasize revitalization of the private sector. Section 728 retained with slight modifications the conditions on military aid to El Salvador passed by both houses. These required the President to certify that the Salvadoran Government: (1) was making a concerted effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights, (2) was achieving substantial control over the armed forces committing acts of indiscriminate terror, (3) was making continued progress on economic and political reforms, (4) was committed to free elections at an early date with all groups willing to implement an equitable political solution in the country, and (5) was investigating the murders of the U.S. citizens.

Section 729 retained the Senate provision requiring a report to Congress on the views of Salvadoran factions and United States allies on the potential for a political resolution of the conflict. Section 730 retained the Senate provision prohibiting the use of United States assistance to compensate for expropriated or confiscated property in El Salvador. Section 731 modified the House-passed provision calling for extended voluntary departure status for Salvadoran refugees by stating the sense of Congress that the administration should review on a case-by-case basis petitions for extended voluntary departure status by Salvadorans claiming that they would be subject to persecution if they returned to El Salvador.

President Reagan signed the measure into law—Public Law 97-113—on December 29, 1981.

SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN

The following section analyzes the various areas of concern relating to El Salvador. It demonstrates that the legislation passed in 1981 reflected a variety of sometimes divergent and contradictory currents of thought and opinion, with the result that the legislative guidance for policymakers was not entirely clear.

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION*

When the Reagan administration dispatched additional military advisers to El Salvador in early March 1981, characterizing the conflict as a case of indirect aggression by Soviet-bloc countries, many Members of Congress feared that the country was heading down a path

* See U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, Issue Brief No. 8-030, by Ellen C. Collier; and U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The War Powers Resolution—A Special Study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 248-254, 270-280, for the congressional action and the administration responses mentioned in this section.

similar to the one taken in Vietnam when large-scale United States troop involvement was preceded by the dispatch of United States military advisers. Some of them turned to the War Powers Resolution, which Congress passed in 1973, toward the end of the Vietnam War, to assure that any future U.S. participation in hostilities would require congressional authorization.¹⁰

The War Powers Resolution requires the President to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" [sec. 3]. It also requires him to report any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities (sec. 4(a)(1) or any introduction of U.S. forces in foreign territory "while equipped for combat" [sec. 4(a)(2)], or while acting "to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged in hostilities" [sec. 8(c)]. Once a report is submitted or "requested to be submitted" under section 4(a)(1), the Congress must authorize the action within 60 to 90 days or the President is required to withdraw the troops.

Almost immediately after the dispatch of additional advisers, some Members of Congress raised the question of presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolution. On March 3, 1981, Congressman Ottinger and 44 other Members sent President Reagan a telegram expressing concern about the action and calling for compliance with the War Powers Resolution. Simultaneously, Senator John Glenn argued that the administration had failed to consult the Senate adequately before the decision and might be in violation of the resolution, while Chairman Michael Barnes of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs complained that the action was taken "without any consultation with Congress" except a perfunctory notification 2 hours prior to the formal State Department announcement. On March 4, 1981, Representative Ottinger and 37 cosponsors introduced House Concurrent Resolution 87 calling on the President to submit a report under the War Powers Resolution, and a few days later, on March 17, 1981, Senator Eagleton called for both consultation and reporting in compliance with the War Powers Resolution.

The Reagan administration, in a variety of memoranda, argued that the dispatch of military personnel to El Salvador did not trigger the requirement for consultation or reporting under the War Powers Resolution. Among the arguments were (1) that the U.S. military personnel were not being introduced into hostilities or situation of imminent hostilities since they would not act as combat advisers and would not accompany Salvadoran forces in combat or operational patrols but would act solely as trainers to Salvadoran personnel who would come to the training centers; (2) that hostilities within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution would include any armed confrontation between opposing forces involving an exchange of fire with conventional or guerrilla forces, but would not apply to "irregular or infrequent violence, such as sporadic terrorists attacks, which happen to occur in a particular area"; and (3) that the specified military personnel were not "equipped for combat" and would carry only personal sidearms to be used solely for self-defense.

¹⁰ Public Law 93-148.

While the administration denied any immediate responsibility to consult or to report, it pledged that in the event that circumstances raised the prospect of imminent involvement of U.S. personnel in hostilities, it would comply with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.

When a related question was raised about section 21(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act requiring a report to Congress within 48 hours after the outbreak of "significant hostilities involving a country in which United States personnel are performing defense services," Secretary Haig agreed to supply periodic reports. Since the reports were not filed under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, however, the mechanism for a legislative veto was not triggered.

Determined to defend their view of congressional prerogatives, 11 Representatives, on May 1, 1981, filed a lawsuit against President Reagan (*Crockett et al. v. Reagan et al.*, Civil Action No. 81-1034 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) charging that the sending of military advisers to El Salvador violated the Constitution, human rights legislation, and the War Powers Resolution. Eventually there were 29 plaintiffs in the case, demanding that the executive branch comply with the consultation and reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution. On June 18, 16 Senators and 13 Representatives filed a motion to intervene, contending that the judicial branch should not interfere in a situation where legislators could vote to terminate military assistance to El Salvador if they wished. This court test of the consultation and reporting requirements under the War Powers Resolution was still pending at the end of 1981.

The War Powers Resolution appears to have posed a restraint on administration policy, forcing it to insure that U.S. military personnel in El Salvador were not armed for combat and were not accompanying forces engaged in combat. Nevertheless, congressional concern about U.S. involvement in El Salvador remained high. Shortly after three U.S. military advisers were videotaped carrying M-16 rifles and other combat equipment in a guerrilla-contested area in El Salvador in February 1982, Senator Robert Byrd introduced S. 2179 and Congressman Ottinger introduced H.R. 5832, both of which would amend the War Powers Resolution to prohibit the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into El Salvador for combat unless Congress had previously authorized the action, or such action was necessary to meet a clear and present danger to the United States or to evacuate U.S. citizens.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MURDERS OF U.S. CITIZENS

Critics of U.S. policy in El Salvador were particularly concerned about the fact that many human rights abuses, including the killing of the U.S. churchwomen in December 1980, were attributed to Salvadoran security forces. They feared that President Duarte was a captive of the extremist groups within the military that permitted the indiscriminate killing of innocent individuals to continue. Taking the killing of the U.S. nuns and the two agrarian experts as the most prominent example, these critics were determined to press for a full scale investigation of the murders.

Reflecting this sentiment, Representative Mary Rose Oakar, from

the Ohio district of the two slain nuns, introduced H. Res. 112 on March 19, 1981, calling upon the President to (1) demand that El Salvador investigate the murders of the four U.S. missionaries and two U.S. labor representatives; (2) instruct the FBI to take a role in investigating the murders; (3) report regularly to Congress on the investigations; and (4) warn El Salvador that U.S. assistance to the country may be terminated if these investigations are not satisfactorily resolved. While no action was taken on this resolution, eventually it had 40 cosponsors.

When the foreign affairs committees of the House and the Senate approved conditions on aid to El Salvador in April and May 1981, three of the conditions were related to human rights or the killing of the U.S. nuns. The President was required to certify (1) that the Salvadoran Government was not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human rights, (2) that it had achieved substantial control over security and armed forces' abuses, and (3) that it was making good-faith efforts to determine the responsibility for the murders of the four nuns and two agrarian reform experts. At about the same time, House Members filed the suit mentioned above, *Crockett v. Reagan*. One of the grounds was that military assistance to El Salvador violated section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits military assistance to any government which "engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

Throughout the year the arrest of suspects in the murders of American citizens, the alleged massacre of refugees in the Lempa River, and the reported killing of civilians by the Treasury Police in the Soyapango suburb of San Salvador were closely followed in Congress. When President Duarte visited the United States in September 1981 to gain support for his government, he met with relatives of the murdered nuns and assured them that the investigation was continuing. He also indicated that over 600 National Guardsmen had been dismissed for human rights abuses and that 64 were in prison for offenses. However, by the end of the year, neither the suspects in the murders of the agrarian experts nor the six National Guardsmen in custody in connection with the murder of the nuns had been formally charged. On December 2, 1981, 1 year after the murder of the nuns, the Senate passed Senate Resolution 250 proposed by Senator Kennedy which expressed "deep concern over the failure of the Government of El Salvador to bring to justice those responsible for the numbers of the six Americans," urged the Government to "use every legal means available to bring about a just and expeditious resolution of these cases," and welcomed the Government's recent request for technical assistance from the FBI in carrying out the investigations.

When President Reagan signed the foreign aid authorization act into law on December 29, 1981, with its conditions on aid to El Salvador, many Members of Congress doubted that the certification could be made. These doubts increased when the American Civil Liberties Union and the Americas Watch Committee issued a report on January 26, 1982, charging the Salvadoran Government with responsibility for a systematic denial of human rights, including the killing of 12,501 persons in 1981, and urged President Reagan not to make the required

certification.¹¹ Nevertheless, on January 28, 1982, 30 days after enactment, the President found that the Government had met the human rights conditions. Since the paramilitary organization known as ORDEN had been disbanded, a code of conduct had been adopted for the military, and the statistics compiled by the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador indicated "a declining level of violence over the past year and a decrease in alleged abuses by security forces."¹² With regard to the cases of the murdered U.S. citizens, the certification found that the Government was making a good faith effort, particularly after a reinvigoration of the investigation with FBI assistance in early December 1981, to determine responsibility for the murders of the U.S. nuns.

The President's certification was strongly criticized by a number of Congressmen for lacking credibility,¹³ and Congressmen Studds and Harkin introduced House Joint Resolution 399 on February 2, 1982, with 31 cosponsors, to declare the President's certification to be null and void and thereby terminate military aid to El Salvador.

NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

When President Reagan significantly increased military aid to El Salvador in February 1981, critics claimed that he was seeking a military victory for an unpopular regime. In their view, a negotiated political settlement, following the Zimbabwe model, might be attainable with much less bloodshed and without strengthening the Salvadoran military. They contemplated negotiations between the Duarte-led junta and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) aligned with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas which would lead to some sort of internationally supervised election to determine the future government in El Salvador.

This formula was urged for a number of reasons. In the first place, it would resolve the knotty problem of legitimacy since neither the Duarte-led junta nor the FDR-FMLN had a clear claim to popular support. Duarte was the leader of the popular Christian Democratic Party and he was widely regarded as the undeclared winner of the fraudulent 1972 Presidential elections, but he was President of the junta as a direct result of the October 1979 military coup. The FDR-FMLN, on the other hand, was linked to the so-called "popular organizations" that had shown considerable popular support through mass demonstrations and general strikes in 1979 and 1980. The FDR included the leftwing of the Christian Democratic Party as well as the social democratic National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and was headed by Guillermo Ungo, a member of the first junta established in October 1979, who had been the Vice Presidential candidate with Duarte in the 1972 elections.

Proponents of negotiations also felt that if a formula for internationally supervised elections could be developed providing some security for candidates of the left and right, the effect would be to isolate and control the extreme rightists associated with the junta as well as

¹¹ American Civil Liberties Union and Americas Watch Committee. Report on human rights in El Salvador—January 1982. Washington, Center for National Security Studies, 1982.

¹² See Congressional Record, daily edition, Feb. 2, 1982, pp. E163-164 for the justification accompanying the Presidential determination.

¹³ For critiques of the Presidential certification, see Congressional Record, daily edition, Feb. 2, 1982, pp. E168-170; and Feb. 8, 1982, pp. E285-289.

the extreme leftists linked with the FDR-FMLN. Finally, they felt that there was some chance for success in negotiations since the Christian Democrats had been associated previously with MNR and the UDN, two parties allied with the FDR, in the National Opposition Union coalition that contested the 1972 and 1977 elections.

In October 1980 the civilian-military junta had accepted the mediation of the Catholic Church in a proposed "dialogue" with the leftist groups, but the FDR-FMLN rejected the offer, charging that the junta, with U.S. assistance, was responsible for a new wave of repression in the country. A few months later, in March 1981, the FDR-FMLN leaders indicated a willingness to talk to the United States and raised no objection to Socialist International efforts to have Willy Brandt attempt to mediate the conflict. This time, however, the junta rejected the mediation offer and launched a plan for junta-held elections for a constituent assembly in 1982.¹⁴

From that time on, two formulas competed for acceptance: First, a negotiated settlement between the junta and the FDR-FMLN in which the two parties would establish the conditions for internationally supervised elections, and second, a formula for junta-led elections which called upon the leftist opposition to lay down their arms and to compete in the electoral process.

When the foreign affairs committees adopted conditions on aid to El Salvador in April and May of 1981, the House committee seemed to favor the first formula while the Senate committee favored the second. The House version required the President to certify that the Salvadoran Government had demonstrated a "willingness to negotiate with opposition groups an equitable political resolution of the conflict." The Senate version required a demonstrated "willingness to negotiate an equitable political resolution of the conflict with any group which renounces and refrains from further military or paramilitary opposition activity."

In mid-July 1981, Assistant Secretary of State Enders supported junta-held elections when he gave a major speech calling for a political solution through democratic elections with broad participation, possibly facilitated by the United States, by "all non-violent political groups, whatever their relationship to the current government."

In the late summer and early fall, after a period of quiescence, the FMLN guerrillas launched renewed attacks, some directed at the infrastructure of the country, knocking out much of the nation's electricity and the key Oro Bridge linking the eastern third of El Salvador to the rest of the country. About that time, Mexico and France issued a declaration in August recognizing the FDR-FMLN opposition as "representative political forces" that should be included in negotiations to find a political solution to the conflict in the country. Later, in early October, in a proposal presented to the United Nations by Nicaragua, the FDR-FMLN offered to enter into unconditional negotiations with the Duarte government to end the conflict.

Responding to these events, the Duarte government rejected negotiations and in September 1981 called on all duly constituted parties,

¹⁴ See U.S. Library of Congress, *El Salvador—From 1931 to the March 1982 Elections: A Chronological Study of Politics, Parties, and Conflicts*. Typed Report, by K. Larry Storrs, Mar. 28, 1982. Washington, 1982, for an accounting of various efforts to promote a negotiated political solution.

including the social democratic MNR and the Communist UDN and any other parties that wished to form, to participate in elections for a constituent assembly in March 1982. The FDR-FMLN refused to participate in the junta-held elections, citing the military's traditional manipulation of the electoral process, the killing of the FDR leaders in November 1980, and the continuing state of siege as evidence that appropriate conditions did not exist for free elections.

Within Congress, support for some sort of political solution to the conflict appeared to be mounting. When the Senate completed action on the foreign aid authorization bill in October 1981, it passed the Hatfield amendment urging the President to appoint a special information-gathering envoy. The amendment also required a report to the Congress within 90 days on the viewpoints of all major Salvadoran political factions and U.S. allies regarding the potential for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. In the House, Congressman Yatron introduced House Concurrent Resolution 197 which urged the President to press for a "negotiated settlement" in El Salvador. A modified version (H. Con. Res. 226) calling for the President to press for "unconditional discussions" among the major political factions was passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in November 1981, and was passed by the House on a 396-3 vote on March 2, 1982. Neither of these efforts was opposed by the administration, in part because Duarte's efforts to draw the leftist parties into the elections could be seen as meeting the legislative mandates.

When House-Senate conferees considered the foreign aid authorization bill in December 1981, they had to reconcile the House language requiring certification of the Salvadoran Government's "willingness to negotiate with opposition groups an equitable political resolution of the conflict" with the Senate language requiring negotiations with "groups that renounce and refrain from further military or paramilitary opposition activity." The conference compromise, adopted by both Houses in December, required the President to certify that the Salvadoran Government "is committed to the holding of free elections at an early date and to that end has demonstrated its good faith efforts to begin discussions with all major factions in El Salvador which have declared their willingness to find and implement an equitable political solution to the conflict, with such solution to involve a commitment to (1) a renouncement of further military or paramilitary activity, and (2) the electoral process with internationally recognized observers."¹⁵ While this compromise formulation clearly substituted "discussions" for "negotiations," it still left some doubt about whether the Duarte-led junta was required to enter into discussions with the FDR-FMLN opposition as urged by some legislators. Chairman Michael Barnes of the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee explained his interpretation to the House, on December 16, 1981, that the provision would mandate a change in U.S. policy by requiring the Duarte government to open discussions with the left in order to obtain U.S. military assistance:

This is perhaps the most important condition, in that it reverses the fundamentally mistaken aspect of the administration's policy which precludes a political settlement of the conflict by opposing talks unless the left gives up and lays down its arms. Under this language, the Government of El Salvador could

¹⁵ See conference report on S. 1196 (H. Rept. 97-413), pp. 85-86.

receive no further military assistance from the United States if it refused to enter into discussions with the left, so long as the left declared that it was willing to seek a political solution, and that the political solution would involve an end to violence and elections.¹⁶

If this interpretation had prevailed, the Congress would have played a major role in modifying administration policy in the direction of a negotiated political solution. However, when President Reagan made the first certification on January 28, 1982, the requirement for discussions with the left was neglected. Focusing almost exclusively on the question of elections, the certification stated that the Duarte government had made a clear commitment to free and fair constituent assembly elections in March 1982, and had invited all parties that renounce violence to participate in the elections. On the other hand, the certification said, the FMLN-FDR had "denounced the elections and rejected the government's standing invitation to join in a discussion of electoral issues," and had maintained that "any elections must be preceded by negotiations between the government and all elements of the FMLR-FDR resulting in a restructuring of the government and the military."¹⁷

Reflecting congressional displeasure at President Reagan's refusal to deal with the requirement for discussions with the left, as well as continuing disagreement with administration policy, Congressman Studds and Harkins introduced House Joint Resolution 399, on February 2, 1982, to declare the certification null and void. A few days later, Senators Dodd and Tsongas and Representatives Barnes and Solarz introduced similar measures (S.J. Res. 144 and H.J. Res. 405), on February 10, 1982, calling upon the President to seek an internationally supervised cease-fire in El Salvador and a negotiated political solution to the conflict in the country.

LAND REFORM AND PRIVATE SECTOR REVITALIZATION

The Christian Democratic Party joined the civilian-military junta in El Salvador in January 1980 only after the military accepted certain conditions, including agreement that an extensive agrarian reform would be carried out quickly, and that representatives of private enterprise would be excluded from the junta. Considered to be a reformist and antioligarchical party on the basis of its electoral campaigns throughout the seventies, the Christian Democrats were convinced that fundamental reforms were essential, and they seized upon the rare moment when the military leaders of the October 1979 coup were in agreement to launch their program.

Within months the junta announced a massive agrarian reform, nationalization of the banks, and government control of exports as a way to break the overwhelming control of the powerful landed oligarchy. Under phase I of the agrarian reform, announced in March 1980, about 376 estates larger than 1,235 acres were to be taken over, with military assistance, to be comanaged by the government's Institute for Agrarian Transformation until titles could be granted to private farmers or cooperatives. Under phase II, to be implemented later, properties ranging in size from 247 to 1,235 acres were to be taken

¹⁶ Congressional Record, daily edition, Dec. 16, 1981, p. H9750.

¹⁷ Congressional Record, daily edition, Feb. 2, 1982, p. E164.

over. And under the phase III, "Land to the Tiller" program, announced on an emergency basis in April 1980 (Decree 207), about 150,000 families renting or sharecropping farms of less than 100 hectares were to be given immediate possession of the farmed land, with the former owners being compensated partly in cash and partly in bonds.

Not surprisingly, the various reforms were controversial in El Salvador and in the United States. From the left they were attacked as inadequate and as a cover for repression since many landless peasants would not benefit from the reforms, some of the best coffee lands would not be touched until phase II was implemented, and many peasants had been evicted from their lands when they attempted to make a claim under the "Land to the Tiller" program. From the right the reforms were attacked as unworkable projects, contrary to free enterprise and Salvadoran tradition, that were being imposed by the Christian Democrats and the United States without adequate discussion and input from affected Salvadoran groups. Within El Salvador, business and landowner groups were particularly critical of the Christian Democrats' "communitarian" ideas and the exclusion of the private sector from the governing junta. They pressed for the payment of compensation to the owners of lands affected by the agrarian reform, and for other measures to reestablish the confidence of the private sector.

Within the U.S. Congress, a similar range of opinion about the reforms was evident in hearings and speeches from the floor. Some saw the reforms as radical and Marxist-oriented, while others argued that the reforms were an essential element to win the support of the peasants and to undercut the guerrilla's appeal. Reflecting doubt about the wisdom of the program, the Senate, on June 17, 1980, a few months after the announcement of the reforms, passed with little discussion an amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill for fiscal year 1981, proposed by Senator Helms, that prohibited U.S. assistance to El Salvador "for the purpose of planning or executing the confiscation, nationalization, acquisition, or expropriation of any agricultural or banking enterprise, or the properties or stock shares which may be pertaining thereto."¹⁸ House-Senate conferees modified this amendment slightly, in accordance with section 620(g) of the Foreign Assistance Act, to prohibit U.S. aid "for the purpose of planning for compensation, or for the purpose of compensation" in connection with the expropriation or nationalization of agricultural or banking enterprises in El Salvador.¹⁹ In this form, the amendment became law (Public Law 96-533) in December 1980, with the approval of both Houses and the President.

During 1981 the wisdom and effectiveness of the reforms continued to be debated, particularly in hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs²⁰ and the House Ap-

¹⁸ Congressional Record, daily edition, June 17, 1980, part I, pp. S7190-S7194; and part II, pp. S7195-S7201.

¹⁹ Conference Report on H.R. 6942, International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (H. Rept. No. 96-1471), pp. 68-69.

²⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward El Salvador. Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 5 and 11, 1981. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981.

propriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.²¹ At these hearings, administration witnesses and representatives from the American Institute for Free Labor Development strongly supported the reforms, while critics pointed out shortcomings, and representatives from Salvadoran business offered comments on needed measures to support the private sector.

Apparently convinced of the need for reforms in El Salvador, the Foreign Affairs Committees of the House and Senate approved conditions on aid to El Salvador in April and May of 1981 that required the President to certify that the Salvadoran Government was "making continued progress in implementing essential economic and political reforms, including the land reform program." Without modification, this provision was included among the required conditions passed by both Houses in December 1981.

Other Members of Congress were concerned about implementation of the agrarian reform and were determined to encourage the private sector in El Salvador. Chairman Clarence D. Long of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations wrote to Secretary Haig on May 14, 1981 to support various reprogramings for El Salvador. He indicated that the subcommittee was concerned about the delay in compensating the previous owners of land, the slow pace in providing titles to newly created landowners or cooperatives, and the tendency of AID to favor the larger cooperatives established under phase I of the program at the expense of Decree 207 landholders in the provision of credits and related support. He asked that the subcommittee be given monthly reports on progress in compensation and titling, as well as a report on the feasibility of individual as opposed to cooperative ownership of phase I lands.²²

Several months later, on August 5, 1981, Representative Kent Hance and 40 cosigners sent Secretary Haig a letter that expressed concern about the "failure of the Salvadoran Government to utilize the talents and resources of the private sector." It expressed admiration for the strong private sector in the country and urged the Secretary "to make it clear to the Salvadoran Government, which is receiving so much assistance from the United States, that we in Congress expect them to open the Government to the participation of the business sector" and to do "everything they can to support a free market economy and a viable private enterprise."²³ When the House considered the foreign aid authorization bill in December 1981, Representative Hance proposed an amendment, subsequently passed, to state the sense of the Congress that "U.S. economic assistance to El Salvador should put emphasis on revitalizing the private sector and supporting the free market system."²⁴

Arguing strongly against the agrarian reform in El Salvador, Senator Helms proposed a lengthy amendment in October 1981 which he said "would get the United States out of supporting land reform in El Salvador in any way, shape or form." After offering an extensive

²¹ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982—Part 1 (El Salvador). Hearings. 97th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 25, Mar. 24, Apr. 29, 1981. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981.

²² Congressional Record, daily edition, Oct. 28, 1981, p. S12324.

²³ Congressional Record, daily edition, Dec. 9, 1981, pp. H9031-H9032.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. H9031-H9033.

critique of both the Carter and the Reagan administrations for supporting agrarian reform in El Salvador,²³ he called for more development assistance for the private sector. After limited discussion, the Senate adopted a substitute amendment proposed by Senator Percy that restated the previous year's prohibition on the use of U.S. funds "for the purpose of planning for compensation, or for the purpose of compensation" in connection with the agrarian reform.

This put the United States in the somewhat anomalous position of requiring that the Salvadoran Government continue to implement the agrarian reform program, while refusing to permit U.S. assistance to be used to provide compensation to former owners affected by the reform.

EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Congressional action relating to El Salvador during 1981 generally supported the administration policy toward that country. Despite the serious misgivings of a sizable section of the Congress, a majority of Members were willing to support administration efforts to provide increased military and economic assistance to the Duarte-led junta, but they insisted upon requiring the President to certify that the Salvadoran Government had made progress in certain areas of congressional concern. The conditions on aid posed some constraints upon the administration, but the wording of many of the provisions was such that few legislators doubted when the conditions were passed that the administration would make the required certification, particularly since only 30 days would elapse before the first certification was due. While certain Members felt that the condition requiring discussions with the left would open the way for a negotiated political settlement, the administration took a different interpretation of the provision and maintained its unequivocal support for junta-held elections on March 28, 1982. When a rightist majority emerged from those elections, with less commitment to the agrarian and other reforms, it raised questions about the level of congressional support that would be forthcoming in 1982, particularly since the Congress could hold the foreign aid authorizations hostage to the second certification which was due on July 28, 1982.

²³ Congressional Record, daily edition, Oct. 22, 1981, pp. 811944-811951; and Oct. 28, 1981, pp. 812323-812327.

Communist Interference in El Salvador

February 23, 1981



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

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- I. A Case of Communist Military Involvement in the Third World
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Summary

This special report presents definitive evidence of the clandestine military support given by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and their Communist allies to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas now fighting to overthrow the established Government of El Salvador. The evidence, drawn from captured guerrilla documents and war materiel and corroborated by intelligence reports, undercores the central role played by Cuba and other Communist countries beginning in 1979 in the political unification, military direction, and arming of insurgent forces in El Salvador.

From the documents it is possible to reconstruct chronologically the key stages in the growth of the Communist involvement:

- The direct tutelary role played by Fidel Castro and the Cuban Government in late 1979 and early 1980 in bringing the diverse Salvadoran guerrilla factions into a unified front;

- The assistance and advice given the guerrillas in planning their military operations;

- The series of contacts between Salvadoran Communist leaders and key officials of several Communist states that resulted in commitments to supply the insurgents nearly 800 tons of the most modern weapons and equipment;

- The covert delivery to El Salvador of nearly 200 tons of those arms, mostly through Cuba and Nicaragua, in preparation for the guerrillas' failed "general offensive" of January 1981;

- The major Communist effort to "cover" their involvement by providing mostly arms of Western manufacture.

It is clear that over the past year the insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively transformed into another case of indirect armed aggression against a small Third World country by Communist powers acting through Cuba.

The United States considers it of great importance that the American people and the world community be aware of the gravity of the actions of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Communist states who are carrying out what is clearly shown to be a well-coordinated, covert effort to bring about the overthrow of El Salvador's established government and to impose in its place a Communist regime with no popular support.

Arms flow into El Salvador



I. A Case of Communist Military Involvement in the Third World

The situation in El Salvador presents a strikingly familiar case of Soviet, Cuban, and other Communist military involvement in a politically troubled Third World country. By providing arms, training, and direction to a local insurgency and by supporting it with a global propaganda campaign, the Communists have intensified and widened the conflict, greatly increased the suffering of the Salvadoran people, and deceived much of the world about the true nature of the revolution. Their objective in El Salvador as elsewhere is to bring about—at little cost to themselves—the overthrow of the established government and the imposition of a Communist regime in defiance of the will of the Salvadoran people.

The Guerrillas: Their Tactics and Propaganda. El Salvador's extreme left, which includes the long-established Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) and several armed groups of more recent origin, has become increasingly committed since 1976 to a military solution. A campaign of terrorism—bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and seizures of embassies—has disrupted national life and claimed the lives of many innocent people.

During 1980, previously fragmented factions of the extreme left agreed to coordinate their actions in support of a joint military battle plan developed with Cuban assistance. As a precondition for large-scale Cuban aid, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, meeting in Havana in May, formed first the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) as their central executive arm for political and military planning and, in late 1980, the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Front (FMLN), as the coordinating body of the guerrilla organizations. A front organization, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), was also created to disseminate propaganda abroad. For appearances sake, three small non-Marxist-Leninist political parties were brought into the front, though they have no representation in the DRU.

The Salvadoran guerrillas, speaking through the FDR, have managed to deceive many about what is happening in El Salvador. They have been aided by Nicaragua and by the worldwide propaganda networks of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Communist countries.

The guerrillas' propaganda aims at legitimizing their violence and concealing the Communist aid that makes it possible. Other key aims are to discredit the Salvadoran Government, to misrepresent U.S. policies and actions, and to foster the impression of overwhelming popular support for the revolutionary movement.

Examples of the more extreme claims of their propaganda apparatus—echoed by Cuban, Soviet, and Nicaraguan media—are:

- That the United States has military bases and several hundred troops in El Salvador (in fact, the United States has no bases and fewer than 50 military personnel there);

- That the government's security forces were responsible for most of the 10,000 killings that occurred in 1980 (in their own reports in 1980, the guerrillas themselves claimed the killings of nearly 6,000 persons, including noncombatant "informers" as well as government authorities and military).

In addition to media propaganda, Cuba and the Soviet Union promote the insurgent cause at international forums, with individual governments, and among foreign opinion leaders. Cuba has an efficient network for introducing and promoting representatives of the Salvadoran left all over the world. Havans and Moscow also bring indirect pressure on some governments to support the Salvadoran revolutionaries by mobilizing local Communist groups.

II. Communist Military Intervention: A Chronology

Before September 1980 the diverse guerrilla groups in El Salvador were ill-coordinated and ill-equipped, armed with pistols and a varied assortment of hunting rifles and shotguns. At that time the insurgents acquired weapons predominantly through purchases on the international market and from dealers who participated in the supply of arms to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

By January 1981 when the guerrillas launched their "general offensive," they had acquired an impressive array of modern weapons and supporting equipment never before used in El Salvador by either the insurgents or the military. Belgian FAL rifles, German G-3 rifles, U.S. M-1, M-16, and AR-15 semiautomatic and automatic rifles, and the Israeli UZI submachinegun and Galil assault rifle


VIETNAM PROMISES WEAPONS

Quantity	Type
892	9mm pistols
1,620	AR-15 (M-16) semiautomatic rifles
162	30-caliber machineguns
36	7.62mm M-60 machineguns
12	12.7-caliber M-50 antiair machineguns
36	62mm mortars
12	81mm mortars
12	DKZ-57 antitank rocket launchers
15,000	9mm rounds
1,500,000	AR-15 rounds (5.56mm)
240,000	7.62mm M-60 rounds
240,000	30-caliber rounds
130,000	12.7-caliber M-50 rounds
9,000	62mm mortar rounds
4,000	81mm mortar rounds
1,500	DKZ-57 antitank rocket grenades

have all been confirmed in the guerrilla inventory. In addition, they are known to possess .30 to .50 caliber machineguns, the U.S. M-60 machinegun, U.S. and Russian hand grenades, the U.S. M-79 and Chinese RPG grenade launchers, and the U.S. M-72 light antitank weapon and 81mm mortars. Captured ammunition indicates the guerrillas probably possess 60mm and 82mm mortars and 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles.


Recently acquired evidence has enabled us to reconstruct the central role played by Cuba, other Communist countries, and several radical states in the political unification and military direction of insurgent forces in El Salvador and in equipping them in less than 6 months with a panoply of modern weapons that enabled the guerrillas to launch a well-armed offensive.

This information, which we consider incontrovertible, has been acquired over the past year. Many key details, however, have fallen into place as the result of the guerrillas' own records. Two particularly important document caches were recovered from the Communist Party of El Salvador in November 1980 and from the Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP) in January 1981. This mass of captured documents includes battle plans, letters, and reports of meetings and travels, some written in cryptic language and using code words.




**MODERN WEAPONS NOW IN
GUERRILLA INVENTORY**

Belgian FAL semiautomatic rifle
 German G-3 rifle
 U.S. M-1, M-16, and AR-15
 semiautomatic and automatic rifles
 Israeli UZI submachinegun and Galil
 assault rifle
 30 and 50 caliber machineguns
 U.S. M-60 machinegun
 U.S. and Soviet hand grenades
 U.S. and Chinese grenade launchers
 U.S. M-72 light antitank weapon
 U.S. 81mm mortars



Photos display captured weapons and
munitions.



When deciphered and verified against evidence from other intelligence sources, the documents bring to light the chain of events leading to the guerrillas' January 1981 offensive. What emerges is a highly disturbing pattern of parallel and coordinated action by a number of Communist and some radical countries bent on imposing a military solution.

The Cuban and Communist role in preparing for and helping to organize the abortive "general offensive" early this year is spelled out in the following chronology based on the contents of captured documents and other sources.

Initial Steps. The chronology of external support begins at the end of 1979. With salutations of "brotherly and revolutionary greetings" on December 16, 1979, members of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), National Resistance (FARN), and Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) thank Fidel Castro in a letter for his help and "the help of your party comrades . . . by signing an agreement which establishes very solid bases upon which we begin building coordination and unity of our organizations." The letter, written in Havana, was signed by leaders of these three revolutionary organizations.

At an April 1980 meeting at the Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City, guerrilla leaders made certain "requests" (possibly for arms). Present at this meeting were representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Vietnam, Hungary, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

In notes taken during an April 28, 1980 meeting of the Salvadoran Communist Party, party leader Shafik Handal mentions the need to "speed up reorganization and put the Party on a war footing." He added, "I'm in agreement with taking advantage of the possibilities of assistance from the socialist camp. I think that their attitude is magnificent. We are not yet taking advantage of it." In reference to a unification of the armed movement, he asserts that "the idea of involving everyone in the area has already been suggested to Fidel himself." Handal alludes to the concept of unification and notes, "Fidel thought well of the idea."

Guerrilla Contacts in Havana.

From May 5 to June 8, 1980, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders report on meetings in Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. They proceed to Havana and meet several times with Fidel Castro; the documents also note an interview with the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) Chairman Erich Honecker in Havana. During the Havana portion of their travels, the Salvadoran guerrilla leadership meets twice with the Cuban

Directorate of Special Operations (DOE, the clandestine operations/special forces unit of the Cuban Ministry of Interior) to discuss guerrilla military plans. In addition, they meet with the Cuban "Chief of Communications."

During this period (late May 1980), the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) is admitted into the guerrilla coalition after negotiations in Havana. The coalition then assumes the name of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) and meets with Fidel Castro on three occasions.

After the Havana meetings, Shafik Handal leaves Havana on May 30, 1980 for Moscow. The other Salvadoran guerrilla leaders in Havana leave for Managua. During the visit of early June, the DRU leaders meet with Nicaraguan revolutionary leaders (Sandinistas) and discuss: (1) a headquarters with "all measures of security"; (2) an "international field of operations, which they (Sandinistas) control"; and (3) the willingness of the Sandinistas to "contribute in material terms" and to adopt "the cause of El Salvador as its own." The meeting culminated with "dinner at Humberto's house" (presumably Sandinista leader Humberto Ortega).

Salvadoran Communist Party Leader's Travels in the East. From June 2 to July 22, 1980, Shafik Handal visits the U.S.S.R., Vietnam, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ethiopia to procure arms and seek support for the movement.


On June 2, 1980, Handal meets in Moscow with Mikhail Kudachkin, Deputy Chief of the Latin American Section of the Foreign Relations Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Kudachkin

suggests that Handal travel to Vietnam to seek arms and offers to pay for Handal's trip.

Continuing his travels between June 9 and 15, Handal visits Vietnam where he is received by Le Duan, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party; Xuan Thuy, member of the Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat; and Vice Minister of National Defense Tran Van Quang. The Vietnamese, as a "first contribution," agree to provide 60 tons of arms. Handal adds that "the comrade requested air transport from the USSR."

From June 19 to June 24, 1980, Handal visits the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), where he is received by Hermann Axen, member of the G.D.R. Politburo. Axen states that the G.D.R. has already sent 1.9 tons of supplies to Managua. On July 21, G.D.R. leader Honecker writes the G.D.R. Embassy in Moscow that additional supplies will be sent and that the German Democratic Republic will provide military training, particularly in clandestine operations. The G.D.R. telegram adds that although Berlin possesses no Western-manufactured weapons—which the Salvadoran guerrillas are seeking—efforts will be undertaken to find a "solution to this problem." (NOTE: The emphasis on Western arms reflects the desire to maintain plausible denial.)

From June 24-27, 1980, Handal visits Czechoslovakia where he is received by Vasil Bilak, Second Secretary of the Czech Communist Party. Bilak says that some Czech arms circulating in the world market will be provided so that these arms will not be traced back to Czechoslovakia as the donor country. Transportation will be coordinated with the German Democratic Republic.



Handal proceeds to Bulgaria from June 27 to June 30, 1980. He is received by Dimitir Stanichev, member of the Central Committee Secretariat. The Bulgarians agree to supply German-origin weapons and other supplies, again in an apparent effort to conceal their sources.

In Hungary, from June 30 to July 3, 1980, Handal is received by Communist Party General Secretary Janos Kadar and "Guesel" (probably Central Committee Secretary for Foreign Affairs Andras Gyenes). The latter offers radios and other supplies and indicates Hungarian willingness to trade arms with Ethiopia or Angola in order to obtain Western-origin arms for the Salvadoran guerrillas. "Guesel" promises to resolve the trade with the Ethiopians and Angolans himself, "since we want to be a part of providing this aid." Additionally, Handal secures the promise of 10,000 uniforms to be made by the Hungarians according to Handal's specifications.

Handal then travels to Ethiopia, July 3 to July 6. He meets Chairman

Mengistu and receives "a warm reception." Mengistu offers "several thousand weapons," including: 150 Thompson submachineguns with 300 cartridge clips, 1,500 M-1 rifles, 1,000 M-14 rifles, and ammunition for these weapons. In addition, the Ethiopians agree to supply all necessary spare parts for these arms.

Handal returns to Moscow on July 22, 1980 and is received again by Mikhail Kudachkin. The Soviet official asks if 30 Communist youth currently studying in the U.S.S.R. could take part in the war in El Salvador. Before leaving Moscow, Handal receives assurances that the Soviets agree in principle to transport the Vietnamese arms.



Further Contacts in Nicaragua. On July 13, representatives of the DRU arrive in Managua amidst preparations for

the first anniversary celebration of Somoza's overthrow. The DRU leaders wait until July 23 to meet with "Comrade Bayardo" (presumably Bayardo Arce, member of the Sandinista Directorate). They complain that the Sandinistas appear to be restricting their access to visiting world dignitaries and demanding that all contacts be cleared through them. During the meeting, Arce promises ammunition to the guerrillas and arranges a meeting for them with the Sandinista "Military Commission." Arce indicates that, since the guerrillas will receive some arms manufactured by the Communist countries, the Sandinista Army (EPS) will consider absorbing some of these weapons and providing to the Salvadorans Western-manufactured arms held by the EPS in exchange. (In January 1981 the Popular Sandinista Army indeed

In late January, Honduran authorities seized a refrigerated trailer truck which was being used to smuggle arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Approximately 100 M-16 rifles, some of which were traceable to Vietnam, along with a large cache of ammunition and mortar rounds, were discovered in the hollowed-out insulation on the top of the truck. The truck also contained extra sets of license plates from the Central American area as well as quantities of Communist propaganda materials.

Right: View of truck from rear.

Below: View of truck from above.



This sample page is part of two large caches of guerrilla documents that have been captured in recent months, providing substantiating evidence of the full involvement of several Communist countries in the arming of the Salvadoran guerrillas.

-7-

IX - ~~Armamento del Secretario General del PC~~

~~Oficinas de Viet Nam~~ (5 de septiembre estarán en Esmeralda)

192 pistolas 9 mm.
~~20~~ AR 15
~~52~~ ametralladoras M 30
~~6~~ " " pesadas M60
~~12~~ " " M50 calibre 12.7
~~6~~ morteros de 62 mm.
~~12~~ morteros de 81 mm.
~~2~~ lanzacohetes an ti-tnaque DKZ-57
~~1000~~ cartuchos de 9 mm.
~~100000~~ " de AR 15
~~100000~~ " para ametralladora M 30
~~100000~~ " " M 60 (7.62)
~~100000~~ ametralladora M 50 (12.7)
~~10000~~ obuses para morteros de 61mm.
~~10000~~ " 81 mm.
~~10000~~ " anti-tanques DKZ-57

~~Guinea~~

60 Toneladas

~~150~~ subametralladoras Thompson con 300 cargadores.
~~10000~~ fusiles M₁
~~10000~~ " M 14
~~100000~~ tiros calibre .45 para las Thompson
~~100000~~ M₁
~~100000~~ M 14 con 200 cargadores.
 Piezas de repuesto
 El 15 de agosto salía este cargamento para Habana.

~~Guinea~~

~~1000~~ subametralladoras de fabricación alemana con 200.000
~~10000~~ tiros.
~~10~~ comet. calibre 30 con 50.000 tiros
~~100000~~ uniformes
~~10000~~ botiquines individuales para combatientes

Estos dos últimos rubros serán enviados cuando se le proporcionen modelos.

~~Cheskoslovaquia~~

Enviarán armas checas. No pueden cambiar en occidentales.
 No precisaron cantidad en armas.

~~Radio~~

Radio-comunicadores de ondas cortas y ultra corta.

~~100~~ cortas y 12 ultracortas
~~100000~~ uniformes conforme modelos y talla que se envíen

switched from using U.S.-made weapons to those of Soviet and East European origin.)

The DRU representatives also meet with visiting Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat in Managua on July 22, 1980. Arafat promises military equipment, including arms and aircraft. (A Salvadoran guerrilla leader met with FATAH leaders in Beirut in August and November, and the PLO has trained selected Salvadorans in the Near East and in Nicaragua.)

On July 27, the guerrilla General Staff delegation departs from Managua for Havana, where Cuban "specialists" add final touches to the military plans formulated during the May meetings in Havana.

Arms Deliveries Begin. In mid-August 1980, Shafik Handal's arms-shopping expedition begins to bear fruit. On August 15, 1980, Ethiopian arms depart for Cuba. Three weeks later the 60 tons of captured U.S. arms sent from Vietnam are scheduled to arrive in Cuba.

As a result of a Salvadoran delegation's trip to Iraq earlier in the year, the guerrillas receive a \$500,000 logistics donation. The funds are distributed to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and within El Salvador.

By mid-September, substantial quantities of the arms promised to Handal are well on the way to Cuba and Nicaragua. The guerrilla logistics coordinator in Nicaragua informs his Joint General Staff on September 26 that 130 tons of arms and other military material supplied by the Communist countries have arrived in Nicaragua for shipment to El Salvador. According to the captured documents, this represents one-sixth of the commitments to the guerrillas by the Communist countries. (NOTE: To get an idea of the magnitude of this commitment, the Vietnamese offer of only 60 tons included 2 million rifle and machinegun bullets, 14,500 mortar shells, 1,620 rifles, 210 machineguns, 48 mortars, 12 rocket launchers, and 192 pistols.)

In September and October, the number of flights to Nicaragua from Cuba increased sharply. These flights had the capacity to transport several hundred tons of cargo.

At the end of September, despite appeals from the guerrillas, the Sandinistas suspend their weapons deliveries to El Salvador for 1 month, after the U.S. Government lodges a protest to Nicaragua on the arms trafficking.

When the shipments resume in October, as much as 120 tons of weapons and materiel are still in Nicaragua and some 300-400 tons are in Cuba. Because of the difficulty of moving such large quantities

overland, Nicaragua—with Cuban support—begins airlifting arms from Nicaragua into El Salvador. In November, about 2.5 tons of arms are delivered by air before accidents force a brief halt in the airlift.

In December, Salvadoran guerrillas, encouraged by Cuba, begin plans for a general offensive in early 1981. To provide the increased support necessary, the Sandinistas revive the airlift into El Salvador. Salvadoran insurgents protest that they cannot absorb the increased flow of arms, but guerrilla liaison members in Managua urge them to increase their efforts as several East European nations are providing unprecedented assistance.

A revolutionary radio station—*Radio Liberacion*—operating in Nicaragua begins broadcasting to El Salvador on December 15, 1980. It exhorts the populace to mount a massive insurrection against the government. (References to the Sandinistas sharing the expenses of a revolutionary radio station appear in the captured documents.)

On January 24, 1981, a Cessna from Nicaragua crashes on takeoff in El Salvador after unloading passengers and possibly weapons. A second plane is strafed by the Salvadoran Air Force, and the pilot and numerous weapons are captured. The pilot admits to being an employee of the Nicaraguan national airline and concedes that the flight originated from Sandino International Airport in Managua. He further admits to flying two earlier arms deliveries.

Air supply is playing a key role, but infiltration by land and sea also continues. Small launches operating out of several Nicaraguan Pacific ports traverse the Gulf of Fonseca at night, carrying arms, ammunition, and personnel. During the general offensive on January 13, several dozen well-armed guerrillas landed on El Salvador's southeastern coast on the Gulf of Fonseca, adjacent to Nicaragua.

Overland arms shipments also continue through Honduras from Nicaragua and Costa Rica. In late January, Honduran security forces uncover an arms infiltration operation run by Salvadorans working through Nicaragua and directed by Cubans. In this operation, a trailer truck is discovered carrying weapons and ammunition destined for Salvadoran guerrillas. Weapons include 100 U.S. M-16 rifles and 81mm mortar ammunition. These arms are a portion of the Vietnamese shipment. A trace of the M-16s reveals that several of them were shipped to U.S. units in Vietnam where they were captured or left behind. Using this network, perhaps five truckloads of arms may have reached the Salvadoran guerrillas.

The availability of weapons and materiel significantly increases the military capabilities of the Salvadoran insurgents. While attacks raged throughout the country during the "general offensive" that began on January 10, it soon became clear that the DRU could not sustain the level of violence without suffering costly losses in personnel. By the end of January, DRU leaders apparently decided to avoid direct confrontation with government forces and reverted to sporadic guerrilla terrorist tactics that would reduce the possibility of suffering heavy casualties.

III. The Government: The Search for Order and Democracy

Central America's smallest and most densely populated country is El Salvador. Since its independence in 1821, the country has experienced chronic political instability and repression, widespread poverty, and concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few families. Although considerable economic progress took place in the 1960s, the political system remained in the hands of a traditional economic elite backed by the military. During the 1970s, both the legitimate grievances of the poor and landless and the growing aspirations of the expanding middle classes met increasingly with repression. El Salvador has long been a violent country with political, economic, and personal disputes often resulting in murders.

The Present Government. Aware of the need for change and alarmed by the prospect of Nicaragua-like chaos, progressive Salvadoran military officers and civilians overthrew the authoritarian regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero in October 1979 and ousted nearly 100 conservative senior officers.

After an initial period of instability, the new government stabilized around a coalition that includes military participants in the October 1979 coup, the Christian Democratic Party, and independent civilians. Since March 1980, this coalition has begun broad social changes: conversion of large estates into peasant cooperatives, distribution of land to tenant farmers, and nationalization of foreign trade and banking.

Four Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups are using violence and terrorism against the Salvadoran Government and its reforms. Three small non-Marxist-Leninist political parties—including a Social Democratic Party—work with guerrilla organizations and their political fronts through the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), most of whose activities take place outside El Salvador.

The Government of El Salvador—headed since last December by Jose Napoleon Duarte, the respected Christian Democrat—denied office by the military in the Presidential elections of 1972—faces armed opposition from the extreme right as well as from the left. Exploiting their traditional ties to the security forces and the tendency of some members of the security forces to abuse their authority, some wealthy Salvadorans affected by the Duarte government's reforms have sponsored terrorist activities against supporters of the agrarian and banking reforms and against the government itself.

A symbiotic relationship has developed between the terrorism practiced by extremists of both left and right. Thousands have died without regard to class, creed, nationality, or politics. Brutal and still unexplained murders in December of four American churchwomen—and in January of two American trade unionists—added U.S. citizens to the toll of this tragic violence. The United States has made clear its interest in a complete investigation of these killings and the punishment of those responsible.

Despite bitter resistance from right and left, the Duarte government has stuck to its reform programs and has adopted emergency measures to ease the lot of the poor through public works, housing projects, and aid to marginal communities. On the political front, it has offered amnesty to its opponents, scheduled elections for a constituent assembly in 1982, and pledged to hand power over to a popularly elected government no later than mid-1983.

The government's pursuit of progress with order has been further hampered by the virtual breakdown of the law enforcement and judicial system and by the lack of an effective civil service.

The introduction of the reforms—some of which are now clearly irreversible—has reduced popular support for

those who argue that change can only come about through violence. Few Salvadorans participate in antigovernment demonstrations. Repeated calls by the guerrillas for general strikes in mid- and late 1980 went unheeded. The Duarte government, moreover, has made clear its willingness to negotiate the terms of future political processes with democratic members of all opposition forces—most notably, by accepting the offer of El Salvador's Council of Bishops to mediate between the government and the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

In sum, the Duarte government is working hard and with some success to deal with the serious political, social, and economic problems that most concern the people of El Salvador.

U.S. Support. In its commitment to reform and democracy, the Government of El Salvador has had the political support of the United States ever since the October 1979 revolution. Because we give primary emphasis to helping the people of El Salvador, most of our assistance has been economic. In 1980, the United States provided nearly \$56 million in aid, aimed at easing the conditions that underlie unrest and extremism. This assistance has helped create jobs, feed the hungry, improve health and housing and education, and support the reforms that are opening and modernizing El Salvador's economy. The United States will continue to work with the Salvadoran Government toward economic betterment, social justice, and peace.

Because the solution in El Salvador should be of the Salvadorans' own making and nonviolent, the United States has carefully limited its military support. In January, mounting evidence of Communist involvement compelled President Carter to authorize a resupply of weapons and ammunition to El Salvador—the first provision of lethal items since 1977.

IV. Some Conclusions

The foregoing record leaves little doubt that the Salvadoran insurgency has become the object of a large-scale commitment by Communist states outside Latin America.

- The political direction, organization, and arming of the insurgency is coordinated and heavily influenced by Cuba—with active support of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Vietnam, and other Communist states.

- The massing and delivery of arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas by those states must be judged against the fact that from 1977 until January 1981 the United States provided no weapons or ammunition to the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

- A major effort has been made to provide "cover" for this operation by supplying arms of Western manufacture and by supporting a front organization known as the Democratic Revolutionary Front to seek non-Communist political support through propaganda.

- Although some non-Communist states have also provided material support, the organization and delivery of this assistance, like the overwhelming mass of arms, are in the hands of Communist-controlled networks.

In short, over the past year, the insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively transformed into a textbook case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers through Cuba. ■

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Strategic Situation in Central America and the Caribbean

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United States Department of State
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Following is a statement by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 14, 1981.

Major Developments

There are four major developments that have come together to create what can only be described as a state of danger in the Caribbean Basin.

One is the new Cuban strategy for uniting the left in the countries of the region, committing it to violence, arming it, training it in warfare, and attempting to use it for the destruction of existing governments. I say new because it is only 3 years ago that the policy was adopted. Prior to 1978—for some 10 years since the death of Che Guevara on an Andean hillside—Cuba had made a sustained effort to portray itself as a member of the international community not unlike others, carrying on state-to-state relations through embassies, emphasizing trade and cultural contacts.

Observing this pattern, many in this and other countries of the hemisphere began to hope that revolutionary Cuba was on the way to becoming a status-quo nation. The 1970s, of course, were marked by Cuban intervention in Africa on a continent-wide scale. But, it was argued, Africa was a special case.

The turn came in 1978, when Cuba decided to back the insurrection in Nicaragua. At first it was not apparent to many that a new Cuban strategy was in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like a case all of its own. But then the same thing was tried in El Salvador, in Guatemala, in Colombia; now it is being tried in Honduras.

We have attempted to identify and illustrate the full scope of this new Cuban strategy in a research paper [see Special Report No. 90], which I would like to submit to the committee for its study. The paper is based on both public and intelligence sources. It was not written to make sensational revelations, and it does not. But I wonder how many Americans are aware of the sweep and the sophistication of what is going on. In many countries of the region, Cuba is attempting no less than to construct a machine to destroy the established governments.

The pattern is always the same. For years the radical left in the area has been divided by disagreement over tactics. The old-line Comintern parties argued patience: You only had to wait for Marx's famous objective conditions to emerge, and the revolution would occur. Other factions were for setting up Che Guevara-style *focos*: put some armed *guerrilleros* into the countryside and their presence will radicalize the peasants. Others were for *guerra prolongada*: discredit the regime by hitting the economy. Still others advocated spectacular kidnappings and assassinations.

Under the new strategy Cuba is approaching each of these groups, often calling them to Havana. Cuba offers to supply (or arrange for the supply of) arms and training. But there are conditions: The left must unite, it must create a single directorate for command and control, it must commit to a single strategy (which often is written out and approved by Castro personally). And that strategy is always the same: armed struggle against the established government.

It is important to be clear about the effects of this process. It enhances Cuba's role as the guide (and sometimes as the arbiter) of each revolutionary movement. It increases the pressure on democratic movements on the left to make common cause with the men with the guns rather than face blame as the obstacle to the unity of the left. Once unity on the left has been created, democratic socialists in the hemisphere and in Europe face the dilemma of whether or not to support it. Many have supported such movements—only to learn with bitterness that their money and political backing are welcome; their ideas are not.

This is not only history. The process goes on. In Honduras, Cuba has just now completed the same unification operation: Parties have been joined together in a national directorate committed to armed struggle. A new attempt to overthrow an established government by force is underway.

The democracies in the hemisphere have had to break, suspend, or downgrade relations with Cuba: Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador.

The second development is the economic and social crisis in the region. It also began in 1978, just as Castro was launching his new policy of intervention.

For the past two generations, most of the Central American countries and many of the islands compiled an enviable record of economic and social change. But in 1978 a serious deterioration began. Prices for export commodities—coffee, sugar, cocoa—began to decline sharply. Prices for imported oil and imported capital kept going up. With allowed economic growth in the industrial world, tourism stagnated. Run-on credit crunches resulted. Some countries are bankrupt. Others are threatened with bankruptcy. In two, Cuban-assisted insurrections are destroying power plants, bridges, and crops and attempting to disrupt the tourist trade.

The result is a grave, general economic crisis bringing with it misery and despair for many millions of people in the region. Coinciding as it does with the Cuban drive to unify the left and commit it to violence, economic crisis creates great potential political vulnerability throughout the area.

The third factor is developing the role of Nicaragua as a platform for intervention throughout Central America. We have watched with deepening concern as Nicaragua has moved away from pledges of political pluralism toward a repressive, one-party state. At the same time it is greatly expanding its army and building up an inventory of heavy arms. It continues to be deeply involved in logistics and other support for the insurgency in El Salvador.

The United States and a number of other countries have tried to provide an alternative to these trends, notably by providing economic aid but also by maintaining political contacts. Since 1979 the United States alone gave \$120 million in assistance. Recently we tried by diplomatic means to achieve a rapprochement with Managua. And we don't close the door on future attempts.

But frankly there is little to show for our efforts. Indeed, I wonder whether any of the democratic countries that have supported Nicaragua can claim to have slowed down, much less to have stopped the negative trends.

There are more than 1,500 Cuban military and security advisers in Nicaragua, twice as many as there were at the start of the year. More tanks are reported on their way. Preparations for the receipt of MiGs are well advanced.

A final factor is the special importance of the struggle in El Salvador for the future of the area. El Salvador is the second largest Central American state in population and in the past has achieved a relatively high level of economic development.

But El Salvador is important not only for itself. There are underway these two critical experiments in reform: one in land tenure, the other in the creation of democratic institutions and strengthening the political center. If these reforms are defeated by arms, prospects for peaceful change elsewhere will be seriously set back.

There is something else. If, after Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority, what state in Central America will be able to resist? How long would it be before the major strategic U.S. interests—the canal, sea lanes, oil supplies—were at risk?

U.S. Strategy

To meet and overcome these challenges the United States must also have a comprehensive strategy. Let me summarize briefly the line of action we are now developing.

First, we must make sure that our friends have the means to defend themselves. El Salvador and Honduras are the two most threatened countries. The buildup in Nicaragua menaces both; targeting of El Salvador's economy by Nicaraguan-supported insurgents creates a situation of emergency in that country. Both need more resources—above all, economic but military as well. We will be consulting with the Congress on how we can best provide help.

Second, we must join with others to help provide the Caribbean Basin countries the opportunity to achieve long-term prosperity. President Reagan is preparing for submission to the Congress early next year a far-reaching package of proposals. Because the markets in the countries of the basin are so small, investment other than in staples is often unattractive. But if investors could be sure of unimpeded access to outside markets, particularly to the vast U.S. market, at least for a defined period of time, then investment in the area becomes more interesting. The skilled and relatively low-cost labor of the area becomes an attraction. We are developing proposals for one-way free trade arrangements and for investment incentives; there will also be provision for preventing abuses. At the same time we will present proposals for emergency financial assistance to tide countries over until they can take advantage of the new opportunities to begin earning their own way.

Third, we must not falter in our pursuit of democratic values—for they assure the legitimacy of governments we hope to help. In a free, open election with broad participation, Honduras chose a new government last month. Costa Rica—whose deeply rooted democratic institutions are helping it to weather a brutal economic crisis without violence—goes to the polls in February. El Salvador will follow with elections for a constituent assembly—the first step in creating representative, constitutionally bound government in that nation. In Central America only the Nicaraguan Government refuses to go before the people.

Let me in this regard make a remark on the subject of proposals for negotiation between the government and the insurgents. Members of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR) say they want to talk about "restructuring the army" and "establishing a new order." In their view such changes are conditions precedent to elections.

But the establishment of a new order and the status of the army are among the subjects for the constituent assembly to be elected in March. Why should they only be debated and decided with the insurgents and not with the campesinos, the labor unions, and the political parties? Why shouldn't the FDR have—only have—the representation in the assembly it can get by campaigning?

In July the United States said it would facilitate contacts and discussions on election issues. In September we sent a group to El Salvador and talked to all interested in talking to us, including the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), a member of the FDR. The representative of another member of the FDR has asked to see us in Washington this week, and we are receiving him on the same basis. If there are opposition elements who believe in a democratic solution, we will help them participate in the electoral process. But it would be wrong to assist those—in negotiations or otherwise—who are committed to the destruction of democracy.

Fourth, we must continue the pursuit of justice for the countries of the area. Lawlessness from both the left and right has been a major weakness in El Salvador. But the government is making progress in bringing it under control. Violent deaths other than in combat as reported each week by our Embassy in San Salvador are down by more than a half since last year. I do not want to give you the impression that our weekly figures are complete. But the trend is significant. Progress is unmistakable. I wonder whether the insurgents have made any contribution to that progress at all. For they claim that their violence is justified by a higher goal.

Fifth, our emphasis should be on collective action. Last week the Organization of American States voted 22 to 3 with 4 abstentions in support of free elections as a means to a political solution in El Salvador. In the same forum Secretary Haig has suggested that all countries in Central America should address the arms race that now threatens in Central America as a result of Nicaraguan imports of heavy weapons and the Cuban military adviser presence

in Nicaragua. Should more serious threats emerge, it is in collective security that we should seek solutions.

Finally, we must communicate to Cuba that the costs of escalating its intervention in the region will be very high. We have readied measures to prevent another Mariel seafight should Cuba again seek to utilize the longings of its own citizens to harm this country. We are tightening the economic embargo. We are preparing creation of a radio devoted to Cuba news and beamed to the island, so that Cubans can be better able to hold their government accountable for its actions. Our underlying message is clear: We will not accept, we do not believe the countries of the region will accept, that the future of the Caribbean Basin be manipulated from Havana. It must be determined by the countries themselves. ■

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U.S. OPTIONS—AND ILLUSIONS— IN CENTRAL AMERICA

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IN BRIEF

While it has mustered a much more realistic understanding than its predecessor of the basic forces and stakes in the accelerating battle for the Caribbean-Central American region, nevertheless the Reagan Administration appears caught in a mire of regional developments, competing options and domestic attitudes, including those of potent special interests. There seems to be emerging a new and dangerous temptation to look for the exit of a "negotiated solution"—dangerous because it promises no solution, but more likely a sharpening of the categorical choices that are painfully reminiscent of America's dilemma in Vietnam. Still missing is a rationale that can give coherence and credibility to U.S. policy in the region. That rationale may be found in the powerful and unifying potential of Latin American nationalism.

The fires of revolutionary conflict are spreading in Central America, threatening to engulf widening parts of this vital area at the strategic doorstep of the United States. Conventional weapons are flooding into the region from worldwide communist suppliers. At the same time, the United States seems to be vainly casting about for a political and economic policy which can help stamp out the fires while bolstering on a more durable basis those regional forces that can resist revolutionary Marxist advances and Soviet-Cuban inroads.

The advent of the Reagan Administration in

1981 marked a sharp shift in official U.S. perspectives of the accelerating current of developments in the Caribbean-Central American region and of the requisite U.S. policies to deal with these developments: one might call it the shift from a "regionalist" to a "globalist" perspective. In contrast with the Carter Administration, which at least until its final months tended to view developments in the Southern Hemisphere in essentially a regional context and outside the superpower competition, there seems to be a consensus in the higher strata of the Reagan Administration that the key to U.S. regional policies is to be found in the Soviet

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threat and in what the Soviets call the "global correlation of forces." Latin America in general, and the Caribbean-Central American region in particular, are now seen as arenas of an ever bolder Soviet strategy directed at the "strategic rear" of the United States.

In this "globalist" perspective, direct and indirect Soviet expansion, with emphasis on the use of surrogates, aims at two paramount and entwined strategic objectives: 1) the erosion of the resource base of America's economic and military power, and 2) the build-up of the resource base for the Soviet security system. From Moscow's vantagepoint, the two objectives need not interact in a "zero-sum" sense: that is, an erosion of the U.S. position does not necessarily have to translate into a direct and immediate gain for the Soviet Union. Thus, anti-U.S. states can be tied in loose ways to the Soviet Union and its proxies—principally Cuba—or even tolerated in a "nonaligned" stance while nevertheless catering to Soviet security goals.

It will be the thrust of the analysis that follows that, while this recognition in Washington of the forces and stakes involved in the ascending conflict in the Southern Hemisphere is a positive (if belated) development, nevertheless the Reagan Administration's unfolding policies toward the region continue to be flawed both by misperceptions and by a drift toward "pragmatism"—which tends to become a euphemism for the absence of a policy.

The United States must come up with a coherent strategy designed not only to undercut the geopolitical designs of its adversaries, but also to build up those political and economic forces in the Caribbean-Central American region able and willing to sustain constitutional and free enterprise systems. A coherent U.S. policy must deal certainly with communist expansion, but even more it must recognize and discard those policy concepts and initiatives which make Latin America increasingly vulnerable to Marxist revolution.

The imperative of such a policy requires: 1) a forthright discussion of the various U.S. options for blocking Soviet-backed revolution, and 2) the replacement of strategic pragmatism with a sound U.S. historical perspective and doctrine. In the absence of such historical perspective and coherent doctrine, U.S. policy will continue to be at the mercy of revolutionary

tides as well as powerful special interests. There is still time to hammer together the essential elements of an embracing and effective strategy, but the accumulating warning signals from the Southern Hemisphere mark that task as an excruciatingly urgent one.

President Reagan's proposed Caribbean Basin Initiative may set a beginning, but it goes only part of the way in meeting this imperative.

The Soviet Offensive

The Reagan Administration has accurately focused upon the Soviet Union as the principal progenitor of conflict and conflagration in the world at large, including the Caribbean-Central American basin. Yet, implicit in the Administration's views has been an emphasis on the overt tentacles of expanding Soviet military and political power and influence, including those extended through Moscow's clients and surrogates. A coherent U.S. hemispheric policy, however, demands a more integrated understanding of a phenomenon that has been fundamentally alien to the American sensibility and experience: namely, the basic phenomenon of imperialism. For what the Soviet Union is plying today is imperialism in its atavistic manifestations of the expansion of the imperial state, but with a powerful modern instrument: the export and exploitation of revolution.

Soviet imperialism carries both overt and covert dimensions. In its overt form, the Soviets have militarized Marxism-Leninism. The original Marxist-Leninist concept regarding the "inevitability" of historical development has been replaced with military Marxism, the concept of the Marxist state fashioned by military conquest or coup d'état from above rather than social revolution from below. Clausewitz has been reversed by the Soviets: politics becomes the continuation of war by other means. Having brought state socialism to a repressive zenith at home, and having expanded it through the "Brezhnev Doctrine" to the subjugation of neighboring parts of the empire, overt Soviet imperialism has become the ultra-imperialism of our era.

In its covert form Soviet imperialism disguises aggressive expansion as "national liberation" and as directed at democratic and popular causes rather than dictatorial or totalitarian outcomes. Covert Soviet imperialism toward targeted countries has several remarkable fea-

tures. Conflict is vertical—that is, a Soviet-backed insurgency is depicted as internal or civil war, and not as the cutting edge of a horizontal, transnational process. The pattern of the ultimate takeover is flexible, depending on the vulnerability, feasibility and desirability of the prize. The vulnerability of the target nation is both opportunistically recognized and carefully prepared, and the mode of exploitation depends on the desirability of the prize and the feasibility of its taking.

The preparation of vulnerability is the most interesting aspect of covert Soviet imperialism: in each case, the target country is systematically undermined politically and ideologically, infiltrated in its culture and institutions, and eventually disrupted. Because the Soviets work adaptively in the wings of a targeted society, they are able to make use of forces and groups that are ostensibly opposed to them. This is particularly applicable when the forces in question lean toward Marxist values or Marxist "mind-sets," notwithstanding their ostensible allegiances to ideological mainstays or embodiments other than the Soviet model. At the present juncture in the Caribbean-Central American region, the Socialist International especially fits this mold. More will be said on this topic below.

More generally, covert Soviet imperialism batters on opportunity—and opportunity is paved by circumstances not only in the target area, but in the broader international environment, with heavy emphasis on prevalent policy attitudes in the United States and other significant nations. This tactic was heralded in the Russo-Cuban intervention in Angola. In that operation in the mid-1970s, not only was the United States inhibited by internal politics from moving against the intervention, but other, regional forces capable of resisting had been politically discredited in the United States to the point where even indirect U.S. intervention was barred. The Soviets and their surrogates obviously are trying to erect the same kinds of barriers and inhibitions to possible U.S. intervention in El Salvador, Guatemala and other targets of their conflict strategy in Central America.

Counterpointing covert Soviet imperialism are its overt manifestations—notably the growing reach of Soviet conventional military power, which long ago has breached the erstwhile U.S.

strategic "containment." By matching, and in many areas surpassing, U.S. naval power, Soviet military forces combine with the covert means to effect and sustain political conquests—and are doing so in an expanding geographical arc that is approaching ever closer the core bases of U.S. power.

The orchestration of the overt and covert prongs of its offensives yields to the Soviet Union another tactical advantage: it conditions U.S. policy and public opinion—as well as those of the target countries and other relevant nations—to focus on the overt manifestations of Soviet power at the expense of the more shadowy salients of attack. And it is in this context that the Reagan Administration has been doing a disservice to its own, presumed objectives in the accelerating struggle for the Caribbean-Central American region. By placing the emphasis on the "blatant" aspects of the growing Soviet involvement in the region, sight has been lost of the intricate field of covert battle within the threatened societies themselves. Moreover, the imbalance in emphasis makes it easier for opinion circles in the United States, as well as in other Western countries, to cling tenaciously to the myth that what is happening in threatened societies simply represents a continuation of a "legitimate" revolutionary process that is strictly indigenous to the societies themselves.

History makes it clear that Soviet conflict strategy is rarely, if ever, "blatant"—that is, until opportunity enables them to cast aside both caution and pretense.

The Geopolitical Outlines

As was noted at the outset, the Soviet imperial strategy is aimed at the indirect defeat of the United States through 1) seizing, or barring U.S. and Western access to, strategic resources—particularly oil and industrial minerals—and 2) gaining control over, or the ability to interdict, the world's searoutes. The Caribbean-Central American and South Atlantic-Latin American regions fit integrally into this design.

There has been a dearth of geopolitical thinking in the United States in recent years. Although Americans are increasingly sensing the overall impact of patterned changes in power relationships in various geographical regions of the world, few are familiar with the precepts of the classical geopolitical writers, let

alone with the scattered writing of their contemporary disciples. Indeed, it can be argued that the lack of a geopolitical framework of policy perception has, as much as any other factor, been responsible for the inconsistent, often incoherent U.S. foreign policy initiatives of the past three decades.

It is an elementary fact of geopolitics that the sealanes of the Caribbean are indispensable to the U.S. military and economic position. Truly a single geopolitical region, the Caribbean contains the islands and the littoral states. Certain patterns of control over these islands and states permit either the opening or the closing of the Atlantic-Pacific and north-south maritime routes. The north-south searoute includes the major South Atlantic sealane connecting the Persian Gulf with the Caribbean Sea and Gulf Coast ports via the Cape of Good Hope. The Caribbean Sea is both a major transshipment point for Middle East oil and a principal refining center. Refineries and transshipment installations are located in St. Croix, Aruba, Curaçao, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela and the Bahamas. Nearly one-half of the total oil destined for the U.S. East and Gulf Coasts is refined in the Caribbean basin.

The direct military importance of this region looms large, for example, in the context of the defense of Western Europe. Not only would a large contingent of the U.S. troops earmarked for NATO reinforcement embark from Gulf ports, but also great quantities of materials necessary to sustain NATO forces depart on vessels from those harbors. In short, for the United States the Caribbean sealanes are essential to commerce in peacetime and to the projection of U.S. military power to deter or to prevail in war.

These vital sealanes can be jeopardized in a wide variety of ways. The mini-island states, if they should tumble under the control of hostile forces, could be transformed into convenient platforms for the harassment of naval or commercial traffic. Already the tiny island nation of Grenada, with Cuban support, is helping to spread revolution in the Lesser Antilles, with St. Vincent a focal point of anti-U.S. activity. The littoral states of the Caribbean basin are all targeted in varying degrees by Soviet-Cuban conflict strategy. All of them suffer from a variety of serious internal problems which are ripe for exploitation.

Nicaragua has become the pivot for this conflict strategy on the Central American mainland. The *Washington Post* reports that the military build-up in Nicaragua has created a standing army of 45,000 to 50,000 troops—some three times the size of the former forces under Anastasio Somoza.¹ According to this report, Nicaraguan pilots are being trained in Bulgaria to fly MiG jets, and Cuban military advisers number between one and two thousand.

Thousands of foreign revolutionaries are being trained in Nicaragua. Bases have been constructed at the four corners of Nicaragua: at Punta Nata in the northwest, which looks across the Gulf of Fonseca into El Salvador; Rancho San Martin in the southwest, which may sustain Soviet-built MiGs; Puerto Cabezas in the northeast, providing access to Honduras; and Colonia-Agricola in the southeast facing Costa Rica. These bases portend a Soviet-Cuban potential for generating wars in Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Colombia—not to mention the ongoing conflict in El Salvador.

Indeed, there are signs that Nicaragua might largely take up Cuba's cudgels as sponsor and warehouse of insurgency in Central America. Meanwhile, however, Cuba's fueling of insurgency has become increasingly sophisticated. Every insurgent movement is encouraged to develop in accordance with its own environment and its own aims. No revolutionary process is seen as an exact model for another.

Certainly, there is ample tinder for conflict to be exploited in the region, some of it in places that are not prominent in the news. One, for example, is the Venezuela-Guyana dispute over Esequibo, a contested territory between the eastern border of Venezuela and the western border of Guyana. Castro has been encouraging Guyana to take a hard line vis-a-vis Venezuela, and it is possible that the agreement to negotiate peacefully this dispute will lapse in June 1982. Meanwhile, Castro has not only backed Guyana against Venezuela in this dispute, but has established several training camps for indoctrination, guerrillas and communications at Tumatumari, Kimba and Konawaruk respectively in Guyana.

Similarly, newly independent Belize has become an object of regional concern. The belief is strong in Guatemala that Belize provides a

base for infiltrating terrorists into that country and serves as a transshipment point for terrorist weapons and supplies.

These and other security issues trace an ominous pattern. Should a Soviet surrogate become firmly established on mainland Latin America—as now seems probable in Nicaragua as well as elsewhere—the U.S. strategic position in this hemisphere would be fundamentally at risk. A pan-Caribbean communist movement linking the scores of depressed micro-states and economically devastated but ideologically impressionable littoral states would create for the United States the gravest problem it has ever faced in the region.

Some of the Options for the United States

The current dialogue—within the U.S. policy community and at large—over appropriate U.S. policies toward the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Caribbean-Central American region has identified several policy options. They are not necessarily discrete or mutually exclusive; as will be seen, some apply to tactics that might be invoked at different stages of a given revolutionary process. Nevertheless, in shorthand form these options are the following:

1. *Preemptive Revolution.* This option applies particularly to a situation featuring a given country under heavy attack by revolutionary and insurgent forces that are clearly supported by Moscow and Havana. The general estimate is that the given government cannot hold out for long against the combined assault of these forces, all of which are marked by radical Marxist ideologies, although not necessarily (or in the same degree) friendly to the objectives of their suppliers in the Soviet Union and Cuba. Some observers suggest that this description fits the situation in El Salvador today.

Under the circumstances, the United States may have the choice (or may believe it has the choice) of supporting one insurgent faction in the hope that, once having assumed control of the country, it will pursue policies that are both moderate and pro-American (or at least not anti-American). In Latin America, this is generally referred to as the "Mugabe solution"—after the leader of the Zimbabwe insurgents in southern Africa who, after having established his power in his "liberated" country, has been

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displaying ostensibly moderate policies (at least thus far).

As a general proposition, the tactic may seem enticing in the abstract. Yet, even assuming that the Mugabe episode has been a "success" for the West (an assumption that is contestable), does the analogy apply to Central America? More important, is the United States really in a position—in terms of image, resources and available influence in the field—to enter the game of "competitive revolution"? And even if it were feasible, could the Reagan Administration play at this game—without coming under debilitating fire from both left and right at home?

2. *Counter-Penetration.* This option is not dissimilar to the "preemptive revolution" option above, but it involves different timing and somewhat different instrumentalities. The basic idea is to accept the victory of a given revolutionary movement in a given country as a *fait accompli*, but to try to influence the regime, through both internal and external means, in directions more favorable to U.S. interests. Essentially this is the option that is being discussed as an alternative to confrontation with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua today.

The trouble with this option is that the means available to the United States tend to be sorely limited. This applies particularly in a situation like that obtaining in Nicaragua, where not only the Sandinista regime has consolidated its hold over the country, but where also the Cubans (and less directly the Soviets) have consolidated their hold over the regime and the movement. In that case, the only conceivable levers available to the United States, beyond whatever scattered covert assets may exist inside the country, are external forces that are ideologically compatible with the regime and the society. But by very virtue of that compatibility, those external forces tend to be of doubtful value and probably counterproductive to U.S. interests. This will be brought out in the discussion of the Socialist International below.

3. *Categorical Alliance with Authoritarian Forces.* This is the option that the United States ostensibly has been following in the case of El Salvador and which has come under increasing domestic and international attack. In its more explicit and more widely applicable connotations, the option holds that the United States

should 1) recognize that the polarization of forces in the Central American-Caribbean region leaves some form of authoritarian rule of the center or the right as the only realistic alternative to the entrenchment of communist or quasi-communist forces, and 2) therefore make both clear and durable its support of such regimes, notwithstanding domestic brickbats and international censures.

The travails which the United States is currently encountering in its support of the Duarte regime in El Salvador may be specific to the circumstances in that unfortunate country, but they are also reflective of the fragility of this option in its more general application in the region. For example, to the extent that it will be pursued in Guatemala, the option may be placed to an even more excruciating test there.

The trouble is that evolving circumstances indicate clearly that the option can hardly be sustained, in and of itself, "notwithstanding domestic brickbats and international censures." Rather, particularly under the duress of domestic pressures, the U.S. Administration finds itself constantly wavering in its support of the given regime and/or trying to place the best image on this support by imposing internal reforms, elections, etc., which usually have the effect of weakening the regime without providing for a more "democratic" alternative.

American policymakers may look back nostalgically upon the times when U.S. policy enjoyed a relatively "free ride" in the exercise of its political choices in the Southern Hemisphere. Yet, the drumbeats of the American media (which in turn reflect to one extent or another powerful special interests), along with the "internationalization" of the Central American-Caribbean problems, have sharply curtailed this former luxury. A clear lesson that is emerging from the embattled U.S. policy in El Salvador is that U.S. assistance to regimes in the region must be encased in a larger rationale that is both more positive and compelling than simply the encouragement and support of "anti-revolutionary" regimes.

4. *A Negotiated Modus Vivendi with the Revolutionary Regimes and Forces.* This is, in effect, the option with which the United States is flirting in its tentative acceptance of Mexico's offer to act as an intermediary between Washington on the one hand and Havana and Managua on the other. The general option has gained

greater (and disquieting) prominence with reported remarks by Secretary of State Alexander Haig of his willingness in principle to "discuss" regional problems with the Soviet Union.

The outlines of the regional "settlement" adumbrated by Mexico call essentially for 1) the cessation of arms supplies by Cuba and Nicaragua to the Salvadoran rebels, 2) the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the United States and Nicaragua, 3) U.S.-Cuban negotiations (by implication to lead possibly to the resumption of formal diplomatic ties), and 4) the reinstitution of U.S. economic assistance to Nicaragua. Although the scheme may exude a superficial attractiveness—especially to harassed policymakers looking for any life-raft that might rescue the United States from its dilemma—it holds prospects that are both flawed and dangerous. These prospects relate first of all to Mexico's self-assumed role as the "honest broker."

Among the larger Latin American nations, Mexico has been conspicuous in its equivocal view of the Soviet-Cuban offensive. Thus, Mexico's President Lopez Portillo, in his fifth annual State of the Nation address, deplored "the new climate of the Cold War," praised Cuba, Nicaragua and the leftist insurgents in El Salvador, and in a separate action joined France in recognizing the Revolutionary Front led by Guillermo Manuel Ungo as a "representative political force" in El Salvador.² Nine Latin American nations immediately condemned the Mexican-French recognition of the Revolutionary Front, charging that a declaration which tended to favor one of the subversive extremes that operate in El Salvador in an "armed struggle for the conquest of the government" was unacceptable intervention. The statement was signed by the foreign ministers of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Venezuela. The number of signatories has since reached twelve.

Beyond Mexico's historic sympathy for revolutionary causes of all sorts, it is easy to speculate that Mexico's leaders are increasingly feeling the vulnerability of their own country to Soviet and Cuban propaganda and subversion. Benevolence toward Castro and the Sadinistas helps the regime buy time and ward off leftist militants both inside and outside the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). It is

probably in this context that President Lopez Portillo's words in his fifth annual State of the Nation address should be understood:

By further tightening the links of friendship and cooperation that bind us with the revolutions of Cuba and Nicaragua, we have underscored Mexico's attachment to the political principle of a free people's free determination. For sympathy and affinity with the essence of their struggle—social justice—[Mexico] has helped them and will continue doing so.³

These considerations throw a large shadow on Mexico's willingness—or, in the final analysis, its ability—to play a strictly even-handed role as an intermediary between the United States and its revolutionary opponents in the Central American-Caribbean region. Yet, even if the intermediary efforts might be successful, what could be the extent of that "success"?

The realities of the situation speak compellingly for the prospect that such a negotiated "settlement" would prove at best a transitory lull in the storm, and at worst a cover for a *de facto* retreat by the United States from the region. First of all, there would be no way in which a cessation of the arms flow to El Salvador, and increasingly elsewhere in the region, could be effectively verified, let alone enforced. Indeed, it can be conjectured that the "export of revolution" by Havana and Nicaragua (as well as, of course, Moscow) would be emboldened by a new "legitimacy," by lessened fears of U.S. reprisals, and by a progressive erosion and demoralization of those regional regimes that might still be determined to resist the revolutionary offensive.

In short, not only will the cancer spread more quickly (if perhaps less visibly) but the United States would face inexorably a much sharpened dilemma, with the alternatives ever more painfully reminiscent of Vietnam: it could react to the inevitable "breaches" of the agreements with direct military intervention as the only really viable response, or it could turn its back and accept the same kind of outcome that was imposed in Southeast Asia in 1975.

The Penalties of Pragmatism

It was stressed in the foregoing discussion of the options for the United States that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact,

U.S. Options—and Illusions—in Central America

each of them has been adopted—or flirted with—in one measure or another by the Carter and Reagan Administrations. The total picture adds up to a "strategy of pragmatism."

That "strategy" not only is one by default, but it tends to be elevated into a virtue. The theme is echoing ever more in Washington that in as "diverse" a region as Central America and the Caribbean there can be no fruitful overarching strategy: each case must be approached on its own merits, and each specific policy determined on the basis of its own cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, it is argued, the necessity for pragmatism is reinforced by the tides of American domestic opinion which place sharp limits on any broader policy design—assuming that one were available.

Perhaps there is sincerity behind those avowals, particularly as they relate to the constraints set by American domestic opinion. Yet, as far as domestic factors in the United States are concerned, there is one that places the underlying assumptions of "pragmatism" into a different light. That factor has to do with a traditionally powerful element in the equation of U.S. regional policies: namely, special U.S. business and commercial interests.

That subject can only be approached in a tentative way. Nevertheless, it seems clear that a disquieting attitude has evolved in wide circles of the American business and banking communities on the question of revolutionary Marxist change in areas abroad, on the nature of the revolutionary statist regimes that have sprouted, and on the ability of U.S. and Western commercial interests (particularly those represented in multinational corporations and banking combines) to "do business" with those regimes.

This perspective was recently revealed in a startling way by David Rockefeller, the retired chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank. During a tour through Africa, Rockefeller, whose bank has helped finance purchases of airliners and oil equipment for the Marxist regime in Angola, made some far-ranging comments about the phenomenon of Marxist-revolutionary movements and regimes. He downgraded the ideological fervor and pro-Soviet orientation of such regimes by asserting: "The more I've seen of countries which are allegedly Marxist in Africa, the more I have the feeling it is more labels and trappings than reality."⁴ And then, noting

that Chase Manhattan was the first American bank in Moscow and Peking, he declared:

I don't think an international bank such as ours ought to try to set itself up as a judge of what kind of government a country wishes to have. We have found we can deal with just about any kind of government, provided they are orderly and responsible.⁶

It is not difficult to transplant this attitude from Africa to Latin America and the Caribbean where, if anything, U.S. commercial and financial interests have a longer history, where they believe that they are operating on more familiar ground, and where there may be more (superficial) grist for the assumption that the "Latin way" of revolution is inherently indigenous to the given and specific social environment and not likely to accede to any enduring fealty to Moscow. The fact that the same assumption was widely applied to Castro's revolution in Cuba more than twenty years ago is seldom drawn into account.

No hard evidence obviously can be drawn as to 1) whether the view articulated by Rockefeller is representative of a broader "mind-set" on the part of U.S. business interests with large stakes in the Central American-Caribbean region, and 2) if so, to what extent this "mind-set" is, in turn, a force behind the apparent predilections toward "pragmatism" in U.S. policy. The least that can be said, however, is that the role of U.S. commercial interests in the evolving politics of the region, and in the policies emanating from Washington, is open to probing question.

Another source of encouragement of U.S. "pragmatism" comes from Europe: namely, from the Socialist International, which has endeavored to arrogate to itself the role of "mediator" between the United States and regional revolutionary movements. This role was prominent during the Carter Administration, when hopes were pinned in Washington on the ability of the Socialist International and its operatives to influence, and perhaps transform, the fledgling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

As recently as in June 1981, Felipe Gonzalez, head of the Socialist Party (PSOE) in Spain, proclaimed in Managua that the Socialist International supported the Sandinista revolution and will be its "protective umbrella." Gonzalez'

position could hardly be otherwise, as the Socialist International had taken the lead in the battle against Somoza.

The Socialist International has taken a strong pro-revolutionary position in El Salvador as well. Since the failure of the major revolutionary military offensive in that country just before President Reagan's inauguration, the Socialist International has been ostensibly bending its efforts toward a negotiated internal settlement. It should be noted that the titular leader of the communist-dominated Democratic Revolutionary Front in El Salvador is Guillermo Ungo, chief of the Socialist International's Salvadoran affiliate.

More generally, the charge is rife in parts of the Latin American press that the Socialist International, along with the Mexican-led Permanent Conference on Political Parties of Latin America (COPPPAL), have become coopted by the Marxist offensive in Central America. Thus, for example, the National Liberation Party of Costa Rica belongs to both these organizations: its delegates helped form the Solidarity Committee with the Sandinista Revolution in December 1980 in Madrid. It bears noting that France's President, François Mitterrand, is also a member of the International Committee to defend the Sandinista Revolution.

According to prominent press reports, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which is tied to the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD), plays an important role in behalf of the Socialist International in Latin America. Recently a letter was published from the representative of the Foundation in Mexico to the Secretary-General of the Socialist International, Bernd Carlsson; it indicated the people close to the Socialist International who were friends and advisers of the candidates for the presidency of Mexico. There is general agreement in Mexico that this initiative forced the early designation of the next PRI candidate for President.

More generally, the regime in Mexico has sustained a strong cooperative role with the Socialist International in Central America. This connection has been maintained indirectly through COPPPAL. Tomas Borge, the Nicaraguan Sandinista leader of the Popular Prolonged War Faction, is a member of the Executive Council of COPPPAL.

The dominant ideological strains in the Socialist International clearly are Marxist, not

withstanding a minority representation of more moderate social-democratic viewpoints from some Western parties. With respect to the basic thrust of the International's activities in Central America, the verdict of a knowledgeable analyst is worth citing at length:

Socialist International officials assert that they are attempting to prevent Castroism or Soviet influence in El Salvador. In 1979, they made the same assertions with regard to Nicaragua. It is noteworthy, however, that in the entire stream of SI denunciations of Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay and Honduras there has never been an SI condemnation of Castroism, never a call for pluralism in Cuba. And in the general resolution adopted in November 1980 by the SI Congress in Madrid, Cuba is not mentioned. The effort by Fanny Simon of the Social Democrats USA to include criticism of Cuban policy in the Latin American-Caribbean region during the pre-Congress Bureau meeting was rejected on the instigation of the British Labor Party and Jamaican People's National Party representatives.

... The consistently expressed SI support for national liberation movements has been as uncompromising as the CPSU support for these movements, even though the motivations and purposes of the two organizations may differ. The word "parallelism" may well describe the SI's and the CPSU's support of these movements. In Nicaragua, El Salvador and Chile, "convergence" may even be the better term."

In the light of such evidence, the characterization of the Socialist International as an "ally" of the United States in the effort to resolve the problems of the area carries an ironic twist. Moreover, it tends to reinforce the conclusion that, to the extent that U.S. "pragmatism" is, in whole or in part, hostage to such forces, it represents the path of inexorable capitulation to the revolutionary forces and their manipulators in Moscow and Havana.

The Untapped Potential of Nationalism

The United States needs an overarching rationale that can lend both credence and coherence to its initiatives on the Central American battleground, with emphasis on the crucial psy-

chological dimensions of that arena. It is perhaps ironic that the immediacy of that battle might finally awaken the United States to the potential of a powerful but latent ally in the global struggle: the force of nationalism. This is a complex subject, but it can be spelled out concisely in the Central American context.

A U.S. strategy to defeat the Soviet imperial policy in Central America can harness nationalism in two salients: in thrusts against the core and intrinsic linkages of the Soviet imperial system itself, and in bolstering the "natural" regional defenses against the intrusion of a new extra-hemispheric colonialism into the hemisphere. It is this rationale which places Poland and El Salvador on the same battlefield, but which needs to be spelled out explicitly.

The momentous significance of the events in Poland is that they have not only spiked the economic myth that is communism's *raison d'être*, but also painted the vulnerabilities of the Soviet empire in unmistakable colors. Soviet imperialism requires a confederation of client states in a hierarchy similar to that which bonded the feudal *ancien régime*. The Soviet Union's international feudal order is brittle at its center, in its links and within those peripheries where clients are employed as mercenaries.

The vast Soviet military enterprise has pauperized a people whose repression at home is justified with the ideological banners of "revolutionary" wars abroad. The promise of "peaceful socialism" is progressively revealed as a sham because the feudal order could not subsist without the demonstrated "enemy," whose existence rationalizes massive expenditures for a military machine, which in turn ensures the continued abject economic status of captive peoples. Both at the center and in the peripheries of the Soviet empire the most powerful forces are precisely those struggling to effect fundamental economic, political, administrative and even constitutional changes.

It is a great irony of our age as well that the Soviets have recognized only too keenly their own, rending imperial contradictions and have turned for help to an unusual source—to the "enemy" himself. Soviet military power owes much to economic assistance from the West. The Soviet forces that invaded Afghanistan came in trucks built at the Kama River plant, a facility constructed with U.S. technology and

financing. The Export-Import Bank financed the Soviet purchase of diesel engines for those trucks to the tune of \$153,950,000.¹ Bertram D. Wolfe has speculated on the tendency of American businessmen to assist Marxist regimes because they "hoped to ingratiate themselves and then make huge profits by tapping the supposedly 'inexhaustible' Russian market, a story that repeated itself during the 'detente' illusions of the seventies."²

The United States and its allies clearly are in a position to sharpen the Soviet imperial dilemma by blocking the funnels of credit. Perhaps existing loans may not be called, but the extension of new credit certainly should be curtailed. More generally, U.S. geopolitical doctrine must be directed at the internal and external stresses in the Soviet imperial design; those weaknesses must be exploited as systematically and with the same sense of strategic coherence that has animated the offensive of the global opponent.

Meanwhile, on the immediate battlefield, the most powerful indigenous force in Latin America is still nationalism. It exists in the region in its classic manifestation as a cultural phenomenon that postulates the hierarchy of values for defining the state, for judging the conduct of the state's foreign and domestic policy, for authorizing state autonomy, and for protecting the cultural values themselves. In Latin America, nationalism is also a shared, hemispheric phenomenon that derives from common historical roots and a struggle against colonial yokes imposed from abroad. The Soviet Union has endeavored to exploit this force—while concentrating on dividing the target societies from within—but the masks of "national liberation" and of the use of local surrogates are transparent. And the Soviet Union

cannot hide the fact that it is an extra-hemispheric power.

By contrast, the deepest and most honest impulse in the ethos of the United States is that which embraces and respects national self-determination and national autonomy. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that, in the eyes of Latin American observers, the countenance of that ethos tends often to be distorted by multinational economic interests that are perceived as dominant in the U.S. foreign policy process—interests that are equated in their sinister implications with those of other transnational intruders into the region.

The policy of the United States in the Southern Hemisphere must hew to a clear rationale that categorically favors those Latin American nationalisms which aspire to state autonomy, internal growth and the sustenance of traditional cultural wellsprings. Such nationalisms are intrinsically opposed to the various manifestations of the international revolutionary movement. The United States can hope for strengthened relations with the Latin American states if it stresses the sanctity of national sovereignty, of the right to economic development, and of the protection of cultural heritage.

Such an unmistakable policy rationale has the potential not only for attracting substantial Latin American support, but also for defining the real lines of the unfolding battle—as well as for fostering a positive pan-American nationalism steeped in common hemispheric interests and cultural legacies. In the meantime, the United States must spurn the temptations of "internationalist solutions" that may or may not ease its immediate policy dilemmas, but that certainly, in the not-much-longer run, will play into the hands of extra-hemispheric opponents and their regional surrogates.


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1. *Washington Post*, November 22, 1981.
2. Christopher Dickey, "Lopez Portillo Underlines Growing Rift with U.S.," *Washington Post*, September 2, 1981.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Washington Post*, March 3, 1982.
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6. Arnold M. Silver, "The New Face of the Socialist International" (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, October 1981).

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Introduction

The Central American Crisis: A Framework for Understanding

Howard J. Wiarda

THE Caribbean basin, which includes the islands of the Caribbean as well as the mainland nations of the circum-Caribbean, has become a crucible of crisis and an area of major U.S. foreign policy concern. It is a region where the East-West conflict and the North-South division not only intersect but where they have taken some of their most dramatic and virulent forms. That is, it is an area where the political and ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union (or its proxies or client states) and the struggle over the distribution of economic resources have become especially intense. The Caribbean basin is one of the key world regions of conflict where America's vital interests are strongly affected.¹ It is therefore particularly appropriate and timely that this special issue of the *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review* be devoted to Central America and U.S. policy there.

The crisis in the Caribbean and Central America should not be exaggerated, but it must not be understated either. It should be said in the first instance that while three or four of the twenty nations of the area are presently in turmoil, sixteen or seventeen of them are not. These nations have a fairly impressive economic track record (although in the last few years growth has slowed down as

they too have been strongly affected by the worldwide economic downturn), and their political performance is, by and large, as good as or better than any in the third world. On the other hand, in the three or four nations that are in turmoil, there is considerable evidence that the situation is not improving and that the crisis may be deepening. The deterioration was not adequately covered by the American media until the situation actually reached a crisis stage, and even then the coverage tended to be sporadic, uninformed, often biased, and based on ethnocentric stereotypes. The lack of awareness of the American public regarding these more recent developments in Central America and the biased and incomplete nature of much of the information coming to us about this region provide added justifications for our attention to it here.

Elusive Facts . . .

Public discussion of Central America and U.S. policy there would be greatly enhanced if we were clear and in agreement on the basic facts of the situation. Policy options could then be more easily and rationally discussed. Unfortunately, the facts are not yet so clear; indeed it is precisely because the facts and interpretations with which we are confronted are so at variance that the policy discussion has been so emotional and divisive. To help determine what the actual situation is in Central America and what U.S. policy is and should be provides a major reason for this exercise.

To begin, let us try to spell out the major areas of controversy and see if some sense and at least a

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¹ The phrases come from a major AEI research project entitled "American Vital Interests in Regions of Conflict," directed by Samuel P. Huntington and Brent Scowcroft. In that study Professor Jorge Domínguez of Harvard contributed a major paper on the Caribbean and Central America, which was published by AEI.

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modicum of agreement can be reached on the key issues involved.

1. What are the causes of the upheaval in Central America? Is the crisis there mainly due to internal events or to the actions of external actors? The consensus now seems to be, in contrast to how these issues were publicly stated earlier by the administration, that the political disruptions in the region are due chiefly to internal conditions endemic to the area. These conditions have been exploited and exacerbated, and the guerrilla groups aided and abetted, by external forces. What then are the domestic conditions in Central America that give rise to political disruption and upheaval and that seem almost to invite outside intervention? These issues are addressed later in the Introduction and in the essay by Secretary Thomas O. Enders.

2. What are U.S. interests in the area? Are they major or minor? How critical is Central America to us? The answer seems to be that the circum-Caribbean is an area of growing and increasingly vital U.S. concerns, of at least intermediate strategic, political, and economic importance, and that insufficient attention has been paid to these facts by either the public or American policy makers. These issues are addressed in greater detail by Secretary Enders and by Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes.

3. What is the nature of the regimes in Central America, and to what extent do they merit our support and understanding? Has the Nicaraguan regime become a monolithically Marxist-Leninist government, has pluralism in fact been jettisoned, how close are the ties with the Soviet Union or Cuba, is it still possible and politically feasible for the United States to shape the course of the Nicaraguan revolution? Concerning El Salvador the questions are equally complex: How viable and democratic is the existing government, how successful have been the reforms, to what degree can the government control repression and the activities of its own armed forces? Or, are these even the right questions to ask in El Salvador? Are they perhaps more the reflection of U.S. political preferences that have only limited relevance in El Salvador, where the political givens are often quite different from those of the U.S. polity? On the other side in El Salvador, the questions involve the degree of pluralism within the guerrilla forces or, alternatively, the extent of their dominance by Marxist-

Leninist elements. The same questions posed for El Salvador may also be asked with regard to Guatemala, both as regards the nature of the regime in power and the nature of its opposition. Our analyses, as David Scott Palmer's essay makes clear, must be sufficiently sophisticated to recognize both the parallels that exist among these countries, and the major differences as well.

4. What about the role of outside forces in Central America? How influential have the Cubans and Soviet Union been in shaping the direction of the Nicaraguan revolution, and how involved have they and Nicaragua been in fomenting trouble in El Salvador and Guatemala? Has the U.S. perception of such outside interference also changed over time? Is the conflict in Central America still perceived as primarily an East-West struggle or does the administration now view the issues somewhat differently? What is the proper interpretive balance between the actors and circumstances locally involved and U.S. perceptions of the conflict in a larger global context? It is fair to say that in Central America the East-West dimension and our perception of it threatened for a time to overwhelm and submerge our understanding of local events? Related to this, one might ask whether or to what degree the hyperbole accompanying the strong early American statements on Central America were related to the need to satisfy a domestic U.S. constituency and therefore were as much a part of domestic politics as of foreign policy. Secretary Enders addresses many of these questions in the statement that follows.

5. Finally, what is or what should be U.S. policy in Central America? How great is our capacity to influence local events there, what are the constraints on our policy, what levers are appropriate that we can use, what are the implications of our proconsul role, would intervention work, what goals would be accomplished, what are the potential costs and consequences of our intervening in a mainland country as distinct from a more isolated island (Santo Domingo in 1965 is the case and model usually cited)? Short of intervention, armed or otherwise, what should U.S. policy be in Central America and the broader circum-Caribbean? These questions are addressed by Secretary Enders and by Drs. Falcoff, Kryzanek, and Palmer.

... and Persistent Fictions

Our understanding of Latin America, and of Central America in particular, has long been grounded in myth and fiction. The fact is we do not think of Latin America as important or worthy of attention, in either an academic or a policy sense. Our attitudes tend to be condescending and patronizing, shaped by images of comic-opera politics in countries referred to as "banana republics."

When we do pay attention to the area, almost always in times of crisis only, we tend to look at it from a condescending perspective and through the prism of cold-war considerations. That is, we have consistently sought to understand Latin America on our terms and not theirs, through our institutional and political preferences rather than Latin America's own; and our aid and foreign policy initiatives have therefore consistently sought to remake Latin America in our own image and in terms of U.S. preferences. In a statement that conveys much understanding, *New York Times* correspondent James Reston once wrote that the United States will do anything for Latin America except read about it.

Our lack of understanding of, let alone empathy for, the Latin American part of our hemisphere lies at the heart of our present dilemma in Central America and of our policy problems. We have consistently misinterpreted the area because we insist on imposing an intellectual framework derived from the Western European and North American experiences upon an area where it either does not fit or fits only imperfectly.

In El Salvador, for example, much of the debate has centered on the issue of whether another Vietnam is in the making. Critics condemn the El Salvadoran government as a military dictatorship, castigating it for its undemocratic character and for the excessive role of the military in the national political life. Regime supporters in contrast feel at pains to emphasize the democratic character of the regime, or its aspirations thereto. Almost no one bothers to worry that the dictatorship-democracy dichotomy may be a false and misleading one in El Salvador that ignores its traditions of generally moderately authoritarian rule tempered by paternalism and populism, or the absence of a history and political culture supportive of democratic institutions, or the special role played historically by the military, or the sheer genius the

Latin Americans have long demonstrated for improvising mixed and half-way solutions, somewhere between democracy and dictatorship, that are both reflective of their own histories and in accord with their own existing political realities.

These points need of course to be elaborated in greater detail.² But they do begin to get at some of the roots of our dilemma in Central America, which I would reemphasize derive first and preeminently from a lack of understanding, comprehension, or empathy for the region and its social and political institutions.

If there is, then, a distinct Latin American or Central American political *system* or process that we fail often to understand, what are some of its principal components and what implications does this carry for policy? Space constraints rule out a detailed treatment and imply a glossing over for now of the qualifications and national variations that must be taken into account before sound policy can be implemented. Nevertheless the issues are of such importance that they cannot be ignored.

1. The City-State Size of the Central American Countries. The countries of this region can be likened to city-states rather than larger nation-states. Not only is size important but politics in a city-state is also qualitatively different from politics in a larger nation-state.³ In the city-state everyone who matters knows everyone else who matters—or is inter-related. Politics tends to be more personalistic, family-based, organic, cliquish, patrimonial, clanish, almost tribal. Violence and extra-constitutional challenges to power may be endemic, almost "normal."

2. The Uninstitutionalized Character of Politics. In such small-sized and intimate polities, larger-scale

² My own efforts to grapple with these issues are contained in *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982); *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981); *The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980); and *Latin American Politics and Development* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979, with Harvey F. Kline).

³ Roland H. Ebel, "Governing the City-State: Notes on the Politics of Small Latin American Countries," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, vol. 14 (August 1972), pp. 325-46.

and impersonal institutions such as political parties, legislatures, etc., are often viewed as unnecessary and peripheral to the main arenas mentioned previously. Hence U.S. efforts to create the institutions of a "modern" and larger nation-state in Central America will not likely be successful.

3. The Fear of Disorder. Given their turbulent histories, the uninstitutionalized nature of politics, and the presence, as the Central Americans see them, of large numbers of "uncivilized" (in both a cultural and political sense) elements within their borders (peasants or Indians, especially in the Guatemalan case), the great fear of the historic elites and middle classes (including the military officer corps) long dominant in these societies has been of disorder and breakdown. Such breakdowns are not only destabilizing in a political sense but they also threaten newly won social and economic positions, which therefore must be defended and upheld at all costs. National upheaval also threatens to undermine the often thin veneer of Western civilization on which society and social status are based. To Central Americans the stakes in preventing such disorder are thus perceived as high, which helps explain what to North Americans often seems to be the excessive use of force and repression in these societies.

4. The Need for Discipline and Authority. If Western civilization has been only weakly established and is woefully underinstitutionalized in Central America, then strong authority and discipline may sometimes be employed to defend it. "Above all there is order," said Bolívar, a sentiment his successors in the area have consistently echoed. But authority and discipline must be exercised fairly and for the common good. A truly rapacious and indiscriminately violent regime, or one that gravitates from authoritarianism to totalitarianism, helps legitimize the right to rebellion, a right that in Central America is traditionally nearly as strong as the obligation to obedience.

5. The Need to Accommodate New Power Contenders. As Central American society has modernized, new social groups—the middle class, organized labor, rural workers, unorganized city dwellers—have risen to prominence. According to the rules

of the Latin American political "game,"⁴ these new political forces should be accommodated within the system if (1) they have demonstrated, by means of strikes, violence, or electoral mobilization, a sufficient power capability as to make their continued exclusion inappropriate and unreasonable; and (2) they agree not to try to eliminate the older, historic groups (the Church, the Army, and the oligarchy).

These operating procedures help explain why Latin America has been such a fundamentally non-revolutionary society in the past, and why it is so prone to revolution today. If a group is not accommodated even after demonstrating its power capability (condition 1), then it may have locally sanctioned grounds to launch an armed insurrection. If, however, the newer groups are unwilling to coexist with the older groups and seek to destroy them altogether, as in the Marxist-Leninist conception (condition 2), then strong action may be taken against the rebels. A prolonged conflict may develop and an almost Hobbesian state of "war of all against all" may result.

This kind of situation—that is, where both sides have by now repeatedly violated the unwritten rules of the political game—is at the root of the conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala, and was at the heart of the conflict in Nicaragua before the Sandinistas eventually triumphed. It may also be suggested that the accommodative model described above worked best in Latin America from the 1930s to the 1950s when it was mainly the rising middle class that needed to be absorbed into the system. In the present circumstances, however, when it has become the time of the masses to press for acceptance and benefits, the system has proved to be far less workable. One of the key problems for Central America is that the comparatively "easier" era of middle class accommodation has now almost ended and the far more difficult one of mass assimilation has arrived.

6. Elections as Peripheral. Elections in Central America, with Costa Rica being the major exception, have generally been peripheral to the main arenas of politics. They are tentative and carry only

⁴ The discussion here follows the path-breaking analysis of Charles W. Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," reprinted in Wiarda (ed.), *Politics and Social Change in Latin America*.

indefinite legitimacy. Like an opinion poll, they are useful in showing the current balance of domestic power, but they do not always provide a definitive right to rule for a given period. Elections should be viewed as part of an ongoing political process implying further and future negotiations; they tend not to be an end in themselves. The elections in El Salvador should be assessed in this light.

7. The Need for Ad Hoc Solutions. Latin America, it may be argued, has demonstrated a genius for ad hoc, improvised solutions that may seem like a crazy quilt from a U.S. or European ideological perspective, but may be perfectly rational in a given Latin American context. If the dictatorship-democracy dichotomy is often a false and not very useful one in Latin America, then we must remain open to the possibilities of such strange-bedfellow and halfway-house solutions as mixed civil-military juntas, coalitions (however temporary) of the major currently contending forces, and shifting combinations of these. Such solutions are not always soul-satisfying in an ideological sense, but they are often quite functional and viable.

8. The Economic Crisis. The entire model of Latin American change and accommodation to new groups suggested in item 5 above is conditional upon a constantly expanding economic pie. For new groups to be admitted without the old ones being eliminated requires steady economic growth. But if the economy becomes stagnant or even contracts, if oil prices increase disproportionately, or should markets for the region's principal products dry up, through either changed consumer habits or new tariff restrictions, then the political struggle is bound to intensify and become more violent. In fact, just such an economic slowdown has been occurring. At the heart of the political struggle in Central America is a long-term economic crisis, exacerbated since the mid-1970s, that has undermined the capacity of these nations to deal with change in the traditional accommodative manner.

9. The Radicalization of the Younger Generation. The younger generation in Central America, especially its university-educated elites, has become predominantly Marxist. This generation no longer necessarily accepts the time-honored political rules

followed by the older generation. The younger generation also wishes to break or modify the historic dependence of their countries on the United States. We are therefore seeing in Central America not only a political struggle among opposed factions but a generational shift as well. Currently, even in the peaceful countries of the area, this new generation occupies low- and middle-level positions within the state and political machinery; but the implications of its occupying even higher posts and, in alliance with other of the newer forces such as workers and peasants, of its coming to power are likely to be enormous.

10. Outside Forces. If the disruptions in Central America involved only indigenous forces, they would be understandable, more or less predictable, and perhaps even something with which we could empathize. Some countries of Central America would likely become socialist, but given their proximity to the United States and their need for U.S. markets, they would probably remain in the Western rather than the Soviet mold, "our" socialists instead of "their" socialists.

The Central American conflict, however, has been internationalized to such a degree that it is no longer possible to treat it in isolation. The Cuban presence, the Soviet presence extended by proxy, the European involvement, and the entire cold-war conflict immensely complicate the problem of trying to arrive at indigenous solutions to these local conflicts.

Some might feel that it would be best, and certainly easier, for the United States to stand back from Central America, whose byzantine affairs we only weakly comprehend and where the politically and ethically right course is so ambiguous, and allow the El Salvadorans and Guatemalans, for example, to find their own solutions to their own problems. Unfortunately, in the charged international arena and circumstances in which we find ourselves, our withdrawal from Central American affairs would probably not be matched by similar noninterference on the part of the Cubans and others.

Thus the likelihood of Central America being left alone to develop autonomously no longer seems realistic. Our continued involvement therefore remains a necessity, however uncomfortable that may at times make us.

Conclusion

In this Introduction we have sought to provide a broad overview of the forces at work and the dilemmas facing us in Central America. The general discussion might be extended to encompass the developmental crises, the interplay of forces, and the possibilities for conflict not only in Central America but also in Latin America as a whole. Our purpose has been both to raise the key questions for discussion, the "elusive facts" about which there remain many questions and considerable disagreement, and to suggest some concepts and parameters enabling us to go beyond the "persistent fictions" and lack of understanding that pervade our thinking and limit our comprehension of Central American and Latin American realities.

From the analysis presented it seems clear that crises and conflict in Central America and the region more generally will be with us for a considerable time to come. These are not just ephemeral and surface changes that we are witnessing, the barracks revolts, *pronunciamientos*, and "revolutions" with which we are familiar from newspaper headlines or *New Yorker* cartoons. Rather, they reflect deep-seated societal transformations involving class changes, generational shifts, profound crises of modernization, and epochal turning points in the national histories of these countries. These internal and domestic transformations in the region have been manipulated for their own advantage and exacerbated by a number of external actors operating within the region. In these circumstances, not unfamiliar ones for those unfortunate countries that become mere pawns in a larger cold war, the interests of the Central American nations themselves are frequently ignored and ridden roughshod over.

Because the present crisis in Central America is both basic and structural, it is unlikely to end soon or easily. If we are correct in our assessment that at the root of the Central American crisis is both a severe economic downturn and the need to devise a new or revitalized political formula to accommodate the newly awakened and mobilized lower classes and the still marginal and insecure middle classes into the political and economic system, then that process of change and transformation may require a generation or two. It took approximately thirty years for the era of middle-class dominance that began in Latin America around the 1920s to be

consolidated, and it will likely require at least that long for Central America to reach a new plateau in which the new mass groups have been accommodated as well.

United States policy during these changes, particularly given the presence of various outside forces, will hence have to be persistent, patient, forceful where necessary and useful, but constrained when it is more appropriate for indigenous forces to act. In this introductory statement we have spelled out some of the central and long-term elements in the Central American struggle which we must understand and that provide the framework within which U.S. policy must be formulated. The essays that follow present some more specific policy recommendations.

A Look Ahead

We are pleased to have a particularly distinguished group of contributors for this special issue of the *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*. In the first essay Ambassador Thomas O. Enders, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, lucidly sets forth the rationale, strategy, and thinking undergirding U.S. policy in the area. In the second essay Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes, of the professional staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, explores U.S. strategic interests in Central America and assesses our policy there. In the third essay Dr. Mark Falcoff, resident fellow in the Center for Hemispheric Studies at AEI, examines both the State Department's much maligned "White Paper" on El Salvador and the arguments of its major critics.

Next, Dr. David Scott Palmer, director of Latin American studies at the Foreign Service Institute, analyzes the differences between military and civilian-democratic regimes in Latin America and the implications of these differences for U.S. policy. Finally, Dr. Michael J. Kryzanek, chairman and professor of political science at Bridgewater State College and author of a recent book on the Dominican Republic,⁸ critiques the Caribbean basin policy of the United States, offers some suggestions for its improvement, and also sets forth some historical lessons from previous U.S. interventions in the area that are well worth pondering. It is a stimulating collection that offers a diversity of views on a key foreign policy topic.

⁸ Michael J. Kryzanek, *The Dominican Republic: Caribbean Crucible* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982). Coauthored with Howard J. Wiarda.

The Central American Challenge

Thomas O. Enders

Make no mistake: The well-being and security of our neighbors in this region are in our own vital interest.

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

February 24, 1982

I

Four major developments affecting Central America require a sophisticated policy response on the part of the United States.

The first is massive economic disruption. Until the late 1970s, Central America had recorded two decades of economic progress. Throughout the 1960s, isthmian economies boomed at an impressive 6 percent annual growth rate. The 1973 oil shock created major problems for this predominantly oil-importing region, but high coffee prices helped to sustain growth at a 4.6 percent annual rate over the 1970-1978 period. The result, despite high population growth rates and distributive inequities, was a region-wide annual increase in the gross domestic product (GDP) of more than 2 percent per year per capita between 1960 and 1978.

The year 1978 brought the crack: sharp declines in the prices of export commodities (coffee, sugar, and cocoa) were accompanied by relentlessly escalating prices for imported oil and capital. At the same time, slowed economic growth in the industrial world reduced tourism to the region, another major generator of income. Widening credit deficits turned inexorably into severe foreign exchange shortages and bankruptcies.

Political instability exacerbated the economic reverses. The Central American Common Market had been crippled by the brief 1969 El Salvador-Honduras war. This setback proved minor compared with the economic consequences of political violence and uncertainty as the 1970s progressed. Nicaragua's civil war ended in 1979—only to bring wider troubles without successfully rebuilding the

economy to pre-civil war levels. In El Salvador and Guatemala, Cuban- and Nicaraguan-assisted guerrillas stepped up economic warfare, destroying power plants, bridges, and crops and disrupting the tourist trade. Inevitably, Costa Rica and Honduras have been troubled by regional instability and incipient terrorism.

The cumulative result is grave and generalized economic crisis. The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that Central America lost international monetary reserves of over \$1.2 billion between 1978 and 1980. In 1980 economic growth fell behind population growth. The year 1981 brought further deterioration. Unemployment and underemployment now exceed 20 percent on a regional basis. In Costa Rica in 1981 inflation was about 60 percent; the currency was devalued 200 percent, and the overall decline in economic activity was 5 percent. The Salvadoran economy has declined 20 percent in three years. About one-fourth of the work force is unemployed. Throughout the region, economic weakness and social dislocation increase vulnerability to violence and external interference.

The second development affecting Central America, also since 1978, is that Cuba is aggressively promoting armed conflict. The new Cuban strategy¹

¹ The Cuban strategy today, though reminiscent of that of the 1960s, has one important distinguishing feature. Instead of throwing up obstacles, the Soviet Union has backed Cuban efforts to incorporate nondoctrinaire groups into broad political-military fronts dedicated to armed struggle. Allowing Havana to take the visible lead, the Soviet Union supports Cuban policies through massive financial (\$8 million a day) and military assistance to Cuba, through facilitative assistance for obtaining weapons, and through advice and propaganda support. These and related points are spelled out in U.S. Department of State Special Report No. 90, *Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America*, December 14, 1981.

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departs from earlier efforts to develop state-to-state relations. Instead, Cuba is now trying to unite the radical left, commit it to the use of violence, train it in warfare and terrorism, and attempt to use it to destroy existing governments and replace them with Marxist-Leninist regimes on the Cuban model. During 1978, Cuba helped unite three major factions of the violent opposition in Nicaragua by conditioning further support on effective unity. Then in 1978 and 1979, Cuba increased military training for Sandinista and other "internationalist" fighters and built up clandestine supply networks for channeling arms and other supplies to guerrilla forces in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the region. Cuban military advisers accompanied Nicaraguan Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) columns into Nicaragua from Costa Rica and maintained direct military communications with Havana.

Although the extent of Cuba's political-military intimacy with the Nicaraguan rebels was initially disguised by the depth of internal and international opposition to Somoza, the evidence is now overwhelming that Cuba is following the same pattern in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.³ Cuba has insisted that all Marxist and Communist factions abandon longstanding disagreements over tactics, create unified directorates for command and control, and commit themselves to the armed overthrow of the established government.

This process enhances Cuba's role as the guide (and sometimes arbiter) of each insurrectional movement. It increases pressure on the democratic left, domestically and internationally, to support the armed guerrillas rather than face blame as the obstacle to the unity of "progressive forces." By making Cuba the key provider of arms, security, and political-military advice, this process also makes

Cuba the key to whatever governments might emerge should the guerrillas succeed in moving beyond destruction to power.

Cuba is obviously not the sole cause of violent movements in Central America. Bloodshed, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare have been comparatively common there since premodern times. Although Cuba has supported various groups of the violent left for more than twenty years, violent social conflict has even older antecedents in several countries.

Nonetheless, the surge in Cuban and Soviet support for organized violence in Central America since 1978 has changed the scale of conflict. The conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala, where guerrilla groups plan to install Cuban-style regimes, have brought about disruption and destruction and been a major contributor to poverty. Should the Cuban-trained vanguards actually seize power, the social and economic progress of the people would be even more uncertain.

Contrary to Cuban propaganda, Cuba does not only instigate violence in areas where social change is blocked or where authoritarian regimes prevail. In El Salvador, for example, Cuba actively promoted armed violence just when members of the democratic left were participating in the first post-revolutionary government. Cuba then helped organize massive deliveries of arms to guerrilla forces just when the Christian Democratic government was implementing land reform and moving toward democratic elections. As another example, in 1981, just as Honduras was completing its transition to democracy, Cuba completed unification of the radical parties into a single directorate committed to armed struggle.

The third factor we must confront concerning Central America is the emerging role of Nicaragua as a platform for intervention against its neighbors. The United States and many Western countries have tried to provide a framework for peaceful development in Central America by providing economic aid and maintaining political contacts. The United States alone has provided \$120 million in economic assistance since 1979. We have also tried repeatedly to achieve a rapprochement with Nicaragua by diplomatic means. Little progress has been made despite these efforts.

³ The Cuban role as arms broker for Salvadoran guerrillas was first documented in U.S. Department of State Special Report No. 80, *Communist Interference in El Salvador*, February 23, 1981. Castro subsequently admitted to Socialist International representative Wischniewski in April 1981 and to delegations to the September 1981 Inter-Parliamentary Union in Havana that the conclusions of the report were essentially correct and that Cuba had supplied arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez tacitly admitted that Cuba was providing military training to Salvadoran guerrillas in an interview published in *Der Spiegel* on September 28, 1981.

After the triumph of anti-Somoza forces, Cuba moved rapidly to ensure that the Cuban-oriented forces of the FSLN would dominate the Nicaraguan government—by the traditional device of controlling military and security forces. The number of military and security advisers among the large Cuban contingent in Nicaragua increased steadily, doubling during 1981 to some 2,000. Along with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Cuba has provided in the past year some \$28 million in tanks, light aircraft, helicopters, heavy artillery, surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft weapons, military transport vehicles, and small arms and ammunition. Twenty to thirty Soviet tanks have already been delivered to Nicaragua.

Seventy Nicaraguan pilots have been training in Bulgaria, and landing strips in Nicaragua have been lengthened and hardened in apparent preparation for the arrival of MIGs. The Nicaraguan army and militia have already been built up to 70,000 men—with announced goals of an army of 50,000 and a militia of 200,000. This military buildup is profoundly threatening to Nicaragua's neighbors. The explanation that Nicaragua gives is that 250,000 armed people are needed to deal with several thousand Indian refugees in Honduras and a few hundred weekend warriors in Florida.

This militarization has accompanied the steady erosion of the new Nicaraguan government's initial pledges of political pluralism and the emergence of an increasingly repressive one-party state. The degree to which the Sandinistas now cooperate with Cuba to promote armed insurrection among Nicaragua's neighbors is illustrated by Cuban use of Nicaraguan territory to provide training and other facilities to guerrillas active in neighboring countries. Managua has been a frequent site for meetings of guerrilla leaders, Cuban officials, and Sandinista leaders on guerrilla strategy and tactics. Between October 1980 and February 1981, Nicaragua was the staging site for a massive Cuban-directed flow of supplies to Salvadoran guerrillas. Arms and support for Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas from Nicaragua have continued since—apparently restricted only by the requirements of clandestine activity.

The fourth factor affecting the region is the special importance of the struggle in El Salvador

for the future of Central America. El Salvador is the region's second most populous country. Its agricultural system is productive. Its industrial base, once rapidly developing, still has substantial potential.

But El Salvador is important not only for itself. It is the site of two critical experiments in reform: one in land tenure and the other in the creation of democratic institutions and the strengthening of the political center.³ The reform process is still incomplete. The country is fragile militarily, politically, and economically. If armed violence is used to destroy these reforms, then the prospects for peaceful change and democratic development elsewhere in Central America will be seriously set back.

Who can doubt that the capture of El Salvador by a rabid minority committed to the spread of Marxism through "revolutionary violence" would endanger every other state in the region? How long would it be before major strategic U.S. interests—the Panama Canal, the sea lanes, and oil supplies—were at risk?

II

To meet and overcome these challenges, the United States must have a comprehensive strategy. We are developing a multifaceted approach based on the following elements.

First, we must join with others to help provide Central America opportunities to achieve long-term prosperity. The critical financial situation brought on by lower commodity prices, higher oil costs, and increased debt service payments must receive the highest immediate priority. The very substantial assistance being provided by Venezuela and Mexico through their oil facilities has helped the Central American countries enormously. Emergency financial assistance from the United States and others is nonetheless crucial for Central America to avoid bankruptcy and overcome its present crisis. We have been consulting with Canada, our European allies, and Japan, finding that they share similar perceptions of the problems in Central America and of the urgent need for the developed countries to respond with trade and financial assistance.

³ El Salvador's struggle is documented in *El Salvador: The Search for Peace*, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 1981.

On February 24, 1982, speaking before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS), President Reagan noted that "economic disaster is consuming our neighbors' money reserves and credit, forcing thousands of people to leave for the United States, often illegally, and shaking even the most established democracies." He then presented a five-part program of economic cooperation as the U.S. contribution to the Caribbean Basin Initiative—covering the islands of the Caribbean as well as Central America.

The key measures, for which the administration is now urgently seeking congressional approval, are free trade for Central American and Caribbean exports to the United States, tax incentives for U.S. investors in the region, and emergency economic assistance, including \$350 million in FY 1982 supplemental aid. This is an integrated program that will be negotiated country by country to complement local self-help measures.

Second, we must not falter in our pursuit of democratic values. Democratic values and institutions can give the governments of Central America the kind of sustained popular support and legitimacy they need to counter armed minorities intent on seizing power by force. In January 1982, after a free, open election with broad participation, Honduras inaugurated a new government, thus concluding an important step in its two-year-old transition to democracy. Costa Rica—whose deeply rooted democratic institutions are helping it to weather a brutal economic crisis without violence—elected a new president in February. El Salvador's Constituent Assembly elections in March were a critical step in creating a representative, constitutional government in that nation. In Central America, only the Nicaraguan government refuses to go before the people.

Elections are a vital means of resolving differences peacefully. The United States will support efforts to develop democratic institutions in Central America. Other Latin American governments and political leaders are also lending their support to democratic development. Hemispheric leaders gathered together in the December 1981 OAS General Assembly gave concrete expression to this sentiment with their 22-3 vote in support of Salvadoran elections.

Third, we must ensure that our friends have the means to defend themselves. El Salvador and Honduras are the two most vulnerable Central American countries. The Nicaraguan military buildup threatens both. Nicaraguan-supported insurgents have targeted El Salvador's economy, creating a situation of emergency in that country. Both El Salvador and Honduras need more resources—above all, economic resources, but military as well.

An improved climate of security and political stability is essential to Central America's economic recovery. Terrorist attacks on the economic infrastructure—on bridges, electric power installations, coffee mills, telephone switchboxes, warehouses, factories, farms, and tourist facilities—seem to be motivated by the belief that worsening the economic situation of the people improves the prospects for a violent overthrow of the existing government. Clearly, Central American governments must be able to respond to and thwart these cowardly attacks on difficult-to-protect targets to prevent a drain on the nation's economy. They must enhance the overall security climate. The increased military expenditures needed just to cope with terrorist attacks strain local budgets and make more productive investment difficult. Rarely have our neighbors wanted—or needed—our assistance more.

Fourth, we must continue the pursuit of justice in the countries of the region. Lawlessness on both the left and right has been a major weakness in El Salvador, but the government is making progress in bringing it under control. The insurgents boasted proudly at the end of 1981 of having inflicted over 2,000 casualties and of having carried out 378 acts of sabotage and bombings in the last half of that year.⁴ As long as terrorism continues, the countries of Central America must work to deal with the problem more effectively. In many cases, antiquated legal systems are not up to the difficult task. Modernizing the fundamental legal and judicial tools of law enforcement could help the Central American countries deal with violence more effectively and more humanely.⁵ We would be willing to assist in such endeavors.

⁴ Radio *Venceremos* broadcast to El Salvador of December 28, 1981.

⁵ See, for example, the paper *Strengthening Juridical Responses to Terrorism in Latin America*, submitted in

Fifth, our emphasis should be on collective action. The OAS has a long and successful history of resolving Latin American conflicts, the most recent example being the Peru-Ecuador border dispute in 1981. At the OAS General Assembly in December 1981 Secretary of State Alexander Haig suggested that all the countries in Central America should address the sudden danger of an arms race in Central America as a result of Nicaraguan imports of heavy weapons and the Cuban military presence in Nicaragua. Should additional threats emerge, we must seek solutions in collective security.

Finally, we must communicate to Cuba that the costs of increased Cuban intervention in Central America will be very high. We have established measures to prevent another Mariel sealift should

Cuba seek to utilize cruelly the deportation of its citizens to harm the United States. We are tightening the economic embargo of Cuba. We are creating a radio station devoted to news about Cuba. Radio broadcasts will be beamed to the island so that Cubans will be better able to hold their government accountable for its actions. The underlying message is clear: the United States will not accept, nor do we believe the countries of the region will accept, the idea that the future of the Caribbean basin can be manipulated from Havana. That future must be determined by the countries themselves.

If we have learned anything, it is that respect for the individual, democracy, and the rule of law are essential to human progress. We cannot give in to those who advocate the sacrifice of freedom and individual rights as the necessary price for economic progress. Experience has taught us that the search for economic progress, social justice, and human dignity can only succeed in the context of peace and tranquillity.

January 1982 to the U.S. Department of State's external research program by Keith Rosenn of the University of Miami School of Law and Economics.

The Stakes in Central America and U.S. Policy Responses

Margaret Daly Hayes

CENTRAL America is a region in turmoil. The unrest there is the result in part of the area's endemic economic, political, and social backwardness and its leaders' resistance to change. It is also the result of a series of international economic shocks, including the rise in the price of petroleum since

1973, prolonged depressed prices for the region's principal export commodities, and policy mistakes in dealing with these shocks. The unrest is exacerbated by uncompromising opposition on the one hand and by subversion on the other.

Over the years the United States has paid far too little attention to Central America. The region appeared stable, with firm national leadership providing unquestioning (and unquestioned) support for the United States and its policies around the world. Small national economies seemed to perform without serious problems unless one looked closely. Few did look closely.

The United States now faces a tremendous challenge in Central America. Important U.S. national and national security interests are at stake in a cam-

MARGARET DALY HAYES is a member of the professional staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. The ideas expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not in any way represent the opinions or positions of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, or its members. Several of the ideas presented here were developed earlier, in Margaret Daly Hayes, "U.S. National Security Interests in Central America in Global Perspective," in Richard E. Feinberg, ed., *Central America: The International Dimensions of the Crisis* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982).

paign that is neither well understood nor appreciated by the American public. The challenge to U.S. national interests in Central America, and in the wider Caribbean basin¹ as well, is not yet credible. Nevertheless, it is real. At stake are:

- U.S. interests in the developing economies of the region
- the security the United States has enjoyed because of a friendly, stable, trouble-free border region along its southern flank
- U.S. prestige in the region and more widely in the developing world
- the respect of friends and allies of long standing
- U.S. ability to continue to exercise leadership in the regional and global community of nations
- the political futures of the nations in the area

The challenge the United States faces in Central America today is political, and it is, most simply stated, to provide political leadership. Though organized political opponents in the region increasingly use military action to achieve their goals, U.S. military might cannot be used against them. Though economics is at the root of most problems in the region, solutions to those problems are unimaginably complex and are not readily achieved overnight. Nevertheless, what is presently taking place in Central America and the larger Caribbean basin, of which it is part, directly affects U.S. long-term national security interests. Finding the political instruments to deal with present problems in the region is of vital interest to the United States.

The Stakes in Central America

The importance to the security of the United States of a region of underdeveloped countries whose populations live in rural impoverishment, and whose principal items of exchange with the world economy are coffee, cotton, sugar, and banana exports, is a

¹ The term "Caribbean basin," as used here, includes the Central American nations (Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama), Colombia and Venezuela, the island republics of the Greater and Lesser Antilles, and Guyana and Surinam. Mexico is also included. Focusing on the Caribbean basin as a region of U.S. national security interest does not mean to suggest that there are no great differences in political and economic conditions within the region. The approach places attention, however, first on the region, and then on the subregions within it.

subject that is understandably open to question. Although U.S. security interests in the Caribbean basin may not be on the same plane as our interests in the Persian Gulf, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Japan, they are nevertheless quite important. Were conditions different in the Caribbean basin, U.S. security could be seriously threatened or could become much more costly to maintain than at present. In the present turmoil, in Central America and some of the outer islands, one of the most important and difficult tasks for the United States is to ensure that the risks to, and costs of, security in the region are not increased.

Not only because of current turmoil in Central America, but also for reasons of longstanding tradition—Latin American as well as North American—and treaty agreements, the United States has important national interests in Latin America. First and foremost, the United States has a major interest in the friendliness and tranquillity of the region. In the past it has had only a mild interest in the economic and political development of the region, but this is changing. It has a major, crucial interest in avoiding instability and hostility in the region. When things go wrong, U.S. security interests are threatened. In contrast, however, when they go right, U.S. interests are not much enhanced. This fact has traditionally been one of the primary reasons why it has been difficult to attract adequate attention to the region except in times of turmoil. Present regional instability demands that we give closer attention to understanding our long-term interests in the political environment of our southern border.

Elsewhere I have argued that at least three separate areas of U.S. security interest in Latin America can be identified—the Caribbean basin and Gulf of Mexico, east coast South America and, finally, west coast South America.² The degree of U.S. interest in each region is determined in large part by the region's proximity to the continental United States, by its proximity to other areas of security concern, and the political, military, and economic capabilities of the region's member states. The focus of U.S. security interest in each area is quite different, reflecting the different political and economic conditions in the regions.

² Margaret Daly Hayes, "Security to the South: U.S. Interests in Latin America," *International Security*, vol. 5 (1980), p. 4.

The Importance of the Caribbean Basin

Today U.S. attention is focused intently on the Caribbean basin, where Grenada appears to be moving closer to Cuba and the many small nations are struggling against great odds to meet the economic demands of their populations. In one part of the basin, in Central America, first Nicaragua, then El Salvador, and increasingly Guatemala have experienced wrenching civil turmoil resulting from leftist opposition to entrenched right-wing oligarchic regimes. The United States is deeply concerned that political instability in these countries could result in the emergence of hostile, possibly Communist, states that could provide shelter to a more adventurous Soviet fleet, harbor offensive weapons aimed at the United States, or serve as listening posts to monitor our military movements in the area. A repetition of the Cuban revolution of 1959, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, or the Cienfuegos submarine base incident of 1969 is clearly in the minds of U.S. defense planners and policy makers as they observe the present military buildup in Nicaragua, the ongoing insurgency in El Salvador, and increasing instability elsewhere in the region. The future of the political processes unfolding in these countries is of vital concern to the United States and warrants the attention of the U.S. leadership at the highest level.

The Caribbean basin represents the U.S. southern flank. The United States has traditionally regarded the area as a region of highest security concern. Data on the use of armed force by the United States since World War II demonstrate this dramatically. Of 215 uses of armed force for political purposes between 1946 and 1975, over one-fourth took place in the Western Hemisphere, and virtually all of these in the Caribbean basin.³ The current instability in Central America and some of the Caribbean islands has recalled the longstanding U.S. concern for this region. Moreover, recent strong U.S. reactions to instability in the region are directly related to our perception and interpretation of security interests in the most traditional terms of the East-West conflict—the principal focus of the U.S. security concern.

The Caribbean basin also warrants security atten-

tion for its own reasons. The region is militarily important to the United States, providing critical links in the network of U.S. listening posts monitoring ship and submarine activities in the Atlantic Ocean and on the approaches to the Caribbean. Various U.S. military training activities take place in Panama, Puerto Rico, and Cuba that would be expensive to move, or, in some cases, would be irreplaceable. Communications, tracking, and navigation facilities are located throughout the region and particularly in the eastern islands. The navy's Atlantic Underseas Test and Evaluation Center in the Bahamas is critical to the development of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The Panama Canal has become especially important because of increased shipments through the canal of petroleum, coal, and grain on east-west trade routes. It would be militarily important in any future prolonged conventional conflict.

The Caribbean basin is also economically important. A continuing high volume of interoceanic and hemispheric trade moves through the Caribbean on north-south trade routes, and to and from the Panama Canal. Lightering operations in the Antilles will be critical to the supply of U.S. crude petroleum imports until port facilities elsewhere are developed to handle supertankers. Refineries in the Antilles supply over 50 percent of U.S. petroleum products made from Middle Eastern and African crude oil.

The Caribbean basin is also the principal source of U.S. raw-material imports from the Western Hemisphere. After Canada, Mexico is the second most important supplier of critical raw materials to the United States. It is the principal supplier of silver, zinc, gypsum, antimony, mercury, bismuth, selenium, barium, rhenium, and lead to the United States. With new petroleum wealth, Mexico could supply up to 30 percent of U.S. petroleum import requirements or up to 2 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day by the mid-1980s. Venezuela provides 28 percent of U.S. iron ore imports, 23 percent of its petroleum products, and 8 percent of its crude petroleum. Nearly 50 percent of U.S. bauxite imports have traditionally come from Jamaica.

The availability of such mineral imports from the Caribbean basin countries represents an important convenience for the United States today. In the event of a major global conflict their availability would be critical. At the same time, the

³ Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978).

cumulative "conveniences" of ready availability and longstanding commercial relations with the countries in the Caribbean basin region represent a real *interest* that is lost on neither the United States nor the regional governments. Political interests in the region are far less tangible and more open to debate and discussion. Nevertheless, U.S. political interests are being challenged by the current instability of Central America.

The Political Challenge in Central America

The United States has compelling political interests in maintaining good relations with the nations of Latin America. As part of the Western Hemisphere and in the immediate U.S. geographic sphere of influence, Latin America has long been perceived as a key element in the U.S. political following in the world. Although the inter-American system is not as closely knit today as it once was, and Latin American states wish to diminish their dependence on the United States, the hemispheric community still figures importantly in our own and others' perceptions of our political following in the world and, by extension, of the East-West balance.

The Soviet Union has always recognized the importance of Western Hemispheric solidarity and has taken advantage of every opportunity to embarrass the United States when cracks appear. The United States has demonstrated a less clear understanding of the importance of the hemispheric community in measuring its own relative weight on a world scale. In the 1960s and 1970s it adopted policies—regarding arms control, trade, nuclear energy, and human rights—with the perhaps unintended consequences of undermining hemispheric cooperation and lessening Latin American commitment to the inter-American system. Dramatic swings in U.S. policy toward the region have tended to create uncertainty and skepticism. Though the Latin Americans at times resent their closeness to the United States, and at times use it to gain leverage against the United States, they nevertheless continue to figure importantly in the global assessment of U.S. political weight in the world. Failure to achieve their support and collaboration represents a net loss in U.S. prestige in the international balance of power. This is true whether one speaks of Southern Cone countries such as Chile or Argentina, or of Mexico or Panama closer to home.

From the U.S. point of view, recent political instability in the Caribbean basin is especially unsettling because it reflects badly on the solidarity and viability of the Western Hemisphere community and on U.S. leadership of it. Instability challenges the cherished U.S. security assumption that political stability and strongly pro-American governments in the region are essential for U.S. security and well-being. As long as the U.S. interpretation of its own security depends on this conventional wisdom, the Caribbean basin, with Cuba present, will be a gnawing problem for the United States.

The presence of a Soviet-backed regime in Cuba is a profound irritant to the United States both because it represents an undeniable crack in hemispheric solidarity and because it provides a base of operation for Soviet fishing, naval and satellite intelligence, and other activities. Moreover, Cuba is an unabashed source of support for anti-American movements in the Caribbean basin and elsewhere in the world.⁴ Although Cuba kept a low profile in the region until the late 1970s, its activism in other world regions threatened U.S. interests abroad, increased the chances of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, and suggested what could occur closer to home. The establishment of militant Communist regimes in Angola and Ethiopia served as reminders of the possibility of Communist regimes in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada, or Jamaica.

The United States continues to be concerned that unstable political situations in Central America could provide an entree for further Soviet encroachment in the hemisphere. This concern is both justified and sometimes exaggerated. The Soviets recognize the psychological victory that Cuba represents and have exploited it. As the incidents of 1962 (missile crisis) and 1970 (Cienfuegos submarine base incident) suggest, however, they still seem to be unwilling to confront the United States directly in its sphere of influence.

Indeed, it would be difficult for the Soviets to make significant inroads in the region. The Central American and Caribbean economies are extremely dependent on the United States for markets, investment, and replacement parts. They would be hard-

⁴ See U.S. Department of State, "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in the Hemisphere," research paper presented to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., December 14, 1981.

pressed to maintain economic activity if they were to break relations with the United States or if the United States chose to embargo them. They could survive only if the Soviets were to underwrite their economies substantially, as they have in the case of Cuba. Though the Soviets support the Cuban economy to the tune of \$3 billion per year, they have not been generous with other "potential Cubas." They have not yet been especially generous with either Grenada or Nicaragua. They were not generous with Chile under Allende.

Cuba's dependence on the Soviets is well known. Few political leaders in the Caribbean or Central America desire to trade one overlord for another if a better alternative exists. Cuba itself has only limited tangible resources to offer these countries. Its chief appeal is psychological. Much greater Soviet support would be required for the Cubans to underwrite Caribbean and Central American economic development. While there is a continuing debate over whether this additional support is now forthcoming to Cuba, strong direct Soviet support appears unlikely today when Soviet interests are occupied elsewhere.⁸

At the same time, it is both plausible and logical that the Soviets would encourage low-cost Cuban harassment of the United States by supporting and funding Cuban adventures in the Caribbean and Central America. Hence, it is not surprising that massive and persuasive documentary evidence that Cuba, other Communist bloc countries, and the Soviet Union were supplying arms and training to Salvadoran guerrillas has emerged. Only the naive believe that the Cubans and Soviets are not aiding and abetting leftist forces in the war of political will that is emerging in Central America.

The Caribbean basin countries are able to contribute very little to their own internal defense or to regional defense. The responsibility consequently falls to the United States. Most Central American and Caribbean countries have poorly armed, poorly trained forces. A direct consequence of poor training is a lack of order and discipline, especially when

units are actually tested in the field. The countries of the eastern Caribbean do not have the equipment to enforce fishing and anti-drug trafficking laws in their own waters. Only Venezuela and Mexico have the population and economic wherewithal to support a sizable military capability in the Caribbean basin, but it is in neither country's interest to replicate capabilities available under the U.S. umbrella. In the context of these regional military capabilities Nicaragua's announced plan to build an armed force of 50,000 equipped with Soviet tanks and aircraft is threatening. Such a force is totally disproportionate to the threats that could be mounted against them from the region and only serves to alarm Nicaragua's neighbors.

Because the area has had such a low military profile, has been dependable and predictable, and has served effectively as a buffer zone for the United States, the escalation of irregular military activity in Central America is especially alarming to U.S. defense strategists accustomed to focusing their attention on other world areas, confident that the neighborhood was safe. When a hostile enemy power is perceived to be behind the widespread instability, terrorism, and guerrilla activity, there is even greater alarm. Moreover, the United States has always been inclined toward a pessimistic interpretation of events in its own backyard.

The tone with which policy makers today react to events, especially negative events, in Central America and the Caribbean antedates, by many years, the current alarms of "the Russians are coming, the Russians are coming." In the 1970s it was not fashionable to wave that banner. Moreover, it is undeniable that Cuba has been especially active in the region in the past two or three years. Other extrahemispheric actors—Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Europeans, other Latin American powers—are all, for different reasons, getting involved in a region to which few of them paid any attention previously. The region has become more permeable in the past decade than had been recognized. Even the benevolent or benign participation of these many actors contributes to perceptions of diminished U.S. ability to maintain control over or to influence deteriorating circumstances. Such perceptions heighten U.S. feelings of insecurity.

The very strong, almost visceral, U.S. response to Central American crises stems from factors that have characterized U.S. policy making toward the

⁸ Jiri Valenta argues this position in his chapter in Richard E. Feinberg, ed., *Central America: The International Dimensions of the Crisis* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982). In contrast, Robert Leiken maintains that the Soviets have embarked on a major economic and political offensive in the Western Hemisphere. See his "Eastern Winds in Latin America," *Foreign Policy*, no. 42 (Spring 1981).

region for many years. The first factor has been our ill-founded overconfidence in the stability and placidity of this region and in the ability of the United States to control events there. A second factor is the very essence and nature of the long-range strategic planning process and its tendency to force all conflict into the mold of an East-West military confrontation. Third, the crisis management process itself also tends to focus attention on the East-West elements of a conflict, even when such elements may be minor components of the situation.⁶ Finally, the United States has not had a constructive policy toward the region since the Alliance for Progress, and even that policy concentrated its efforts on South America, not Central America.

Identifying the problems of past policy toward the Caribbean basin, however, does not necessarily point out solutions. How should the United States go about dealing with the present crisis in Central America?

Policy Choices in Central America

First, we must recognize that Central America is undergoing dramatic change. The old order cannot last, nor should we seek to maintain it at any cost. I believe this premise is widely accepted in the United States. It is not necessarily so well understood, however, by our neighbors in Central America, who tend to read U.S. policy statements selectively as it suits their own interests.

It is essential that the United States be seen as supporting responsible, progressive reforms in the region. Too often, because of our past performance, our commitment to the need for reforms is judged to be weak both by those resisting change and by those promoting change. Revolutionaries on the left believe we are their archenemy. Extremists on the right assume we will support them to the end to avoid communism. Moderates whom we would prefer to support are uncertain of our commitment and, as a result, frequently fail to assert themselves effectively. More attention needs to be given to the image the United States projects in the region.

⁶ The impact that these characteristics of policy process have had on U.S.-Latin American interactions is discussed in Margaret Daly Hayes, "U.S. National Security Interests in Central America in Global Perspective," in R. Feinberg, ed., *Central America: The International Dimension of the Crisis* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982).

Second, we must recognize that our motives are suspect in Latin America. No amount of posturing on our part will change the fact that Latin Americans, and especially Central Americans, have an unpleasant memory of their historical relationship with the United States. The countries have been exploited economically by U.S. corporations. U.S. marines have invaded the region, and the Central Intelligence Agency has conspired to interfere in their internal affairs. U.S. administrations, one after another, have promised a "new deal" for Latin America and then failed to deliver. It will take many years to overcome the suspicions generated over the decades. Moreover, the enormous gap between the political, military, and economic power of the United States and that of our Central American and Caribbean neighbors guarantees that the relationship will remain uneasy. Friendship does not thrive in such an unequal relationship.

Third, we must determine what desirable range of political and economic conditions we are willing to support in the region and with how much effort. Then we must begin to implement a policy that is consistent with those goals. In my opinion the United States desires in Central America (and elsewhere) friendly, stable, prosperous states in which fair elections, respect for human rights, and creative attention to improving the lot of the poor are common values actively pursued. Moreover, we do not want hostile neighbors. We have learned to live uneasily with Cuba, but an expanded Cuban/Soviet military presence in the region is simply intolerable. The present state of relations with Nicaragua or Grenada is also highly undesirable. We would prefer a situation of comity throughout the region.

To achieve the desired goals, the channels of communication with opposition or revolutionary leaderships should be kept open and available, even if they are not always useful. It should be made clear to these leaderships, many of whom seem to act on bizarre premises about the United States, that we would like to establish and maintain good relations throughout the hemisphere. We should make clear the rules of the game as we see them and expressly define the limits of tolerable behavior. We should make known the benefits to be derived from good relations between us.

At the same time, if the United States is to be a reasonable and pragmatic broker of its own interests in the region and if it is to be successful in lead-

ing elements of the right and the left toward moderate, pragmatic, and democratic solutions, it must be cautious in its use of rhetoric against the Cubans and other revolutionary groups in the region. Rightly or wrongly, the Cuban revolution enjoys considerable respect among Latin American political leaders, in part because it was accomplished in spite of U.S. opposition. It is unbecoming for the United States, a superpower, to rail against revolutionary movements. Too often such pronouncements merely leave the impression that we oppose social change. A better strategy for dealing with Cuba would be simply to ignore it—write it out of our vocabulary and concentrate on positive, constructive activities that would help minimize Cuba's revolutionary appeal. Quiet diplomacy, aggressively implemented, would seem to provide a better and more effective approach to the problems of the Caribbean basin.

Fourth, the United States must make a long-term commitment to promoting conditions conducive to political stability and economic prosperity in the region. Social science literature, revolutionary doctrine, and common sense argue persuasively that at the root of political instability are poverty, illiteracy, frustrated aspirations, unequal income distribution, and inadequate economic opportunities for people. Such conditions provide the friendly sea in which the fishes of dissent prosper and proliferate. Political crises in Central America are likely to continue until the economic crises and the crises of political leadership are resolved.

If the long-range U.S. goals for the Caribbean basin are that it be less crisis-ridden and demand

less of our security attention, we must make a commitment to the region's economic development. A development program for the region that includes commitment of enough U.S. funds to reflect the region's importance to U.S. national security and that is tailored to respond to the economic needs and capabilities of individual countries in the region would tell the people of the region that the United States has an interest in the fate of its neighbors and is committed to their well-being. Such a program would go a long way in compensating for past U.S. neglect. It would also present a tremendous psychological and economic challenge to the Cubans and Soviets, which they probably could not meet. The Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative is a bold, important step in the right direction. Although it will not be a panacea for regional problems, it will require considerable effort and energy in the United States and in individual Caribbean basin countries to be successful. It is a set of programs for the long term, a first step that merits strong bipartisan support.

The United States should not expect gratitude for its development effort. Nor should our policy makers expect either economic development or political stability to cause the Caribbean states to line up behind the United States on all issues. Our history of involvement in the region evokes too much emotion for such responses. A well-orchestrated diplomacy of regional development and stability, however, would contribute to a more desirable state of affairs in this volatile, impoverished region. It would represent a constructive reassertion of U.S. leadership at an especially crucial time.

The El Salvador White Paper and Its Critics

Mark Falcoff

EL Salvador is a Central American republic about which most U.S. citizens know next to nothing. Yet this tiny country, smaller than the state of Maryland, has become the eye of a storm over larger foreign policy issues. At the heart of

this controversy is a white paper (*Communist Interference in El Salvador*¹) released to support the administration's requests for military and economic aid to that country's beleaguered civil-military junta.

¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Communist Interference in El Salvador*, Special Report No. 80, with accompanying documentary annex.

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I

The stated purpose of this brief was to present "definitive evidence of clandestine military support given by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and their Communist allies to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas now fighting to overthrow the established Government of El Salvador." Such evidence, it held, "underscores the central role played by Cuba and other Communist countries beginning in 1979 in the political unification, military direction, and arming of insurgent forces in El Salvador."

Specifically, the following propositions are advanced in the State Department's white paper:

- The Cuban government of Fidel Castro played a key role in 1979 and early 1980 "in bringing the diverse Salvadoran guerrilla factions into a united front."
- The Cubans provided "assistance and advice" to those guerrillas "in planning their military operations."
- A series of contacts between Salvadoran Communist leaders and key officials of several Communist states "resulted in commitments to supply the insurgents with nearly 800 tons of the most modern weapons and equipment."
- Two hundred tons of those arms were covertly delivered to El Salvador, mostly through Cuba and Nicaragua, in preparation for what turned out to be an unsuccessful "general offensive" in January 1981.
- A major Communist effort was made to "cover" bloc involvement in Salvadoran affairs "by providing mostly arms of Western manufacture."

In sum, the paper concluded,

by providing arms, training, and direction to a local insurgency and by supporting it with a global propaganda campaign, the Communists have intensified and widened the conflict, greatly increasing the suffering of the Salvadoran people, and deceived much of the world about the true nature of the revolution.

The white paper was issued on February 23, 1981. Almost immediately it became the subject of heated controversy in Congress and in the press, and at this writing it continues to provoke considerable skepticism in liberal circles. Both Senators Claiborne Pell (Democrat, Rhode Island) and Robert Byrd (Democrat, West Virginia), for example,

have wondered aloud at the documentary veracity of the paper. Columnist Jack Anderson has simply stated as if it were a fact that the paper was "later shown to have relied on highly questionable and probably forged documents." If this was the case, then the Reagan policy in El Salvador—and therefore, by extension, in Central America—would be based at best on self-deception, at worst on lies. Therefore an examination of this document and the points raised by its critics is something more than a matter of academic interest.

II

The white paper consists of two parts. One is an eight-page pamphlet that summarizes the evidence upon which the State Department based its conclusions. The other is a 170-page book of reproduced documents, together with their English translations and a chronology. These constitute what the paper's editors call "a very small portion" of two caches recovered in November 1980 from the Communist party of El Salvador (PCS) and in January 1981 from the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). Somewhat gracelessly translated, they nonetheless offer a fascinating, perhaps unprecedented, glimpse into the political universe of Central American revolutionaries.

The chief exhibits include notes on three meetings: one between representatives of the El Salvadoran guerrilla leadership and Soviet and Eastern bloc representatives at the Hungarian embassy in Mexico City; another between the guerrillas and the Cuban Directorate of Special Operations; and another between a representative of the Nicaraguan FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) directorate and the Salvadoran revolutionary Joint General Staff at a secluded location in Managua. The same staff departed from the Nicaraguan capital for Havana, where Cuban "specialists" added the final touches to the military plans for a "general offensive" which was, in fact, launched without success in January 1981.

The most important document provides details of a journey by Salvadoran Communist party chief Shafik Handal in June and July 1980, to the Soviet Union, Vietnam, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ethiopia. In Moscow he met with Latin American specialist Mikhail Kudachkin of the Central Com-

mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who urged Handal to travel to Vietnam in search of arms. Kudachkin also offered to pay for Handal's trip. In Hanoi, Handal met with high authorities of the party and state, and there obtained a pledge of 60 tons of weapons as a "first contribution." He then journeyed to the GDR, where he was advised that nearly 2 tons of auxiliary equipment (not arms) had already been dispatched to Managua. The East Germans also pledged an additional DM 2-3 million worth of resources "not directly military" in accordance with "concrete requests from the Salvadoran side." They promised to provide training for military cadres "especially in covert operation[s]" and to continue to search for "solutions" to the problem of acquiring Western-made weapons for their Central American comrades.

In Czechoslovakia Handal was told that some Czech arms circulating on the Western market would be provided to the guerrillas. Their transshipment would be coordinated with the German Democratic Republic. The Bulgarians offered German-made weapons and other supplies. The Hungarians offered radios and other provisions and proposed to trade arms with Ethiopia or Angola to provision the Salvadoran guerrillas with Western-made weapons. In Ethiopia Handal received commitments for "several thousand weapons" and ammunition. Returning to Moscow, Handal was told "in principle" that the Soviets would agree to transport the Vietnamese weapons. Some weeks later several (unidentified) socialist countries doubled the amounts of assistance promised to the El Salvadoran guerrillas.

What kinds of shipments actually took place as a result of these discussions? In late September 1981 the guerrilla logistics committee informed the Joint General Staff that 130 tons of arms and other military materiel from socialist countries had arrived in Nicaragua for transshipment to El Salvador. Because of U.S. pressure on Nicaragua, however, there was a one-month delay in moving the arms to El Salvador. Meanwhile, the Salvadorans received a \$500,000 cash contribution from Iraq to facilitate their operations and to purchase supplies in both El Salvador and Honduras.

Then, in early November, the shipments from Nicaragua were resumed. At this point the warehouses in Esmeralda (Cuba) were said to be "filled to the brim with the shipments that arrived last

week, over 150 tons," and an additional 300-400 tons were scheduled to arrive a few days later.

The concluding documents emphasize that the chief problem had become logistical. Because of careless planning, arms shipments were too closely bunched together to be absorbed in an orderly manner. New talks with the Nicaraguans on delivery arrangements were scheduled, and on this note the document sample ends.

III

Criticism of the white paper has turned largely on the use of its supporting materials rather than on the authenticity of the documents themselves. In fact, through a somewhat disingenuous use of language, many opponents of the administration's El Salvador policy have implied, without actually saying it, that the documents are forgeries. One critic who has unequivocally affirmed that they are a complete fabrication is, curiously enough, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) man, Ralph McGehee. His argument, however, is based not on the El Salvador materials themselves but on an extrapolation from other situations in which the agency, he claims, has engaged in the large-scale fabrication of Communist communiqués. He also assures us that "although Soviet or Cuban support to leftist movements in Latin America may occur, it has generally been impossible to document." This point, which does not in itself speak to the case in question, allows him to conclude that the materials published in the white paper "can only be the product of yet another CIA forgery operation."²

Rather more sophisticated objections have been offered by John Dinges in the *Los Angeles Times* and by James Petras in *The Nation*. Dinges sees a discrepancy between the figures in the summary pamphlet for arms shipments—800 tons promised and 200 tons delivered by the time of the planned offensive—and the quantities referenced in the documents themselves, which, he writes, "indicate that far lesser quantities were promised or in shipment, and only about 10 tons ever actually crossed

² Ralph McGehee, "Foreign Policy by Forgery: The CIA and the White Paper on El Salvador," *The Nation*, April 11, 1981 (emphasis added). In spite of the tone of certainty that pervades this article, the author does not claim CIA service in any Latin American country.

the border." He also characterizes Handal's reception in Moscow as "cool" and cites one of the documents wherein is expressed fear that Soviet "indecisiveness" might jeopardize any promise of arms made by socialist countries. Dinges concedes, rather curiously, that "read literally," the documents in the white paper would support its conclusions. He adds, however, that "if the Soviet Union and Cuba were pulling the strings behind the guerrilla movement, as Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., has charged, evidence of such control is not to be found in the captured documents."³

The "counter-white paper" by Petras takes a different approach. First, he broadens the scope of the debate by insisting that the State Department has purposely ignored "the political and social realities" of El Salvador "by excluding an account of the social forces involved in the opposition," which, he insists, are neither Marxist nor manipulated by Marxist forces. Second, he denies the criticality of Cuban sponsorship of revolutionary unity with the argument that "the unity of leftist forces was under way prior to December 19 [1979] as the result of increasing repression by the regime and pressure from the rank and file of all groups." Finally, echoing Dinges's point about the actual arrival of arms in El Salvador, Petras says that the "failure of the guerrilla offensive in January was in part the result of inadequate armaments coupled with massive infusions of U.S. arms to the regime's forces."⁴

The most spectacular break for critics of the white paper came on June 8 and 9, 1981, on publication of two stories—one by Jonathan Kwitny in the *Wall Street Journal* and the other by Robert Kaiser in the *Washington Post*.⁵ For purposes of economy, and because the two pieces are strikingly similar, only Kwitny's will be dealt with here. In this piece, the State Department official who uncovered and assembled the documents in the white paper, Jon Glassman, is quoted as saying that parts of the paper are possibly "misleading" and "overembellished."

³ John Dinges, "White Paper or Blank Paper?" *Los Angeles Times*, March 17, 1981.

⁴ James Petras, "White Paper on the White Paper," *The Nation*, March 28, 1981.

⁵ Jonathan Kwitny, "Apparent Errors Cloud U.S. 'White Paper' on Reds in El Salvador," *Wall Street Journal*, June 8, 1981; Robert Kaiser, "White Paper on El Salvador Is Faulty," *Washington Post*, June 9, 1981.

In a three-hour interview [Kwitny writes] Glassman freely acknowledges that there were "mistakes" and "guessing" by the government's intelligence analysts who translated and explained the guerrilla documents. . . .

But a close examination of the documents the State Department has brought forward indicates that, if anything, Mr. Glassman may be understating the case in his concession that the white paper contains mistakes and guessing. . . .

A close reading . . . indicates, instead, that [the white paper's] authors were making a determined effort to create a "selling" document, no matter how slim the background material.

The story then presents in considerable detail what Kwitny regards as critical weaknesses of the white paper. These are, briefly, that several important papers were attributed to guerrilla leaders who did not write them; the role of Castro in unifying revolutionary forces in El Salvador is not substantiated in the documents; that these papers, if anything, suggest "footdragging in procuring and transporting arms" on the part of various countries, "particularly the Soviet Union." The *pièce de résistance* deals with the white paper's estimates of actual arms shipments.

"From the documents [Kwitny quotes the white paper] it is possible to reconstruct chronologically the key stages in the growth of Communist involvement." It [the paper] then lists as the fourth such stage "the covert delivery to El Salvador of nearly 200 tons of . . . arms, mostly through Cuba and Nicaragua." But nowhere in the documents is there any mention of 200 tons.

Mr. Glassman says "That [200 tons] comes from intelligence based on the air traffic, based on the truck traffic. In other words, it doesn't come from the documents. . . ."

Another frequently quoted statistic in the white paper is that "the series of contacts between Salvadoran Communist leaders and key officials of several Communist states . . . resulted in commitments to supply the insurgents nearly 800 tons of the most modern weapons and equipment."

The 800-ton figure also represents an extrapolation, Mr. Glassman says. He says he multiplied 130 (the tonnage of arms one document says are stored in Nicaragua) by six to arrive at "nearly 800."

Oddly enough [Kwitny remarks], Document I, which provides the rationale for this extrapolation, seems largely given over to complaints by the unidentified author about the ineptitude of guerrilla leaders in even finding a meeting place and the slowness of arms deliveries from outside El Salvador.

IV

Leaving aside the single outright charge of forgery, critics of the white paper largely agree that its documents—in the words of James Petras—"refute the very case the State Department is attempting to demonstrate." Where this is not so, they are based on random calculations which in any case are not justified by the materials made public. Finally, the very failure of the guerrilla offensive in January 1981 merely underlines the insignificance or near nonexistence of outside aid. Let us examine some of these assumptions in greater detail.

Documents as a Source. Although the State Department made it known from the beginning that the document book released with the white paper represented only a small portion of the two caches, and that not all of its findings were based on these papers, critics continually look to the document book for what they have been flatly warned will not be found there.⁹ The most egregious example deals with the 200 tons of arms actually delivered to El Salvador. It is quite true, as Kwitny (among others) writes, that "nowhere in the documents is there any mention of 200 tons." The reason—as Glassman told him—is that the figure comes from other intelligence analyses based on air and surface traffic.

In the *Wall Street Journal*, however, this statement is immediately followed by the assurance that the 200-ton figure was arrived at "by extrapolating the hauling potential of several trucks that were listed in Document N . . . This document,"

⁹ What the white paper actually said was that its evidence, which consisted of "captured guerrilla documents and war materiel and corroborated by intelligence reports, underscores the central role played by Cuba and other Communist countries" in El Salvador (emphasis added). Much of the information which the State Department possesses, it goes on to say, "has been acquired over the past year. Many key details, however, have fallen into place as the result of the guerrillas' own records."

Kwitny writes, "an undated, unsigned, and barely legible handscrawled sheet, lists four trucks, three of which are still to be bought or built, along with the numbers, totalling 21, under the headings 'sea,' 'air,' 'land.'" *As it happens, however, this is not how the intelligence community arrived at the 200-ton figure, nor was it an accurate account of what he was told by Glassman.⁷ The reference to Document N is Kwitny's own.*

The disjunction between the white paper's findings and the document book is repeated later in a discussion of military aid promised the guerrillas by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat. By separating two sentences with nearly a dozen lines on another subject, Kwitny manages, first, to obscure the fact that this reference came from other intelligence sources and, then, when he finally reports the fact, makes it seem as if Glassman has been abruptly surprised by some inconsistency.

The three errors in the white paper that Glassman freely conceded—that the authorship of one document was possibly wrongly attributed to a particular individual, that Castro was wrongly cited as talking about the unification of Salvadoran groups when he in fact was speaking about uniting Central American Communist organizations in support of the Salvadoran left, and that the summary pamphlet turned a third-person reference in the documents concerning Handal into the first person—are all irrelevant to the documents' authenticity or to their political significance. Nonetheless, *these* are the "mistakes, errors, and guessing" plucked from the Glassman interview by Kwitny and misleadingly turned into general characterizations of the white paper.

The Role of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Other Socialist Countries. The white paper does not—contrary to Dinges's view—accuse the Cubans and Soviets of "pulling the strings behind the guerrilla

⁷ "The thrust of the [Kwitny] article," Glassman publicly stated the day it appeared in the *Wall Street Journal*, "does not represent my views. Mr. Kwitny simply extracted from a three-hour interview, a few anecdotes to support a different point of view. The result is a story which does not accurately reflect my position." Department of State, *Daily Press Briefing*, June 8, 1981, mimeographed, p. 29. In the specific case of Document N, I rely on Glassman's reply to a question submitted to him on January 15, 1982.

movement," but it does establish that both have played a crucial role in Salvadoran events. Without the Cubans and Soviets, there would still be serious political turmoil in El Salvador but on a completely different level, which would be far more amenable to an elected government. Document A, a letter from Handal to Castro dated December 16, 1979, thanks the Cuban dictator for "help" in "undertak[ing] a transcendental step"—namely, the signing of a unity agreement among various revolutionary groups. Handal promises to honor the agreement and remain "worthy" of Castro's example and of the "patient and wise work that Cuban solidarity has contributed" to bringing about that unity. The other documents leave no doubt that Cuba is the chief point of reception for Eastern bloc weapons in the Western Hemisphere, from which they are transshipped to El Salvador via Nicaragua. What is remarkable is that Castro has even admitted as much—some months after the failed offensive, to a visiting German Socialist leader. On that occasion he "insisted that the shipments had ended," although he did not specify when. He also added that "the Soviet Union had not been involved."⁸

If there is one point that the document book repeatedly substantiates it is that the Soviet Union indeed did not wish to appear to be involved. That is why Handal was sent off to Vietnam, Ethiopia, and to other Eastern bloc countries. The particular appeal of Vietnam is, obviously, its capacity to offer an abundance of captured American munitions. This much is shown by the inventories of arms uncovered in El Salvador, and confirmed by subsequent rechecking of serial numbers against U.S. Army records.

It is true, as both Dinges and Kwitny point out, that in Document E, dated August 5, 1980, Handal is depicted as "concern[ed]" as to the effects that the lack of decision by the Soviets may have, not only regarding the assistance that they themselves can offer, but also upon the inclination of the other parties of the European socialist camp to cooperate.⁹ This fear, however, expressed at one particular point, proved groundless, as the other documents and intelligence reports confirm.⁹ What

the revolutionaries did not get is direct Soviet assistance. Without Soviet sponsorship, however, it is simply not conceivable that the countries of the European socialist camp would cooperate. This is a point that is driven home in Document B, minutes of a meeting in the Hungarian embassy in Mexico City. There a member of the revolutionary coalition was reminded by the Hungarian delegate that "it is because of the [Salvadoran Communist] party that the socialist world opens the door to you. It was a different case in Nicaragua."

The Dimensions of External Arms Commitment. How did the State Department arrive at the conclusion that "key officials of several Communist states [made] commitments to supply the insurgents nearly 800 tons of the most modern weapons and equipment"? As we have seen, Glassman is quoted in the *Wall Street Journal* as saying that "the 800 figure represents an extrapolation. He says he multiplied 130 (the tonnage of arms one document says are stored in Nicaragua) by six to arrive at 'nearly 800.'" Glassman did not, however, simply pluck the multiplier six out of the air, nor are the 130 tons simply "stored" in Nicaragua. Document I refers to them as "one-sixth of all the material obtained that the DRU, the Unified Revolutionary Directorate [the coalition of Salvadoran guerrilla organizations], will have eventually concentrated in Lagos [Nicaragua]." The fact that this exhibit, as Kwitny writes, "seems largely given over to complaints about the ineptitude of guerrilla leaders in even finding a meeting place, and the slowness of arms deliveries from outside El Salvador" is simply irrelevant. What is at issue in this instance is the size of the external arms commitment.

Why did the January 1981 offensive fail? Was this due, as Petras claims, to "inadequate armaments coupled with massive infusions of U.S. arms to the regime's forces"? The result of any military engagement—particularly in revolutionary warfare—is always open to different assessments. In this particular case, however, the evidence we have points overwhelmingly in a direction opposite the one Petras would have us take.

First, Document P, dated October 29, 1980, complains that revolutionary propaganda has not been taking hold among the Salvadoran masses. "The popular sectors are becoming progressively confused and are being affected by the defeatist

⁸ *New York Times*, April 25, 1981.

⁹ If the documents were a fabrication, one cannot help wondering why this sentence would have been allowed to slip in.

attitude [Junta President José Napoleón] Duarte and his lackeys are trying to instill among the people." Although in "the interior of the country our military forces are engaged in heroic combat," the author says, "vast sectors of the population" are "unaware of this situation, which can be dangerously influenced by a defeatist attitude."

Second, the failure of the guerrilla offensive simply could not be due to "massive infusions of U.S. arms to the regime." The reason is astonishingly simple. Between 1977 and early 1981 no U.S. arms were sent to El Salvador. Plans to reequip that tiny country's armed forces were held up in the final weeks of the Carter administration while an investigation was launched to determine responsibility for the murder of four American nuns in December 1980. The arms embargo was lifted on January 17, 1981. *The guerrilla offensive was launched on January 10, a full week earlier.*

V

The controversy over the white paper—at least in mainstream forums and in the Congress—has really been something more than a debate over a government document. In a broad sense it reflects an

unfortunate confusion between fact and policy, differences of opinion over the origins of revolution and over the importance of external aid to insurrectionary movements, varying perceptions of Soviet strategy, and—unavoidably—partisan interest. To the degree that such discussions help to sort out the options, risks, costs, and benefits, they are part of the foreign policy process in a democracy.

In the case of El Salvador, however, serious discussion must begin with the acknowledgment that there is no discrepancy between what the exhibits released in the white paper show, and the position of the Reagan administration. For other reasons—which it remains the burden of others to provide—the Reagan policy in that country, and for that matter, in Central America as a whole, may yet be shown to be ill-advised. But that is a case that must be argued first by taking the evidence of outside involvement fully into account. Such evidence is now in the public domain, represented by the white paper and its document book. Arguing around these or purposefully misrepresenting what they contain will not do. In that sense, the white paper represents a challenge which critics of the administration's policy have not even begun to meet.

Military Governments and U.S. Policy: General Concerns and Central American Cases

David Scott Palmer

THE policy of the United States toward military governments, like U.S. foreign policy more generally, is closely related to four distinct but inter-

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acting elements: (1) overarching national interests, (2) the institutions responsible for foreign policy, (3) underlying national norms and values, and (4) objective realities in the countries and region with which the policy is concerned.

In parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, special military security issues have been raised recently even as military governments in the region as a whole are on the wane. Thus far the present administration has been curiously tentative in dealing with the issues raised by these developments.

Brief consideration of the four elements, with special reference to those aspects that relate to security and military governments, should give some indication as to why this is the case as well as suggest some potential pitfalls for future policy.

Overarching National Interest

The fundamental and continuing objective of U.S. foreign policy is to protect the nation from threats to its security. The United States normally pursues this objective in the Western Hemisphere by supporting stability and predictability in political affairs and economic growth and development in the countries of the region. In spite of agreement at this most general level, however, specific U.S. administrations may work to realize the basic policy objective in quite different ways.

The Carter administration, for example, backed civilian organizations and institutions and democratically elected governments. It also stressed bilateral or multilateral public economic assistance. Military aid and sales were downplayed and often actively discouraged. During most of Carter's term, policy makers argued that U.S. national security goals in Central America and the Caribbean, as well as in Latin America generally, were directly related to the political responsiveness of the governments of these countries to their populations and of improved economic circumstances.

In this context, communism *per se* or East-West issues more generally were not seen as the most compelling concerns in the area. In the absence of a strong national security justification, there was a continued decline in U.S. military assistance programs in the region begun in the early 1970s. One result of these emphases was the rapid cooling of U.S. relations with most military governments of Latin America. The Carter administration followed this approach in Latin America and the Caribbean for various reasons: liberal ideological predispositions, legislative restrictions, and popular opinion. Also, when the policies were being formulated, there was no major pressing military security threat in the region.

To date, the Reagan administration, unlike its predecessor, has tended to view the major U.S. concerns in East-West terms, most concretely as the struggle against both communism and Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere. One result has been renewed emphasis on military sales and assistance as a major policy tool. Equipment and

advisers have been rushed to El Salvador and Honduras, and various arms sales and training agreements with several other Latin American countries are in various stages of negotiation. Another result is that economic assistance for some countries is now justified more prominently as support for governments and peoples threatened by Communist subversion. In addition, efforts are being made to improve relations with the remaining military regimes in Latin America.

This apparent policy shift is only partly explained by the present administration's conservative ideological orientation. The change also responds to the quite different circumstances in Central America that greeted Reagan and his advisers when they took office in January 1980. Marxist-Leninist guerrillas were actively fighting for control in El Salvador and Guatemala, and various incidents suggested spillover effects in both Honduras and Costa Rica. Beginning in 1978, Cuba shifted its own regional policy and started to support guerrilla movements more actively on several levels. Nicaragua's revolutionary government showed signs of being more clearly against the United States and of supporting Cuba and the Soviet Union.

What is surprising under these circumstances is that U.S. policies did not change even more markedly. Relations between the United States and the government and military establishment of Guatemala are curiously standoffish in spite of the growing guerrilla presence there. Substantial efforts were made between August and October 1981 to achieve a rapprochement with Nicaragua, and some economic assistance continues. The Caribbean Basin Initiative promises, in its broad outlines at least, to continue policies begun by the previous administration which respond primarily to economic issues. At least part of the explanation for the more modest than expected adjustment in U.S. policies toward military governments is to be found in the ways in which the other key elements of policy affect them.

Foreign Policy Institutions and Procedures

The number of U.S. public entities responsible for various aspects of foreign policy formulation and implementation has tended to increase over time in response to a more complex set of international problems and issues and a growing willingness of the U.S. government to accept greater responsibilities on the world scene. At the same time, for a number of reasons, the always tenuous balance

among these organizations and agencies has shifted in various ways.

Perhaps the most notable shift has been the growing willingness of Congress to involve itself in the foreign policy process. Because of the special circumstances that propelled Congress into this more activist mode in the early 1970s, a number of legal dispositions now restrain the executive branch in various ways. These include limitations on covert action, military assistance, U.S. troop commitments abroad, and reporting requirements on human rights status. Such restrictions have a particularly inhibiting effect on an administration's inclination to give active support to repressive military governments in Latin America in the name of the East-West struggle. Because the Carter administration was not so inclined, such limitations did not pose serious difficulties for its policies.

This is less the case, however, with the Reagan administration. Barring some dramatic shift in the configuration of Congress in the 1982 elections, past legislative branch dispositions and the strong opposition of some key members will probably continue to restrain the executive from giving more support to military governments in the region.

In addition, the conscious decision by the Reagan administration, during its first year in office, to downplay the policy-making role of the National Security Council may well have contributed, albeit inadvertently, to greater continuity in Latin American policy from the previous administration than might otherwise have been the case. Significant shifting of personnel in policy-making positions for Latin American affairs, prolonged battles over some positions, and long delays in filling some job slots seem to have had the same effect. As a result, this administration has been much slower than its predecessor in placing its distinctive stamp on U.S. relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries.

Underlying National Values

As a number of recent experiences have demonstrated, no U.S. policy can stray too far for too long from a core of norms and values of the wider U.S. public without serious long-term consequences. In the foreign policy area, there has always been a sense in the body public that democracies are to be preferred to nondemocratic regimes. Any policy that tilts too far toward support of authoritarian

governments runs the risk of being repudiated by popular sentiment and opinion.

The new administration learned this between February and April 1981 when it gave preliminary indications that it was prepared to take strong steps to counter subversion in Central America and particularly in El Salvador. The immediate outpouring of vehement opposition, not only from some members of Congress but also on university campuses and among human rights and church groups, almost certainly contributed to the administration's backing off from its initial posture. The same response may well also have helped to blunt the efforts by more conservative elements within the administration to gain full control of policy making toward Latin America and the Caribbean.

At the same time, however, there has emerged also over the past generation, particularly since the 1950s, an equally strong anti-Communist streak in that same body public. To the degree, therefore, that anticommunism can be used to justify actions that would otherwise be rejected or severely questioned, certain policies are capable of securing substantial public support. The as yet unanswered question is the degree to which such support for specific policies in the name of anticommunism will be eroded by changed perceptions, post-Vietnam, about the ability of government to implement policy effectively and the candor of public officials. The intensity of opposition to possible U.S. actions in El Salvador illustrates the limits of public support in the 1980s for policies toward Latin America based too largely on a cold-war world view out of the 1950s.

Realities in the Region

Whatever the national interest, the nature and mix of institutions responsible for policy, and the underlying norms and values, no policy can be pursued successfully unless it adequately takes into account objective realities in the country or region to which it is being applied. What are the main dimensions of those realities in terms of U.S. policy toward military governments?

1. The general trend in Latin America as a whole is toward various types of democratically elected civilian governments. It is always difficult to categorize political systems in Latin America along the civilian-military dimension. Even when

allowances are made for this, however, significant changes have occurred over the past five years. In 1977 there were ten military governments and four democratic governments in Spanish and Portuguese America (five other cases were ambivalent). Five years later there are eight democratic governments and seven military governments (four others are ambivalent). Of the remaining military regimes, five are taking specific steps to return to civilian rule in the near future (within the next five years). Furthermore, most of the ten English-speaking countries of the Caribbean retain the democratic procedures of their colonial heritage.

Some part of this trend can be attributed to recent U.S. policy efforts to encourage civilian institutions, as in the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Honduras, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Most of the explanation for this development in these and other countries, however, is found in the various forces in the region itself that produce periodic ebbs and flows of civilian and military regimes. Civilian opposition, limited success in governing, and forceful military and civilian leadership were among the factors driving a number of long-term military governments back to civilian rule recently.

Ecuador, Peru, and Honduras have held elections and are now governed by civilians. Panama, Uruguay, and Brazil are moving in this direction. Democratic forms were strengthened in the Dominican Republic when an opposition party won the election of 1978 and took office. Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia retained their own distinctive varieties of democratic institutions. Although the 1980 coup in Bolivia overthrew the civilian government and annulled elections, the 1981 coup there shows signs of leading the country back to some form of moderate rule. Even El Salvador, in spite of the guerrilla insurgency there, is not as dominated politically by the military in 1982 as it was in 1977, and has plans to hold popular presidential elections within two years. Only the governments of Chile and Argentina remain rather completely in military hands and even there recent events suggest that some changes may soon be in the offing. (For various reasons, Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay are ambiguous cases in Spanish America, as are Haiti and Grenada in the non-Spanish Caribbean.)

Granted, past history indicates that these trends can be reversed and may well be within the next ten to twenty years. Nevertheless, the general di-

rection of developments in both Latin America and in the non-Latin Caribbean at this time suggests that the issue of U.S. support for military governments is less salient than the questions of how to enhance the shift toward civilian governments now under way and of which specific policies can strengthen those civilian governments now in power. Any U.S. policy of generalized and indiscriminate support for military regimes in the face of such trends, even if justified by an administration on anti-Communist grounds, is likely to be counterproductive. This is because such a policy undermines in most cases the very democratic institutions and procedures that an administration argues it would be trying to protect from the threat of Communist subversion.

2. Guerrilla activity in some parts of Latin America is on the rise. The phenomenon of a growing guerrilla presence in a country is normally a symptom of the failure of the social, political, and economic systems to respond over time to the legitimate needs and aspirations of the populace. It can usually be overcome by attacking the causes rather than the symptom to make the system more responsive. When such movements are actively supported by committed adversaries of the United States, however, a military security threat is introduced into the region that cannot be ignored. In such cases, as in Guatemala and El Salvador, the immediate threat normally demands such special measures as rapid increases in training and assistance to the military establishments. Even in extreme circumstances, however, the ultimate security objectives of the United States—political stability and economic growth—are best served by also supporting efforts to build responsive economic and political organizations.

However belatedly and imperfectly, the government of El Salvador has demonstrated such a willingness since 1979. Substantial U.S. economic and military assistance under these conditions is not only defensible but probably the only feasible alternative. In Guatemala the continued truculence of key military and civilian authorities in dealing constructively with the underlying conditions that have given rise to the guerrilla movements in the first place puts the United States in a most difficult position. Large-scale U.S. military or economic assistance to Guatemala would place the United States on the side of those reactionary elements who will virtually guarantee the continuation of

the causes of the guerrilla insurrection if they continue in power. If we do not provide assistance there will be an increased military security threat posed by forces linked to the international adversaries of the United States. It is too early to tell whether or not the March 1962 coup will provide even a partial solution to this dilemma, though early signs are somewhat promising.

Thus certain crisis situations involving national security may predispose the United States to support military governments more actively than would otherwise be justified by an objective consideration of longer-term national interests. In actual fact, short-term security crises normally influence U.S. policy more than such longer-term goals as democratic institution building and economic development, regardless of which political party controls the White House. Under circumstances like those at present in El Salvador and Guatemala, what is remarkable to date is the restraint shown by U.S. policy. In El Salvador the United States is attempting to help resolve the crisis through a combination of military and economic assistance, support for economic reform, and support for civilian rule. In Guatemala the U.S. approach thus far has been to avoid interference almost completely.

3. Those who are familiar with Latin American political life realize that there will probably be military governments in the future just as there have been in the past. Even though authoritarian rule has passed its hundred-year peak in Latin America (by some calculations), the tradition of military rule is too deeply ingrained to predict, as some have in the past, that the era of the military in politics is over.

One policy implication of this reality is that military establishments merit support by their U.S. counterparts through training, professional activities, and military assistance programs both because they are military institutions and because they are political actors. Through such relationships, it is argued, the U.S. military gains a closer acquaintance with its Latin American colleagues and is in a position to understand more fully their concerns and even to influence them in appropriate ways toward actions compatible with U.S. interests in the region. The progressive drawing down of U.S. military programs in the region over the past ten years had somewhat different consequences than those anticipated. Most militaries simply sought

assistance elsewhere, including from the Soviet Union, or further developed their own domestic arms and training capacities.

4. Latin America today is much more diversified and complex politically, economically, and socially than thirty years ago. One consequence of this change is the relative decline in the political and economic importance of the United States to many countries of the region. Some exceptions are to be found, as in most of the countries of the Caribbean basin. Here multiple U.S. ties with the countries involved can be used to try to accomplish long-term U.S. objectives that are quite compatible with the interests of the countries themselves. Even here, however, U.S. predominance and the resulting inevitable asymmetry in relations requires the most sensitive of bilateral or multilateral diplomatic relations to avoid forcing such countries to make choices that they should really make on their own if the results are to be successful and reasonably permanent.

In most of the Caribbean, present political institutions and practices are compatible with our own and congenial to the United States. The challenge is to provide or encourage provision of the economic support that will ultimately strengthen such institutions and help them survive. The United States does not have to do this alone, nor should it. Most countries in the region have long-range objectives similar to those of the United States, and some, such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Trinidad, are in a position to provide substantial assistance as well. The issue of support for military governments does not really arise in the Caribbean itself.

In Central America matters are infinitely more complicated. In Guatemala and El Salvador active guerrilla movements threaten established governments. In El Salvador short-term security goals dictate a policy of military and economic support for the present military-civilian government in spite of its limitations.

In Guatemala the choice is not as clear-cut. Guatemala is the one Latin American country in which progressive military dominance has slowly squeezed out moderate elements and moderate alternatives from the civilian side. A pernicious cycle is presently at work which has grave implications for the country and its people and potentially grave security implications for the United States. In this context, the cycle can be broken only when mod-

erate forces control the country. This probably cannot be accomplished until more reasonable elements within the military are persuaded that the extreme course now being followed is folly. Some modest rapprochement between the Guatemalan military and its U.S. counterparts after the direction of the new military government there becomes clearer is possibly the only way the United States might begin to help resolve the present conundrum.

In most of the rest of Latin America, the United States no longer has the ability to influence outcomes so directly. In the Caribbean basin, perhaps even including Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, prudence suggests a modest, pluralistic approach to the problems of the region. In the rest of Latin America, however, the relative decline in the number of U.S. government bilateral relationships with those countries requires it.

Conclusion

A U.S. policy that further encourages civilian rule and movement in that direction is what is needed in the region. Such a policy would enhance key U.S. national interests, such as gaining political and economic responsiveness of governments to their citizens. It also agrees with the underlying norms and values of our country (for democracy and against communism) as well as with the present sense of Congress. In addition, such a policy reinforces trends toward the establishment of more responsive governments in the region that are already under way. If the United States can avoid the pitfall of generalizing to all of Latin America the short-term security challenges that affect only a few countries in Central America, then the long-term interests of both the United States and the countries of the region are much more likely to be satisfied.

President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Formula

Michael J. Kryzanek

THE speech by President Ronald Reagan to the Organization of American States in late February 1982 officially launched what has come to be called the Caribbean basin initiative, or, in some circles, a "mini-Marshall plan." The United States seems ready to embark on a new foreign policy initiative which seeks to exert increased influence in this strategically important region through an ambitious and costly program.

Stressing a combination of economic and military aid (projected at \$350 million in its first year), investment incentives, and a twelve-year period of free trade with only a few restrictions, the policy put forward by the Reagan administration is a comprehensive development plan for the Caribbean basin

(including the island mini-states from the Bahamas to Trinidad and the countries of Central America). Moreover, the policy apparently seeks to encourage participation from other industrial and area nations as a means of presenting the aid multilaterally rather than as just another venture in U.S. foreign assistance.

The key element in the Caribbean basin initiative that differentiates it from past efforts to affect the course of Latin American development is the emphasis being placed on private investment and the increased presence of foreign (in particular U.S.) business in the region. The Reagan administration seems convinced that this "mini-Marshall plan" should rely on the private sector as the engine of development.

Although it is still too early to comment on the final shape of the policy for the Caribbean basin

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(because much depends on bilateral negotiations and congressional approval), based on the president's remarks and the public response to this new initiative, we can examine what appear to be the fundamental premises of this policy. Any policy that affects our closest neighbors (some twenty-seven countries and 50 million people), that potentially involves the distribution of billions of dollars in public aid and private investment, deserves close scrutiny.

Containment and Capital: The Means for Security and Development

The Caribbean basin initiative that is evolving in Washington seems to be based on a relatively simple formula. It combines the goal of containing left-wing revolutionary movements with the view that massive injections of public and private capital will help attain two admirable (from the U.S. perspective) objectives—greater security in the face of Communist expansion and accelerated economic development in the region. In some ways reminiscent of the Alliance for Progress, the Caribbean basin initiative of President Reagan seems to be based on the idea that the “two swords” of containment and capital will limit the reach of Castroism in places like El Salvador, Nicaragua, and tiny Grenada, while also funneling assistance to the poorest countries (in income, perhaps, but not in natural resources) in the hemisphere.

The containment “variable” was put into place in the Caribbean basin initiative in response to what was perceived as Communist direction of the revolution in El Salvador and the fears of a Central American domino effect. With Castro supplying arms to the revolutionaries in El Salvador, a Marxist government in Nicaragua, and the possible formation of what one journalist called the “coconut curtain” in the mini-island states, President Reagan made the now controversial decision to step up the U.S. military presence in El Salvador.

The decision to station U.S. personnel in El Salvador, however, has diverted attention from a number of other containment initiatives by the administration. So-called nonmilitary equipment (jeeps and trucks) was sent to Guatemala for the first time since the Carter presidency, while the White House lobbied Congress to resume full military assistance to that country. Joint military maneu-

vers were staged with Honduras, along with a doubling of U.S. military aid to that country. The president also increased military assistance to democratic governments such as the Dominican Republic, while also negotiating an agreement with Venezuela for the sale of sophisticated F-16 fighter planes.

Within one year the Reagan administration seemed to have become less dedicated to Carter's human rights policy and outspoken support for reform in Central America, replacing them with a policy of providing conservative regimes with weapons and technical assistance. President Reagan has moved from Carter's benign neglect to active, if not intense, interest in strengthening the defense capabilities of the Caribbean nations and including them in the overall security strategy of the region.

President Reagan's choice of the policy of containment in the Caribbean basin marks a return to a more traditional and perhaps more popular policy posture. Reviving this doctrine, however, should not blind policy makers to the realization that selling arms to our neighbors is often an ineffective tactic; nor will it necessarily ensure regional security. The administration must recognize that a policy of containment does little to curb Communist expansion before it spreads because that policy does not deal with the root causes of revolution. Although containment remains this country's principal response to communism, it is a defensive measure and, especially in the third world, often only postpones revolution.

With the containment policy firmly in place, the Reagan administration advanced capital formation as the companion piece in its foreign policy formula for the Caribbean basin. Although the Caribbean basin initiative is but a few months old, President Reagan's belief in capital as the “other sword” in the Caribbean is not without a model or reference point.

The first foreign leader to meet President Reagan after his inauguration was Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica. On the heels of his victory over socialist Michael Manley, Seaga promised Reagan that Jamaica would turn in a new direction, one in which private-sector development would become the primary means of modernization. In return for Seaga's pledge to move Jamaica away from socialism, the Reagan administration granted \$107 million in real or promised aid to the country. The public-sector aid, however, is but a “foot in the

door." Already banking and business groups led by David Rockefeller are working with local officials to find ways in which private corporations can enter the Jamaican economy. Estimates as high as \$775 million in private investment destined for Jamaica reveal the early interest of the foreign business community in the Seaga government.

The transfer of capital from a wealthy country to a poor country for the purpose of economic development is not a new approach. The prospect, though, of a multinational "invasion" of the Caribbean is already causing concern in some circles. The tide of nationalism is perhaps not as strong in the Caribbean as it is in some other places of the world. The talk of "rewriting" investment laws, however, of providing tax breaks to businesses, creating industrial free zones, leasing parcels of land or the seabed, and permitting large-scale foreign control of certain internal sectors of the economy concerns many businessmen in the region. It may anger moderate nationalists, to say nothing of leftists who will surely call for nationalization of foreign enterprises.

One other point should be made concerning the capital variable of the Caribbean basin initiative. Although Jamaica has become the hoped-for showcase of private investment, aid to Nicaragua has been severely curtailed and the United States has rejected attempts by Castro to open U.S.-Cuban commercial ties. If the actions of the Reagan administration on Nicaraguan aid and normalization of ties with Cuba are any yardstick of the future direction of the program, it appears that U.S. aid to the Caribbean may be given selectively, based on a fairly conservative ideology, and probably will not be used as a political tool to entice Marxist regimes away from Soviet domination.

The Missing Variables: Trade, Social Reform, Cooperation, and Democratic Stability

It is a well-known fact that politics differs a great deal from mathematics, so when a formula is applied to political situations, it is less precise and less predictable than when it is applied in a mathematical context. Nevertheless, the administration's seemingly consistent but vastly oversimplified belief that containment plus capital in the Caribbean basin will provide greater protection against Communist expansion and spur economic development neglects

several other vital factors that are essential to a successful U.S. policy toward the region. If the Reagan administration clings rigidly to the "two sword" formula and neglects these other elements, the Caribbean basin initiative will probably languish or, worse, backfire.

Trade. The decision to provide millions of dollars in aid and investment to the Caribbean will do little for this region if the conditions and volume of trade continue to tilt in favor of the industrialized countries. In each of the countries of the Caribbean (with the possible exception of Venezuela and Mexico) there is a deep-seated trade imbalance, with imports (especially of oil) far exceeding exports. Costa Rica, for example, saw its net cash reserves drop to an all-time low of \$417 million in 1981, in large part because of the high price of imported oil and its inability to make up the difference by exporting its basic commodities, coffee and bananas.

The problem is compounded by the fact that most of these countries rely on export revenue from commodities that are subject to price fluctuations in the world market. A decline of only one cent in the price of a particular commodity can mean the loss of millions of dollars in revenue. The Dominican Republic saw the price of sugar soar from ten cents to seventy-six cents between 1974 and 1975, only to drop to sixty-four cents in 1979 and then to hit bottom again at twelve cents in 1981. The effects, political as well as economic, are devastating.

The problem of dependency deepens for these countries when they must negotiate loans from either friendly governments, international lending organizations, or private banks. Borrowing money increases the pressure on the economies of the Caribbean nations as the governments must channel precious revenues to meet interest payments. Jamaica, a country representative of this lending malaise, is \$1.4 billion in debt and recently negotiated a \$695 million loan from the International Monetary Fund.

To lessen economic pressures, for years Caribbean leaders have been calling for greater access to the markets of the industrial nations and more stable pricing mechanisms. In some instances negotiations with the developed countries, in particular with the United States, have provided new avenues

of trade and lowered tariff barriers. Unfortunately for these countries, world pricing agreements on basic commodities such as sugar have not been implemented and thus the roller-coaster effect on revenues gained from the export sector continues. Although President Reagan's call for free trade in the Caribbean is a giant step forward, there are many in this region who feel that special interests in the United States will persuade Congress to maintain trade restrictions and sabotage one of the key elements of the new Caribbean program.

Social Reform. It might be said that the Achilles heel of past U.S. efforts to achieve security and development in Latin America has been a problem of perception—that is, the United States is not seen as being supportive of social reform. The countries of the Caribbean see the United States as a country obsessed with anticommunism and fearful of social experiments that will upset the status quo. Almost every U.S. administration in recent memory has had to deal with this image. Most have been unsuccessful simply because actions speak louder than words. For its part, the Reagan administration has been perceived as doing little to convince the reform-minded in the Caribbean that it is willing to accept large-scale land redistribution efforts, income security programs, and equitable tax policies.

In the past U.S. presidents have generally promised aid, talked tough to the Communists, and made some cosmetic efforts at promoting social reform in the Caribbean. If the Caribbean basin initiative is to work, then the capital that flows into the region must be accompanied by firm commitments to support governments that move forward in reforming those areas of national life that have a history of inequality and injustice. To accomplish this the Reagan administration may have to demand concessions from reluctant Caribbean governments.

The current conventional wisdom that it is in the long-term interest of the United States to support the anti-Communists in power and play down reform must be balanced by the memory of Somoza's Nicaragua and the demise of other authoritarian governments that have failed to address crying social needs and adjusted too late to changing political conditions. The Reagan administration must be willing to weigh its concern for security against the recognition that there is a point in the

process of political change when rigidly adhering to the status quo can intensify revolutionary fervor and jeopardize U.S. interests. Undoubtedly, placing the United States in the forefront of social reform in the Caribbean will be a risky business. It may create severe tensions between this country and the local conservative elites in the Caribbean. Policy makers should also remember that many of these nations are at a point in their political evolution where increased military assistance and the presence of technical advisers will not be enough to contain left-wing revolutions.

The United States probably will not become the champion of social reform in the Caribbean. It is incumbent upon the administration to realize, however, that the old regimes of the region are indeed dying and that the United States must be ready to march forward with the forces of change and reform there. Or else we may once again be asking ourselves how the Caribbean was "lost."

Cooperation. Another variable that must be included in the basic formula supporting the Caribbean basin program is the need to make this a truly cooperative development effort. One of the major problems faced by the Alliance for Progress was that the program became "our" program and therefore relied heavily on U.S. presidential support and congressional financing. Moreover, by initiating and promoting the alliance, this country often faced criticism from those who felt that our commitment to social reform and economic development was halfhearted.

The Reagan administration has gotten off to a good start by including Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela in the initial deliberations. Mexico, with its lingering support for Castro's Cuba, and Venezuela, with its longstanding (for Latin America) record of democratic government, provide the necessary legitimacy that will be required to convince a number of apprehensive nations that this new policy is not just another example of U.S. economic intervention.

The suggestion that Japan and West Germany or perhaps Spain might also become part of the program is also encouraging. The Japanese, Germans, and Spanish have for a number of years now been active in the Caribbean and are no longer strangers to the economic climate or the social

problems of this region. The United States can only benefit by fostering a cooperative effort in the Caribbean. Not only does cooperation diminish our image as the Colossus of the North, but it also helps ensure the attainment of one of our prime objectives—attracting an optimum level of Western aid and investment into the region.

Unfortunately, in all this talk of cooperation there remains the very real possibility that national self-interest and varying levels of anti-Communist fervor will reduce the program from a multilateral to a bilateral approach. There are already disagreements between Mexico and the United States over whether Cuba should be included in the program and charges that the United States has not been as generous as it promised. One can only hope that a cooperative development plan of such magnitude will not falter over the intractable foreign policy positions and petty feuding of its participants.

Democratic Stability. The final general concern that the Reagan administration must face in attempting to implement its Caribbean policy is by far the most difficult and most unpredictable. It is almost an axiom of development politics that a stable political climate is essential for the modernization of the third-world nations. There is abundant evidence that revolutions, civil wars, palace uprisings, and assassinations have a detrimental effect on the fragile socioeconomic structure of the poor countries.

What can the Reagan administration do to ensure some measure of political stability in the Caribbean so as to create the necessary environment for democratic development? There are those in the administration who believe that authoritarian governments can be acceptable allies of the United States despite their unsavory images as repressive police states. What seems unfortunate for the administration, and perhaps what may lessen the effectiveness of the Caribbean basin initiative, is not so much the shift toward accepting authoritarianism but the seeming absence of vigorous support for democracy as a stabilizing agent in the third world.

There is no doubt that authoritarian governments such as those in Brazil and Chile have achieved considerable economic growth. Too often, however, the Brazilian case or the Chilean model is applied to Guatemala or El Salvador or Honduras as though

it were completely applicable. The fact is that authoritarian governments in Central America are not creating the proper climate for development, but are presiding over internal anarchy.

It is time for the administration to give as much vocal support to democratic governance as it does to defending authoritarianism. Latin America may have its economic success stories in authoritarian Brazil and Chile, but Latin America also has its democratic successes, primarily in the Caribbean basin, with Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. In these countries the combination of a constitution, popular participation in government, greater opportunities for affecting government policy making, and a legitimate role for opposition groups has created political systems that have achieved both internal order and a considerable degree of economic development. If the Caribbean basin initiative is to be an effective vehicle for stability and modernization, its proponents should look to the democratic countries for a model and not to the authoritarian regimes.

Special Problem Areas in the Caribbean

Although the original Caribbean basin formula could be modified to include the preceding four variables, the success of the policy will hinge on the outcome of some immediate internal economic and political problems in a number of key countries at the epicenter of the region. While much emphasis is being placed on El Salvador and Nicaragua, the fate of the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and of course Cuba is critical if the Reagan administration hopes to foster a favorable environment for its new policy initiative.

The Dominican Republic. Since 1978 the democratic administration of Antonio Guzmán has made some important strides both in economic development and in establishing a stable, nonrepressive government. Guzmán's decision not to run again in 1982, however, opened the question of whether the country would continue to be democratic. With Guzmán out of the picture a number of presidential candidates have emerged, including some with ideological positions critical of the United States.

Several commentators have expressed the fear that the fragile Dominican democracy cannot withstand a divisive election that might threaten ami-

cable relations with the United States. Some Dominicans privately fear a return of the military or the reemergence of former President Joaquín Balaguer (or his proxy), under whose administration repression and corruption flourished. Each of these alternatives would create unrest and uncertainty in a country where 125 U.S. companies are active and where discussions over a more stable sugar policy have led to increased tension. Political upheaval in the volatile Dominican Republic at an early stage in the promotion of the Caribbean basin initiative might easily divert attention away from U.S. economic development initiatives in the region and direct it toward bringing order to one of Latin America's nascent democracies.

Jamaica. The sense of expectation that accompanied Edward Seaga's victory over Michael Manley in 1980 has now, in 1982, turned to apprehension and, in some quarters, anger. All is not well in Jamaica. The economic breakthrough promised by Seaga has been slow in coming. Unemployment remains at 25 percent, growth in the gross national product (GNP) has been negligible, and foreign indebtedness continues to climb. Most disappointing of all, the promised avalanche of foreign investment has not occurred because U.S. investors are still reluctant to place their money in a country that has an undercurrent of instability.

For Seaga and his economic team it is now clear that the transition from the socialist mismanagement of his predecessor to a prosperous capitalist economy will take more time than originally thought. Unfortunately, the Jamaican prime minister does not have much time. Already dissenting voices are being heard decrying the lethargic performance of the Jamaican economy. Public opinion polls indicate the charismatic Manley has again regained his popularity among the Jamaican people.

Much is at stake in Jamaica. Both Seaga and Reagan have expressed confidence that the road to development is through private investment. The failure of the Jamaican economy to rebound during the first year of the Seaga administration has cast doubts on this belief. Further disappointments could force a reevaluation of the whole economic philosophy underlying the Caribbean basin initiative and, worse, rekindle the violence that plagued Jamaica during the past election.

Puerto Rico. The situation in Puerto Rico could potentially be the most troublesome for the Reagan administration. In a real sense Puerto Rico is a prime example of the philosophy and practice of the administration's approach to Caribbean development, although the infusion of public aid and private investment into the commonwealth began years earlier.

Starting with Operation Bootstrap in the 1940s Puerto Rico has been the recipient of over \$3 billion in U.S. disbursements and an estimated \$14 billion in private-sector investments. Compared with the other Caribbean and Latin American nations, Puerto Rico has fared well under commonwealth status, with the highest per capita income (\$2,500 in 1981), an educated populace, a growing middle class, and an expansive industrial-technological sector.

Nonetheless, problems abound in this "capitalist paradise." Unemployment hovers at around 20 percent, and 57 percent of the Puerto Rican population depends on food stamps. The GNP has shown only meager growth rates in recent years, and social problems such as alcoholism, crime, and illegitimacy are rampant. Puerto Rico is fast becoming, in the words of one critic, "a welfare state, made in the U.S.A."

The fact that the combination of public and private investment in Puerto Rico has not created a vibrant economy or addressed nagging social problems is not lost on the people of this island. Pro independence terrorists, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) and the *Macheteros*, have stepped up their activities in both Puerto Rico and the United States. Public opinion polls show a general dissatisfaction with the current commonwealth arrangement, although most Puerto Ricans fear the impact on their lives if governing status was changed to independence or statehood.

The indecision of Puerto Ricans on this issue has taken pressure off U.S. politicians who were gearing up for a debate in 1983 on statehood for Puerto Rico. Despite this respite, however, the problems of Puerto Rico remain, especially now in the face of the administration's budget cuts, which will seriously affect the subsidized food program (a possible 25 percent reduction) and Medicaid (in a society where 60 percent of the population does not have sufficient medical insurance).

Although Puerto Rico has attained a level of prosperity under the commonwealth arrangement, President Reagan will find that aid and investment do little to calm the anger and frustration of the 3.2 million citizens of this island who resent the effects of colonial status. Failure to act on the social and economic problems will only intensify that anger and frustration.

Cuba. The most immediate problem facing the Reagan administration as it seeks to develop a Caribbean policy is Cuba. At some point, the White House will have to determine how it intends to deal with Castro. The present administration seems unwilling to negotiate with Cuba and is fostering a heightened state of hostility between the two countries.

It is time now for President Reagan to examine whether it may be more advantageous to include Cuba as a recipient of U.S. aid than to continue the present situation of isolation and confrontation. The current policy has not curbed Cuba's appetite for revolution, but in fact has increased that appetite and created more of a security problem for the United States.

Castro needs aid, trade, investment, and technology almost as much as Dominica or St. Kitts or Haiti does. Moreover, the United States should not only think of containment in a military sense, but rather should use its economic strength and success to try to persuade our adversaries to take a more moderate or conciliatory position.

It is unlikely that Castro will tone down his Marxist rhetoric, but the promise of badly needed aid could convince him to lessen his support of Central American and Caribbean revolution. Including Cuba in the Caribbean basin program may in the long run prove beneficial and may be a better way of containing communism than by using a force of military advisers.

Central America: Lessons from the Past

The growing animosity between the United States and Cuba is potentially a serious development because it could lead to a confrontation with the Castro regime over the revolutions in El Salvador and Nicaragua and spur an expansion of our military presence in Central America. Although President Reagan has on more than one occasion stated

his unwillingness to increase the number of U.S. advisers in Central America, it is essential that the administration not fall into the trap of making policy in an atmosphere of escalating crises. The administration should step back from its position of military posturing and hostility toward revolutionary movements and review the long-term implications and ramifications of intervening to curb the spread of communism in the hemisphere. An important question to ask at this point is what we can learn from past involvement in this part of the hemisphere.

Between the time that Theodore Roosevelt brandished his Big Stick at the turn of the century and the end of the Hoover administration, the United States intervened in a number of Caribbean basin countries. To put an end to what Theodore Roosevelt called "chronic wrongdoing," the United States sent troops and civilian advisers to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and of course Panama.

The presence of the United States in this region from 1898 to 1934 clearly demonstrated our desire to ensure political and economic stability in the small nations to our south while also reminding other foreign powers that the United States intended to remain the dominant force in the Caribbean. Although the United States was for the most part successful in achieving its objectives, U.S. involvement in these countries created serious problems for the American occupiers and fostered political circumstances that in the long run weakened our hold on the region.

The "era of intervention" provides at least five lessons on the effects of an aggressive U.S. military and civilian presence in the Caribbean basin.

- The United States found it necessary to remain for an extended period of time in the countries in which it had intervened, and in many instances these countries became protectorates.

- Despite the fact that the United States helped to modernize the countries that it occupied, the local populace responded negatively to the changes and saw them mostly as another means of furthering U.S. interests. More attention was focused on allegations of atrocities committed by the U.S. military than on the extent of new modernization projects.

- The U.S. presence helped spur nationalism in

the countries that were occupied and in some cases served to rally militant opposition groups. Moreover, our intervention caused extensive criticism and mistrust of the United States among the Latin American community of nations.

• The United States was not able to establish a firm base of democratic governance while it occupied these countries, despite some apparently well-meaning efforts. Rather, to ensure continued stability the United States helped to form local constabularies which laid the foundation for some of Latin America's most authoritarian dictatorships.

• With its series of interventions in Latin America the United States firmly established itself as a champion of the status quo in the face of accelerating social change throughout Latin America. By supporting stand-pat governments, often at the cost of its democratic principles, the United States ignored the realities of development in Latin America and closed off options that could have eased the inevitable transition of power from the old regime to the new regime.

The tug of war in the Reagan administration over the direction of U.S. policy in Central America has raised issues similar to those that arose during the era of intervention—namely, the nature and extent of U.S. support of stable governments, the most effective means of assuring national security, and the acceptable limits of superpower intervention. As President Reagan sorts out the options for U.S.

policy in this region, he would do well to remember the past as he plans for the future. There are lessons to be learned from these earlier policies that can serve to remind the president what may lie ahead as we once again try to achieve stability and security in the Caribbean basin.

Conclusion

The Reagan administration has been criticized for lacking direction in its foreign policy and for being overly concerned with domestic problems to the neglect of our interests and position in the world. The emerging Caribbean basin initiative can offer an opportunity for President Reagan to define more precisely the approach that his administration will take toward the third world.

Although in the past the Caribbean had an image of being a sleepy, tropical backyard for U.S. leisure and business interests, it is fast becoming what Theodore Roosevelt believed it would become: a strategically important tinderbox to which the United States must pay close attention and over which we must spread our influence. The revolutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador have reminded President Reagan of the strategic and political importance of the Caribbean and of the fact that it is a major area of U.S. interests. The Caribbean basin initiative is a response to those revolutions. Whether it is the correct response, however, depends on the wisdom and flexibility of the formula employed by U.S. policy makers.

FAREWELL, MONROE DOCTRINE

Carlos Fuentes, former Mexican ambassador to France, is the author of numerous articles, short stories, and novels. His next novel, Distant Relations, will be published in the fall by Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Three dates of change in Latin America

by Carlos Fuentes

IN 1960, C. Wright Mills visited the newly created school of political science at the National University of Mexico. For most of the students and teachers of government of my generation, this was their first contact with the intelligentsia of the United States. The residue of good feeling left by the Roosevelt era had died in Guatemala; the majority of universities and scientific and cultural organizations in Latin America had sided with the Guatemalan revolutionaries and had decided to shun their U.S. counterparts after the invasion of 1954. This was the result of disillusionment, of outrage, and even of a certain confusion.

In 1954 an invasion of Guatemala had taken place. It was nominally headed by a putschist colonel, Carlos Castillo Armas. It had been carefully planned by the American ambassador, John Peurifoy. It was armed, launched, and then consolidated in power by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. It permitted the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, to gloat over what he called "a glorious victory."

A "glorious victory" over what? According to the U.S. government it was communist influence in Guatemala, the communist-inspired government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán. A "glorious victory" for what? For the unilaterally proclaimed Monroe Doctrine—this Monroe Doctrine that periodically and conveniently pops out of the ghost-closet of the U.S. government until it meets its spectral sibling, the Brezhnev Doctrine; this Monroe Doctrine that would ban extracontinental interventions in

this hemisphere but not extracontinental interventions by the United States in other hemispheres and most assuredly not in this one, its backyard, its most immediate sphere of influence, Latin America; this Monroe Doctrine that ironically and conveniently forgets that if a Monroe Doctrine had been in effect in 1776, the United States would not exist. There was more evidence of French intervention in the North American War of Independence than there is or, I fear, ever shall be of Soviet intervention in the Salvadoran civil war.

1954: a glorious victory against democracy in the name of democracy. The victory of that extraordinary mixture of malice and innocence, arrogance and ignorance that has, as a rule, characterized Washington's policies in Latin America.

HOW MANY people in this country, except a few specialists (certainly not the policymakers themselves), knew the political traditions and cultural realities of Guatemala in 1954 or know those of El Salvador in 1981? How many were aware of Guatemala's troubled history, the background it shared with Latin America: conquest and colonization in the sixteenth century, legal independence and economic dependency since the nineteenth century, and, also since the nineteenth century, the heritage of our perennial struggle between civilization and barbarism—the basic dilemma of our nations, far beyond ideological nitpicking and strategic posturing—this demand that we choose between civiliza-

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tion, the respect due to a man's hands, a woman's sex, or a child's eyes, or barbarism and the brutality that humiliates, tortures, and then murders us all?

How many citizens of this country were aware, in 1954 or today, of the dramatic struggles in Guatemala, throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, between the liberalism of Francisco Morazán and the return to colonial privilege and exploitation under the military chieftain and lifetime president, Rafael Carrera; of the liberal reforms introduced by Justo Rufino Barrios after Carrera's death; of the fight against aristocratic privileges, for the separation of church and state, and for universal education?

And if these realities were ignored, how dare the faraway government of the United States rush in as if it knew them intimately and were capable of acting in the best interests of a people who alone understood the dynamics of their own history, their own contradictions, their family affairs?

How many people in the United States, as Dulles celebrated the "glorious victory," could recall the twenty-two-year-long dictatorship of Manuel Estrada Cabrera, built on repression and the piecemeal surrender of the country to the United Fruit Company—until in 1920 Congress declared the president insane? How many could remember the fourteen-year-long dictatorship of Jorge Ubico, the gerontocratic "easy rider" who militarized Guatemala on Mussolini's model, right down to the elementary schools?

How many, finally, knew and understood that the general strike of 1944, the Central American "Solidarity" movement of its day, gave birth to the first twentieth-century democracy in Guatemala, the successive governments of Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the creation of a labor code, social security, a free school system, and agrarian reform?

Democracy in Guatemala in the 1940s and 1950s meant the massive transfer of power from the army to the labor and peasant organizations. I stress its importance because if Guatemalan democracy had been allowed to persist it would have influenced democracy in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and would then have met Costa Rican democracy; perhaps a truly Central American model would have been born of this experience. Instead, the experience was aborted with callous, imperial blindness; the price is being paid today, in money and blood, in El Salvador.

Democracy in Guatemala, democracy in Nicaragua, democracy in El Salvador was born, is being born, shall be born of the local

experiences of Spanish conquest and colonization, formal independence, economic dependency, liberal reforms, and dictatorial repression. In 1954, these Guatemalan experiences were violated and corrupted by the CIA invasion. This was the *only* non-Guatemalan experience suffered by Guatemala. The rest was, as ever, malice and ignorance, innocence and arrogance.

1954 was an important year for the men and women of my generation because the hopes for Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy—which, with political imagination and pragmatic respect for nonintervention, had met the dramatic challenge of the Mexican Revolution under President Lázaro Cárdenas, thus ensuring collaboration within the Western hemisphere against the Axis—were now buried inside an iceberg that not even the warm waters of the Caribbean could melt.

It was an important year, because it proved how uneven was the balance of forces in the hemisphere at the time. The Dulles resolution against Guatemala at the Caracas Inter-American Conference was approved almost unanimously, with only two abstaining votes: those of Mexico and Uruguay. Mexico paid for its unruliness with the economic pressures exerted on it by the Eisenhower administration: the flight of capital and the devaluation of the peso.

It was an important year, 1954, because political development in Guatemala was not merely interrupted by violent foreign intervention; it has been continually perverted and poisoned down to this very day. Today Guatemala is a terrorist nation; the principal terrorist is the government of General Lucas García, and the violence that exists there stretches to the extremes of indiscriminate murder of political leaders, abduction of dissidents, torture of their families, torture of missionaries and other social workers, the moral prostitution of young Indians forced to deny their heritage, insult their parents in public, and become murderous goons of the dictatorship.

The isolation of Cuba

WHEN SOME OF US met C. Wright Mills in Mexico in 1961, my second date, we realized that we should distinguish between the actions of the U.S. government and those of the democratic polity in this country. We realized that the best interests of democracy in the U.S. and Latin America were served not by isolation but rather by a willingness to

build bridges and make sure that communication was kept alive above and beyond visa restrictions, prejudices, and honest differences of opinion.

"Keep in touch," said Mills back in 1961. "We need you and maybe you'll need us." He added: "I tell gringos that when they come to Mexico they should keep away from the stones. There are too many beautiful stones in Mexico and they distract you from the people. Stick to the people." And he also said, "Do things your way. Don't sit forever waiting to see what the U.S. will do or won't do. To hell with the United States: do your own stuff."

Aye, there's the rub: that when Latin America does *not* "do its own stuff," it is accused of being composed of a bunch of shiftless, whining, grumbling, irresponsible beggars who throw all the blame for their native problems on the shoulders of the United States.

But when we do do something about our condition, we are accused of being communist agents and Soviet-trained terrorists, a subversive menace in the very backyard of the United States. We are then worthy only of being bombed back into the underdevelopment we should never have left. If ever there was an international Catch-22, it is surely this one.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the Cuban revolutionaries were experimenting with self-government. Instead of respecting them, as the Roosevelt administration had done in Mexico's case, the Eisenhower administration slammed the door in Cuba's face, countered every internal revolutionary reform with U.S. sanctions and propaganda, and prepared the invasion plans, again conceived by the CIA, which the Kennedy administration inherited and sent to defeat at the Bay of Pigs.

But as 1962 dawned, the balance of power had changed. At the Punta del Este Conference in late January, the United States tried to ram through the collective decision to break relations with Cuba, expel her government from the OAS, and launch a barrage of economic and political sanctions against the Castro regime.

Once again it was Mexico, this time standing quite alone, which refused to go along with a decision it judged legally unfounded and politically foolish. But this time the distribution of forces in the world was different. The López Mateos administration in Mexico could make a show of alliance with Gaullist France and with the leaders of the nonaligned movement, establish trade with communist bloc countries, and nationalize American-owned utilities.



Susan Melselas/Magnum

I was in Havana the day the first Soviet tanker sailed into the harbor, bringing the Cuban government the oil it would otherwise have been denied. This was the price of its refusal to knuckle under to U.S. sanctions. I said to myself then that the history of our continent, for better or worse, had changed forever. The cold war had killed the Good Neighbor Policy. Its consequences became frighteningly evident during the October missile crisis.

I also told myself that Latin America should never again allow itself to be put in the quandary of having to choose between the United States and the Soviet Union; that the next revolution should find conditions that would offer a choice among different sources of economic and political support. Those revolutions have now come, first in Nicaragua and now in El Salvador. They have come about for the same reasons that they came to the thirteen colonies in 1776, to France in 1789, to Mexico in 1910, to Russia in 1917, to Guatemala in 1944, to China in 1948, to Bolivia and Cuba in the 1950s, and to the whole colonized world in the aftermath of World War II; for reasons rooted in the local culture, history, and economy; in the heavens and hells of a people's imagination, its memory, its hopes, its self.

THE PROBLEMS in El Salvador in 1981, my third date, have been around for five centuries; their name is colonialism, the internal colonialism of the traditional ruling class and the external colonialism inherent in client-state relations.

El Salvador shares with Guatemala, and Nicaragua under the Somozas—indeed, to some degree, with all of Latin America—problems that existed a long time before the United States or the Soviet Union came into being, problems as old as the discovery of the New World. Our lands were not only discovered and colonized; they were conquered, and conquest plus colonization spells what Max Weber called patrimonialism, a condition brought on by the confusion of all public and private rights in favor of the chieftain and his clan of relatives, favorites, sycophants, and hangers-on. Patrimonialism—the right of the conquistador—precludes competent administration or economic planning: it is based on obedience and whim, not law. This state of things requires a standing patrimonial army—thugs, mercenaries, death squads, responsible to no law save that of the caprice of the ruling clan.

This patrimonialist confusion of public and private functions and appropriations has been

the style of governance in Latin America almost constantly, from the Indian empires to the Spanish colonies to the Republican nations. We in Latin America understand this. We know intimately that if we do not abolish these conditions ourselves, we shall never be viable societies and harmonious communities, minimally prosperous, sufficiently independent.

Many men and women have tried to change this barbaric order through reform: Juárez in Mexico, Sarmiento in Argentina, Battle in Uruguay, Arévalo in Guatemala, Allende in Chile. Others have had to use arms: Morelos and Morazán, Juárez when conservative militarism allied itself with French intervention to oppose the reform laws, Zapata, Sandino, and Guevara. The United States, too, knows this conflict between reform and revolution. Jackson and the two Roosevelts and Kennedy were able to reform; Washington and Lincoln had to fight, and their fights were cruel, bloody, and necessary. But they never had to reform or revolutionize such a persistent, ancient, slow-moving creature as this turtle of Latin American patrimonialism, protected by its standing army.

Today there are deep inequalities and staggering poverty in many other nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia; but there is not always an accompanying revolutionary situation. Sometimes, as in Mexico or India, nationalist revolutions have created political institutions that cushion class warfare, permit policies of mediation and even of postponement, and are at times capable of effectively and flexibly reforming themselves. In Algeria and Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Nigeria, institutions are being fashioned out of the anti-colonial experience, and many of the problems of those new nations will surely find political solutions.

The colonial-military complex

IN EL SALVADOR political development was brutally interrupted in 1932, when the army, under the command of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, surrounded and massacred 30,000 people in order to crush a rebellion of peasants and proletarians who were simply asking for a minimum wage. Political freedom in El Salvador has been smothered ever since, from coup to rigged election to countercoup and through a constant unresponsiveness to the needs of the people. Who cared? Who knew anything about this nation, the smallest, the most densely inhabited, and one of the poorest nations in our hemisphere?

I shall tell you who knew. Father Rutilio Grande knew, who was killed because he said that poverty is not the will of God but the greed of a few. Archbishop Oscar Romero knew, who was killed because he found it intolerable that illiteracy in El Salvador affected nearly half of the population. Four American missionaries knew, who went to work and help so that the level of infant mortality in El Salvador should not be three or four times higher than that of any other Western nation. President José Napoleón Duarte should know, he who was tortured by the same thugs with whom he shares power today, who was deprived of his electoral victory in 1972 by the same gorillas with whom today he offers free elections to a population that has seen its brothers and sisters and fathers and mothers and children die, assassinated by the same death squads that are supposed to guarantee free elections in El Salvador.


YES, THOSE WHO knew have been silenced. The political opposition has been decimated. Yet a revolution of complex composition—Catholic, agrarian, and nationalist in its roots, but also with strong Marxist, democratic Christian, and social-democratic elements, with militant stu-

dents and accountants, printers and bank clerks—has claimed the right to do for El Salvador what has not been achieved in nearly five centuries: the abolition of colonialism, and at the very least the creation of a few conditions that might permit some evolution of the political structure.

They have met the army. I suppose they have found out what every Latin American democratic movement has had to find out for itself: that as long as the army protects the fortress of colonialism, conditions will continue as they traditionally always have. Perhaps the problem for El Salvador is not the overthrow of this or that junta, but the overthrow of the army. For the army is the only obstacle standing between the congealed colonialism that feeds its own vicious circle and any form of evolutionary democracy. In order to exist, colonialism needs an army to protect it by repression; in order to exist, the army needs a colonial structure, which it must defend and preserve through repression.

The problem is there. It has been there for nearly five centuries. But it has been forgotten. It is conveniently forgotten every time Latin America makes a move toward independence.

When the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, says that violence in El Salvador is created by outside interven-



Susan Meisner/Magnum

tion, not by social injustice, which has "existed for decades," she forgets that *violence* has also existed for decades; that it has, in fact, co-existed with social injustice for centuries. And when Secretary of State Alexander Haig says that "we are not going to be dragged into another Vietnam, but the problems will be dealt with at the source of the difficulty," it is to be hoped that he understands that the "source of difficulty" in El Salvador is military and paramilitary repression, the prevention of political evolution by the army.

Perhaps Mr. Haig and Ms. Kirkpatrick, if they are real anticommunists, will come to understand that by helping the military in El Salvador they help communism in El Salvador; that by identifying the Soviet Union with the revolution in El Salvador they hand the Soviet Union a moral victory that belongs only to the Salvadoran people. And that even if Cuba and the Soviet Union did not exist, there would still be a revolution in El Salvador. And that if it were true that arms are flowing into El Salvador from Hanoi and Havana and Managua, and should they then cease to flow, the civil war would continue in El Salvador, because it depends on historical factors that have nothing to do with communism—and because most of the arms that flow in come from private sources of contraband in

Florida, Texas, and California.

The State Department White Paper on communist intervention in El Salvador proves nothing. The same arms have been photographed over and over, for Indochinese and Cuban and now Salvadoran effect; the captions and the photographs do not coincide; an example of what, ludicrously, does coincide is the sinister "meeting" between Salvadoran communists and Sandinistas in Managua on a particular date, which happens to be the date of the anniversary of the Nicaraguan Revolution. So that Ambassadors McHenry and Pezullo, who were also present, stand accused as well.

What can be proved is that if the Salvadoran rebels had half the arms that the State Department credits them with, they would by now have swept the army barracks and captured the abundant U.S. matériel shipped into El Salvador; that the army commanders themselves smirk at the allegations of the State Department, because they know the rebels have mostly old rifles and bazookas and whatever they can get on the international black market. But they will not say so publicly; they need arms to control El Salvador and repress, again and again, any attempt at even minimal change. For how long would the present agrarian reforms outlive the triumph of the army



Susan Matisoff/Magnum

and the death squads in El Salvador? Two sets of figures tell the tale: 240 members of the new agrarian cooperatives have now been murdered by the paramilitary forces; eighty co-ops are paying "protection" to the army. Protection from what? From the death squads trained, armed, and financed by the army itself, of course.

The way out of El Salvador

THE WAY OUT of this mess is by not identifying military success in El Salvador with the prestige of the United States. For whether the United States loses or wins militarily in El Salvador, it will always lose in the end. It loses because if it thinks it has won it will have done so at the expense of the social and economic self-determination of the Salvadoran people. It will only have strengthened the prevailing official brutality and postponed the next insurrection. But it also loses if it thinks it has lost militarily, because it will then have passed up the opportunity to help El Salvador in the only way it can be helped by the United States. This way is for the United States to swallow hard and choose to become simply one among many participating forces in the solving of El Salvador's economic and social problems, according to El Salvador's needs.

For 1981 is not 1954; it is not even 1961. The opposition in El Salvador knows, as the revolutionaries in Nicaragua have learned, that once in power it can and should choose a plurality of sources of support—financial, technological, political. The choice for Nicaragua and El Salvador, the choice for all the underdeveloped nations, is not between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is between cold-war submission to one of the superpowers and the new, freer polity taking shape in spite of Moscow and Washington.

The balance of forces in 1981 is not what it was in 1954 or in 1961. The U.S. should take a good hard look at the Central American and Caribbean area; link the realities there to those of the emerging nations in Asia and Africa, especially after the election of François Mitterrand in France; understand western Europe's desirable role as an enlightened broker in the relations between the developing and the industrialized worlds; glance at the severe tensions within the Soviet bloc; and conclude, with true courage, with true self-interest, that nobody's welfare can be furthered by inventing a fictitious fulcrum of East-West confrontation in a small country where, even if it should "go communist," the

Soviet Union would be unable to maintain it within its orbit without paying an exorbitant material price. I suspect, however, that the Soviet Union does not want El Salvador in its orbit. The Soviet Union prefers to wink at the United States and say: "We have understood you. You can do whatever you like in your sphere of influence. We can do whatever we like in ours. We strangle Afghanistan. You strangle El Salvador. We strangle Poland. You strangle Nicaragua. And if it comes to the crunch and you want to strike at sources not outside the target area, here goes Cuba and here comes West Berlin. Okay?"

No, it is not okay; the balance has changed because Mexico and Venezuela have emerged as important economic and political powers in the Americas. They have a role to play in Central America and the Caribbean. They are playing that role, and their message is, Hands off El Salvador, everyone. Negotiate. Do not internationalize an internal conflict. Do not invent an East-West confrontation in a land that only requires North-South cooperation. The United States has a role to play, too, but only if it is in concert with the other nations of the area. What no one will tolerate is a procon-sular attitude from Washington.

What we expect of the United States is loyal participation in our own Latin American policy of shifting power from the army to the people; of ending the long rule of the army; of cooperating with Mexico and Venezuela and Costa Rica and West Germany and the Soviet Union and East Germany and Sweden and Japan and Canada and France in offering the people of El Salvador and Nicaragua the plural sources of aid they need to reconstruct their shattered economies.

What we expect of the United States is a shift in its attention away from the sterility of East-West confrontation and toward the fertility of global economic negotiations.

What we expect from the United States is as little and as much as Roosevelt gave Cárdenas: American faith and trust in itself as a democratic polity, and an understanding that by respecting self-determination in Latin America, by understanding change, upheaval, and even violence in Latin America instead of stopping change, adding to violence, and creating its own counterrevolutionary havoc, by accepting the universal right to revolution even when it hurts U.S. private interests, the United States is most loyal to itself as a community founded on revolution, and most consonant with its self-interest when it does not permit marginal and private interests to set themselves above the meaning, the attraction, the truth of this great nation. □

**STATEMENT OF CONSTANTINE C. MENGES, CONSULTANT,
THE HUDSON INSTITUTE**

Mr. MENGES. Thank you.

Members of the committee, and fellow citizens, it is a pleasure to be here, I think we are meeting at a time of great importance for Latin America. More than 350 million people live in the 50 political entities to our south.

I believe Latin America is at a very important threshold. A number of positive trends that have been visible in the last two decades. Those include strong economic growth, improvement in living standards and social well-being for a large proportion of the population in Latin America, despite a doubling of the size of the population in the last two decades and a return to democratic government in a number of countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Peru, Ecuador, and Honduras.

On the other hand, there are some very disturbing and serious negative trends. These include the economic pressure caused by the high oil prices, the huge foreign debts of many of the countries, and very importantly, the increased power of the Cuban and Communist-supported terrorist groups in Latin America, but especially in Central America.

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In my judgment, Latin America is at a threshold and whether the positive steps or the dangerous trends characterize it in the 1980's will depend on the wisdom of the Latin American political leaders and in some important measure, on the wisdom of U.S. foreign policy and on your judgments and decisions as to U.S. interests in Latin America.

THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST

The interests of the United States are relatively easy to describe and have been the same for some time. First, that the countries of Latin America not be allied with the Soviet Union, Cuba, or any other hostile foreign powers.

Second, that they are governed by moderate governments.

Third, they are essentially cordial and friendly to the United States.

The best situation for the United States would certainly be one in which all the countries of Latin America were ruled by parliamentary democracies committed to social fairness. As we have seen, among the 160 nations of the world, the 55 democracies get along well together, have totally eliminated coercion and the threat of war from their relationships, and, of course, are better for their people than any other form of government.

ELEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY

In my judgment, there are three elements of a balanced and prudent American policy toward Latin America in this decade. I will discuss each one. First, that the United States maintain normal relations with all the governments of the region as they are, while encouraging moderate and democratic groups within the countries.

Second, that the United States prevent the success of extreme left and Communist revolutionary groups and growth of left and Communist terrorists.

Third, that the United States take leadership in providing economic assistance for continued growth and adaptation to the very dangerous economic pressures which will become more visible in the next few years. Let me comment on each of these.

ENCOURAGING DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

When speaking about the need to have normal relations with governments as they are, while at the same time, in a sensible and responsible way encouraging and supporting democratic political development my mind turns to the very good and positive example of the transition from four decades of right wing dictatorship in Portugal and Spain. In that situation the democratic countries, the European Economic Community, other democratic nations, decided not to try to use coercion, economic aid threats and other sanctions in a style of high profile interventionism against the authoritarian regimes of Spain and Portugal to bring about the democratic transition.

Instead, what was done in 1974 and 1975 in Portugal was to maintain relations with the government as it existed while at the same time working quietly but openly to help the moderate democratic trade unions, political parties and groups. In Portugal, it was also vital that the Communist Party of Portugal be defeated in its attempt to grab power and create a dictatorship there.

That Communist Party was defeated, moderate groups were helped, and we have the result in both Portugal and Spain of people moving from rightwing dictatorship to functioning parliamentary democracies, which in Spain recently stood a test from rightwing elements of the military.

That is an important example not only because I have written a book on the transition in Spain, which I viewed as an important positive example for Latin America, but also because I believe it illustrates a style of policy which the United States can and should adopt in Latin America.

We have to find the middle ground between the unrealistic interventionism of a crusade and just having routine diplomatic relations with all Latin American countries in a relatively undifferentiated way. We also have to understand that there is a real difference between authoritarian regimes which may control the society for a time, but which have the intention of returning to constitutional government and totalitarian regimes whether Fascist or Communist, which have the mission of totally transforming society and intend to remain in power for eternity if they can. That is an important distinction.

This leads to my view there must be three aspects of normal U.S. policy with respect to Latin America. First, normal bilateral relations in trade, diplomacy and the like. Second, for a limited number of countries, where it is appropriate, we should and must develop practical country-by-country strategies of support for genuinely democratic groups which use the existing resources of our embassies, such as exchange programs, communications, AID, and other things of that type. This might be true, for example, now in the reemergent democracies, those countries that have just returned to democracy—the Dominican Republic, Peru, Ecuador, and Honduras. Examples that should be part of this effort are the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) which supports free and democratic trade unions as well as the American Political Foundation—a bipartisan initiative of the two major American parties that seeks to build relationships with democratic parties in other countries.

However, there should be a third level of effort under this rubric of support for democratic political development. This special level of effort is required where the pace of transition to democracy has picked up and there are immediate and real opportunities as in Brazil and Uruguay, where the regimes have made a decision to move back toward constitutional government and have entered that delicate period of trying to loosen control without losing control. There is also a special need to help the democratic and moderate groups in situations where terrorism and destabilization threatens to unravel and polarize institutions, such as the societies of Central America today.

Useful examples of this special level of effort are provided by the political action foundations established by each of the major German democratic parties. Over a period of 16 years I have personally observed and witnessed their very effective help for democratic institutional development in many countries.

Now, to go a little more into what that special level of effort might mean in terms of actions: One could try to link democratic groups in

Latin America with those in Portugal and Spain; one could provide training, funds, and encouragement for democratic and moderate groups; one could publish and distribute the writing of democratic groups. Most importantly, one could engage in the active competition of political ideas by affirming democratic values and human accomplishments on one hand, while telling the truth about the repression and poverty of Communist regimes, especially Cuba, in the case of Latin America.

It would also be possible to help with electoral systems and the holding of elections. One thing worth considering is bringing members of the security and police forces from a transitional dictatorship together with those from countries that have already made a successful transition back to democracy. For example, some of the Spanish military and intelligence people who now are committed to democracy, as they demonstrated last week, could meet with their counterparts in Brazil and other countries to talk about the fears of that transition period, what it is like, what happens, and how in fact this can work successfully.

Of course, one might also reach out to students and workers from Latin America who are studying in the United States, in more effective ways. Importantly, the special level of effort should require that some part of the U.S. Government provide accurate information on efforts by Communist or extreme right groups to control or penetrate ostensibly genuinely democratic organizations in other countries.

Now, all of this effort should be public and consensual, but discrete. It should involve other third countries which are democratic.

PREVENTING SUCCESS OF EXTREME LEFT

Let me now turn to the second task of American policy, preventing the success and growth of Communist and extreme left revolutionary movements. I believe this is an extremely urgent task and it is a corollary and prerequisite of democratic political development. I think it is important that we remember that the whole postwar period, since 1945, has been characterized by a clear Soviet commitment to political war against the democracies and against the targets of opportunity.

For the Soviet Union and its partners, including Cuba, détente and peaceful coexistence are explicitly defined—and they tell us this again and again—as including their covert as well as overt support for political warfare against democratic governments, through terrorism, propaganda, destabilization efforts, and the use of other governments as well.

A second reality we have to bear in mind is that in any particular region the success of one Communist movement in one country is likely to add to the momentum and dynamism of those same movements in other countries. If Nicaragua becomes definitively Communist this will have an immediate impact on that region. Third, the test, of competence in foreign policy is prudence and timely preventive action. It is acting when the problem is small and still manageable as it is today in Central America. Let me turn to Central America to illustrate this second task of policy and what needs to be done. Specifically I will talk about Nicaragua and El Salvador.

NICARAGUA

In Nicaragua the central reality that to some degree I believe has been ignored by much of the American media, much of the American intellectual community, and much of the American political community, is that two very different groups united to overthrow Somoza. These were a long established Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group, funded, trained, and supported by Cuba since 1962, the Sandinistas, who are and have been Marxists-Leninists in terms of their leadership and in the core groups, and, second the genuine democratic opposition groups in Nicaragua.

Those two groups joined together and overthrow Somoza in July 1979, when the second stage of the struggle for power began. Unfortunately so far, in the second stage the democratic countries have not provided anywhere near the equivalent help of any type to the democratic groups. As a result, today I believe Nicaragua stands on the brink of being controlled by a Communist leadership group that in no way represents the will of the people of Nicaragua who don't want to go from one dictatorship to another.

Today there is a new secret police trained and helped by East Germans and Cubans mainly. There is a new army of 30,000 with Soviet weapons trained by the Cubans. It is potentially solidly behind the FSLN Directorate which is the real power center in Nicaragua.

Third, there is a new neighbor informant committee system similar to the one in Cuba. All the elements of dictatorial control of the society are in place. What is missing is that the Nicaraguan people don't want to be Communist and, fortunately, there is still a chance for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua, because there are four democratic parties; most of the Catholic Church is against the Marxist-Leninist efforts to consolidate power, and along with most of the business community, the people are, in broad terms, opposed to the prospect of becoming a second, more impoverished Cuba.

The requirement in Nicaragua today—and it is an urgent requirement—is that the United States and other democratic countries provide significant institutional support to the genuinely democratic elements and distinguish, in fact, if not in word, where the Marxist-Leninist element, and genuinely democratic elements are in Nicaragua, both within Government and within the social organizations.

Second, a way must be found to use the \$630 million in economic assistance that has come from the democratic countries to Nicaragua since the revolutionary victory as an incentive for the fulfillment of the explicit pledge made on July 12, 1979, in a letter to the OAS, by FSLN that it would allow free elections—not in 5 years as declared in 1980—that it would allow free trade unions and democratic parties and a free media. The Government of Nicaragua is not fulfilling those promises.

EL SALVADOR

In El Salvador today, the key reality is that the three groups are competing for power. The three groups are the extreme right, which includes some elements of the wealthy elite, some businessmen, some elements of the security forces—estimated at 20 to 30 percent—with most collaboration from among the paramilitary police forces rather than the regular army. Since 1980, it has made three attempts to stage

a coup against the current Government but has failed because most of the military do not support the extreme right, and because the United States vigorously opposed the attempt to seize power.

The Christian Democrats believe that the extreme right has murdered 140 of their leaders in the last year and reasonable estimates for its total violence range between 2,000 and 4,000. The extreme right condemned the agrarian and banking reforms of 1980 and would turn those back if it took power.

Then there is the Communist left. The recent welcome revelations of the Reagan administration have documented the fact that the six major communist terrorist groups which have been fighting and murdering on an ever-growing scale in El Salvador over the last few years are Marxist-Leninist in ideology. They are committed to installing a Communist government. They are in alliance with—I call it a Communist tiger in alliance with a moderate left rabbit—a small part of the Social Democrats and some dissident Christian Democrats.

It is clear that this extreme left group is not popular and does not represent the will of the people in El Salvador. In recent months, they have failed in three general strike attempts to obtain support. They failed in an ever-increasing wave of terrorism, which, by their own claims and by my count of their claims during 1980, found the Communist coalition responsible for 4,000 to 6,000 of the political deaths in El Salvador during 1980. Their terrorism, their military attacks, their tons of Communist-supplied weapons, have still not given them a popular base. They would not be good for the people of El Salvador and their victory would be very bad for the interests of the United States, because of the reasons I have mentioned earlier.

The third group in El Salvador is what I call the centrist coalition and it includes the Government. The centrist coalition in El Salvador, in power since January 1980, has in the past year withstood three rightwing coup attempts and has withstood systematic murder and brutality by the extremist right, which, according to President Duarte, killed 140 of his Christian Democratic colleagues.

It has withstood ever-growing terrorists from the Communist left and at the same time this centrist coalition, in the face of the enormous violence and tragedy in El Salvador today, implemented major agrarian reforms which distributed land to 1.3 million among 1.8 million formerly landless peasants of El Salvador.

That centrist coalition government, fortunately, has the support of the United States—and it should have the support of the United States. My suggestion for a reasonable and balanced policy in El Salvador contains four major elements:

First, a level of economic and political support for the centrist government for the continued implementation of agrarian reforms and for economic stability as well as democratic institution building through democratic parties, free union, media and institutional resources of that kind.

Second, a reasonable program of military and intelligence assistance to help the Government defeat the Communist guerrillas. I believe the proposals made by the Reagan administration, for adding 40 instructors and approximately \$25 million in military aid to the \$10 million allocated by the Carter administration, makes sense and is reasonable, modest, and appropriate to the need.

However, I would add that there also has to be an offensive program, against the Cuban-managed covert networks in the entire region that are funneling the weapons in. That program requires, obviously, intelligence sources and methods.

The third dimension of a balanced policy is an effort to contain and neutralize the extreme right in El Salvador which, in my judgment, is a great danger to the success of the current Government and to the momentum that now is with the centrist coalition against the extreme left. The containment and neutralization of the extreme right must include efforts to make sure that no exiles from Central America are in this country directing, funding, or supporting extremist right murder.

It must also include a variety of other methods which can be effective against the extreme right. I believe this is a very important part of a balanced policy.

Finally, I would say a balanced policy toward El Salvador requires the building of a transnational coalition of support for the centrist government, including first the Christian Democratic parties, which are supporting that government from Europe and Latin America—the governments of Venezuela, and Costa Rica—and also efforts to persuade the Social Democrats of Europe and Latin America that they should condemn the violent left as much as they condemn the violent right. They should withdraw from coalitions with the Communist groups because, in the case of Central America, the Communist groups will dominate any coalition with the moderate left.

Third, it should also include strong efforts to persuade Mexico that its current policy of support for the revolutionary left is misguided and not in its best interests or the best interests of the people of the region.

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken about 16 minutes and I have a third element of policy, which I will just mention briefly in passing because I know that the other witnesses would like to testify and that you would like to move the hearing on.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The third element of policy I have identified is the need to take the leadership in providing timely economic assistance for continued growth and for adaptation to the secular global economic pressures that are going to be felt in the region in the next 2 or 3 years. These secular pressures include first, the rise in oil prices which are absorbing all the export earnings of many of these countries.

Second, the fact that since 1973, many of the Latin American countries have used heavy foreign borrowing, to pay their rising oil bills. For example, the total debt burden of Latin American countries has grown from \$22 billion in 1970 to \$140 billion in 1980. In Mexico the current burden is \$55 billion and in Brazil, \$60 billion.

In a table that is included, in my testimony you will see that in the case of Brazil, a nation of 120 million people, if the current trends continue—and I have made a reasonable estimate of what might happen in the next 2 or 3 years—the gap between what Brazil earns from its exports and what it has to pay for the combination of oil imports and debt service, that gap will grow from minus \$1 billion last year to minus \$10 billion this year, to minus \$15 billion in 1981,

to minus \$26 billion in 1982. Now, of course, experts will disagree about whether it is going to be minus \$26 billion or minus \$20 billion, but the order of magnitude is correct.

What is needed is to take preventive action in time which combines the OPEC surpluses with the capital resources of the governments and private sectors in the major industrial democracies in a way that permits the timely restructuring of the foreign debt of these countries. This should be linked to the creation of additional jobs and programs that are fair to the poor so there is a gradual adjustment rather than sharp austerity and reduction in living standards which could in turn provoke severe problems of social and political stability.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would say that the three elements of policy discussed with you are mutually reinforcing. Preventing the success of Communist and extreme left terrorist groups is a necessary corollary and requirement for democratic political development. And democratic political development. And democratic political development is good in itself for the people of the region, good for their relations with us and important to their continued economic vitality and to social fairness within those countries. That in turn requires some of the timely and reasonable economic measures that I have described briefly.

Thank you.

[Mr. Menges' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONSTANTINE C. MENGES, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE
THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1980'S

I. The U.S. National interest

More than 350 million people live in the fifty nations and soon-to-be-independent territories of Latin America (including the Caribbean). During the next decade two entirely different sets of historical forces will be competing: on the positive side there is the return to constitutional government in four nations, steps toward continued political liberalization in others such as Brazil, along with two decades of overall economic growth and rising living standards for many despite a doubling in population since 1960. The destructive trends include the severe economic threats posed by past oil price rises and possible future jumps, mounting inflation, underemployment and the recent slowdown in economic growth rates along with a resurgence of Cuban supported terrorism, propaganda, and political destabilization by the extreme left with a corollary increase in counter-terror by the extreme right. The wisdom of Latin American leaders and United States policy during the first years of this decade may well be decisive in determining whether the positive or the destructive trends shape the future history of the region.

Latin America is often perceived as a region of economic underdevelopment and poverty where the grand ideals of the Alliance for Progress failed. In fact, like many vague perceptions this is partially true, especially in terms of political development, but also quite out of date, particularly in economic progress. For the past 30 years the Latin American economies have been growing at an average annual rate of 5.2 percent. Until the 1979 oil price shock, this growth rate had increased steadily each decade. In per capita terms this has meant a real average annual increase of 2.7 percent, a rate of improvement that matches most industrial nations and is higher than the Alliance for Progress target set in 1961. In most countries living conditions have improved for a majority of the population. Signs of this include the visibly expanded ownership of consumer goods and social improvements. During the last thirty years, for example, life expectancy has increased from less than 50 years to 62 years; there was a near-doubling in primary school attendance from 55 percent of the age group to 90 percent and an increase in secondary school attendance from 10 percent to 35 percent, while university enrollment grew from 2 percent of the age group to 9 percent. Contrary to the widespread impression, the terms of trade for the region have im-

proved steadily even for countries which do not export oil. Exports have increased dramatically and nearly all governments have operational control over their basic exports (e.g., Mexico, Venezuela, Peru—oil; Chile—copper).¹

Despite this overall success in economic growth, the sharp increase in population since 1960 (3.2 percent annually, the world's second fastest) and the failure to redistribute economic gains more equally have left significant proportions of the population in poverty within most of the countries. In Mexico and Brazil, for example 30 percent to 40 percent of the population is estimated to live in poverty and similar or larger proportions hold for many though not all of the countries.

Latin America recovered more quickly than expected from the 1973 four-fold increase in OPEC prices partly because of massive borrowing from private and public lending institutions in the industrial democracies. This means that annual foreign borrowing went up from \$3 billion in 1970 to \$15 billion in 1975 to more than \$40 billion in 1980. The combined external debt of Brazil and Mexico now totals more than \$100 billion and debt service requires large proportions of their foreign exchange earnings.

Economic growth in Latin America has meant that it now is the third largest market for United States products, following Europe and Canada. These U.S. exports and imports totalled \$50 billion in 1979 while United States private investment added up to \$37 billion or 20% of the worldwide total. At present, the United States imports a number of strategically important minerals from Latin America including nearly 20% of its petroleum. Mexico, Guatemala and Venezuela also are estimated to have the largest potential for hydrocarbon energy development in the world with the estimated reserves for Mexico alone believed nearly to equal those in Saudi Arabia.

Ironically, while Latin America has grown in significance during recent years, the United States has substantially reduced its official involvement and presence in a number of dimensions. Direct development aid from the U.S. fell from \$1.1 billion in 1974 to about \$259 million in 1979 with similar levels projected for the next years. In the area of cultural and education exchange, despite the high prestige of U.S. universities in Latin America, there has been a sharp decline from the already modest level of 1,470 U.S. sponsored visitors in 1968 to 521 in 1977. This compares with the Soviet bloc program which in 1978 provided educational grants to 4,659 Latin American students in addition to paying for shorter visits by hundreds, perhaps thousands of leaders from all sectors.²

Military assistance dropped from \$142 million in 1976 to \$30 million in 1979, while training programs for Latin American officers average \$7 million annually. This reduction in bilateral economic aid has been partly offset by United States contributions to the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, which have expanded their programs substantially even to the "middle income" nations (those with more than \$1,000 per capita GNP such as Brazil and Mexico) which have recently been defined as ineligible for most bi-lateral aid.

With these facts in mind, it now becomes possible to focus on the issue of the United States national interest. In broad terms, it is in the U.S. national interest that the governments of Latin America be friendly, moderate and independent of hostile foreign control. Consequently, the most favorable conditions for the United States would exist if each of the Latin American countries were governed by stable democratic regimes which promoted both economic development and social justice. This is demonstrated not only by the consistently good relationships among the democratic nations of the world during this century and by the genuine "security community" which has evolved among democratic Europe, Japan and North America, but also by the cordial relations the United States has had with virtually all the democratic regimes of Latin America.³

The most urgent specific present danger to the security of the United States is the effort by totalitarian left factions, encouraged and supplied by Cuba and the Soviet Union, to take advantage of Latin America's social and economic problems to gain power wherever they can. In recent years, the United States has failed to take enough of the needed positive and preventive actions and our gov-

¹ Data is from the World Bank, but an excellent interpretive analysis of the last three decades is Joseph R. Ramos, "Dependency and development; an attempt to clarify the issues", DOCLA, Sept.-Oct., 1978, Santiago, Chile.

² Council of the Americas, "Toward realism in western hemisphere relations", July, 1980.

³ Karl Deutsch, "Political community in the North Atlantic Area," 1957 defined a "security community" to exist when the threat of force had ceased to become an integral part of relations among sovereign states; since World War II this has been achieved among the democratic nations.

ernment has even been unwilling to provide realistic information about the political purposes and terrorist actions of the extreme left in Central America. This enormous failure of political will and prudence has resulted in the establishment of governments in Grenada and Nicaragua which are now *nearly* completely under Marxist-Leninist control. It has also permitted Cuban supported terrorist groups to bring El Salvador to the brink of a communist takeover and there has been passivity as the predicted increase in communist guerilla activity in Guatemala occurred month by month during 1980.

Victory for the extreme left in El Salvador would further polarize Guatemala and probably lead to a tragic increase in violence by its extreme right and left during 1981 with the possibility of communist victory in 1982. In turn, this would greatly increase the probability that communist and radical left groups in Mexico, Honduras and perhaps Panama, with clandestine help from the revolutionary movements in Cuba and Central America, would begin a campaign of destabilization through political action and terror. Whatever, the ultimate outcome, the consequences of major revolutionary violence and the counter-violence likely from the threatened governments (especially Mexico) would include immense human suffering, severe economic dislocations including possible interruptions in Mexican oil production and the Panama Canal, large numbers of Mexican refugees seeking safety in the United States would swell the current tide of illegal immigration by several millions if the violence approached the proportions experienced in El Salvador during 1980 (about 9,000 deaths in a population of 4.7 million). There would be billions of dollars in direct economic and social costs for the United States of merely coping with the results of this revolutionary destabilization process whether the extreme left gained power or not.⁴

There would be other large negative results. The continued expansion of revolutionary warfare in the Central America/Mexico region would distract, divide and demoralize many in the United States, thereby making it less effective in other arenas of American leadership and importance such as Europe and the Persian Gulf. For most citizens the prospect of an extreme leftist government in Mexico, whatever the deception used and initial pledges of "friendly relations" would appear to be a vital threat to the security of American territory as well as an enormous geopolitical set-back. Since power is "the capacity to achieve intended effects" the inability of the United States to prevent a successful political war on its door step would reduce the confidence of allies and others such as Persian Gulf regimes looking to the United States for protection.

Furthermore, the United States interest in preventing the success of communist revolution in Central America and Mexico and the establishment of any additional communist regimes in Latin America is also a major defense interest. Cuba has demonstrated the enormous costs of coping with Soviet military installations close to the United States as well as the destructive effects of its Soviet-supplied and encouraged political and military activities in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia) the Persian Gulf (South Yemen) as well as Latin America-support for terrorism in Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru. The failure of the Eisenhower administration to distinguish between democratic and Marxist-Leninist opposition to the Batista dictatorship permitted the consolidation of communist power in Cuba from 1959 to 1961 and then brought the most severe threat of World War III when the U.S.S.R. attempted to install ballistic missiles in 1962.

At the same time, the success of the existing democratic constitutional governments and those in transition is of major importance to the United States because it provides positive examples for a world order favorable to the democratic nations. The strictly economic aspects of United States relationships with Latin America are also important for both partners. Our discussion of Mexico and Brazil will illustrate that prudent and helpful U.S. economic policies can have beneficial consequences as well for our security and world order interests by providing timely help to prevent severe internal problems.

II. Significant trends and United States policy

Given the realities of contemporary Latin America and a prudent regard for our national interests, there are three essential tasks of a balanced and effective

⁴ For a more specific discussion of how the destabilization of Mexico might evolve, see C. C. Menzies "Mexico the Iran next door?", San Diego Union, August 1979; and "Central America/Mexico: a forecast of strategic trends, 1980-83", International Strategic Issues, April 1980, SAGE Associates, Washington, D.C.

U.S. policy: A/encourage and support existing democratic governments and the process of peaceful transition to genuine democracy; B/preventive extremist and leftist terrorist groups and their front organizations from taking power; C/provide help for successful adaptation to global economic pressures as a way of promoting continued economic growth and better living conditions.

These three goals are mutually reinforcing if the United States acts with foresight, prudence and consistency. Some observers, usually liberals, make the intellectual mistake of believing that any change is better than right wing dictatorship and fail to closely examine the political goals, character and consequences of communist and extreme leftist groups. Others, usually conservatives, fail to understand that social reform and democratic political development are not only intrinsically in the United States interest but that this ultimately provides the best defense against communist success. Often those with a great deal of past experience with the failure of well-intentioned but poorly thought out and badly implemented U.S. policies, tend to think that the U.S. government is too incompetent and faction-ridden to do anything on behalf of the first two goals. This discussion departs from all these views and will suggest practical approaches to achieving each of these purposes.

A. Encouragement for democratic political development

A good definition of democracy is given in Raymond Gastil's *Freedom in the World* (1978).

There is democracy where rulers are politically responsible to their subjects. And there is political responsibility where two conditions hold: where citizens are free to criticize their rulers and to come together to make demands on them and to win support for the policies they favour and the beliefs they hold; and where the supreme makers of law and policy are elected to their offices at free and periodic elections.⁶

Despite the large amount of conceptual and empirical writing on political development in the last two decades, nearly all this academic effort has focused on the "structures and functions" of evolving political systems. Although the work of Easton, Almond, Verba, Huntington and others has been useful in providing a general framework for comparing changes in the organizational style of governments, it has not been concerned with the most difficult task of political development—the creation of functioning democratic governments accountable to their citizens. Ernst Halperin notes that nearly all academic writing on Latin America during the last decade has followed this "structure functionalist tendency" and the result is that "Latin Americanists have been caught with our pants down. Human rights and democracy are the big issues and we do not know how to fit them into our functionalist model of the political system."⁷

Two premises are fundamental to our consideration of policy. First, that political democracy can be attained and lost by societies and that there are means of assessing movement in either direction. Second, there is a distinction between the authoritarian and totalitarian types of dictatorship and the prospects for liberalization are far greater in authoritarian regimes.⁸ In authoritarian regimes, a large variety of intermediate institutions such as voluntary association, labor and business organizations, civic and religious groups, some partially free media, continue to exist with some degree of independence from the state. In totalitarian dictatorships, the regime either destroys or dominates these institutions, while making far greater effort to obtain positive expressions of ideological loyalty from the population.

The recent return to democratic government in Latin America includes the Dominican Republic (1977), Ecuador (1979) Peru, which ended twelve years of

⁶ Raymond Gastil, *Freedom in the World*, 1978, p. 115.

⁷ Ernst Halperin, "The State of Latin America Studies," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 2, April 1978, pp. 99-111. Among the few analytic discussions of the process of building and achieving democracy are *Developing Democracy* (1972) by William A. Douglas and Seymour M. Lipset's *Political Man* (1959), and the writing of Raymond Gastil. The Woodrow Wilson program focus on democratic transitions is a welcome additional effort in this sparse field.

⁸ One of the almost defining characteristics of totalitarian regimes is their ability to prevent or resist efforts to change them. This is especially true when they are supported by competent military forces such as the Soviet troops in Cuba. Nevertheless, recent events in Cuba suggest that we should not assume that there is zero chance that the Castro regime will be endangered by internal forces. It might be useful to give some thought to the pressures and dilemmas the U.S. might face if the prospect became serious that Soviet troops—either currently deployed in Cuba or reinforced—might become substantially engaged in protecting the Castro regime in Cuba.

leftist military rule in 1980, and Honduras where the military government conducted fair elections in April 1980 as a first step back toward constitutional government.

These transitions back to democracy took place at the initiative of the leaders and major institutions within those nations. They followed the successful examples set by Portugal (1976) and Spain (1977) where more than four decades of dictatorship by the right were followed by the successful restoration of democratic institutions which required the defeat of the attempt by the Portuguese Communist Party to seize power in 1975. The European democracies along with the United States helped support the democratic political, labor, business and civic leaders and institutions in Portugal and Spain.⁴

There was however, no effort, to use economic or other pressures to tell those countries how or how quickly their existing political systems should be liberalized. In that same spirit, a new United States administration could encourage and nurture the forces of political moderation and democracy in Latin America through a variety of open relationships. This is especially important in the fragile recent democracies as well as in countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile where the current military governments have embarked on a defined program of liberalization.

In essence United States policy must find the middle ground between the unrealistic interventionism of a crusade and merely routine diplomatic relations in all situations short of visible crisis. There is a domain of useful government and private action where the United States can support democratic forces and weaken those seeking to polarize the hemisphere into either communist or authoritarian regimes.

A first step in doing this is to transcend the artificial and self-limiting categorization of all policy as either "non-interventionist" or "interventionist." The overall posture of the United States in the region might have several facets. One is normal diplomatic relations dealing with the day to day interests and bilateral issues with continuity and predictability. High profile efforts to bring about internal political change using trade, investment credits, aid cutoffs and the like would occur only in extreme cases. There should, however, be a second level of thought and action concerned with developing practical country-specific strategies for identifying and supporting genuinely democratic groups. This would involve the use of discretionary resources such as information, communications, and cultural exchange programs to nurture democratic groups systematically.

One specific example of this type of support is the work of the American Institute for Free Labor Development. That private organization with backing from American labor and business has worked for years in some Latin American countries to help the genuinely democratic trade union, community and peasant organizations become more effective and compete with the communist dominated unions and mass action organizations.⁵ In the last two decades, more than 360,000 democratic labor leaders have been trained but in recent years the level of government support has in no way matched the need and opportunity for this type of democratic political action.⁶

A third level of effort might be focused on specific countries of interest, either because the pace of transition toward democracy was speeding up or the dangers of polarization by extremists were increasing. This could involve the establishment of a semi-autonomous organization which could act separately from the official diplomatic presence; German political foundations such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung are possible models. Among the functions which could be performed at comparatively modest costs by such an entity or by the existing foreign policy institutions are:

- Actions to increase the sense of solidarity among the existing democratic governments in Latin America, enabling them to establish cooperative links with people and institutions seeking greater democracy;
- Building of links between newly legalized political parties, trade unions, voluntary associations, and their democratic counterparts in Latin American

⁴ The Spanish transition is discussed by Samuel Eaton, *Forces of freedom in Spain, 1974-79*, 1981 and C. C. Menges, *Spain: the struggle for democracy today, 1978*, as well as the articles of Juan Linz of Yale University.

⁵ The tragic death on Jan. 4, 1981 of Mr. Michael Hammer, Mr. Mark Pearlman of AIFLD and Mr. Rodolfo Viera, leader of the agrarian reform program in El Salvador, testifies to the personal courage required because individuals doing this work are often the target of violence by the extreme right or extreme left.

⁶ AIFLD, Annual report for 1979, Washington, D.C.

nations, especially with individuals who have recently made a successful transition;

- The encouragement of democratic opposition groups through publication and distribution of their writings and invitations to travel in the democracies;
- active engagement in the competition of political ideas by communicating the facts of successful social and economic performance in the democracies and the repression, poverty, corruption and elite privilege of communist regimes such as Cuba, using films, media and books for key audiences;
- providing appropriate accurate information to leaders of democratic groups when extremists make efforts to penetrate and obtain control;
- providing advisory help in the conduct of fair elections, monitoring services, and establishment of independent parties and media;
- reaching out to students and workers from Latin American countries while they are temporarily studying or residing in the U.S.

These three types of actions would be public, consensual, and directed toward long term effects. More difficult decisions would need to be made if the U.S. were to consider moving toward more immediate and direct involvement in particular countries where timely action was essential. A fourth type of policy might involve special political and economic help for threatened fragile democracies along with direct help to counteract externally supported destabilizing forces. This level of involvement might occur in the context of threatened movement toward the extreme left as in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

These efforts to support democratic groups in particular countries could also benefit by cooperation with third parties such as other democratic Latin American or European countries, trade union federations, democratic political parties, and the international links among them such as those among the social democratic and the Christian democratic parties.

B. Preventing the success of communist and extreme leftist revolutionary movements

There are three essential realities which seem to have been forgotten by many concerned with events in Latin America. First, the Soviet bloc, including Cuba, has always defined both peaceful coexistence and detente to include the continuation of the "struggle between the two world systems" by all means short of open military attack. During the last 35 years—despite the misinformed contemporary illusions about earlier American supremacy—the Soviet Union and those it controls have achieved a number of major gains through political warfare (Eastern Europe, China, Southeast Asia, Cuba, and since 1975, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan.) This political warfare is different in each situation but it employs a blend of propaganda, deception, competent organization, terrorism and para/military methods. Our government has had great difficulty in taking prudent and timely preventive action because those techniques—often applied through proxies—intentionally keep the threat ambiguous.

Second, in a particular geographic region, and to some degree in the world, each successive victory of the revolutionary left adds to its power, appeal and momentum in the next target countries. Third, in foreign affairs, the test of prudence and competence is acting in a timely way so that negative trends can be reversed with a minimum of human cost and geopolitical risk (halting the remilitarization of the Rhineland by Nazi Germany in 1936, for example.)

In Latin America, the immediate danger is that if the communist forces consolidate their power in Nicaragua and take El Salvador, then ninety million people living from Panama to the United States border could be swept unwillingly into Cuban-type totalitarian regimes. Fortunately, from the point of view of the Soviet Union, this process while desirable as a means of further weakening its principal adversary, is not worth a major effort in clandestine or public action and therefore the United States and friendly governments can act with comparatively little risk at present. Nevertheless, this requires a factual understanding of what is really happening in the Central America/Mexico region.

In Nicaragua, two very different political groups joined together to overthrow Somoza in July 1979: the communist guerrillas and activists who had been receiving Cuban aid since 1962 and a variety of genuinely democratic parties, business and labor groups. Fidel Castro had won his revolution with a similar coalition and in 1961, having eliminated all the social democrats and other moderates, he wrote candidly that he had promised free elections and democratic reform because he did not want his movement to be "very small and limited" * * * if it had a more radical program * * * the revolutionary movement against Batista would not of course have gained the breath * * * and made possible the

victory."¹⁰ Castro also described how he established an inner power center and kept the moderates involved in the Council of State and other powerless units until he could dispose of the "bourgeois remnants."

Despite Castro's candid boasting about his deception of the moderates inside and outside Cuba, most of the influential United States media and other observers of Latin America have not wanted to make the definitive operational distinction between the communist and the democratic elements of the new Nicaraguan government and seek ways to limit Cuban/Soviet support to the former and increase the competitive prospects of the latter.¹¹

President Carter failed to act effectively to help the democratic forces, despite knowledge of the massive Cuban supply of weapons for the final offensive during June-July 1979 and the Cuban secret agents who provided the extra resources which could assure dominance by the Marxist-Leninist groups irrespective of the hopes of the Nicaraguan people.¹²

Nicaragua has received more than \$650 million in economic aid from the democracies and international lending institutions. None of this has been translated into effective incentives for democracy. Elections were postponed until 1985 and they "will serve to reinforce and improve the revolution."¹³ The media is under virtually complete control except for *La Prensa*. The revolution is continuing pressure against all non-Sandinista parties and unions and in November 1980 an unarmed leader of the business federation was killed by the police—perhaps as a warning. In late August 1980, the four democratic parties called upon the OAS and democratic governments to hold the FSLN to its pre-victory written promise of free elections—not one word of this poignant appeal was carried by any of the United States prestige media.¹⁴ In foreign policy, Nicaragua has given clandestine support for the revolutionary terrorists in El Salvador, it has signed a friendship agreement with the U.S.S.R. and has taken a pro-Soviet/Cuban position on nearly all issues in the United Nations. In a visit to North Korea, Thomas Borge, the communist Minister of the Interior said: "The Nicaraguan revolution will not be content until the imperialists have been overthrown in all parts of the world."¹⁵

At present real power is in the hands of the nine person Directorate chosen in Cuba in consultation with Fidel Castro in March 1979. It controls the new secret police, the new army and the Sandinista Defense Committees, a neighborhood informant network—three instruments of social control being established with extensive Cuban help. Genuinely democratic groups still exist and there is still some chance to prevent a totalitarian state from being consolidated—but only if much more help (a la Portugal) is given to the democratic forces and if the extreme left fails to win in El Salvador.

In El Salvador three forces are fighting; a reformist coalition; the extreme right and the extreme left. In March 1980 the reformist coalition enacted a major agrarian reform which provided land for 2.1 million peasants. (see appendix I) It has also prevented—with U.S. help—two right wing coups and still can succeed if given more political, economic, intelligence and military help to support the moderate coalition against the extreme left and right. The centrist coalition consists of the Christian Democrats, most of the military, many democratic unions and the 160,000 member UCS peasant organization along with most of the Catholic Church and significant elements of the business community. The extreme right is using some elements of the security forces and various private para-military groups to murder moderates as well as members of the extreme left. Its actions have become more destructive as the power of the extreme left has grown; the Christian Democratic leadership has had far more people murdered than the extreme left.¹⁶

¹⁰ From *Revolucion*, December 1961, also quoted in Theodore Draper, *Castroism—Myths and realities*, 1964.

¹¹ Such an approach of support for the democratic elements of the post-Somoza Nicaragua was suggested by me in articles such as "Echoes of Cuba in Nicaragua," *Chicago Tribune*, June 29, 1979, and "The Future in Nicaragua," the *Washington Star*, July 21, 1979 and "Time to play freedom's high cards in Nicaragua," *San Diego Union*, July 29, 1979—but there was hardly any media writing along these lines in 1979.

¹² A CIA intelligence report of May 1979, leaked to the press in late July 1979, demonstrated that the Carter administration had timely warning and factual information concerning the extent of Cuban and DGI support for the FSLN Directorate.

¹³ FSLN Directorate member quoted by Jeane Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Security and Latin America," *Commentary*, January 1981.

¹⁴ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Aug. 26, 1980.

¹⁵ As quoted in Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ During a November 1980 visit to Washington, D.C., the current President of El Salvador said that the U.S. press has systematically distorted events in his country, especially by failing to note the murder of Christian Democrats by both extremes and the progress on agrarian reform. He made this accusation publicly in December. "Salvadoran leader says foreign press is distorting events," *Washington Post*, Dec. 31, 1980.

In January, 1980 three leftist terrorist organizations, the Communist Party of El Salvador and the two mass action groups (BPR, FPL) formed a united front group now called the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR.) Since then a consistent political/military strategy aimed at victory in the winter of 1980-81 has been followed: relentless attack on the current government to fragment and isolate it internally; the international use of propaganda to hold it "responsible for all the violence", along with a steady buildup in the military and organizational strength of the FDR. In 1978 there were an estimated 400 extreme left terrorists; by 1979, about 1,000 and by December 1980, roughly 5,000 facing an army of 12,000 and about 6,000 in para-military forces. At the end of December, 1980, the members of the communist government in exile for El Salvador located in Mexico, announced they would begin a final military offensive so that Mr. Reagan would "find an irreversible situation in El Salvador by the time he reaches the presidency." "As in Nicaragua, the power structure clearly places the completely Marxist-Leninist Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) above the political arm of the FDR. The brutality of the extreme left is best illustrated by their own claims which during 1980 accounted for about 5,000 of the estimated 9,000 political deaths (see Appendix III, and IV).

The pattern of left revolutionary action and suggestions for a balanced approach

There is definitive evidence that since 1978, Cuba has provided important new political, economic and military support to the left terrorist groups in Central America. Castro has urged unity, prudence and, above all, the deception of the U.S. to prevent direct or indirect intervention before the revolutionary gains could be made irreversible.

Speaking specifically about Cuban support for the totalitarian left in El Salvador and Guatemala the administration told the Congress in March, 1980 that it includes: "advice, propaganda, safe haven, training, arms" (Department of State) and "men and material which transit Honduras, aircraft landings at remote haciendas" with weapons from Cuba for the terrorists (Department of Defense.)

Internationally, the extreme left has been successful in partially coopting both Mexico and the democratic Socialist International especially the German Social Democratic Party and its political foundation—the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. In late March 1980 the Socialist International condemned U.S. support for the reformist El Salvador government; in April 1980 the democratic socialists of El Salvador with help and encouragement from the SI and the German SPD joined the "Revolutionary Democratic Front" to work under the leadership of the communist left as "one more soldier in the revolutionary process." This provides the aura of legitimacy and moderation which the extreme left is using to prevent many U.S. allies in Europe and Latin America from supporting the current government of El Salvador. In December, 1980, the temporary suspension of U.S. aid greatly contributed to the isolation of the current government.

A comprehensive and balanced approach in El Salvador requires that the United States provide more political and economic support for peaceful reform while at the same time taking vigorous action against the extreme left terrorists networks and their Cuban support structures as well as seeking ways to contain and neutralize the extreme right.

The critical judgement to be made is whether there is a better chance of helping the moderate Christian Democratic and military leaders against both extremes by withholding or providing economic or military aid. The withholding strategy has been tried for months (helicopters, military aid) and has clearly failed. The next weeks probably represent the last chance for the United States to try a supportive strategy which provides the moderates with the economic and military assets they can use to continue the reforms, defeat the extreme left and neutralize the power of the extreme right. A new policy must also include additional communications efforts to affirm democratic values, tell the truth about life under communism and intensified economic sanctions against Cuba as long as Castro continues to supply weapons and training for political

¹¹ New York Times, Dec. 27, 1980, "Salvadoran rebels predict final offensive."

violence. These approaches could throw the revolutionary left off balance and provide more time to strengthen the moderates in the region.

Central America and relations between the United States and Mexico

There are three distinguishable aspects to the current United States-Mexican relationship: the communist threat in Central America and the correct response; the array of normal bi-lateral relations which include trade, energy, illegal immigration; air routes/tourism, water sharing; the political climate of the relationship as a result of the views of the elite, influential publics within both nations.

A new administration in Washington can make progress on the last two issues by competent diplomacy and increased efforts to open a dialogue with the mostly anti-American opinion-making elites. A recent public opinion survey found that 70% of the Mexican public was favorable to the United States, but 75% believed the United States was not fair in its economic relations.¹⁹ The first issue, however, is the most important, least well understood and has the most immediate political consequences.

Currently, the Mexican strategy is to support the "leftist coalition" in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala without seeking or urging any guarantee of free elections, political liberties and the like. The Mexican hypothesis is that given the failure of the Carter administration to halt the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in 1979 and the growth of the revolutionary forces in El Salvador and Guatemala through 1980, its only successful strategy must be to "moderate the extremist left by supporting the revolutionary groups."²⁰

Examples of this discreet but officially sanctioned support include: Nicaragua-breaking relations with Somoza (May 1979) and permitting Cuban and Sandinista support elements to be based in Mexico and facilitating the flow of money and cadres through Mexico, 1979; El Salvador—during 1980, consistent support for the revolutionary groups in El Salvador by the Mexican government party, the PRI, acting for the government * * * this involved permission for the "Revolutionary Democratic Front" (FDR) government in exile to use Mexican territory, facilitation of aid shipments * * * and extensive, support through the PRI apparatus (funds, propaganda, safe house) action against any Honduran support for the El Salvador government, the holding of a Conference of World Solidarity with the revolution in El Salvador in November; further, the government linked trade unions (CTM) called for the termination of diplomatic relations and suspensions of oil sales.²¹ Guatemala—during 1980, a process of official distancing from the current government combined with tacit acquiescence in the establishment in Mexico of arms supply networks, small training areas, medical facilities for the communist guerrillas in Guatemala.²²

The United States must communicate to Mexico that: it understands the Mexican strategy but believes it is mistaken because of the fundamental differences in outlook and power between the hard-core communist groups which control the "leftist coalition" in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and the moderate, reformist left which Mexico hopes to encourage. The U.S. has definitive evidence that the leadership of the Central American revolutionary groups is communist and firmly tied to Cuba/USSR.

A better way to promote reform, stability and constitutional government would be an approach which consists of support for the center, as well as democratic left forces and which condemn equally the violence of the extreme left and extreme right. Mexico is a sovereign state and of course will pursue its own policy. However, it would be advisable to discuss the facts and alternatives at greater length in the very near future. Since a revolutionary Guatemala might become a sanctuary for guerrillas and terrorists operating in the southern oil-rich regions of Mexico, the consequence of being wrong about strategy could be very severe.

C. Assistance for adaptation to global economic pressures—the example of Brazil

The prospects for improving living conditions, political liberalization and stability in Latin America will be greater during this decade if the economic growth rates of the last 30 years are continued. Latin American economies on the whole

¹⁹ ICA, "Mexico * * * public opinion prior to the presidential visit," report R-10-79, May 17, 1979.

²⁰ For an extensive discussion of this see my chapter, "Mexican foreign policy" in *The future of Mexico*, Hudson Institute, 1980.

²¹ FBIS, Dec. 10, 1980.

²² Among published indicators of this are, "Mexican support for guerrillas in Guatemala," *Business Week*, Oct. 20, 1980.

performed well after the 1973 OPEC oil price increase as a result of structural changes and because of a massive increase in public and private loans from the industrial democracies. World Bank reports indicate that the foreign debt increased from \$22 billion in 1970 to \$140 billion by the beginning of 1980. The combination of continued OPEC price increases, the large foreign debt service payments, a reduction in export growth due to economic slowdowns in OECD nations and the unwillingness of oil exporting nations to make their capital surpluses directly available to the developing countries are creating a mounting economic crisis.²⁰

Among the nations of the world, Brazil ranks seventh in population (120 million) and tenth in GNP (\$213 billion in 1980) and covers nearly half the vast South American continent. It is the world's fourth largest agricultural exporter and, among oil importing developing countries, Brazil has the largest value of exports. Brazil has immense strategic importance for and influence on the destiny of Latin America. Continuous economic and political stability and progress would have a positive effect in the region, while a growing economic crisis and political polarisation might have very destructive consequences. The industrial democracies currently have a \$72 billion stake in its economic performance, including \$23 billion in U.S. loans (\$16 billion) and investments (\$7 billion.) The following table projects the consequence for Brazil of current international economic trends.

BRAZIL—DRAMATIC RISE IN OIL COSTS AND FOREIGN DEBT, 1962-82

[Dollar amounts—billions, rounded]

Year	GNP	Inflation (percent)	Cost of import oil	Foreign debt		Foreign debt service	Export earnings	Gap between export earnings and costs of oil and debt service
				Amount	GNP (percent)			
1968.....	\$64	24		\$4	6			
1977.....	158	39	\$4	32	20	\$6	\$12	
1978.....	167	41	5	43	25	8	13	
1979.....	199	77	6	52	26		15	
1980.....	213	110	12	60	28	14	16	\$0.1
1981.....	227		15	75	33	19	17	.10
1982.....	243		19	98	40	25	18	.17
								26

¹ Based on published estimates for 1980.

² Projections by SAGE based upon the following assumptions: GNP and export growth, 7 percent; oil imports at 290 mbbbl/yr at \$50/bbl in 1981 and \$65/bbl in 1982 with domestic substitution (gasohol)/conservation offsetting a portion of the expected increase in imports to support growth; debt service costs at 25 percent with credits remaining available to pay past debts and meet oil import costs; inflation rise will also erode Brazil's position, but is not reflected in these computations.

Source: Table from "International Strategic Issues," November 1980 published by SAGE Associates of Washington, D.C.

Brazil illustrates the severity of the economic problems and the requirement for United States participation and perhaps leadership in a multinational effort to work out new public-private financing methods to prevent sharp control concentrations.

The private lenders have a tendency to downplay the seriousness of such potential problems because they do not want to risk a disinvestment stampede which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The IMF and World Bank (total annual lending \$15 billion) alone do not possess adequate resources. There is also a need for action in advance of a visible crisis which in Brazil could be accompanied by threats from either the right or left extremes (more likely the right) which could halt the liberalization process and risk severe social conflict which would in turn reduce the prospects for financial help from abroad. The outlines of a sensible program would include efforts to use OPEC capital surplus along with OECD government funds and guarantees to refinance current debt in return for internal economic policies that are responsible, job creating and redistributive or least harmful to the poor.

²⁰ See the comprehensive analysis in World Bank Report, September-October 1980.

III Latin America in the global context of United States foreign policy

Under the current historical circumstances, United States foreign policy must be effective in a number of currently vital tasks which include: maintaining adequate military forces; strengthening the alliance bonds with Europe and Japan; preventing additional radical or pro-Soviet regimes from coming to power in the Persian Gulf regions; and, preventing the establishment of additional communist regimes in this hemisphere, most importantly, preventing any major revolutionary violence or destabilization of Mexico. Each of these is interrelated. The essential alliance among the democracies can be threatened by military weakness which leads to allied appeasement or by additional Libyan type regimes in control of the oil supply for Europe and Japan which would certainly link oil sales to economic and political conditions—most likely related to Israel—intended to separate the United States from its more dependent allies.

Consider the damaging effect on the credibility of the United States with its allies or in the Middle East context, of a several year process of revolutionary violence in Mexico with casualties proportionate to those in El Salvador (i.e., 126,000 deaths) or an "Iran-like," anti-American, radical, faction-ridden government, or in the worst case, a pro-Soviet communist regime in Mexico. The Palestinian terrorist groups have supplied extensive financial, training and weapons support to the extreme left in Central America because they understand this essential geopolitical connection.²² The PLO opened its Brazilian mission in 1972, its Mexican office in 1975, and its "embassy" in Nicaragua in 1980 where Arafat stated that "the triumph of the Nicaraguans is the PLO's triumph." The extreme left in EL Salvador provides a foretaste of the foreign policy it will follow by consistently condemning the "ultrarightist alliance of Washington, Tel Aviv, Guatemala City and Caracas."²³

In essence, Moscow, Havana, the PLO and other adversaries of the United States recognize that should several left extremist governments take power in Central America it will weaken Washington everywhere. As with the change of regime in Iran, few U.S. allies are concerned at present because they do not believe this could really happen. The negative political consequences will be clearly visible only after the formation of a pro-Cuban bloc in Central America. Only then will the leaders of Europe and the Middle East and Asia recognize fully the magnitude of the negative impact on the United States capacity for action in their regions.

Would a more balanced U.S. policy in Latin America bring about conflict with other allies or interests? The most serious difficulty might arise with the social democratic parties of Europe, especially Germany because of the gradual but very dramatic change in the Socialist International, a confederation of the major democratic socialist parties of the world. The Socialist International originally had been distinct from the communist international because of its commitment to democracy and individual political rights.²⁴ Unfortunately, these basic values have been obscured in more and more cases by a loosely defined ideology of third world empathy which, for example, defines the PLO as the "only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" and sanctions terrorism against anything called "imperialism" or "reaction."

In Central America, the German government, the German Social Democratic Party and the Socialist International are in effect supporting the terrorist left. In 1980, citing security concerns, Germany closed its embassy in El Salvador and suspended its economic aid program.²⁵ The German SPD political foundation has wide ranging contacts among the democratic left in all of Latin America. Washington has been hoping that the German Social Democrats would use their enormous influence and financial resources to urge a coalition of all democratic groups against the extreme left and extreme right just as they did in 1975 to rescue Portugal from what Kissinger believed was an unstoppable communist takeover. In March, 1980 the State Department sent a senior official to brief former Chancellor Willy Brandt on the information which showed that the revolutionary left in El Salvador was communist, tightly linked to Cuba and also re-

²² For a number of well documented examples of this support see the testimony of Congressman William Young before the House, Foreign Affairs, Inter-American subcommittee, Sept. 30, 1980.

²³ FBIS, May 17, 1980, it has escaped many observers that Israel has been a major declared enemy of the revolutionary left in Central America.

²⁴ William A. Douglas, *Developing Democracy*, 1972, pp. 166-177, provides an excellent overview of the democratic political development work of both the social democrats and the Christian democrats.

²⁵ Bradley Graham, "Bonn's tilt in Central America causes worry in Washington," *Washington Post*, Sept. 1, 1980.

ceived considerable military and financial help from Palestinian terrorist groups. Nevertheless, at the first meeting of the Socialist International held in Latin America, neither Brandt, as its President, nor the German delegation protested the final resolutions which condemned United States policy in El Salvador, rejected the agrarian reforms as a false "program of 'reforms and repressions'" and warned against "North American military intervention." At the same time, this meeting of democratic socialists invited Fidel Castro to speak as an honored guest, voted unanimously that independence rather than self-determination was the "only solution" for Puerto Rico and urged an alliance with the communist left in Central America.²⁷

In June 1980 the Socialist International stated that it "fully supports the struggle of the FDR... in El Salvador." In late July a key advisor to Chancellor Schmidt came to Washington and learned in detail how much financial and political support Germany and the SPD had been giving the extreme left in Central America. He promised to make an independent inquiry, halt some planned actions intended to give more help to the violent left, and try to get the embassy reopened, restoring economic aid. So far, few of these positive steps have occurred.²⁸ In connection with that visit the prestigious *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* raised this question: how can Germany expect American support against the Soviet Union if it is active on "the side of a violent left joined in a popular front as vassals of Cuban indoctrinated communists?"²⁹ Despite evidence that the agrarian reform in El Salvador had benefited hundreds of thousands of peasants, the November 1980 meeting of the Socialist International again failed to condemn both the extreme left and extreme right in Central America.

Several factors explain this important difference in perspective. Many social democrats from Central America have simply given up hope for reform and have decided that violent revolution is the only way to overcome the brutality of the extreme right. They do not want to know about the fate of thousands of moderates in other nations who have preceded them into the oblivion of impotent coalition with effective, disciplined and externally supported communist groups. These misguided social democrats have in turn found ready support among the more leftist elements in the German social democratic party—the thirty percent of its activists who in 1979 professed to see no problem with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and who think of the Soviet Union as a "transitional society with some authoritarian features" rather than a mature totalitarian state.

The wishful thinking about Nicaragua which ignores the evidence of growing Marxist dominance combined with the Mexican strategy of seeking to moderate the revolutionary movements by joining them have all combined together into a collage of illusions which have neither been explicitly accepted nor rejected by the social democratic leadership of Europe. Instead, they consider Latin America of primary interest to the U.S. and its failure to be more informative and persuasive has permitted their policy toward the Central American revolutions to remain on a collision course with Washington.

Nevertheless, it is likely that a new administration could, with greater effort, be able to convince the moderate majorities in the leading democratic socialist parties in Europe and most of Latin America that their support should be given only to genuinely democratic groups not associated with the communist or violent left. Moreover, if there is no change in German and Socialist International policy in the near future, and if Central America does become communist, there are likely to be severe recriminations when the American political leadership and public come to understand the destructive role played by their ostensible allies, especially the Federal Republic of Germany.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, different concepts of history underline much of the debate about desirable U.S. foreign policies. There is a strong intellectual current, actually a very traditionalist view, that large impersonal "forces" determine the destiny of nations and governments. For some, like the Marxists, who believe they are riding the tide of history, the policy corollary is activism. For others, who have no simple dogmas of historical inevitability, it is often a wishful or merely

²⁷ See the article by Rita Freedman, "Mixed thoughts on Santo Domingo," *Socialist Affairs*, May, 1980 and the resolutions of the Socialist International meetings published there which included the astonishing condemnation of the democratic elections in Honduras during April 1980.

²⁸ Bradley Graham, op. cit.

²⁹ *FAZ*, July 23, 1980.

detached passivity. A recent article illustrated this latter policy viewpoint by commentating in reference to a list of "floundering" governments including El Salvador, Guatemala, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Indonesia, South Korea: "The best course for Ronald Reagan may be to let history sweep (them) away." This advice also assumed that any U.S. attempt to shape the future would lead to a "waste of dollars in volatile, less-important countries just to try to exercise control."²⁰

Quite clearly this discussion has proceeded from a rather different perspective which assumes that history is the cumulative result of conscious decisions by individuals, groups and societies motivated by ideas, visions, interests, fears and hopes—often in ambiguous juxtaposition. Democratic political change is accomplished by committed people or groups and it should be the task of a great democracy like the U.S. to nurture and encourage those individuals by a variety of positive, open and consensual means. In the same way, communist revolution is the product of action by individuals and groups, often highly disciplined and motivated to create a "better society" as they define it. It is possible and it is necessary for the U.S. to prevent further communist success in this hemisphere. Postponing this task will make the human costs greater and the risks to peace more severe as first Cuba and then the Soviet Union invest their prestige and their power in the maintenance of any new communist regimes which consolidate their power.

Timely action will prevent more millions of people from enduring the agony of another repressive communist political economy. The Vietnam argument against containment in this hemisphere is misleading for two reasons. First, because the strategic equation is reversed—there the U.S.S.R., China and North Vietnam together could funnel enormous military resources into a war of attrition without concern for casualties. In the Western hemisphere, there is not yet any reason to use U.S. combat forces and all the elements of strategic advantage, intellectual and material, rest with the United States.

Properly understood and implemented, the three elements of U.S. policy for Latin America are mutually reinforcing—preventing the spread or success of revolutionary violence and terror is a corollary of democratic political development. And, both purposes will be served by timely help to maintain economic growth.

The recent failure of prudent foresight in the Middle East explains why the U.S. now expects to spend \$20 to \$30 billion for a Rapid Deployment Force of 110,000 men which may have limited utility in any major Persian Gulf crisis. The current costs of a prudent and balanced U.S. policy for Latin America are so modest that they do not compete with the resources needed for any other region. The requirements for success are realism, good judgment, cooperative action with Latin America and the institutional discipline to carry out consistent policies once decisions have been agreed upon.

LATIN AMERICA : CLASS CONFLICT AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

By James Petras

The focus of this essay is on the patterns and tendencies in the class struggle in Latin America. The process of class conflict has developed in a complex and contradictory fashion, reflecting ebbs and flows, as well as taking a diversity of forms and directions. The purpose of this essay is to "map" the class struggle, establish its parameters, and identify the underlying political-economic processes out of which the struggle is developing.

There is no singular trend that dominates the area: there is no linear process of progressive upswing in the class struggle throughout the region. There are neither "falling dominoes" as the conservative counterinsurgency professors would have it, nor stabilization and institutionalization of military power, as the generals and their authoritarian bureaucratic advisers would like us to believe. The region is in flux, meaning that there is a range of levels of class struggle: from partial electoral gains and civil wars on the positive side, to military coups and reversals on the negative side. In areas where the class struggle has advanced or right-wing forces have been defeated the gains have been manifested in a variety of forms—increasing political representation, organization and recognition of mass or-

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ganizations, establishment of "popular government" within a capitalist mode of production. The gains as well as the defeats are of uncertain duration—unlike the events of Brazil of 1964, Chile in 1973, Uruguay in 1974, there have not been any definitive outcomes which establish political dominance for a whole historical period.

In that regard, there are several countries where there has been little variation in the internal political situation—or any striking changes in the level of the class struggle. The massive defeats in Chile and Argentina still reverberate upon the working class—the efforts at social reorganization and political regroupment are still at a very early stage. The struggles still retain a local character and are largely, though not exclusively, linked to immediate economic issues. The unprecedented levels of repression and the recurring use of terror have taken their toll, atomizing the trade unions and confining any movement resurgence to limited sectors of the opposition.

What were heralded as "democratic openings" within the dictatorial regimes during the middle and late 1970s have demonstrated their fragility and limitations in a number of countries. In the case of Bolivia, the attempt to move from Banzer's military dictatorship to civilian conservative forms of domination was punctured by a fraudulent election and the nullification of two elections which were won by a center-left electoral coalition. The last electoral outcome was aborted by a right-wing military coup which brought together a coalition of military drug-traffickers, old-line Falangists, and former allies of the Banzer dictatorship. The Bolivian experience describes the *reversibility* of the gradualist democratization process. The Brazilian experience, on the other hand, indicates the *limitations* of the democratic opening from above: as soon as labor activity began to impinge upon the distribution of power at the factory level, affecting the process of capital accumulation through industry-wide strikes, the military regime struck back, arresting the key leaders of the Workers Party and the metallurgical workers' union and barring them from political activity for extended periods. In both Mexico and Panama, the "democratic opening" has merely allowed opposition forces to obtain representation; through institutional and procedural

measures, the regimes have insured that the opposition will remain a minority, with little or no effective influence on policy. These semi-dictatorial regimes are described euphemistically as "restricted democracies." In Peru, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, the transfer of military and right-wing rule to civilian opposition forces has been executed without adversely affecting the ultimate power of the military, the multinationals, or the local capitalist class. This conservative conversion to democracy benefited in each instance from the fragmentation of the left-wing political forces. In the case of Peru, at least, the divisive activities of the Trotskyists, Maoists, and pro-Moscow Communist party facilitated the elite transfer of power—and the electoral victory of the right-wing. Thus the brief euphoria which accompanied the "democratization process" in the late 1970s—and the self-congratulatory rhetoric of the liberals and social democrats—has given way to a more sober and somber mood of reflection and pessimism.

The proponents of the gradual democratization approach failed to come to grips with the profound links between the political institutions and class interests; as the process of political change began to widen and deepen the class struggle, the ruling classes turned against the democratization process, supporting the return to dictatorial forms of rule or arresting and limiting the areas of mass democratic participation. The fundamental flaw of the theorists of democratization was to exaggerate the degree of autonomy of the state and political institutions from the substantive interests of the socio-economic ruling class.

The liberal/social democratic notion that social democracy would come in stages, in which electoral victories would lead to the seats of power, which in turn would lead to new democratic coalitions capable of realizing structural changes, has been demonstrated to be chimerical. Even more wrong-headed have been those accounts which claimed to have identified structural underpinnings to the new "democratization" process: internal changes in the orientation of "national capital" and other strata providing a "consensual" basis for the democratization process; external changes in U.S. capital promoting similar outcomes (superficially deduced from the ephemeral human-

rights policies of the early Carter administration). The abortive nature of the democratization process is a direct result of the limitations which the class structure imposes on any attempt to democratize society under capitalist rulership, especially in circumstances of economic crises and growing class conflict. The heightening of class conflict and the growing electoral power of the mass organizations within the democratization process increases the likelihood of ruling class/military intervention. The central contradiction is found in the fact that the stronger the mass democratic forces within the democratization process, the more vulnerable it becomes. U.S. policy under Reagan has recognized the risks which limited democratization entails and has moved to foreclose and preempt the emergence of popular movements by consolidating ties with right-wing dictatorships. The close linkages between multinational capital, the Reagan administration, and the dictatorial states in Latin America suggest that the so-called Trilateral vision (which purported to speak for multinational capital) of "limited democracy" was more a figment of the analysts' imagination than a consequence of new forms of international capital collaboration in Latin America.

Within the constraints imposed by the limited nature of the "democratic openings," class forces are emerging, extending political space, and deepening the social struggle. Through the extension of trade-union organization, election of municipal and congressional representation, through the politicization of broad strata of the population, new and larger segments of the labor force are being incorporated into the political struggle. The positions occupied by the left allow it to activate and legitimate opposition struggles as well as to provide material support (activists, propaganda, fund-raising, educational campaigns, legal assistance, and political linkages between particular struggles), even as they are constantly threatened by the repressive apparatus; the boundary between permissible opposition and political repression is a fluid one, subject to the internal pushes and pulls within the regimes as well as the overall weaknesses of the economy. In that regard, the end of the economic expansion in Brazil has been accompanied by a hardening of the regime's position — faced with crises, the capitalist

class and state are less willing to grant concessions or tolerate strikes.

Among the more prominent forces which have developed in recent years—much commented about but little understood—is the growth of social democratic parties and movements. They have spread throughout the region and have in some cases successfully attracted support within the broad anti-dictatorial front. The activities, meetings, and financial support of the European parties have strengthened local social democratic forces. Capitalizing on their intense oppositionist activities and their external support, social democratic parties have taken over the government in several countries (Democratic Action in Venezuela, People's National Party in Jamaica, Democratic Revolutionary Party in the Dominican Republic). Where the social democrats have come to power in recent years, they have failed to implement their reform programs, pursued conventional capitalist development strategies, alienated popular support, and usually lost subsequent elections. In the Dominican Republic, where they still retain power, they are torn by internal dissension and are clearly losing popular support. The class struggle that found expression in the social democratic alternative continues to be frustrated—incapable of transcending the contradictory positions of social democracy as it attempts to harness capital development to redistributive policies; external dependency to national development; popular participation and labor discipline. Pulled on one side by the imperatives of U.S., European, and local capital and, on the other hand, by the demands of its working class and peasant electoral base clamoring for structural reforms, social democracy has failed to formulate a coherent and consistent policy to sustain its rulership. The development of the class struggle—contradictory, complex and in constant flux—occurs in the context of an equally changing and comprehensive expansion of U.S. capital. The latter provides the matrix for class action and, in turn, is shaped by the level of intensity of the struggle.

Capital Expansion and U.S. Policy

U.S. policy is intimately related to the size and scope of corporate interests which have taken hold in the region. U.S. capital has expanded and now encompasses a comprehensive range of interests and linkages that increasingly demand support and "policies" facilitating the reproduction and security of their investments, loans, and licensing agreements. The diversification of U.S. economic linkage is manifest in several areas: (a) financial ties and sales of technology are increasingly as important as investment earnings; (b) investments are long-term, large-scale, and spread throughout the economy; (c) industrial production is a central target for U.S. investors, primarily as a means of capturing local markets and secondarily as a basis for exports; and (d) banking capital has exceeded direct investment as the primary connection between the United States and Latin America. Interest payments from Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and Chile have become major sources of income for U.S. banking capital. Brazil's debt is over \$50 billion, Mexico's over \$30 billion, Argentina's close to \$20 billion—indicating the growing importance of finance capital within the political economy of the region. The changes in the structure of U.S. capital involvement and the new linkages provoke political consequences of great importance:

(1) The long-term, large-scale, and diversified investments are conditioned by particular sets of political-economic agreements, designed by particular types of regimes—in which segments allied with U.S. interests predominate. Hence, the political setting is crucial to the continued expansion of U.S. investment, and becomes increasingly important to U.S. policy-makers.

(2) The growth of U.S. investment in industry has most frequently been linked or associated with local private and state interests. The interlocking of state and foreign capital insures that social struggles can easily be transformed into political struggles; the association of national with foreign capital can lead to the combining of national and class struggle.

(3) The growth of private financing has been accompanied by the growing importance of the military and repressive

activities of the imperial state. The ascendance of finance capital is matched by the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy.

(4) In general, the diversification of U.S. capital, its deepening involvement in Latin America, the latter's growing importance as a source of earning for the biggest banks means added pressure on the U.S. government to become more actively involved in promoting, protecting and expanding U.S. interests in the region. This is particularly the case not only because of rising class conflict, but because of growing European and Japanese competition within the region. Moreover, Latin American markets, resources, and labor become especially important in light of the declining position of the United States in Asia, the Eastern countries, Europe and the Mideast. The Big Push of the United States, evidenced by its heightened military activity in Central America, is part of a larger design to enhance all dimensions of U.S. involvement—military and political—and to crowd out competitors outside as well as to repress "inside challenges."

Foreign Policy Consequences of Changing Economic Patterns

The above-enumerated changes were the mainsprings of the evolving policy of the previous Carter administration and they define the direction of the Reagan-Haig team. What distinguishes the former from the latter is the *initial context* in which policy was formulated. Carter's presidency began at the height of massive U.S. opposition to interventionism, military spending, and internal/external spying and covert operations. The state's capacity to pursue aggressively military and political options designed to enhance U.S. corporate economic interests were seriously constrained. Thanks to a four-year program of carefully orchestrated and gradually increased tensions, the Carter administration—and now the Reagan administration—was able to lift many of those constraints and neutralize others, though the process of "remilitarization" can still catalyze opposition as the burgeoning opposition to Reagan's El Salvador policy indicates. The continuity between the Carter and Reagan administrations is especially pronounced with respect to the

latter half of Carter's term of office—especially in the abrupt and radical shift in policy evidenced in the Carter policy-speech on the Middle East, the clumsy effort to promote Cold War tensions over Soviet troops in Cuba, the hyperbolic utterances concerning world-power alignments in the aftermath of Soviet troop entries in Afghanistan, etc. The continuities in policy emphasize the profound and decisive dependence of state policy on promoting the economic imperatives of U.S. corporate capital. While ideological rhetoric, personnel, and personalities have shifted dramatically, the key policy directions have not changed, liberal critics of Reagan notwithstanding.

The Carter administration's policy toward Latin America was concerned with substantially strengthening ties to the major economies of the region. The trends in investment, financing, sales, etc. (outlined above) were promoted by every agency concerned with foreign economic policy. Even at the height of Carter's human-rights morality sermons, private corporate, banking and commercial ties were flourishing with the worst offenders of "human rights." The Carter administration's protests of the political excesses of dictatorial regimes was a symbolic ritual of no major consequence to the ongoing economic relationship. These symbolic gestures were a sop to the liberal activists who were concerned more with policy statements than with the underlying economic relations. Human rights was the opium of the liberal professionals.

The Carter administration's latter-day policy—which evolved with rapidity as the Iranian revolution unfolded—increasingly evoked the themes which have become the centerpiece of Reagan's foreign policy: increasing military budgets, "unleashing" the CIA, a worldwide anti-Soviet crusade, intervention in Central America, arm-twisting of allies, etc. A careful comparison of the Carter policy speech and the policies pursued by Reagan-Haig highlights the essential sameness in purpose and direction. Carter, not Reagan, consigned "human rights" to the dust bin of history. It was Carter who enunciated the doctrine of giving primacy to maintaining U.S. economic interests over and above the self-determination of nations. More important, it was the Carter administration which began to implement the interventionist policy in El Salvador which the Reagan administration is deepening and extending. The

roots of both "interventionist" policies are found in the growing importance which overseas interest, investment and royalty earnings have for the biggest U.S. firms. Massive overseas economic activity was increasingly vulnerable to economic nationalists—in and out of power. Hence, both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans who are ultimately upholders of worldwide corporate expansion have had no alternative to building up the war-machine, to "projecting power" in order to defend "our" corporate interests.

The Reagan administration policy toward Latin America must be analyzed in five dimensions: (1) military: "projecting power"; (2) economic: molding the state to better service corporate interests; (3) political: prioritizing ties with particular countries; (4) strategic: promoting counterinsurgency to contain burgeoning popular movements; and (5) ideological: promoting the myth of East-West confrontation.

The most obvious ingredient in the Reaganite policy toward Latin America is the militarization of foreign policy: diplomatic and political measures are subordinated to an all-out effort to promote a military apparatus and to strengthen linkages with repressive forces in target countries. This policy in turn involves a massive expansion of military programs, an increasing role for military advisers in conflict situations, greater arms sales (and donations), strengthening ties with right-wing dictatorships, unleashing the CIA for direct action, as well as preparing for direct intervention where revolutions are imminently successful. The militarization of foreign policy flows from a military definition of political realities and thus necessarily strengthens U.S. relations with its competitor allies who are fundamentally weakest at precisely that point. The "historical conception" of contemporary conflict in Latin America which the Reaganite right articulates is that sufficient force can bludgeon adversaries into submission. In that regard, the necessary corollary to the reconstruction of "U.S. power" which the Reaganites expound is nothing less than the search to reassert the dominant-subordinate relationships characteristic of the 1950s. A favorite "technique" of Reaganite policy-making has been the *fait accompli* used in pursuit of this paramount goal. The *fait accompli*: the commitment of military aid and advisers to assist the dictatorship in El Salvador and

then the sending of representatives to "sell" the policy to the allies. The exercise of unilateral action and then the expectation that the action itself warrants support are expressions of arrogance which provide an intimation of the direction of policy—for style frequently reveals the substance of policy.

While the military policy is the most transparent element in the Reagan foreign policy, the most fundamental underlying concern which informs that policy is the effort to increase the opportunities for capitalist expansion. In this regard, the Reagan administration is deeply involved in more directly and explicitly subordinating state activity into an instrument of capital. The choice of personnel and the criteria for policy analysis are clearly coordinated with an explicit and direct concern with their impact on the day-to-day needs of capital. Some liberal critics have ridiculed the lack of general knowledge of some Reagan appointees, basing their judgments on criteria foreign to that administration's intention. For the test of the new members of the administration is not their capacity to pass a doctoral exam but their ability to secure the "confidence" of the leaders of the multinationals. Over and over again it has become evident that the crucial question being asked is—sometimes explicitly, more often implicitly—how will this appointee or policy affect U.S. capital? The direct harnessing of the state apparatus to big business, however, does not mean that all business leaders and the administration share a common conception of the best way to proceed. More particularly, those Reagan foreign-policy ideologues who have promoted policies cutting back foreign aid spending, financing of international bank activities, and who in general advocate "free market" doctrines at the expense of state intervention which is essential for large-scale corporate activity abroad have come under attack from the spokespersons of the latter who are also entrenched in the administration. The supporters of international finance, while espousing the free-market rhetoric, in practice favor selective state funding because they know that much of the most lucrative profit-making activities require heavy state and "international" funding to provide the "infrastructural development" to penetrate and extract raw materials, to transport machinery and finished goods, etc. They

view the general and unqualified application of free-market policies by the ideologues as dogmatic, simplistic and contrary to the concrete interests of the corporations operating in the real world. In the early stages of the Reagan administration, the conflict between free-market ideologues and corporate realists has led to compromises where those aspects of the finance programs directly related to "economic development" activity vital to the multinationals have been secured while the social aid programs designed to prevent political unrest in the less developed areas are being cut back: areas which have little immediate profit-generating capability. Most likely, both the ideologues and the realists will opt for a military solution in those under-financed countries if and when political insurgency emerges. In the poorest countries, the administration will support Stroessner-like solutions: dictators who will keep a low profile, keeping their countries in the backwaters in exchange for being "left alone."

Related to the overarching importance of big business in the Reagan foreign policy is the third component of Latin American foreign policy: focusing on "key countries"—"key" referring to the size of the market, their investment potential, their general profit-making capacities. In this regard, the centerpiece of the Reagan policy for Latin America is the effort to forge and strengthen economic ties with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela (the Big Four), even if the ideological-political affinities of the ruling regimes are not as strong as with other more right-wing administrations in the area. Nothing demonstrates the importance of corporate and financial economic interests in shaping the Reagan administration's policies more clearly than the overtures that are being made to Mexico—a government less favorable to Reaganite policy toward Cuba, Central America, etc. than any other in Latin America, and yet a country which possesses one of the most lucrative markets, vital energy resources, and so on. One of the favorite proposals of the Reagan administration will be the formation of a Mexican-U.S.-Canadian "common market" to integrate and subordinate raw-material production, investment opportunities and markets for U.S. producers and financiers—excluding the growing competition from Europe and Japan. While the

administration will cultivate and, of necessity, negotiate with their official counterparts, Reaganite corporate and financial officials will quietly attempt to form alliances and strengthen ties with corporate and financial groups within the Mexican (and Canadian) economy to pressure in the same direction. The "end around" play or indirect-pressure approach is conceived of as planting the seeds for an eventual convergence of interests that will be negotiated at the governmental level. A similar approach may be attempted in Venezuela. The rapprochement with Argentina essentially begins at the political level, with an easing of arms sales, the dropping of the human-rights issue, and the normalizing of diplomatic relations as the first step toward closer economic collaboration. In the case of Argentina, and to a lesser degree Brazil, the economic interests of the administration coincide with the ideological-political dispositions, possibly facilitating greater communication and lessening conflict. Nevertheless, the Argentine economy is enmeshed in a deepening economic and financial crisis, generated precisely by the free-market economics spouted by the Reaganite ideologues; a modification of the more extreme versions by incoming chief-of-state Viola may be forthcoming. The introduction by the regime of some "nationalist developmental" measures, however, will not crimp the relationship, as much as the continued downswing of the economy and the possible reemergence of nationalist-populist forces if the economic decline accelerates and provokes a major crisis. Brazil has been the most important target for U.S. investors and finances—yet it is the area also where the competition from Europe and Japan is most intense, and where internal nationalist and public-sector forces are picking up momentum—not to speak of trade union, church, and leftist opposition. The attempt by the Reagan administration to box the Brazilian regime into the U.S. Central America policy and into its ideological-political definitions of an imminent and threatening East-West confrontation have apparently failed because Brazilian policy-makers realized that whatever their ties to the United States (and their importance), they saw a commitment to the U.S. policy as one which would greatly limit their burgeoning relations with Europe, Japan, the Middle East, etc., and lead Brazil back

toward an exclusive and direct dependence on the United States. Given the growth of the Brazilian economy, the multiplicity of finance, commercial, and corporate ties and the relative decline of the United States, for the Reaganites to believe that they could simply "round-up" Brazilian support by sending a political envoy (even a participant and intimate collaborator in the 1964 coup like former CIA man Vernon Walters) was sheer ignorance of the political-economic changes that have taken place since the mid-1960s, when Brazil provided a fig-leaf military force for the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic.

Thus the Reaganite project of focusing on the Big Four is likely to result in further conflicts and rebuffs to the degree that the Reagan administration continues to operate with a 1950s vision of Latin America as merely a series of client-states, holding the door exclusively for U.S. capital to come in and develop their resources. No doubt, there are influential groups in and out of these countries willing to play the role of doormat; but in these, the largest countries of Latin America, that approach conflicts with very many influential local groups with access to the state and other non-U.S. international ties. The question remains then: Beyond the formulation of a policy focusing on the Big Four, does the Reagan administration have the capacity to execute a policy which recognizes the new realities, the more limited possibilities of promoting U.S. capital in a world of competing claims and interests? To insist on imposing the policy of East-West confrontation (and its corollary, the need to submit to U.S. hegemony) and to attempt to bludgeon the Big Four into accepting this as the new political "reality" could easily lead not to greater integration, but to greater antagonism from precisely the areas the Reaganite business people and bankers are most eager to penetrate. The only hope the Reaganites have for promoting their scenario among Latin America's Big Four is in the eventuality of a major social upheaval, in which the local elite—faced with revolution—in desperation turns to the United States, secures military support, and becomes indebted to the point of surrendering to U.S. dominance, a possible but unlikely outcome.

Parallel to the push toward greater economic penetration (integration) of the Big Four, the Reaganites are raising

counterinsurgency as the central doctrine in their approach to the smaller countries of the region, and more particularly to the Central American countries. Unlike the Carter administration, the Reaganites favor using the stick without the carrot: despite the continued rhetoric about the "importance of social and economic reforms," the major emphasis is on "fighting international communism," and the military definitions of reality are absolutely paramount. In these areas, unlike the Big Four, U.S. policy-makers still retain a predominant role in shaping the composition of the regime and setting the political agenda. While the Reaganites cynically refer to the "Duarte government" in El Salvador, they send arms and advisers, and formulate counterinsurgency tactics for the regime without even consulting him. The counterinsurgency military doctrines which dominate Reaganite policy reflect the narrow social base of support which externally imposed military relations and economic development schemes have within these countries. The historic pattern within which the Reaganite policy operates is anchored in a narrow military caste and a narrow set of collaborator-proprietary classes. The counterinsurgency doctrine is designed to contain the massive and sustained opposition necessarily engendered by this historical pattern of dictatorial control and elite-controlled growth. The alliance between U.S. capital and the most retrograde social classes and military groups within the smaller countries will be deepened; the ideological affinities will merely reinforce the convergence of political and economic ties: free-market and counterinsurgency doctrines can be expected to flourish. Among the academic and journalistic apologists for the Reaganite policies there is likely to be a revival of efforts to eulogize elite modernization with the military as modernizer, to convert oligarchs to entrepreneurs, to "harness traditionalism to modernity." These euphemisms, individually or combined, will serve the ongoing effort to rationalize Reaganite promotion and support for highly repressive and politically isolated dictatorships.

The fifth and final component of the Reaganite policy in Latin America — but not directed exclusively to that region — is the attempt to formulate an overarching political framework justifying the militarization of U.S. policy, the subordination

of Latin America's Big Four to the United States, the elaboration of counterinsurgency in the smaller countries, as well as to disguise the strict subordination of the state to big business. That political framework is eminently simple: East-West conflict permeates all relations and regions. The "doctrine" proclaims that all conflicts and issues either emanate from Soviet expansionist designs or, if not, should be subordinated to efforts led by the United States to thwart them. Hence, all countries in the region should accept the U.S. definition of their political priorities; U.S. hegemony in general should lead to joint participation, closer working relations—naturally including economic, financial and commercial relations (being natural allies)—and implicitly avoid extra-hemispheric relations that weaken the common purpose. Under the cover of reviving the East-West global confrontation doctrine, Washington hopes not only to crush revolutionary forces, but to advance U.S. economic and military interests at the expense of European and Japanese competitors as well as a whole gamut of internal forces which have emerged since the 1950s. The projection of the global-confrontation thesis and its articulation thus serve as the ideological concomitant of the attempt by the Reagan administration to reestablish the world of the 1950s in which U.S. power dominated European allies and Latin American clients. At one level, the whole bizarre effort by Reagan and Haig to find the Soviet hand everywhere can be looked upon as intellectually bankrupt; even in the specific case of Communist arms-flows to El Salvador, the White Paper was a collection of unsubstantiated assertions and unwarranted inferences from rather dubious documentation. The point, however, is not the intellectual or "truth content" of the policy but the driving force behind it, its utility in the pursuit of policy goals and its larger consequences. Lacking credibility, and unable to assert itself through ideological persuasion or political pressure, the Reaganites may attempt to provoke through military measures the polarization they desire: high Reaganite officials admit that plans to launch military attacks on Cuba are in place; Nicaraguans are being trained by Cuban exiles with long-standing ties to the CIA; plans are being made to supply arms to Jonas Savimbi in Angola; Richard Pipes, a top

adviser to National Security Adviser Allen, has even been quoted as discussing war with the Soviet Union in case they don't change their social system. These are not the idle rantings of isolated neofascist fringe groups but alternatives and policies being seriously discussed or pursued in the highest offices of government. U.S. policy is clearly moving toward a direct collision course with a vast array of social and political forces in Latin America. The emergence within Latin America of a number of substantial social and political movements heightens the probability that direct conflict will ensue. Will Americans be returning from the Caribbean in green bags instead of sun-tans?

Regional Patterns and Political Tendencies In the Class Struggle

The level of class struggle varies by region. Central America contains the most intense levels of conflict, while the Southern Cone (Chile, Uruguay and Argentina) are the least developed. In between are the Andean countries, particularly Peru and Bolivia, while several others, including Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador, exhibit growing social and political cleavages that could eventually have a significant impact in realigning politics. Five factors shape the levels of class struggle: (1) the historical outcomes of recent struggles—namely “historic defeats” in which powerful military dictatorships have swept away the institutional base of working-class activity and which exercise power with an iron hand; (2) the growth of capitalist relations of production within the political and social institutional shell of “family based” mercantile-agricultural economies containing highly concentrated land ownership, restricted control over state credit, kinship and business links between landlord, commercial and financial groups and high officials in the military, judiciary, and public sector corporations; (3) the unmitigated impact of free-market activities on the labor force—including growing rural uprootedness, growing dependence on wages as opposed to self-sufficient subsistence agriculture, urban under- and unemployment; (4) demographic changes in the labor force in which the bulk of labor is under 20 years of age, the vast majority unemployed,

uprooted from productive activity, and concentrated into urban areas; (5) the inability of the ruling class to establish political hegemony over the labor force through parliamentary or bureaucratic forms of rulership; hence its constant resort to dictatorial forms of control. What makes Central America so explosive is that it contains all of these ingredients, while other regions lack one or more of the crucial components. In the Southern Cone, the Chilean, Uruguayan and Argentine mass movements are still recovering from the catastrophic defeats inflicted by the rightist military forces: the effects of terror have not yet sufficiently worn off, nor have the regimes loosened their grip over the activities of the mass organizations. In the Central American countries, especially El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, the growth of capitalism within the institutional framework of "oligarchical-dictatorial rulership," has led to the explosive combination of growing "proletarianized labor" and political exclusion, which coalesced a semi-urban youth opposition linked to newly emerging social associations and, in some cases, militant church organizations. The "total war" launched by the U.S.-backed military regimes is to try to counter the political consequences of unmitigated market relations and exclusionary politics through the use of mass terror. Terrorism by U.S.-backed regimes has become the routine political response seeking to reverse the historical tendencies toward popularly based social and political transformations.

Between the mass insurgency of Central America and the rigid control of the dictatorships of the Southern Cone is a whole gamut of political and social tendencies embracing the countries from the Caribbean to the Andes. Regimes involving "restricted participation" (and the restrictions vary from country to country), outright dictatorship (Bolivia), and fairly open political competition (Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Costa Rica) define the universe. The heterogeneity of political experience denies facile efforts to generalize about "democratic openings" or "authoritarian proclivities" within the region. The durable and visible tendency is a constant realignment of political and social forces along class lines—the issues and debates, organizations and programs, within the region are clearly moving along the lines of cleavages between the direct producers and

the owners of the means of production. Secondly, while the levels of struggle vary, including the most elementary demands for wages and against torture, the overall tendency is for the movements to become directly involved in activities to alter the nature of the government, its policy, and even the nature of the state apparatus. The politicization of mass struggle is neither uniform nor always apparent, but reveals an evolving pattern that grows out of the central role which the state plays in organizing economic activities, controlling wage-capital relations, and so on. The very insertion of the state on behalf of property owners inevitably ensures the politicization of the new burgeoning movements.

Finally, the reinsertion of the Reagan administration directly into the class struggle, through its military and political advisers, training programs, and financing ensures that "economic nationalism," already a product of the impact of the multinationals, will be compounded by a "political nationalism" directed against the U.S. state. New class alignments and the politicization of the mass movements will be reinforced by nationalist commitments, and this accumulation of forces will provide the basis for a comprehensive movement, against which the terrorist formulas of officialdom may not apply or be adequate. The prospect of a national movement which is also class-anchored presents a formidable challenge to big property owners and their U.S. backers, not in isolated instances—regions or countries—but throughout the area. The current configuration of forces does not yet resemble this outline, but the underlying forces generating it are indeed present and active.

Class Struggle for State Power: Central America

The most intense level of class struggle involves the organization of a substantial sector of the rural and urban producers in class organizations, the presence of an armed vanguard capable of combating the depredations of the regime and a political-military command organized and responding to the needs of the masses and attempting to take state power. Frequently in some geographical areas of the country situations of

"dual power" exist in which, parallel to the repressive authorities, local popular governance is present, frequently the effective representative of local interests. El Salvador clearly has been in a state of war in which the predominantly military regime is engaged in a campaign of extermination against a vast array of class-based mass organizations and the popularly based guerrilla forces. The U.S.-backed regime's strategic aim is to "up" the kill rate to the point of diminishing political opposition—the ultimate solution for a regime without any significant political support. On the other hand, the generalized terror has provoked large-scale divisions and defections among a vast number of professionals, employees and small employers, swelling the ranks of the working-class and peasant-based organizations and adding a substantial component of petty-bourgeois democratic forces to the opposition: in the conjuncture, the class struggle has been combined with the democratic struggle against totalitarian terror. The shift to the countryside is based on two considerations—the terror and the importance of deepening the worker-peasant alliance, a fundamental requisite in sustaining the revolutionary struggle to a successful conclusion. Hence the growth of the guerrilla struggle parallels the relative decline of the urban political struggle. A similar pattern has emerged in Guatemala, though on a somewhat lower level of activity: the struggle began through the growth of urban trade-union activity, mushroomed into a mass labor-based city-wide organization, suffered severe state-organized terror resulting in thousands of deaths, and led to the diminution of public protest in the cities and an increase of clandestine urban resistance and rural guerrilla activity. The most striking feature of the Guatemalan struggle is the incorporation of the Indian masses in the growing guerrilla movement. Most of the urban labor force retains its hostility to the regime, currently held at bay by the pervasive use of terror. However, a striking defeat of the military in the countryside could once again unleash a torrent of urban working-class activity, reactivate the unions, and create the bonds for an Indian- and working class-based national insurrection. The subjective and objective circumstances are there: what thus far has prevented the consummation of such an alliance is the intervention of the re-

gime: the assassinations have killed off the vital linkages between city and country, between political and resistance organizations. Moreover, the decimation of organized leaders at the local and national level has been made possible by the meager arms which the popular movement has in its possession and the massive armaments supplied by the United States and its allies to the military. Terror and weaponry have thus far sustained the regime, despite its growing political isolation. In fact, the former grows in direct proportion to the latter.

In Nicaragua the class struggle has entered into a new phase of political organization and consolidation of the armed organs of the new state. The contradiction between a popular state and private economy continues and depends on the level of the international class struggle: the attempt by the Nicaraguan leadership to consolidate its national revolution (revolution in one country) has come into conflict with the Reagan administration's effort to roll back the process. Hence the policy of the Nicaraguan leadership of peaceful coexistence of different social systems and its corollary of ideological pluralism and nonintervention has come into conflict with the Reaganite policy, which finds even consummated social revolution in its self-proclaimed sphere of influence as unacceptable, whether in Nicaragua or Cuba. Reagan not only intervenes to *prevent* revolutions (El Salvador) but is prepared to intervene to *reverse* and *overthrow* revolutionary governments which have achieved recognition by other governments. The Reagan policy is to defeat the El Salvadoran and Guatemalan revolutions, and to directly confront Nicaragua: politically isolating, economically strangling and then militarily attacking it. A Reaganite victory in El Salvador would be a springboard for armed action into Nicaragua: Reagan puts little faith in the private sector as a viable political force; in his eyes that is a tenuous and long-term prospect which conflicts with the ideological pressures for short-term, military solutions in Central America. Rather, both Haig and Reagan see the Nicaraguan revolution through the prism of an outsider-military strategy: financial squeezes and training of counter-revolutionary forces.

The regionalization of conflict will accelerate the embry-

onic mass mobilization growing out of the economic crises afflicting Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica and, to a lesser degree, Mexico. The pressures from the Reaganite administration should lead to greater polarization and even to outbreaks of military resistance. In the meantime, Costa Rica and Honduras are experiencing the initial outbreak of strikes, protests, and mass activity against the established powers: the revolutionary spark could, over time, engulf these countries.

Below the level of direct struggle for power, so far identified with El Salvador and Guatemala, is the national popular mobilization which has emerged primarily in Peru, Brazil and Bolivia, and, to a much lesser extent, in Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador. Class struggle at the level of popular mobilization includes a combination of several features, reflecting a variety of forms of struggle: growth and proliferation of mass organization; expansion and incorporation of previously unaffiliated groups and strata to existing movements; expansion of political and social "space" (legal rights, organizational rights, etc.); the extraction of political and social concessions from the regime (what the Brazilian regime presents as its "democratic opening"); increased capacity to engage in industrial and regional mobilization that transcend local firms or communities; electoral victories that provide representation, and so on.

While not contesting state power, the movements in these countries have, with varying degrees of success, established a national political presence and offer a concrete "pole" around which local political and social movements can unite. The three countries which possess the most advanced class-struggle movements in this regard are Peru, Brazil and Bolivia. In Peru the left has emerged as the second electoral force in the country, winning municipal elections in eight provinces and in the second largest city of the country. The bulk of its voting strength is concentrated in the proletarian suburbs of the provincial areas. The bulk of the key trade unions (mining, educational and industrial, etc.) are under leftist leadership. A general strike called in January 1981 was widely supported throughout the country. Providing the left can overcome its endemic and infantile divisions, its prospects for further growth are quite promising; moreover, with the split in the

APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana)*, there are considerable political opportunities to further expand the left's constituency. As it grows in strength, however, the danger of a right-wing counteroffensive also increases: either in the form of a military coup or in the form of rightward and repressive shifts coming from within the Belaúnde government. In Brazil, the growing power of the working class and the emergence of the class-based Workers Party has already touched the outer limits of the regime's tolerance. Top trade unionists were arrested and sentenced to three and a half years for leading an industry-wide strike. Political proscriptions of mass leaders are the order of the day, while parliamentary opposition confined to impotency as a minority is still tolerated. The extension of political space, the proliferation of trade unions, student associations, Christian "base communities," and peasant unions provide a growing network for mass mobilization. The growing institutional constraints of the regime reflect its incapacity to handle mass demands in the midst of a growing financial and economic crisis. The ultimate response has been for the military government to restrict those democratic rights which translate into effective class economic demands—while sustaining individual expression. Above all else, the regime is intolerant of any action that threatens the coercive apparatus. Hence its refusal and outrage at efforts to examine the military's role in the torture of political prisoners in the recent past. Any actions which are perceived to threaten the institutional power and prestige of the military—past or present—is sufficient to mobilize substantial sectors of the military toward a repressive solution—the closure of the "democratic opening." The Bolivian class struggle continues at the level of direct action through union-directed general strikes, even as the political arm of the mass movement has been severely damaged. The military coup of General Meza upset the social democratic electoral victory, and the subsequent repression included numerous assassinations of popular leaders. The single-minded focus on the electoral process by the social-

*The party has split into two factions, one led by Armando Villanueva which is adopting a social democratic approach and proposing tactical alliances with the Marxist left, and one led by the Townsend faction which is proposing to ally itself with the Belaúnde government.

democratic alliance—an astonishing strategy, considering the frequency of coups in Bolivia—prevented any effective counterattack by the popular forces. Nevertheless, the regime's total political isolation, its venality and internal strife over shares in the narcotics trade, should not prevent the reemergence in a relatively short time of a powerful resistance movement.

In Ecuador and Venezuela, democratic and class forces demonstrate a capacity to make incremental gains, despite self-destructive divisions and conflicts among the leftist political groupings. The oil wealth has, as in Mexico, provoked a greater degree of social polarization, increasing the relative shares of the upper-middle class and decreasing the real income of the majority of wage earners and small producers. In Colombia, conflict is endemic, social confrontation exists throughout the society in a multiplicity of forms (for example, urban squatter-settlers against real estate speculators and the state, peasants against landlords and the state, public employees against the state) without any nationally recognized political vanguard. Guerrilla groups proliferate but have yet to anchor themselves in any significant mass movements except in some isolated rural localities. Unlike the process of class struggle among the abovementioned more mature three countries, within this group the class struggle has yet to develop a firm base of support with a nationally recognized political leadership.

The third level of class struggle is found in the Southern Cone: activity of a local, intermittent type predominates, although when historic opportunities present themselves the populace can demonstrate a surprising capacity to repudiate the regime. This was clearly the case during the plebiscite on the constitution in Uruguay, when almost 60 percent of the electorate voted against the regime's formula for perpetuating itself in power. Thus while there are no overt and significant political challenges for power, there is, it appears, a vast latent potential opposition which is only contained by the terror of the regime. Localized conflict, political protest, and occasional armed actions predominate in Chile and Argentina. In the latter country, however, the free-market-provoked economic crisis, including the bankruptcy of a large number of industrial and financial houses, could precipitate a "nationalist" economic

turn which could provide the basis for a Peronist-based trade union revival—a possibility which, however, would be combined with alliances and understandings with sectors of the military high command.

In the Caribbean the direction of the class struggle is contradictory: in Grenada, the radical social democratic New Jewel forces are consolidating their political power through mass organization, promoting economic and social development while sustaining private ownership and the market economy. In Jamaica, the demise of the social democratic Manley government, after its attempt to harness international financing and private capital to nationalist and redistributive policies, has led to the ascent of the rightist Seaga regime. The main effort of this regime will be to collaborate with, and reconcile Jamaicans to, the demands of international capital in the hope of contracting large loans and encouraging the flow of investment capital. Given the relatively high level of labor costs (compared to other Caribbean countries), Seaga's program is not likely to lead to any massive influx of capital. Attempts by Seaga to hold labor demands down will inevitably lead to a new round of class conflict and political unrest. In the Dominican Republic, the social democratic Guzmán regime appears to be willing to sacrifice mass demands rather than alienate international capital. As a consequence, Guzmán has alienated substantial sectors of his original electoral constituency and has divided his own party, the RDP (Revolutionary Democratic Party). The possibilities and limitations of social democracy are thus clearly spelled out in the Caribbean—a powerful movement in opposition, an ambiguous and ultimately weak and ineffective force for implementing popular reforms. It remains to be seen whether the more radical, mass-based, single-party system in Grenada will be more successful in realizing what its predecessors have thus far failed to accomplish.

Conclusion

Centrist political forces are in retreat everywhere in Latin America. Reagan's policy (unlike Carter's) is no longer to

promote center-right, civilian-military alliances, but to strengthen the repressive side of the military, capitalist, U.S. big-business right-wing in any emerging confrontation with the burgeoning popular movement. This means closer relations between Washington and (1) Pinochet in Chile, (2) Viola in Argentina, (3) Meza (or Banzer) in Bolivia, (4) and the whole gamut of political thugs and generals in Central America.

Inevitably, the principal "losers" in this shift are the Christian Democrats in Chile, the Paz Estenssoro and Siles Suazo forces in Bolivia, the APRA (Villanueva faction) in Peru, the AD (Acción Democrática) in Venezuela. The result will be that some sectors of the civilian center-right will move further to the right and tacitly or overtly collaborate if they are accepted, while other centrist sectors may be forced to join broad leftist coalitions as in El Salvador and Guatemala. The emerging U.S. Big Push to the right could polarize a wide array of forces toward broad left coalitions of an extra-parliamentary nature (given the absence of any meaningful electoral framework), if the left is tactically flexible and takes the initiative in organizing the basic forms of mass mobilization as has taken place in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru, and with the Brazilian Workers Party. The ineffectiveness of Peruvian Trotskyism stems from its blind sectarianism; its political demise (from 12 percent of the electorate to less than 2 percent in two years) is a good object lesson for the Latin American left. Equally disastrous has been the Chilean Communist Party's tailing of the Christian Democratic Party, which has resulted in very few demonstrable gains for the mass movement and a veritable political paralysis of the opposition, while the Christian Democrats debate whether to become the loyal opposition of the Pinochet dictatorship.

Along with the Reagan administration's polarization of Latin America, we can expect several other lines of cleavage: increasing conflicts between Social Democrats (inside and outside of Latin America) and Washington policy-makers, though these divisions will not necessarily spill over into an international confrontation. The Europeans are too fearful and prudent, too tied to U.S. military strategy, and too enmeshed in a multiplicity of economic relations to risk any consequential

conflicts with the United States over Latin America. Intra-regional conflicts involving Mexico, Brazil, and the United States are also likely. Tensions already exist over U.S. efforts to reestablish client regimes in Central America, thus reducing the influence of Mexico in the region to zero and surrounding it with regimes hostile to any expression of political independence. The attempt by the Mexican national state bourgeoisie to expand and diversify its economic relations comes into conflict with Reagan's policy of monopolizing and dictating Mexico's energy policy as embodied in his "common market" scheme. Notwithstanding these external conflicts with the United States, the underlying tensions in Brazil—fueled by triple-digit inflation, economic decline, astronomical debt payments and an impending austerity program—may force the Brazilian bourgeoisie to shift toward nationalist or ultra-rightist policies, including closer links with Washington. In Mexico, the oil boom is exacerbating inequalities (opulence and misery) and could detonate a new wave of class discontent with consequences similar to Brazil. The ambiguity regarding possible responses by the "middle class" (petty and middle-bourgeois classes) to a deepening crisis reflects the importance of the changing political context in shaping its response: if, in the unfolding crisis, the bourgeoisie possesses the capacity to hegemonize the opposition, it may decide to ride the horse of popular-nationalism. If it perceives that it is being overtaken by events—including a mass opposition led by a workers' movement, it may withdraw its support and turn toward a variant of military nationalism.

Yet in the coming period, the possibility of "negotiated transition" from military to parliamentary regime is each day more remote. The Reagan administration has definitely buried the Carter idea of promoting conservative civilian-military regimes. Changes in the near future will be the consequence of mass mobilization and prolonged class struggle in which the revolutionary left will (or should) be in the forefront of the movement for democratic rights as the center forces fragment toward both the right and left.

The Reagan administration has inherited from the Carter policy in El Salvador the policy instruments of repression and alliance with the far-right to block a popular revolution.

Reagan will eventually drop the reformist rhetoric and simply defend U.S. economic interests, though it will be larded heavily with security and anti-communist rhetoric. The emerging class struggle in Latin America generated by the free market policies which preceded Reagan, the growing banking and corporate stake in Latin America, and the strong push to capture new markets all point to confrontational politics: the U.S. government and the corporate-backed military dictatorship on one side and the mobilized workers, peasants, students, professionals, and salaried employees on the other.

Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America

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PREFACE

Any formulation of U.S. foreign policy for Latin America and the Caribbean would be incomplete without in-depth analysis of Cuba's role in the region. Some of Cuba's international activities have received publicity and attention, but much has taken place out of the public view. While understanding the full range of Cuba's activities abroad is obviously essential for governments engaged in foreign policy planning, the general public is often uninformed about the nature and extent of Cuba's involvement in other countries. This study of Cuban activities in Latin America and the Caribbean is being issued in the interest of contributing to better public understanding of U.S. foreign policy and developments in the region.

The focus of this study is Cuba's activities in the Americas. It does not attempt to give a description of conditions in the countries in which Cuba is active or to analyze why violent groups develop, but instead examines the degree to which Cuba is directly engaged in efforts to destabilize its neighbors by promoting armed opposition movements. Cuba is clearly not the sole source of violence and instability in the region, but Cuban activities militarize and internationalize what would otherwise be local conflicts. In a region whose primary needs are for economic development, social equity, and greater democracy, Cuba is compounding existing problems by encouraging armed insurrection.

This report describes Cuban activities that are either publicly known or can be revealed without jeopardizing intelligence sources and methods. Cuban involvement is not limited to the examples contained in this study.

SUMMARY

A country-by-country examination of Cuba's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean makes clear that Cuba has renewed its campaign of the 1960s to promote armed insurgencies. In particular, Cuba has stepped up efforts to stimulate violence and destabilize its neighbors, turning away from its earlier policy of strengthening normal diplomatic relations in the hemisphere.

Since 1978, Cuba has:

- Worked to unite traditionally splintered radical groups behind a commitment to armed struggle with Cuban advice and material assistance;
- Trained ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural guerrilla warfare;
- Supplied or arranged for the supply of weapons to support the Cuban-trained cadres' efforts to assume power by force;
- Encouraged terrorism in the hope of provoking indiscriminate violence and repression, in order to weaken government legitimacy and attract new converts to armed struggle; and
- Used military aid and advisers to gain influence over guerrilla fronts and radical governments through armed pro-Cuban Marxists.

Unlike Che Guevara's attempts during the 1960s, Cuban subversion today is backed by an extensive secret intelligence and training apparatus, modern military forces, and a large and sophisticated propaganda network. Utilizing agents and contacts nurtured over more than 20 years, the Castro government is providing ideological and military training and material and propaganda support to numerous violent groups, often several in one country.

Cuba is most active in Central America, where its immediate goals are to exploit and control the revolution in Nicaragua and to induce the overthrow of the Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. At the same time, Cuba is working to destabilize governments elsewhere in the hemisphere. Cuba provides advice, safehaven, communications, training, and some financial support to several violent South American organizations. In the Caribbean, Cuban interference in the post-election period has been blunted in Jamaica, but Grenada has become a virtual Cuban client.

Cuba's new drive to promote armed insurgency does not discriminate between democracies and dictatorships. And attempts by Cuba to destabilize governments occur in spite of the existence of diplomatic ties.

This long-range campaign is directed by the Cuban Communist Party, which oversees farflung operations that include secret training camps in Cuba, intelligence officers abroad, training programs for select foreign students, networks for covert movement of personnel and material between Cuba and abroad, and propaganda support.

Cuba's enormous investment of energy, money, and agents in this campaign would not be possible without Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now totaling over \$8 million a day, enables Cuba to maintain the best equipped and largest per capita military forces in Latin America and to channel substantial resources abroad. In return, Cuba usually is careful not to jeopardize ongoing government relationships in Latin America important to the Soviet Union.

The scope of Cuba's activities in the hemisphere has prevented Cuba from always keeping covert operations hidden. For instance, during 1981 alone:

- In Nicaragua, Cuba has quietly increased its presence to 5,000 personnel, including more than 1,500 security and military advisers.

- In El Salvador, Cuba's key role in arming the Salvadoran guerrillas was exposed and Castro admitted supplying arms.

- In Costa Rica, a Special Legislative Commission documented Cuba's role in establishing an arms supply network during the Nicaraguan civil war and found the network was later used to supply Salvadoran insurgents.

- In Colombia, Cuba was discovered to have trained guerrillas attempting to establish a "people's army."

Cuba's new policies abroad and its reaction to emigration pressures at home have reversed the trend in Latin America toward normalization of relations with Cuba. During the last 2 years, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Jamaica suspended or broke relations with Cuba. Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador withdrew their ambassadors from Havana.

Cuban intervention is, of course, not the sole source of instability. The origins of occasional violent conflict in Latin America lie in historical social and economic inequities which have generated frustrations among a number of people. Sustained economic growth over the past 20 years and resilient national institutions, however, have limited the appeal of radical groups. But in some countries, particularly the small nations of Central America, dislocations resulting from rapid growth compounded existing tensions, leading to the emergence in several countries of radical movements, which often originated with frustrated elements of the middle class. Subsequent economic reversals have subjected already weak institutions to additional stress, making these countries more vulnerable to the appeals of radical groups backed by Cuba.

Cuba is quick to exploit legitimate grievances for its own ends. But its strategy of armed struggle is not based on appeals to the "people." Instead, Cuba concentrates on developing self-proclaimed "vanguards" committed to violent action. Revolutions, according to this approach, are made by armed revolutionaries.

Cuba's readiness to train, equip, and advise those who opt for violent solutions imposes obstacles to economic progress, democratic development, and self-determination in countries faced with growing economic difficulties. The spiraling cycle of violence and counter-violence which is central to Cuba's policy only exacerbates the suffering of ordinary people and makes necessary adjustments more difficult.

Cuba's renewed campaign of violence is of great concern to many countries, including the United States. Cuba should not escape responsibility for its actions. Exposing Cuba's efforts to promote armed struggle will increase the costs to Cuba of its intervention.

I. POLICIES

When it first came to power, the Castro regime had its own theory of how to spread revolution: to reproduce elsewhere the rural-based guerrilla warfare experience of Castro's 26th of July Movement in Cuba. In Che Guevara's words, the Andes would become the Sierra Maestra of South America.

Initial attempts to repeat Cuba's revolution elsewhere failed decisively. During the late 1960s, the Castro regime gradually reined in its zealots. Without abandoning its ideology or its ties to radical states and movements, Cuba began to pursue normal government-to-government relations in the hemisphere. By the mid-1970s Cuba's isolation in the Americas eased, and full diplomatic or consular relations were reestablished with a number of countries.

But diplomacy proved unable to satisfy the Castro government's ambitions. First in Africa and now in Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuba's policy has again shifted to reemphasize intervention.

On July 26, 1980, Fidel Castro declared that the experiences of Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, and Bolivia teach us that there is no other way than revolution, that there is no other "formula" than "revolutionary armed struggle." Castro's statement was an attempt to justify publicly what Cuban agents had been doing secretly since 1978: stepping up support for armed insurgency in neighboring countries.

This study traces the development of this latest phase in Cuba's foreign policy.

Early Failures. The original Cuban theory held that a continental Marxist revolution could be achieved by establishing armed focal points (*focos*) in several countries. Operating in rural areas, small bands of guerrillas could initiate struggles that would spread throughout the continent.

In 1959, Castro aided armed expeditions against Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. During the early and mid-1960s, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia all faced serious Cuban-backed attempts to develop guerrilla *focos*.

In seeking indigenous groups with which to cooperate, the Cubans rejected the orthodox Latin American Communist parties, which they regarded as ineffectual. Instead, they lent their support to more militant groups dedicated to armed violence even when their Marxism was not fully articulated.

The Soviet Union was suspicious of Cuba's policy of inciting armed violence, preferring to work through established Moscow-line Communist parties. Disagreement over this issue was a serious point of friction for several years. Cuba denounced the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as a fraud, arguing that it implicitly undercut the legitimacy of aiding "national liberation" struggles. At the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, Cuba sought to enlist North Vietnam and North Korea and create a more aggressive revolutionary internationalism.

None of the Latin American insurgencies fomented by Havana, however, aroused much popular support. The most severe blow to Cuba's policy during this period came in Bolivia in 1967, when Che Guevara's guerrilla band was opposed by both the peasantry and the Bolivian Communist Party.

After this maverick approach failed to establish a continental revolution, Cuban foreign policy moved into closer conformity with that of the Soviet Union. Castro endorsed the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and accepted Soviet views on East-West relations. Within the hemisphere, Cuba generally conformed to the Soviet approach of fostering state-to-state relations with several Latin American countries.

The Turn to Africa. In the mid-1970s, Cuba renewed its penchant for direct intervention, not in Latin America but in Africa.¹

- In Angola, 20,000 Cuban troops, supported by Soviet logistics and materiel, assured the supremacy of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which had the strongest ties to Moscow of the three movements competing for power after Portugal's withdrawal.

- In Ethiopia, the integration of Soviet and Cuban operations was even more complete, with the Soviets providing overall command and control, materiel, and transport for 13-15,000 Cuban troops fighting against Somali forces.

¹Cuba's military and political activities in Africa are intense and widening. Cuba still maintains expeditionary forces of at least 15-19,000 in Angola and 11-15,000 in Ethiopia. Cuba has military and security adviser contingents in a number of other African countries and in South Yemen.

The Moscow-Havana Axis. These African operations gave evidence of Cuba's military value to the Soviet Union. In areas of the Third World where the Soviets were under constraints not binding on Cuba, Havana could portray its actions as an outgrowth of its own foreign policy of support for "national liberation movements."

Cuba's extensive and costly activities overseas would have been impossible, however, without Soviet aid. The Cuban armed forces, some 225,000 strong, with new sophisticated weaponry from the Soviet Union, became a formidable offensive military machine. Soviet aid and subsidies to the Cuban economy have climbed to more than \$3 billion annually or about one-fourth of Cuba's gross national product. In December 1979, at a time when Soviet oil deliveries to Eastern Europe were being cut back and prices raised, Castro announced that the Soviet Union had guaranteed Cuba's oil needs through 1985 at a price roughly one-third that of the world market. The Soviet Union also pays up to four and five times the world price for Cuban sugar.²

In return, Cuba champions the notion of a "natural alliance" between the Soviet bloc and the Third World in the nonaligned movement. At the Cuban Communist Party Congress in December 1980, Castro explicitly endorsed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and defended the Soviet "right" to intervene in Poland. He also reiterated that Cuba is irrevocably committed to communism and to supporting "national liberation" struggles around the world.

Cuba's policies abroad are thus linked to its relationship to the Soviet Union. By intervening in behalf of armed struggle in Latin America, Cuba injects East-West dimensions into local conflicts.

²According to the World Bank, Cuba's per capita annual growth rate averaged minus 1.2% during the period 1960-78. Cuban economic performance ranked in the lowest 5% worldwide and was the worst of all socialist countries. Only massive infusions of Soviet aid have kept consumption levels from plummeting. Cuba today depends more heavily on sugar than before 1969. The industrial sector has been plagued by mismanagement, absenteeism, and serious shortages in capital goods and foreign exchange. The economic picture is so bleak that in 1979, and again in October 1981, the Cuban leadership had to warn that 10-20 more years of sacrifice lie ahead.

II. METHODS

Even when pursuing an open policy in the 1970s of establishing normal diplomatic relations with a number of Latin American countries, Cuba retained its clandestine ties with remnants of the insurgents and other pro-Cuban elements in Latin America, providing asylum, propaganda, some training, and other support. Between 1970 and 1973, Cuba's security services moved arms and agents into Chile. At the same time, Cubans helped organize President Allende's personal security and trained many leaders of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left.

Cuba's renewed campaign to promote insurgencies draws on these contacts and experiences and combines several different elements.

Sophisticated Strategy. Learning from Che Guevara's failure in Bolivia, Cuban doctrine now emphasizes the need to enlist support for armed struggle through advanced training of local guerrilla cadres, sustained aid and advice, and extensive propaganda activities. The *foco* approach of the 1960s—when a Cuban-sponsored team in the field was considered enough to spark insurrection—has given way to a more sophisticated strategy involving extensive commitments and risks.

Soviet Support. A major difference from the 1960s is that, instead of throwing up obstacles, the Soviet Union generally has backed Cuban efforts to incorporate nondeterrable groups into broad political-military fronts dedicated to armed struggle. Particularly in Central America, Soviet ties to local Communist parties and bloc relationships have been used to favor insurrectionary violence. For example, a senior Soviet Communist Party functionary traveled to Panama in August 1981 to discuss strategy for Central America with Cuban officials and leaders of Central American Communist parties. The Soviet Union has also used its extensive propaganda network selectively to discredit governments and build support for armed opposition groups.

Allowing Havana to take the lead in the hemisphere enables Moscow to maintain a low profile and cultivate state-to-state relations and economic ties with major countries like Brazil and Argentina.

Cuba, in turn, is generally cautious not to undercut the Soviet Union where the Soviets have established valued relationships. In Peru, for example, Cuba has been careful to exercise restraint to avoid prejudicing the status of the 300 Soviet officials there or jeopardizing the Soviet Union's arms supply arrangement.

Central Control. Most of the covert operations in support of this strategy are planned and coordinated by the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party, headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada. The America Department emerged in 1974 to centralize operational control of Cuba's covert activities. The department brings together the expertise of the Cuban military and the General Directorate of Intelligence into a farflung operation that includes secret training camps in Cuba, networks for covert movement of personnel and materiel between Cuba and abroad, and sophisticated propaganda support.

Agents of the America Department are present in every Cuban diplomatic mission in Latin America and the Caribbean—in at least five recent instances in the person of the ambassador or charge d'affaires. America Department officials frequently serve as employees of Cuba's official press agency, Prensa Latina, of Cubana Airlines, the Cuban Institute of Friendship with People, and other apparently benign organizations. When too great an identification with Cuba proves counterproductive, Cuban intelligence officers work through front groups, preferably those with non-Cuban leadership.³

Cuban military intelligence personnel selected for clandestine operations in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East go through an elaborate training program conducted by Cuban, Soviet, East German, and Czech instructors in Havana, with special sessions in surrounding cities. In addition to the language and customs of the area to which they are assigned, and typical intelligence operations such as infiltration procedures and photography techniques, the Cubans are instructed in handling explosives. To disguise their true occupation, the intelligence agents are also instructed in civilian skills such as automotive mechanics, carpentry, and heavy equipment operation.

³Cuba maintains some front organizations set up in the 1960s. One of these, the Continental Organization of Latin American Students, still holds irregular congresses of student leaders from Latin America and the Caribbean (the most recent in Havana in August 1981) and publishes a monthly journal distributed by the Cuban Government.

Armed Struggle. The new Cuban offensive relies heavily on violence. In outline, Cuba's strategy is to:

- Unite traditionally splintered radical groups behind a commitment to armed struggle with Cuban advice and material assistance;
- Train ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural guerrilla warfare;
- Supply or arrange for the supply of weapons to support the Cuban-trained cadres' efforts to assume power by force;
- Encourage terrorism in the hope of provoking indiscriminate violence and repression and generalized disorder in order to weaken government legitimacy and attract new converts to armed struggle; and
- Use military aid and advisers to gain influence over guerrilla fronts and radical governments through armed pro-Cuban Marxists.

The application of this strategy is demonstrated in detail in the case studies that follow. It should be noted, however, that Cuba sometimes emphasizes certain tactics over others. In pursuing its long-term strategy, Cuba concentrates initially on building a network of loyal cadres. When local extremist groups are not capable of or committed to armed struggle, Cuba generally draws on them in support of active insurgencies elsewhere while developing their capacity and willingness for agitation in their homeland. In addition, foreign policy concerns may deter Cuba from promoting armed struggle in a particular country. For example, Cuba attempts to avoid activities which could jeopardize its relations with the Mexican Government since Castro seeks Mexico's support to avoid isolation in the hemisphere.⁴

Propaganda. Cuba's extensive cultural exchange and propaganda activities are tailored to support covert operations and elicit support for armed

struggle.⁵ For example, during the past year, Cubans have used Mexico as a base for coordination of propaganda on behalf of insurgents in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. Radio Havana and other Cuban media recently have publicized statements by Chilean Communist Party leaders urging unity of the Chilean left and calling for armed action to topple Chile's government. Radio Havana has directed broadcasts to Paraguay urging the overthrow of the Paraguayan Government.

Sports competitions, youth and cultural festivals, and special scholarships to Cuba provide channels to identify potential agents for intelligence and propaganda operations. In Ecuador, Cuban Embassy officers in Quito used their ties with Ecuadorian students to try to orchestrate pro-Cuba demonstrations when the Government of Ecuador threatened to suspend relations after Cuba's forcible and unauthorized occupation in February 1981 of the Ecuadorian Embassy in Havana, following its seizure by a group of Cubans seeking to leave Cuba.

Military Training. Witnesses and former trainees have described several camps in Cuba dedicated specifically to military training, including one in Pinar del Rio Province and another near Guanabo, east of Havana. The camps can accommodate several hundred trainees. Groups from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia, Grenada, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Chile, and Uruguay have been trained in

⁴Prensa Latina, the press agency of the Cuban Government, has field offices in 35 countries, including 11 Latin American and Caribbean countries, and combines news gathering and propaganda dissemination with intelligence operations. Radio Havana, Cuba's shortwave broadcasting service, transmits more than 260 program hours per week in eight languages to all points of the world. Cuba also transmits nightly mediumwave Spanish-language broadcasts over "La Voz de Cuba," a network of high-powered transmitters located in different parts of Cuba. In the Caribbean alone, Radio Havana's weekly broadcasts include 14 hours in Creole to Haiti; 60 hours in English; 3 hours in French; and 125 hours in Spanish. Prensa Latina and Radio Havana, in close coordination with TASS and Radio Moscow, regularly use disinformation to distort news reports transmitted to the region, especially those concerning places where Cuban covert activities are most intense.

these facilities during the past 2 years.⁶

Recruits are normally provided false documentation (sometimes Cuban passports) by Cuban agents in third countries and are flown to Cuba on civil aircraft under cover as "students" or other occupations. Panama has been used as a regular transit point for Central and South Americans to and from military training in Cuba.⁷

Once in Cuba, trainees generally are taken immediately to the guerrilla training camps where they usually are grouped according to nationality and the organization for which they are being trained in order to promote a sense of cohesiveness and esprit de corps.

Training normally lasts 3-6 months and consists of instruction by Cuban cadres in sabotage, explosives, military tactics, and weapons use. Although military training is frequently tied closely to operational requirements—the M-19 guerrillas who landed in Colombia in early 1981 did so immediately upon completion of their military instruction in Cuba—witnesses report that political indoctrination is also included in the curriculum.

Many Cuban instructors are active military officers and veterans of Cuban expeditionary forces in Africa. Soviet personnel have been reported at these camps, but they apparently do not participate directly in the guerrilla training.

Political Training. Each year Cuba offers hundreds of scholarships to foreign students. All Cuban mass organizations operate schools in organizational

work and indoctrination open to carefully selected foreign students.⁸ In addition, some 11,000 non-Cuban secondary school students, mostly teenagers, were enrolled in 1980 in 15 schools on the Isle of Youth alone. Cuba does not publicize complete foreign enrollment statistics nor does it release the names of those trained. From the eastern Caribbean alone, close to 300 students are currently in Cuba studying technical and academic subjects. The study of Marxism-Leninism is compulsory in many courses, and military affairs is compulsory in some. When governments have turned down Cuban scholarship offers, as occurred recently in Belize and Dominica, Cuba has gone ahead and concluded private agreements. Local Marxist-Leninist groups with ties to Cuba play a major role in selecting those students who receive scholarships.

In sum, the infrastructure for Cuba's intensified revolutionary agitation in Latin America is a multifaceted yet carefully coordinated mechanism. The Cuban Communist Party, through its America Department, provides cohesion and direction to a complex network that consists of intelligence officers, elements of Cuba's foreign ministry, armed forces, mass organizations, commercial and cultural entities, and front groups.

This extensive apparatus is designed to support one objective: a systematic, long-range campaign to destabilize governments.

⁶Courses in agitation and propaganda open to foreigners include the Central Union of Cuban Workers' Lázaro Peña Trade Union Cadre School and similar courses run by the Union of Young Communists, the Cuban Women's Federation, the National Association of Small Farmers, and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Even the Cuban Communist Party offers special courses for non-Cubans in party provincial schools and in the Nico Lopez National Training School, its highest educational institution. The Cuban press reported graduation ceremonies July 17, 1981, for this year's 70 Cuban graduates and announced that 69 foreigners had also attended advanced courses at the Nico Lopez school. Foreign students represented political organizations from Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Chile, Grenada, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Sao Tome y Principe, and South Yemen. Official Cuban Communist Party newspaper *Granma* labeled their presence "a beautiful example of proletarian internationalism." Courses of instruction at the Nico Lopez school, which is chaired by senior party leaders, include "political training for journalists," "political training for propagandists," economics, and ideology.

III. CASE STUDIES

The Cuban activities described in the case studies which follow must be considered to understand developments within the countries in question. However, the focus of the case studies is Cuban involvement in each country. Readers should, therefore, guard against assuming that the cases below provide a comprehensive picture of the general situation in the country where the events described have taken place.

Central America

Nicaragua. In July 1979, internal and external factors converged to bring about the triumph of the anti-Somoza insurrection and the subsequent domination of the new Nicaraguan Government by the Cuban-trained leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). These events provided a key test for Cuba's new mechanisms and strategy for promoting armed pro-Cuban movements in this hemisphere.

Opposition to Somoza's authoritarian rule in the late 1970s was widespread. The 1978 killing of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, publisher of Nicaragua's most respected newspaper, *La Prensa*, converted many Nicaraguans to the armed opposition of which the FSLN was the core; FSLN assurances on democracy and pluralism were accepted by newly allied political moderates and private businessmen. Internationally, sympathy for the struggle against Somoza led Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica to aid the insurgents, while Somoza stood practically without friends.

This environment enabled Cuba to disguise the extent of its support for the FSLN and avoid disrupting the fragile alliances between the FSLN and other opponents of Somoza. Behind the scenes, Cuba played an active role in organizing the FSLN and in training and equipping it militarily.

Cuba had provided some training and arms to the FSLN in the early 1960s. Until late 1977, however, Cuban support consisted mainly of propaganda and safehaven.

In 1977 and early 1978, a high-ranking America Department official, Armando Ulises Estrada,⁹ made

⁹Ulises Estrada was given his first ambassadorial post in Jamaica following the July 1979 victory of anti-Somoza forces (see Jamaica case study). He is currently Cuba's ambassador to South Yemen.

⁶Latin Americans are not the only trainees. In a May 1978 Reuters interview published in Beirut, Abu Khalaf, a leader of the military branch of Al Fatah, confirmed that Palestinian agents have received training in Cuba since the late 1960s. Palestinian organizations, with Cuban assistance, have reciprocated by training various Latin American groups in the Middle East. *Lillya*, which hosted a meeting of Latin American "liberation movements" January 25-February 1, 1979, also has trained some Latin American extremists.

⁷Public exposure in March 1981 of the use of Panama as a transit point for Colombian guerrillas trained in Cuba led to sharp criticism of Cuba by the Panamanian Government. Panama imposed greater controls on activities of exiled Central and South Americans, and the transit of guerrillas through Panama appears to have ceased, at least temporarily.

numerous secret trips to facilitate the uprising by working to unify the three major factions of the FSLN. Stepped-up Cuban support to the Sandinistas was conditioned on effective unity. During the XI World Youth Festival in Havana in late July 1978, the Cubans announced that the unification of the three factions had been achieved and urged Latin American radicals present at the meeting to demonstrate solidarity with the FSLN by staging operations in their own countries.

At the same time, Estrada concentrated on building a supply network for channeling arms and other supplies to guerrilla forces. International sympathy for the struggle against Somoza provided a convenient facade for Cuban operations.¹⁹ In preparation for the first FSLN offensive in the fall of 1978, arms were flown from Cuba to Panama, transhipped to Costa Rica on smaller planes, and supplied to Nicaraguan guerrillas based in northern Costa Rica. To monitor and assist the flow, the America Department established a secret operations center in San Jose. By the end of 1978, Cuban advisers were dispatched to northern Costa Rica to train and equip the FSLN forces with arms which began to arrive direct from Cuba. FSLN guerrillas trained in Cuba, however, continued to return to Nicaragua via Panama.

In early 1979, Cuba helped organize, arm, and transport an "internationalist brigade" to fight alongside FSLN guerrillas. Members were drawn from several Central and South American extremist groups, many of them experienced in terrorist activities. Castro also dispatched Cuban military specialists to the field to help coordinate the war efforts. Factionalism threatened Sandinista unity again in early 1979, and Castro met personally with leaders of three FSLN factions to hammer out a renewed unity pact.

When the insurgents' final offensive was launched in mid-1979, Cuban military advisers from the Department of Special Operations, a special military unit, were with FSLN columns and maintained direct radio communications to Havana. A number of Cuban advisers were wounded in combat and were evacuated to Cuba via Panama.

The operations center run by the America Department in San Jose was the focal point for coordination of Cuba's support. After the triumph of the anti-Somoza forces in July 1979, the chief of

the center, Julian Lopez Diaz, became Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua. One of his America Department assistants in San Jose, Andres Barahona, was redocumented as a Nicaraguan citizen and became a top official of the Nicaraguan intelligence service.

Castro has counseled the Sandinistas to protect their Western ties to keep the country afloat economically. But to insure that the FSLN could move to dominate the Nicaraguan Government, Cuba has acted quickly to build up Sandinista military and security forces.

Since July 1979, Cuba has provided substantial military, technical, and political assistance. Some 5,000 Cuban advisers, teachers, and medical personnel work at all levels of the military and civilian infrastructures.²⁰ Of this number, more than 1,500 military and security advisers are actively providing military instruction and combat training; instruction in intelligence and counter-intelligence activities; instruction on security protection for the FSLN leadership; and advice on organization of the Nicaraguan police force. In addition, Nicaragua has received within the past year approximately \$28 million worth of military equipment from the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and Cuba. This has included tanks, light aircraft, helicopters, heavy artillery, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft weapons, hundreds of military transport vehicles, as well as tons of small arms and ammunition.

Cuba presently is using Nicaraguan territory to provide training and other facilities to guerrillas active in neighboring countries. The Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua and other America Department officials frequently meet with Central American guerrillas in Managua to advise them on tactics and strategy. Individual Sandinista leaders have participated in such meetings and have met independently with Guatemalan and Salvadoran insurgents. The FSLN also

has cooperated in a joint effort by Cuba and Palestinian groups to provide military training in the Mideast to selected Latin American extremists. Some Sandinistas were themselves trained by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which maintains an embassy in Nicaragua.

Between October 1980 and February 1981, Nicaragua was the staging site for a massive Cuban-directed flow of arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. Arms destined for Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas continue to pass through Nicaragua.

El Salvador. Before 1979, Cuban support to Salvadoran radicals involved training small numbers of guerrillas, providing modest financial aid, and serving as a political conduit between Salvadoran extremists and Communists outside the hemisphere.

During the Nicaraguan civil war, Cuba concentrated on support for the FSLN. After the fall of Somoza, Cuba began intense efforts to help pro-Cuban guerrillas come to power in El Salvador. When a reform-minded, civil-military government was established in October 1979, Cuba's first priority was to tighten the political organization and unity of El Salvador's fragmented violent left. At first, arms shipments and other aid from Cuba were kept low as the Cubans insisted on a unified strategy as the price of increased material support. To forge unity, Cuba sponsored a December 1979 meeting in Havana that resulted in an initial unity agreement among the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), and the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), which had itself formed an armistice with Cuban and Soviet interests. In late May 1980, after more negotiations in Havana, the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) was admitted into the guerrilla coalition.

The new combined military command assumed the name of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU). During this period, Cuba also coordinated the development of clandestine support networks in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, sometimes using arms supply mechanisms established during the Nicaraguan civil war.

With unified tactics and operations now possible, Cuba began to assist the guerrillas in formulating military strategy. Cuban specialists helped the DRU devise initial war plans in the summer of 1980. The Cubans influenced the guerrillas to launch a general offensive in January 1981. After the offensive failed, guerrilla leaders traveled to Havana in February 1981 to finalize a

²⁰The very quantity of Cuban advisers has caused resentment among nationalist Nicaraguans, leading to sporadic outbursts of anti-Cuban feelings. On June 3, 1981, the FSLN announced that 2,000 Cuban primary school teachers presently in Nicaragua would return to Cuba in July, at the mid-point of Nicaragua's academic year. The Nicaraguan Education Minister announced on June 18 that 800 of those departing would return in September after vacations in Cuba, while Cuba would replace the other 1,200 teachers in February. By November 1981, however, all 2,000 Cuban teachers had returned to Nicaragua.

strategy to "improve our internal military situation" by engaging in a "negotiating maneuver" to gain time to regroup.¹¹

Cuba provided few weapons and ammunition to Salvadoran guerrillas from its own resources but played a key role in coordinating the acquisition and delivery of arms from Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Eastern Europe through Nicaragua.¹² After the unmasking of this network, Cuba and Nicaragua reduced the flow in March and early April. Prior to a guerrilla offensive in August an upswing in deliveries occurred. The arms flow continues via clandestine surface and air routes. In addition, the Cubans over the past year have established a network of small ships to deliver arms to Salvadoran insurgent groups.

Cuba also assists the Salvadoran guerrillas in contacts with Arab radical states and movements to arrange military training and financing for arms acquisitions. In September 1980, Cuba laundered \$500,000 in Iraqi funds for the Salvadoran insurgents. In March 1981, the Salvadoran Communist Party Secretary General, Shafik Handal, visited Lebanon and Syria to meet with Palestinian leaders. Cuba also coordinates the training of a relatively small number of Salvadoran guerrillas in Palestinian camps in the Mideast.

Cuban training of Salvadoran guerrillas increased sharply in 1980 as Cuba concentrated on building a trained army able to mount major offensives. A typical 3-month training program included courses in guerrilla tactics; marksmanship and weapons use; field engineering; demolition; fortification construction; land navigation; use of artillery and mines. One observer reported seeing groups up to battalion size (250-500 men) under instruction, sug-

gesting that some guerrillas trained as integral units.¹³

Cuba has provided selected guerrillas more intensive training on specialized subjects. A former FPL guerrilla who defected in fall 1981 reported that during 1980 he had received 7 months of military training in Cuba, including instruction in scuba diving and underwater demolition. Soviet scuba equipment was used. The group trained as frogmen called themselves "combat swimmers" and were told that their mission was to destroy dams, bridges, port facilities, and boats.

Cuba also gives political, organizational, and propaganda support to the guerrillas. Cuban diplomatic facilities worldwide help guerrilla front groups with travel arrangements and contacts. The Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina, has handled communications for guerrilla representation abroad. Cuba and the Soviet Union have pressed Communist parties and radical groups to support the insurgency directly, and through solidarity organizations with propaganda and facilities (office space, equipment, etc.).

The Salvadoran insurgents have publicly stressed the importance of solidarity groups. A member of the FPL, Oscar Bonilla, who attended the Fourth Consultative Meeting in Havana of the Continental Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE), a Cuban front group, told Radio Havana in August 1981 that OCLAE "has been the most important means of solidarity of all the peoples and has gotten us ready to form an anti-interventionist student front in El Salvador, Central America and the Caribbean. . . . We believe that it is good to carry out immediate plans for actions which will permit us to stop an imperialist intervention in El Salvador. In this respect, the students of Latin America will have to confront and attack U.S. interests so that the United States will see how the Latin American and Caribbean student movement responds to an aggression by imperialism in El Salvador."

With Soviet assistance, Cuba has orchestrated propaganda to distort the realities of the Salvadoran conflict. Unattributed foreign media placements and efforts to organize protests against the Salvadoran Government and U.S. policy, which have accompanied official propaganda, stress the theme of U.S. in-

tent to intervene militarily in El Salvador.

Unfounded claims and accusations originated by the Salvadoran guerrillas are routinely replayed to a regional and world audience by Cuba's Radio Havana or Prensa Latina, then echoed by the official Soviet Press Agency TASS, Radio Moscow, and Eastern European media. For example, a false report of a U.S. soldier killed in El Salvador that resounded widely in Cuban/Soviet propaganda during 1980 was traced finally to the Salvadoran Communist Party. This rumor was to support an even bigger lie: that hundreds of U.S. soldiers were in El Salvador, building U.S. bases, and herding peasants into Vietnam-style strategic hamlets.¹⁴

Guatemala. Castro has stepped up Cuba's support to Guatemalan guerrillas whom he has aided with arms and training since he came to power.

As elsewhere, Cuba has influenced divided extremist groups to unite and has conditioned increased Cuban aid on a commitment to armed struggle and a unified strategy. During 1980, discussions about a unity agreement were held among leaders of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), and the dissident faction of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT/D). At the invitation of Sandinista leaders, representatives of the four groups met in Managua under strict security to continue discussions. In November 1980, the four organizations signed a unity agreement in Managua to establish the National Revolutionary Union (with a revolutionary directorate called the General Revolutionary Command—CGR). Manuel Pineiro Losada, Chief of the America Department, and Ramiro Jesus Abreu Quintana, head of its Central American Division, represented Fidel Castro at the signing ceremony. Following the signing of the unity agreement, representatives of the CGR traveled to Havana to present the document to Castro. ORPA publicized the agreement in a communique issued

¹¹A guerrilla document outlining this strategy was found in Nicaragua in February 1981. Guerrilla representatives later confirmed its authenticity to Western Europeans with the disclaimer that the strategy elaborately developed in the paper had been rejected.

¹²The Cuban role as arms broker to the DRU since 1979 has been documented in the Department of State's Special Report No. 80, *Communist Interference in El Salvador*, February 23, 1981. In April 1981, when Socialist International representative Wachniewski confronted Castro with the evidence in the report, Castro admitted to him that Cuba had shipped arms to the guerrillas. In discussions with several Inter-Parliamentary Union delegations at the September 1981 IPU conference in Havana, Castro again conceded that Cuba had supplied arms.

¹³Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez tacitly admitted that Cuba was providing military training to Salvadoran guerrillas in an interview published in *Der Spiegel* on September 28, 1981.

¹⁴At the time these reports first appeared, the United States was providing neither arms nor ammunition to El Salvador. In January 1981, the United States responded to the Cuban-orchestrated general offensive by sending some military assistance and later sent American military trainers, whose number never exceeded 55. There are no U.S. combatants, bases, or strategic hamlets in El Salvador. TASS continues to report falsely that "hundreds" of U.S. military personnel are in El Salvador and participate in combat.

November 18, 1980. All parties agreed it was significant that the unity agreement was the first such document signed on Central American soil.

After this unity agreement was concluded, Cuba agreed to increase military training and assistance. A large number of the 2,000 or more guerrillas now active have trained in Cuba. Recent military training programs have included instruction in the use of heavy weapons.

During the past year, arms have been smuggled to Guatemala from Nicaragua passing overland through Honduras. The guerrilla arsenal now includes 50mm mortars, submachine guns, rocket launchers, and other weapons. Captured M-16 rifles have been traced to U.S. forces in Vietnam. On June 26, 1981, Paulino Castillo, a 28-year-old guerrilla with ORPA, told newsmen in Guatemala that he was part of a 23-man group of Guatemalans that underwent 7 months of training in Cuba, beginning around February 1980. His group was divided into sections for urban and rural combat training in explosives and firearms use. To get to Cuba, Castillo traveled to Costa Rica from Guatemala by public bus. In Costa Rica, a go-between obtained a Panamanian passport for Castillo to enter Panama. In Panama, other contacts equipped him with a Cuban passport and he continued on to Cuba. Castillo returned to Guatemala via Nicaragua to rejoin the guerrillas. He later surrendered to a Guatemalan army patrol.

Guatemalan guerrillas have collaborated with Salvadoran guerrillas. In January 1981, the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and the PGT/D circulated a joint bulletin announcing the intensification of their activities in support of the general offensive in El Salvador. The Salvadorans in turn have provided the Guatemalans with small quantities of arms.

Unity has not been fully achieved, as the four groups have not yet carried out plans to establish a political front group. The joint military strategy, however, is being implemented. The guerrillas have stepped up terrorist actions in an effort to provoke repression and destabilize the government. For example, the EGP took responsibility for placing a bomb in one of the pieces of luggage that was to have been loaded onto a U.S. Eastern Airlines plane on July 2. The bomb exploded before being loaded, killing a Guatemalan airport employee.

Costa Rica. Cuba took advantage of Costa Rica's strong popular and governmental opposition to Somoza's authoritarian government and of Costa Rica's open democratic society to estab-

lish and coordinate a covert support network for guerrilla operations elsewhere in Central America. The apparatus was established during the course of the Nicaraguan civil war and maintained clandestinely thereafter. Costa Rica was well disposed toward groups that opposed Somoza, including the Sandinista guerrillas. Aid provided by Panama and Venezuela was openly funneled through Costa Rica to the Nicaraguan rebels. Cuba, however, kept its role largely hidden.

A Special Legislative Commission established in June 1980 by the Costa Rican legislature revealed Cuba's extensive role in arming the Nicaraguan guerrillas. The commission determined that there were at least 21 flights carrying war materiel between Cuba and Llano Grande and Juan Santamaria Airports in Costa Rica.¹⁸

Costa Rican pilots who made these flights reported that Cubans frequently accompanied the shipments. Although Cubans were stationed at Llano Grande, their main operations center for coordinating logistics and contacts with the Sandinistas was set up secretly in San Jose and run by America Department official Lopez Diaz. The Special Legislative Commission estimated that a minimum of 1 million pounds of arms moved to Costa Rica from Cuba and elsewhere during the Nicaraguan civil war, including anti-aircraft machine-guns, rocket launchers, bazookas, and mortars. The commission also estimated that a substantial quantity of these weapons remained in Costa Rica after the fall of Somoza in July 1979.

The Special Legislative Commission concluded that after the Nicaraguan civil war had ended, "arms trafficking [began], originating in Costa Rica or through Costa Rican territory, toward El Salvador, indirectly or using Honduras as a bridge." Through 1980 and into 1981 traffic flowed intermittently through Costa Rica to El Salvador, directed clandestinely by the Cubans.

In the summer of 1979, the Cubans and their paid agent, Fernando Carrasco Illanes, a Chilean national residing in Costa Rica, along with several Costa Ricans previously involved in the logistics effort for the FSLN, agreed to continue smuggling arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. The Cubans arranged for acquisition of some of the arms and ammunition remaining in Costa Rica from the Nicaraguan airlift to supply the Salvadoran insurgents.

¹⁸The commission's report was issued May 14, 1981.

This new Cuban operation was coordinated from San Jose, first from their secret operations center, then later directly from the Cuban Consulate. The major coordinator, until his expulsion from Costa Rica in May 1981 following the break in consular relations between Costa Rica and Cuba, was Fernando Pascual Comas Perez of the America Department. Comas worked directly for Manuel Pineiro and had the cover title of Cuban Vice Consul in San Jose. Cuban agents made arrangements to store arms for transshipment to El Salvador and to help hundreds of Salvadoran guerrillas pass through Costa Rica in small groups on their way to training in Cuba. Cuban operations have been facilitated by Costa Rica's three Marxist-Leninist parties, which have provided funds, safehaven, transportation, and false documents.¹⁹

Terrorism had been virtually unknown in Costa Rica until March 1981 except for scattered incidents of largely foreign origin. The first Costa Rican terrorists made their appearance in March when they blew up a vehicle carrying a Costa Rican chauffeur and three Marine security guards from the U.S. Embassy in San Jose. In April, four terrorists from the same group were captured after machine-gunning a police vehicle. In June, the group murdered three policemen and a taxi driver. Costa Rican authorities have arrested some 20 accused terrorists and are continuing to investigate leads linking them to South American terrorist groups such as the Argentine Montoneros, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, and Colombia's M-19, and to Cuba itself. Two of the accused terrorists are known to have received training in the Soviet Union.

Director of the Judicial Investigation Organization Eduardo Aguilar Bloise told a press conference August 12 that captured terrorist documents indicated that two Costa Rican peasants had been given "ideological/military training" in

¹⁹In a recorded interview broadcast by Radio Havana on June 16, 1981, Eduardo Mora, Deputy Secretary General of Costa Rica's Popular Vanguard Party (the Moscow-line traditional Communist party, the least disposed to violence of the country's several Marxist parties and splinter groups) explained his party's position: "We establish ties with all revolutionary organizations in Central America. We have close ties and are willing to give all the aid we possibly can in accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism because we believe that the struggle of the Central American people is the struggle of our own people."

Cuba and returned to work in the Atlantic coastal zone of Costa Rica. The documents indicate that the two were in Cuba from 8 to 12 months—possibly in 1978—and were financed by the terrorist group known popularly in Costa Rica as "the family." Aguilar said he did not discount the possibility that others had been trained in Cuba.

Although most of Costa Rica's Marxist-Leninist parties have advocated a peaceful line in respect to Costa Rica, one group with close ties to Cuba—the Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRP)—while disavowing responsibility for terrorist acts, has spoken of them as "well intentioned." Some of the arrested terrorists are known to have belonged to the MRP at one time. On November 5, the Office of National Security announced the discovery of a terrorist cell clearly connected with the MRP. Among the arms and terrorist paraphernalia confiscated was an Uzi submachinegun with silencer. Earlier, the authorities had confiscated a "plan for Guanacaste" from an MRP official which noted such objectives as "prevent the electoral process from developing in a festive atmosphere" and "the taking of power by the armed people." The head of the MRP has traveled many times to Cuba, and Cuba has given training to other MRP leaders.

Honduras. Cuba provided para-military training to a small number of Hondurans in the early 1960s, but relations with Honduran radicals were strained until the late 1970s. Cuba then resumed military training for members of the Honduran Communist Party (PCH) and integrated them into the "internationalist brigade" fighting in the Nicaraguan civil war. After the war, PCH members returned to Cuba for additional training.

Since then Cuba has concentrated primarily on developing Honduras as a conduit for arms and other aid to guerrillas active elsewhere in Central America. In January 1981, Honduran officials discovered a large cache of concealed arms intended for Salvadoran guerrillas, which included M-16 rifles traced to Vietnam. Smuggled arms have continued to be intercepted.

While considering Honduras a useful support base for insurgencies elsewhere, Cuba is also working to develop the capacity for insurrection within Honduras. In the normal pattern, Havana has urged splintered extremist groups in Honduras to unify and embrace armed struggle. While holding back from levels of support given to Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas, Cuba has in-

creased its training of Honduran extremists in political organization and military operations. Cuba has also promised to provide Honduran guerrillas their own arms, including submachine-guns and rifles.

On November 27, Honduran authorities discovered a guerrilla safehouse on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa. Two guerrillas were killed in the resulting shoot-out, including a Uruguayan citizen. Nicaraguans as well as Hondurans were captured at the house, where a substantial arsenal of automatic weapons and explosives was seized. Incriminating documents, including notebooks which indicate recent attendance in training courses in Cuba, were also confiscated. One of those arrested, Jorge Pinel Betancourt, a 22-year-old Honduran, told reporters the group was headed for El Salvador to join Salvadoran guerrillas. Two additional guerrilla safehouses located in La Ceiba and San Pedro Sula were raided on November 29, and authorities seized sizable arms caches, explosives, and communications equipment. These arms may have been destined for use within Honduras.

The Caribbean

Jamaica. In the late 1970s, Jamaica became a special target for Cuba. Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials developed close relationships with important members of the People's National Party, which governed Jamaica from 1973 until 1980. Cuban security personnel trained Jamaican security officers in Cuba and Jamaica, including members of the security force of the office of the Prime Minister. Cuba also trained about 1,400 Jamaican youths in Cuba as construction workers through a "brigadista" program. Political indoctrination in Cuba formed part of this group's curriculum. A considerable number of these Jamaican youths received military training while in Cuba, including instruction in revolutionary tactics and use of arms.

During this same period, the Cuban diplomatic mission in Jamaica grew. Most of the embassy staff, including former Ambassador Ulises Estrada, were Cuban intelligence agents. Ulises Estrada, who had served as a deputy head of the America Department for 5 years, had a long history of involvement in political action activities and intelligence operations and went to Jamaica in July 1979, after playing a major role in Cuba's involvement in the Nicaraguan civil war.

Cuba was instrumental in smuggling arms and ammunition into Jamaica. A Cuban front corporation (Moonex International, registered in Lichtenstein, with subsidiaries in Panama and Jamaica) was discovered in May 1980 to be the designated recipient of a shipment of 200,000 shotgun shells and .38 caliber pistol ammunition shipped illegally to Jamaica from Miami. Jamaican authorities apprehended the local manager of the corporation, accompanied by the Jamaican Minister of National Security and Cuban Ambassador Estrada, as the manager was attempting to leave the country, in defiance of police instructions, on a private plane. The manager subsequently paid a fine of U.S. \$300,000 set by a Jamaican court.

In 1980, weapons were reported stockpiled in the Cuban Embassy for possible use by Jamaicans during the election campaign. M-16 rifles then appeared in Jamaica for the first time and were used in attacks against supporters of the opposition Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the security forces. Over 70 of these weapons have been found by Jamaican authorities. Some of the M-16s found in Jamaica have serial numbers in the same numerical series as captured M-16s shipped to Salvadoran guerrillas from Vietnam.

Ambassador Ulises Estrada was withdrawn from his post in November 1980, at the request of the newly elected JLP government. In January 1981, the Jamaican Government terminated the "brigadista" program and recalled Jamaican students remaining in Cuba under this program. The government decided to maintain diplomatic relations but warned Cuba to stop its interference in Jamaican affairs. Cuba continued to maintain some 15 intelligence agents at the Cuban Embassy in Kingston. On October 29, the government broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, citing Cuba's failure to return three Jamaican fugitive criminals as the immediate cause for this action. On November 17, the government publicly detailed Cuba's role in providing covert military training under the curtailed "brigadista" program.

Guyana. In 1978, as many as 200 Cuban technicians, advisers, and medical personnel were stationed in Guyana. However, while claiming fraternal relations with Guyana's Government, Cuba maintained contact with radical opposition groups. Guyanese authorities suspected the Cubans of involvement in a crippling sugar strike. In August 1978, five Cuban diplomats were expelled for involvement in illegal activities.

Cuban military advisers have provided guerrilla training outside Guyana to members of a small radical Guyanese opposition group, the Working People's Alliance. Five of the seven members of the Cuban Embassy are known or suspected intelligence agents.

Grenada. Cuban influence in Grenada mushroomed almost immediately after the March 1979 coup led by the New Jewel Movement of Maurice Bishop. Bishop and his closest colleagues were Western-educated Marxist radicals, and they turned for help to Fidel Castro, who proved willing to provide assistance.

To allow close Cuban supervision of Grenadian programs, a senior intelligence officer from the America Department, Julian Torres Rizo, was sent to Grenada as ambassador. Torres Rizo has maintained intimate relations with Bishop and other People's Revolutionary Government ministers, such as Bernard Coard.

The Grenadian Government has followed a pro-Soviet foreign policy line. Cuban and Grenadian voting records in international organizations have been nearly identical, so much so that they alone of all Western Hemisphere nations have voted against U.N. resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Cuban aid to Grenada has been most extensive in those areas which affect the security of its client government and the island's strategic usefulness to Cuba. Cuba has advisers on the island offering military, technical, security, and propaganda assistance to the Bishop government. Many Grenadians have been sent to Cuba for training in these areas. Last year journalists observed Cuban officials directing and giving orders to Grenadian soldiers marching in ceremonies in St. George's.

Cuba is aiding the construction of a 75-kilowatt transmitter for Radio Free Grenada. Grenada's state-controlled press, enjoying a government-enforced monopoly, currently bows to a strict "revolutionary" line. Indications are that the new transmitter will continue this emphasis while providing facilities for beaming Cuban and Soviet-supplied propaganda into the Caribbean and South America.

Cuba's largest project in Grenada is the construction of a major airfield at Point Salines on the southern tip of the island. Cuba has provided hundreds of construction workers and Soviet equipment to build the airfield. This airfield, according to Grenadian Government statements, is required to bring tourism

to its full economic potential and will be used as a civilian airport only. Many questions have been raised, however, about the economic justification for the project. The Grenadian Government has ignored requests for a standard project analysis of economic benefits. The planned 9,800-foot Point Salines runway, moreover, has clear military potential. Such an airfield will allow operations of every aircraft in the Soviet/Cuban inventory. Cuba's MiG aircraft and troop transports will enjoy a greater radius of operation. The airport will give Cuba a guaranteed refueling stop for military flights to Africa.

Bishop himself has given an implicit endorsement of future military use of the airfield. A March 31, 1980 *Newsweek* report quoted Bishop's comments to a U.S. reporter: "Suppose there's a war next door in Trinidad, where the forces of Fascism are about to take control, and the Trinidadians need external assistance, why should we oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist them?"

Dominican Republic. With its renewed commitment to armed struggle, Cuba's interest in the Dominican Republic has revived. Since early 1980, the Cubans have been encouraging radicals in the Dominican Republic to unite and prepare for armed actions. Cuban intelligence officials, like Omar Cordoba Rivas, chief of the Dominican Republic desk of the America Department, make periodic visits to the island.

The Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries have mounted extensive training programs for Dominican students. In July 1981, the Moscow-line Dominican Communist Party (PCD) for the first time publicized the Soviet scholarship program. Some 700 Dominican students are currently studying at Soviet universities, principally Patrice Lumumba University, with another 75 in five other Communist states (Bulgaria, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Romania). The PCD itself selects the more than 100 students who begin the Soviet program each year.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has been pressuring the PCD to unite with other extreme left organizations. The PCD and the pro-Cuban Dominican Liberation Party receive funds from both Cuba and the Soviet Union and send significant numbers of their members and potential sympathizers for academic and political schooling as well as military training in Communist countries. Cuba also has given military instruction to many members of small extremist splinter groups like the Social

Workers Movement and the Socialist Party.

South America

Colombia. Since the 1960s, Cuba has nurtured contacts with violent extremist groups in democratic Colombia. During the 1970s, Cuba established full diplomatic relations with Colombia; Cuban involvement with Colombian revolutionaries was fairly limited, although Cuba provided some training to guerrilla leadership. Many leaders of the April 19 Movement (M-19), including the founder, Jaime Bateman—who also attended a Communist cadre school in Moscow—were trained in Cuba. Leaders of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Moscow-oriented Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) also received Cuban instruction.

Cuban assistance to Colombian guerrillas was stepped up after the February 1980 seizure of the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota. A number of diplomats, including the U.S. Ambassador, were taken hostage by M-19 terrorists. As part of a negotiated settlement, the terrorists were flown on April 17, 1980 to Cuba, where the remaining hostages were released and the terrorists were given asylum.

During mid-1980, Cuban intelligence officers arranged a meeting of Colombian extremists, attended by representatives from the M-19, FARC, ELN, and other Colombian radical groups, to discuss a common strategy and tactics. The M-19 had previously held talks with the Nicaraguan FSLN on ways to achieve unity of action among guerrilla groups in Latin America. Although the meeting did not result in agreement by Colombian guerrillas on a unified strategy, practical cooperation among the guerrilla organizations increased.

In late 1980, the M-19 set in motion a large-scale operation in Colombia with Cuban help. In November, the M-19 sent guerrillas to Cuba via Panama to begin training for the operation. The group included new recruits as well as members who had received no prior political or military training. In Cuba the guerrillas were given 3 months of military instruction from Cuban army instructors, including training in the use of explosives, automatic weapons, hand-to-hand combat, military tactics, and communications. A course in politics and ideology was taught as well. Members of the M-19 group given asylum in Cuba after the takeover of the Dominican Republic Embassy also participated in the training program.

In February 1981, some 100-200 armed M-19 guerrillas reinfiltated into Colombia from Panama by boat along the Pacific coast. The guerrillas' mission to establish a "people's army" failed. The M-19 members proved to be poorly equipped for the difficult countryside, and the Cuba-organized operation was soon dismantled by Colombian authorities. Among those captured was Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the M-19 leader who had directed the Dominican Republic Embassy takeover and then fled to Cuba. Cuba denied any involvement with the M-19 landings but did not deny training the guerrillas.¹⁷

Cuba's propaganda support for Colombian terrorists was impossible to deny. When a group apparently consisting of M-19 dissidents kidnaped an American working for a private religious institute, Cuba implicitly supported the terrorists' action through Radio Havana broadcasts beamed to Colombia in February 1981, which denounced the institute workers as "U.S. spies." Radio Moscow picked up the unfounded accusation to use in its Spanish broadcasts to Latin America. The American was later murdered by the kidnapers.¹⁸

Colombia suspended relations with Cuba on March 23, in view of the clear evidence of Cuba's role in training M-19 guerrillas. President Turbay commented in an August 13 *New York Times* interview: "... When we found that Cuba, a country with which we had diplomatic relations, was using those relations to prepare a group of guerrillas to come and fight against the government, it was a kind of Pearl Harbor for us. It was like sending ministers to Washington at the same time you are about to bomb ships in Hawaii."

Chile. After Allende's fall in 1973, Castro promised Chilean radicals "all the aid in Cuba's power to provide." Although Cuban officials maintained regular contact with many Chilean ex-

iles, divisions among the exiles inhibited major operations. The Moscow-line Chilean Communist Party (PCCH), holding the position that revolutionary change could be accomplished by non-violent means, was critical of "left-wing forces" like the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) with which Cuba had close relations.

Throughout the 1970s, members of the MIR received training in Cuba and in some cases instructed other Latin American revolutionaries. This training ranged from political indoctrination and instruction in small arms use to sophisticated courses in document fabrication, explosives, code writing, photography, and disguise. In addition, Cuban instructors trained MIR activists in the Mideast and Africa.

With its renewed commitment to armed struggle, Cuba increased its training of Chileans beginning in 1979. By mid-1979, the MIR had recruited several hundred Chilean exiles and sent them to Cuba for training and eventual infiltration into Chile. At the same time, members of the MIR who had been living and working in Cuba since Allende's overthrow began to receive training in urban guerrilla warfare techniques. The training in some cases lasted as long as 7 months and included organization and political strategy, small unit tactics, security, and communications.

Once training was completed, Cuba helped the terrorists return to Chile, providing false passports and false identification documents. By late 1980, at least 100 highly trained MIR terrorists had reentered Chile, and the MIR had claimed responsibility for a number of bombings and bank robberies. Cuba's official newspaper, *Granma*, wrote in February 1981 that the "Chilean Resistance" forces had successfully conducted more than 100 "armed actions" in Chile in 1980.

By late 1979, the PCCH was re-evaluating its position in light of events in Nicaragua, where the fragmented Nicaraguan Communist Party emerged from the civil war subservient to the FSLN. In December 1980, PCCH leader Luis Corvalan held talks in Cuba with Fidel Castro, who urged Corvalan to establish a unified Chilean opposition. During the Cuban Party Congress that month, Corvalan delivered a speech which sketched a new party line calling for armed struggle to overthrow the Chilean Government and for coordination of efforts by all parties, including the violent left. In January 1981, Corvalan commended MIR terrorist acts as "helpful" and stated that the PCCH was willing not only to talk with MIR repre-

sentatives but also to sign agreements with the group. Several days after this offer, Corvalan signed a unity agreement with several Chilean extremist groups, including the MIR.

Until January 1981, when the new PCCH policy evidently had been ironed out and validated by the agreement for a broad opposition coalition, Corvalan's statements were issued from such places as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Cuba, and Peru—but never from Moscow. Within 2 weeks of the agreement, however, Moscow showed its implicit approval of the policy change and began broadcasting in Spanish to Latin America—and to Chile in particular—PCCH explanations of the new policy and calls for mass resistance and acts of terrorism to overthrow the Chilean Government.

Terrorist activities by MIR commandos operating in Chile have increased substantially during the past year. These have included increased efforts by MIR activists to establish clandestine bases for rural insurgency, killings of policemen, and a number of assassination attempts against high government officials.

Argentina. The Cubans have a long history of association with, encouragement of, and active backing for terrorism in Argentina. The Cubans were linked to the two groups responsible for unleashing the wave of leftist terrorism that swept Argentina in the early and mid-1970s, the Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). Cuba backed these organizations with advice on tactics and instructions on recruiting operations and with training in Cuba in urban and rural guerrilla techniques. During the height of Argentine terrorism, the Cubans used their embassy in Buenos Aires to maintain direct liaison with Argentine terrorists.

The Argentine terrorists were virtually defeated by 1978. In that year, Castro permitted the Montonero national leadership to relocate its headquarters in Cuba. Today, the Montonero top command, its labor organization, and its intelligence organization, among other units, are all located in Cuba. The Cubans facilitate the travel and communications of Montoneros, supplying them with false documentation and access to Cuban diplomatic pouches. Montoneros have been among the Latin American guerrillas trained in guerrilla warfare over the past year in the Mideast as part of a cooperative effort between Palestinian groups and Cuba.

Following the move of their high command to Havana, the Montoneros made repeated attempts to reinfiltate

¹⁷Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez explained in an interview published in *Der Spiegel* on September 28, 1981 why Cuba had not denied training the M-19 guerrillas: "We did not deny this because in the past few years many people came to our country for various reasons to ask for training. We did not deny this desire. If a revolutionary for Latin America wishes to learn the technique and organization of resistance for his own self-defense, we cannot refuse in view of the brutal oppression. This also holds true for the Salvadorans."

¹⁸The U.S. citizen killed, Chester Allen Bitterman, was working for the Summer Institute of Linguistics, a religious group which develops written forms of indigenous languages.

Argentina. In late 1979, small groups of infiltrators eluded detection and were able to carry out several terrorist actions, including four murders. Subsequent attempts by the Montoneros to infiltrate terrorists in early 1980 proved unsuccessful.

With Cuban support, Montoneros are active outside Argentina. Cuban-trained Montoneros were among the members of the "internationalist brigade" that Cuba supported in Nicaragua in 1979. This connection was highlighted when Montonero leader Mario Firmenich attended the first anniversary of the July 1979 victory, wearing the uniform of a Sandinista commander. Montoneros have been active elsewhere as well. Montoneros largely staffed and administered Radio Noticias del Continente, which broadcast Cuban propaganda to Central and South America from San Jose until it was closed by the Costa Rican Government in 1981, after war materiel was discovered on its installations.

Uruguay. After the failure of the urban insurgency organized in the early 1970s by the National Liberation Movement (MLN-Tupamaros), several hundred Tupamaros went to Cuba. During the mid-1970s, Cuba provided some of them with training in military and terrorist tactics, weapons, and intelligence. Several of these former Tupamaros subsequently assisted Cuba in running intelligence operations in Europe and Latin America. Some participated in the Cuban-organized "internationalist brigade" that fought in the Nicaraguan civil war.

Cuba continues to provide propaganda support for the Tupamaros and the Uruguayan Communist Party. Radio Havana reported on June 30, 1981 that the leader of the Communist Party of Uruguay attended a ceremony "in soli-

darity with the Uruguayan people's struggle" at the headquarters of the Cuban State Committee for Material and Technical Supply in Havana. Pro-Cuban Uruguayan leaders are given red carpet treatment when they visit Havana and are usually received by at least a member of the Cuban Politburo.

IV. POSTSCRIPT

Cuba's renewed campaign of violence has had a negative impact on Cuba's relations with its neighbors. Cuba's policies abroad and its reaction to emigration pressures at home have reversed the trend in Latin America toward normalization of relations. Although the Castro government has developed close ties to Nicaragua and Grenada, Cuba finds itself increasingly isolated throughout the Americas.

Peru nearly broke relations and removed its ambassador in April 1980, when the Cuban Government encouraged Cubans eager to leave the island to occupy the Peruvian Embassy. After more than 10,000 Cubans crowded into the embassy compound, Castro thwarted efforts by concerned governments to develop an orderly departure program and opened the port of Mariel to emigration, also expelling many criminals and the mentally ill, and ultimately allowing more than 125,000 people to leave under sometimes perilous conditions. But Cuba still refuses to issue safe conduct passes to the 14 Cubans who remain cloistered in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana today.

Cuba's neighbors were further shocked when Cuban MiG 21s sank the Bahamian patrol boat "Flamingo" on May 10, 1980 in an unprovoked attack in Bahamian coastal waters. Subsequently, four Bahamian seamen were machine-

gunned while trying to save themselves after their vessel sank. Their bodies were never recovered. U.S. Coast Guard aircraft were harassed by Cuban MiGs while searching for survivors at the request of the Bahamian Government.

Relations between Venezuela and Cuba deteriorated badly in 1980, principally over the asylum issue, to the degree that Venezuela removed its ambassador from Havana. In November 1980, Jamaica expelled the Cuban Ambassador for interference in Jamaica's internal affairs and in October 1981 broke diplomatic relations. Colombia suspended relations in March 1981 over Cuba's training of M-19 guerrillas. Cuba's handling of an incident in which a group of Cubans demanding asylum forcibly occupied Ecuador's Embassy in Havana prompted Ecuador to remove its ambassador from Cuba in May 1981. Also in May, Costa Rica severed its existing consular ties with Cuba, expelling Cuban officials active in coordinating support networks for Central American insurgents.

Today, outside the English-speaking Caribbean, only Argentina, Panama, Mexico, and Nicaragua conduct relatively normal relations through resident ambassadors in Havana. Use of Panama as a transit point for Colombian guerrillas, however, led Panama to reassess its relations with Cuba and resulted in sharp public criticism of Cuba's "manifest disregard for international standards of political co-existence" by a high Panamanian Government official. ■

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Bay of Pigs +20

BARRY M. BLECHMAN and WILLIAM J. DURCH

This is a contribution to the debate on U.S. policy toward Latin America.
More articles will follow in later *TWQ* issues.

In September 1980, Cuban cargo planes delivered to Nicaragua the first shipment of several hundred tons of weapons and materials Castro provided to guerrilla forces in nearby El Salvador. From Nicaragua, the arms reached their ultimate destination in the Salvadoran mountains by truck, small boat, and light plane, part of a supply line that reached halfway around the world: to Eastern Europe, Ethiopia, and Vietnam. In November, as terror and counter-terror in El Salvador continued to escalate, some of these shipments were intercepted and a U.S. official later discovered a large stack of documents, reportedly seized but never analyzed by Salvadoran authorities, which yielded a wealth of details on the shopping habits and supply networks of the Salvadoran guerrillas. All evidence pointed to Cuba as the inspiration and clearinghouse for these shipments of arms and supplies.

Upon taking office, the Reagan administration decided to focus world attention on Cuba's efforts to topple the government of El Salvador. Department officials fanned out

across Europe with the evidence of Cuban interference. Secretary of State Alexander Haig briefed NATO ambassadors on what he termed "a systematic, well-financed, sophisticated effort to impose a communist regime in Central America," that was part of a "global communist campaign coordinated by Havana and Moscow." "It is a threat," he continued, "not just to the United States but to the West at large." The secretary's rhetoric escalated throughout February: "Cuban activity has reached a peak that is no longer acceptable in this hemisphere," he warned, and if the "externally managed" arms flow to El Salvador continued, the United States would "deal with it at the source." By mid-March, adverse congressional and public reactions to these echoes of Vietnam caused the administration to downplay El Salvador's problems. Still, the effect was to return U.S.-Cuban relations to the special gladiatorial arena where the two sides have flailed at one another for most of the past 20 years.

Fidel Castro has been a thorn in the side of seven American presidents, influencing U.S. foreign policy and U.S. politics to a degree disproportionate to the size of his small nation. Yet Cuba has always been a special case for the United States—a source of military crises and political contagion going back to the early years of the U.S. Republic.

Of course, reversing the trend toward

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greater staidness and tension in U.S.-Cuban relations, and resuming the faltering steps toward rapprochement that characterized the mid-1970s would be no mean task, and would require significant changes in both U.S. and Cuban behavior. Even to advocate such a posture at present is to spit into the political wind. But the present U.S. stance, although perhaps viscerally gratifying, hardly serves U.S. interests. Inevitably, it casts Cuba as the besieged underdog—a position Fidel Castro is adept at exploiting. It helps Castro regain some stature among Third World nations that he has lost over the past several years. Equally inevitably, such a policy causes Cuba to rely even more on the Soviet Union—for arms, for protection, for economic support. Finally, as illustrated by the recent El Salvador crisis, it can exacerbate U.S. domestic divisions, reopening the still raw wounds of Vietnam.

Far preferable would be a strategy that would attempt through a mixture of sanctions and incentives to induce Castro both to cease his military activities abroad and to expel foreign troops from Cuba, thereby making feasible political and economic peace with the United States.

The United States has more leverage to accomplish these ends than is generally recognized. Cuba's economy is very weak; the sugar crop has been disappointing two years in a row. The socialist showcase is cracked, its shelves empty, and would-be followers of the Cuban model, such as Jamaica, are beginning to turn away. Cuba finds itself tied to the Soviet welfare system more tightly than ever, and a large fraction of its armed forces are mired in two seemingly endless foreign wars, Angola and Ethiopia. Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has cost Cuba both a seat on the UN Security Council and much of its hard-won standing in the nonaligned movement.

Can the United States take advantage of this situation? Possibly, but it must rise above its own rhetoric, pursuing both negotiations with Cuba itself and steps to defuse the situations in Africa and Latin America that have

led to current problems. It will have to quietly hold out the threat of military action, should Castro again overstep acceptable bounds, but also the promise of the economic and political benefits of improved relations. No easy task, to be sure, particularly for a sector of foreign policy so vulnerable to the cycles of domestic politics. Just how we arrived at our present position may provide a basis for resolving some of the current problems in U.S.-Cuban relations.

I

Beneath the swirl of daily events and the idiosyncrasies of contemporary policymakers, certain factors in international politics remain fairly constant. The consequences of geography and the distribution of natural resources extend beyond regimes, beyond generations; language and ethnicity, the basic patterns of culture, change only slowly. Longstanding fears and ancient values persist, causing historic patterns of behavior to evolve only gradually and with frequent repetitions.

To our misfortune, we Americans often lose sight of history in the press of day-to-day concerns, seeing our own generation and its situation as unique. We tend to react viscerally to the rhetoric of new leaders, not noticing that the underlying message is familiar. Believing that circumstance constantly changes, we search desperately for "new" solutions to "new" problems when, in fact, a problem may be longstanding and the solution may be very old, or, equally important, the path toward a solution may have been littered with failures.

For roughly the first century of its existence, and particularly after the Louisiana Purchase, the United States was actively aware of the strategic importance of Cuba and the Florida Straits. Jefferson contemplated annexation more than once. By the early nineteenth century, these notions were abandoned, and continued rule by a weak and de-

teriorating Spain suited U.S. interests, serving both to keep the British out and to keep U.S. long-term options open. Similar considerations in 1825 led the United States to intervene diplomatically on Spain's behalf when Cuba was "threatened" with independence by Simon Bolívar, the liberator of South America. Instead of independence along with the rest of Spanish America, Cuba received a repressive military government that ruled the island for the next 70 years. Havana's Spanish captains-general were given absolute authority, and used it. Among Cuban historians, the perception has lingered that the United States was largely responsible.

By mid-century, however, many Americans began to view Cuba as an opportunity, rather than as a threat. Faced with declining fortunes relative to the North, the South looked actively for areas in which to expand. Cuba would have been a natural next step—the term manifest destiny itself had been coined with Cuba in mind. Under Presidents Polk (1848), Taylor (1854), and Buchanan (1859), the U.S. government offered to buy the island from Spain. Several private expeditions to "liberate" Cuba also were mounted unsuccessfully during this period, the largest being the abortive Quitman Expedition of 1854–1855, an on-again, off-again enterprise involving, at its peak, some 10 thousand men.

After the Civil War the United States repeatedly declined opportunities to support opposition to Spanish rule in Cuba. In early 1895, it broke up a sizable invasion force assembled in Florida by the intellectual father of Cuban independence, José Martí. That Spring, Martí and a smaller group set out again, this time from the Dominican Republic, to begin what was to be the final revolution for Cuban political independence.

More than any other Cuban leader before Fidel Castro, Martí perceived the United States as a clear threat to Cuban political and economic independence. Having lived 10 years in exile in New York, he had come to fear the growing monster, as he called it, that

seemed to hover over his island. From the mid-1880s, U.S. economic interests had increasingly dominated the Cuban economy—in sugar production, transport, and public utilities. Martí's prolific writings served to disabuse his countrymen, finally, of the notion of annexation as a solution to Cuba's problems. Had he survived the war, Martí might have been the first president of a fiercely independent, anti-U.S. Cuba; as it happened, within one month of the 1895 landing he was killed.

The revolution launched by Martí survived his death, but by 1898 it appeared to be failing. Spain had pushed the revolutionary armies back into the eastern third of the island, having first concentrated much of the rural population in one of the earliest examples of the strategic hamlet approach to counter-guerrilla warfare. It was at this point that the United States finally intervened on the side of Cuban independence; but not, one must add, for the most noble of reasons. Interventionist feelings in the United States were stimulated by the yellow journalism of Hearst and his contemporaries, abetted by ambitious men like Theodore Roosevelt, and brought to fever pitch by the sinking of the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor. Weakened by two and one-half years of war and by continuing political upheaval at home, Spain was in no shape to fight. When the United States declared war in April 1898, Spain's primary objective was to lose quickly and honorably. U.S. troops landed at Santiago, in eastern Cuba, fought the famous battle of San Juan Hill, and soon after accepted the Spanish surrender.

When the Spanish withdrew in January 1899, a U.S. military administration took over. By the time the initial occupation ended, the U.S. demand for naval access had been translated into the perpetual lease of Guantanamo Bay as a naval base with U.S. extraterritorial rights. Under a further lien against Cuban independence, the Platt Amendment (a rider added to the U.S. Army appropriations bill of 1901), the United States

claimed the right to intervene militarily to preserve "stable government" in Cuba and to protect lives and property. The United States forced the incorporation of the amendment into the Cuban constitution of 1902 simply by refusing to remove its occupation forces until the amendment was accepted.

U.S. forbearance in 1898 might have changed the course of U.S.-Cuban—and U.S.-Soviet—relations. But clearly, from the Cuban perspective, the United States did not intervene to make common cause with the rebel armies; Cuban leaders had little role in the departure of the Spanish and were not permitted to participate in setting up a new government. To the Cubans, the United States intervened solely to satisfy a popular blood lust against an opponent the United States clearly knew it could beat. Cuba was the arena, but Cuba's interests were secondary.

U.S. citizens attributed more benign motives to the intervention, and this divergence in perceptions was aggravated with time. For Americans, the Spanish-American War inaugurated 60 years of benevolent U.S. guardianship of Cuba; Cubans looked rather less kindly on the relationship. When the first U.S. army of occupation withdrew, full sovereignty was not transferred to the newly elected government because of the Platt Amendment. In fact, the United States intervened one more time with a full expeditionary force (the Army of Cuban Pacification, 1906-1909), several times with warships (though none fired a shot), and more or less continuously, in major and minor matters, through the U.S. minister in Havana. The rampant corruption and frequent violence of the Cuban political system occasioned such interventions—but not always. The United States took no action militarily when Gerardo Machado tore up the Cuban constitution in 1928 and proceeded to rule the island by force, literally throwing his opponents to the sharks. U.S. diplomatic pressure was not brought to bear until mid-1933 when, amid growing strikes and violence, Machado was

forced to leave. The new government, pieced together by U.S. Ambassador Sumner Welles, was overthrown almost immediately by the so-called Sergeants' Revolt led by Fulgencio Batista. Batista proceeded to rule a violence-prone island directly or indirectly for much of the next 25 years.

When Fidel Castro entered Havana on New Year's Day, 1959, he was hailed by many as the new José Martí, the leader who would finally bring Cuba to true independence. Certainly Castro had that image of himself, just as he shared Martí's image of the United States. These images assured that he would work to gain uncontested control of the revolution and reduce both domestic opposition and the influence of the United States. If Washington saw Castro as a potential threat to its interests in 1959, the feeling was clearly reciprocated. The United States looked for alternatives to Castro, and Castro sought alternatives to the United States. As the nineteenth century Cuban planters turned to the United States as an alternative to Spain, Castro turned to the U.S.S.R. as an alternative to the United States. For a price, the U.S.S.R. delivered.

In short, Cuba has figured prominently in U.S. security for 200 years, at times as an asset—as a base for U.S. warships in the Revolutionary War and for training U.S. forces in World War II. More often, however, Cuba has been seen as a threat—as a springboard for military forces directed against the U.S. heartland: British troops in 1812 and Soviet missiles in 1962.

Cuba also has figured as a political threat, the source of potential political contagion. Whether it was slave revolts in the nineteenth century or communism in the twentieth, the United States has worried constantly about the influence of Cuba on political developments in the United States and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere.

In turn, the proximity of the United States to Cuba has had a tidal effect on Cuban eco-

nomic and political development. Although there may be disagreement with Cuban perceptions of the degree of U.S. influence and its assessments of U.S. motives, the fact of U.S. influence cannot be disputed. By repeated actions—and sometimes inaction—the United States has been a decisive influence on Cuba's attempts to assert its political and economic independence as a sovereign nation. From refusals to assist and at times actions to disrupt efforts to liberate Cuba from Spanish rule, to more recent attempts to isolate Cuba economically and to assassinate Fidel Castro, the United States can be seen as acting in a manner inimical to Cuban freedom of choice.

II

Obviously, there are limits to the lessons of the past. History provides few, if any, parallels to Fidel Castro's ambitious internationalism and his pursuit of Cuba's destiny elsewhere in Latin America, in Africa, and in the Middle East. And modern military technology—nuclear weapons in particular—has given new meaning to historic U.S. concerns about the presence of outside military powers in the Western Hemisphere.

Cuban involvement in Latin America began soon after the revolution's triumph in Havana in 1959 and well before the development of close Soviet-Cuban ties. In the early 1960s, Cuban-supported insurgencies were reported throughout Latin America; Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Bolivia appeared to be particularly vulnerable targets. Che Guevara personally led certain operations, first in Africa and later in Latin America, ultimately losing his life in Bolivia in 1967.

Once close relations had been established between Cuba and the U.S.S.R., Castro actually found his new friends too conservative. He was displeased with the Soviet decision to

withdraw its nuclear missiles from Cuba. He chafed at the unwillingness of the Soviets to challenge the United States directly in Cuba or elsewhere in Latin America. During the 1960s he increasingly came to view Soviet support for North Vietnam and the war in Southeast Asia as inadequate, as new evidence of a lack of Soviet resolve and steadfastness. As he became more and more outspoken in his criticisms, the Soviets retaliated, sharply curtailing military and economic aid to Cuba and cultivating a faction within the Cuban Communist party that advocated more pro-Soviet policies and may even have sought to depose Castro himself. Cuban-Soviet relations worsened noticeably in 1968, as Castro moved successfully against this so-called microfaction. Cuban military activity in the Third World had begun to be cut back sharply just before the microfaction affair. Subsequent economic and political difficulties within Cuba—notably Castro's failure to achieve a 10 million ton sugar harvest in 1970, something on which he had staked his personal reputation—kept overseas ventures at a low ebb for several years.

By the early 1970s, these strains had begun to ease. With renewed Soviet military aid and increased economic support, Castro found his military position significantly improved, though his operations outside Cuba remained limited by Cuba's halting economic recovery. On their side, the Soviets seem to have taken steps to put the political conflict behind them, including an apparent decision, coincident with the Twenty-fourth Party Congress and Brezhnev's "peace program," to view Cuban adventurism (at least in Africa) with somewhat greater tolerance, if not to actively underwrite it.

As relations improved, the Soviets rescheduled Cuba's debt and integrated the island's economy into the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance—their equivalent of the West's General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. They stepped up petroleum deliveries, reversing their most effective sanction against

Cuba, and increased their support for Cuban sugar prices. In return, Castro muted his criticisms of Soviet policy; indeed, he became actively supportive. In 1973, with his domestic problems eased and his personal standing revived, Castro returned to an activist Third World policy, extending military aid for the first time to the Middle East, with the deployment of Cuban air and ground force personnel to South Yemen and Syria.

Cuba's military involvement in Africa also began relatively early. Castro sent a number of military missions to Africa soon after the Cuban revolution, either to support new progressive regimes or to advise liberation forces. While the United States paid close attention to the "export of revolution" in Latin America in the 1960s, scant attention was paid to Cuban missions in Africa. But as Cuba's isolation grew within its own region, especially after the total U.S. trade embargo in 1963, African states provided increasingly welcome political ties outside the socialist bloc and Cuba's revolutionary zeal focused on the liberation movements.

In 1975, Cuban military activism in Africa reached its current level—one in which Cuba has been able not only to influence events in the Third World decisively, but also to play a major catalytic role in U.S.-Soviet relations. That year, Cuban ground and air combat forces, totalling some 20 thousand men, were rushed to Africa in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Agostinho Neto led the MPLA, one of three factions struggling to seize control of the country in the wake of the then-new Portuguese government's decision to rapidly dismantle its 400-year-old African empire. Cuban troops contributed decisively to Neto's victory and remained in Angola to protect the regime from continued threats of guerrilla war. This experience was repeated only two years later, with the commitment of another 20 thousand Cuban troops to Ethiopia. At the

time, Ethiopian forces were floundering under attack by a combination of Somali and Somali-supported indigenous forces in the Ogaden and by separatist movements in Eritrea and elsewhere. Again, the Cuban action was decisive, and substantial Cuban forces—12 thousand through 1980—remained in the area to deal with residual threats to Ethiopia's security.

In retrospect, Cuba's intervention in the Angolan civil war was a seminal event—a precursor of problems that continue to plague the United States in the 1980s. Coming after the final defeat of the U.S.-backed regimes in Cambodia and Vietnam, Cuba's Soviet-supported action symbolized the end of an era and marked a sea change in American opinion. In the wake of the Angolan intervention, President Gerald Ford felt compelled to demonstrate—to the country at large and to his party in particular—his toughness with the Soviets by abandoning Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's efforts to complete the SALT agreement negotiated at Vladivostok. This scenario was replayed in 1978 with the Cuban and Soviet intervention in Ethiopia. The act was a body blow to U.S.-Soviet rapprochement, as the Carter administration, in response to a groundswell of public opinion, abandoned a variety of efforts to improve ties with Cuba and Vietnam and began to step back from cooperative relations with the U.S.S.R. itself. Although U.S.-Soviet relations did not turn down decisively until the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, the Carter administration's initial shift from the politics of detente to the rhetoric of Cold War can be marked at the spring of 1978.

Angola, Ethiopia . . . we have come a long way from traditional perceptions of Cuba and U.S. security. Still, Cuban military adventures in Africa and the Middle East have had major impact on the U.S. sense of security and the policies through which the United States has sought to insure that security. Cuba's apparent ability to influence world

politics decisively and the seeming impotence of the United States in the face of sharp setbacks in Southeast Asia, Iran, and elsewhere, has clearly affected perceptions in the United States and among U.S. allies. Although the ultimate rationality of U.S. restraint in Angola and Ethiopia may have been quietly recognized, the United States' inability or unwillingness to do anything about Cuba's Africa ventures casts serious doubt about U.S. power, its political cohesion, and its resolve. It raised new doubts, following those created by the fall of Vietnam, among U.S. friends in Europe. Although these governments would not themselves have counselled forceful actions, they expected the United States to behave differently on its own. When forceful action was not forthcoming, they wondered whether something fundamental had been altered in American society and what its implications might be for their own security.

More important, Cuba's African expeditions had major effects on U.S. politics. They contributed in a measurable way to the resurgence of the American right, first within the Republican party and then in the country as a whole. They put the Ford and Carter administrations, both of which had attempted policies of reconciliation and cooperation, on the political defensive. In general, the success of the Cuban expeditions shook America's self-image and led inexorably to such severe political pressures against policies of restraint in the Third World, e.g. the curtailment of arms sales, that those policies were scrapped.

III

Increasing Cuban activities overseas were matched roughly by increasing Soviet military activities in Cuba. Soviet navy ships paid their first visit to Cuba in July 1969. In April 1970, Russian TU-95 Bear reconnaissance bombers began flights to Cuba at the time of the worldwide Soviet naval exercise, Okean 70, that eventually became routine.

The long-range Bears typically deploy in pairs, flying nonstop from their base on the Kola Peninsula to Havana, observing U.S. naval operations, radar patterns, and other military desiderata along the way. At José Martí airport the aircraft are refueled and maintained, and the crew rested. The aircraft may then fly one or more round-trip missions from José Martí over the central Atlantic or along the U.S. coast (as close as 75 miles) before returning to the Soviet Union. On several occasions, the aircraft have used Havana as a staging area on their way to other facilities in Africa, particularly Luanda, Angola. Although these flights are hardly decisive additions to Soviet military capabilities, they clearly make a substantial contribution to Soviet knowledge of U.S. military activity, usefully supplementing data from satellites and other intelligence sources. In addition, the Bear reconnaissance flights are precedents for other types of aircraft that the Soviets may seek to exploit at some future time.

Significantly, the Bears deployed to Cuba did not at first conduct reconnaissance missions from that island; instead they stayed on the ground in Cuba and flew directly back to the Soviet Union. The first reconnaissance missions were not conducted until September 1972, when it was clear that the United States was not going to protest the deployments and had, in fact, grown accustomed to them. Attempts at acclimatizing the United States to other Soviet military uses of Cuba were not as successful.

Such a probing pattern of deployments was evident in early Soviet naval port visits to Cuba. The first deployment, in July 1969, included several surface warships and three torpedo attack submarines, two diesel-powered and one nuclear-powered. The second deployment, the following May, included two diesel attack subs and a nuclear submarine equipped with cruise missiles. That August, U.S. intelligence noted construction of a pier and shore facilities on Cayo Alcatraz in Cienfuegos harbor, on Cuba's south coast. Communications, radar, and air defense

facilities were being constructed on the mainland nearby, and a Soviet flotilla was bound for Cuba that included a submarine tender and a landing ship carrying two barges of a type used to service Soviet nuclear submarines. The United States concluded that a Soviet submarine base was in the making.

As a base for Soviet naval operations, Cuba could play an important part in Soviet plans to disrupt U.S. efforts to project military power to Europe or the Middle East. The Soviet navy in the Atlantic operates with a major geographic handicap. From their home ports, Soviet naval forces have to pass through relatively narrow and well-monitored areas, where they are vulnerable to attack, before gaining the open ocean. This problem would bedevil Soviet surface ships in wartime and may be the single most important vulnerability of Soviet Northern Fleet submarines. Bases in Cuba, if they were large and capable enough to support a major submarine force, would effectively obviate this problem. Naval facilities in Cuba would permit the Soviets to maintain larger numbers of submarines in the mid-Atlantic—perhaps a third again as many as at present—giving them a correspondingly better starting position in the event of war. Soviet submarines based in Cuba would be in an excellent position to attack U.S. naval forces as they departed from or returned to the naval bases at Norfolk, King's Bay, or Mayport, along the U.S. southern Atlantic coast. Submarines based in Cuba also would be in a much better position to disrupt civilian shipping from the United States to Europe, particularly those ships that seek to escape predictably large concentrations of Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic by making the crossing farther south. Such convoys would be essential in any war effort that involved sustained conventional ground combat in Europe or the Middle East.

As a result of the 1970 Cienfuegos crisis, the question of Soviet naval facilities in Cuba has been settled for a time for most general purpose naval forces and strategic submarines. In 1970, the United States de-

manded and received Soviet assurances that the U.S.S.R. would not establish or use any facility in Cuba to support or repair Soviet ships capable of carrying offensive—that is, nuclear surface-to-surface—weapons and that Soviet strategic ballistic missile submarines would not call in Cuban ports on “an operational basis.” The United States renewed its pledge not to invade Cuba, and both sets of assurances were incorporated into the 1962 understandings.

On two subsequent occasions, however, in April of 1972 and April 1974, Soviet Golf II diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines paid calls in Cuba, though not in Cienfuegos. What seemed to be new Soviet probes of U.S. resolve were stopped when public attention was drawn to the visits. No Soviet ballistic missile submarines have visited Cuba since 1974, and no nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine has ever visited Cuba; nor, under the terms of the 1970 understandings, are the nuclear-powered ones likely to do so.

The Soviets continued, however, to send flotillas to the Caribbean after the Cienfuegos episode roughly twice a year. Beginning in 1974, excursions into the Gulf of Mexico became a more or less regular feature of those deployments, possibly a riposte to regular U.S. Navy cruises into the Black Sea. Task force composition and ports of call have varied, suggesting a continuing probe of U.S. sensitivities. And extension of certain, relatively small, naval support facilities for the Cuban navy, reported under construction at Cienfuegos in 1979, might eventually serve Soviet naval ships as well. The 1970 understandings do not explicitly rule out the servicing of all Soviet naval vessels, because not all carry weapons that could be categorized as “offensive,” as that term is peculiarly defined for Cuba. In autumn 1978, one Soviet naval task force spent 82 days in Cuban waters, sixty-five of them at Cienfuegos, without incurring U.S. objections. (The average duration of port visits up to that time had been 38 days.) That pattern has not had a chance to

establish itself, however. A flotilla bound for Cuba in August 1979 turned around without reaching its destination and headed home, and there were no Soviet port visits in 1980. Presumably, the 1980 port visits were held up by the refugee crisis that spring, by the U.S. elections in the fall, and by echoes of the 1979 imbroglio about the Soviet brigade. Soviet ships, however, did return to Cuba for their first port visit in two years in April 1981, celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Substantial numbers of Soviet military personnel have been in Cuba since the early 1960s. Numbers peaked at perhaps 20 thousand at the time of the missile crisis; the *Military Balance, 1980-81*, published by the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, gives a current figure of 7,500. An unknown number of military technicians staff one or more major intelligence sites near Lourdes; presumably other, less visible sites also exist. Electronic systems at these sites can be used to eavesdrop on some U.S. radio and microwave transmissions, to monitor military air and sea traffic in the vicinity, to track U.S. missiles fired down the Atlantic test range, and to intercept the telemetry from the test being transmitted to nearby ground stations. The exact capabilities of these intelligence systems are difficult to assess, however.

Roughly 2,600 Soviet personnel are constituted in a combat command structure of two motorized rifle battalions, one artillery battalion, and one tank battalion. The unit is thought to have 40 tanks and 60 armored personnel carriers. It was photographed on maneuvers in August 1979 and has since been observed on maneuvers at six-month intervals. It appears to have been in place for at least several years before its political discovery in late summer 1979, and it may represent an aggregation of smaller units present in Cuba in one form or another since 1962. The unit may have some kind of training function, as the Soviets and Castro claim. It

may serve as a tripwire against U.S. invasion of Cuba or, given the proximity of its two garrisons to extensive Soviet intelligence-gathering facilities, the unit may serve to protect those facilities, reportedly the largest outside the borders of the U.S.S.R. In that sense, Cuba is to the Soviets what Iran once was to the United States, only more so—more stable, more cooperative, and with much less reverse leverage; Iran produced oil, Cuba buys it.

Regardless of these ambiguities, what is clear is the impact the discovery of this brigade had on the ratification of SALT II. On August 30, 1979 Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced to his constituents and the world at large that the U.S.S.R. had a combat brigade in Cuba. On September 4th, Church postponed hearings on SALT II to consider the matter. On the 11th, Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops as well as MiG-23s and Foxtrot submarines given to Cuba in 1978-1979. One month later, Church sponsored a Senate resolution formally tying the fate of SALT II to the combat brigade issue, and the treaty was as good as dead.

The United States had been there before, with different results. In September 1963, the Foreign Relations Committee, under the leadership of Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), reported out the Limited Test Ban Treaty for Senate debate. That treaty was as controversial in some respects in 1963 as the SALT II treaty was 16 years later. On September 6, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) proposed a reservation to the treaty to the effect that all Soviet troops must be removed from Cuba before the test ban would enter into force for the United States. Senator Kenneth Keating (R-N.Y.), who had disclosed the missile buildup in Cuba one year earlier, agreed with Goldwater that Soviet troops in Cuba were "intolerable," but argued that the reservation would scuttle the treaty and it was

too important to lose. Two weeks later, after further debate, the Goldwater reservation was defeated 75 to 17. The difference between the 1963 and the 1979 episodes can be attributed largely to the cool heads of the Kennedy administration and the political savvy of the test ban treaty's floor manager, Senator Fulbright.

The "brigade" episode was unfortunately not atypical of U.S.-Cuban relations over the past 20 years. Mini-detente in 1975 was destroyed by Cuban participation in the Angolan civil war. Renewed efforts by the Carter administration achieved more of substance, including a fisheries agreement and the exchange of diplomatic Interest Sections, but foundered when Cuban troops once again trekked into an African conflict, this time in Ethiopia, with markedly greater Soviet support than was the case in Angola. Although Castro opened Cuba to visits by Cuban-Americans in late 1978 and freed most political prisoners, both gestures were far outweighed, in U.S. political circles, by the continuing presence of Cuban troops overseas and by the discovery of the combat brigade.

Even Castro's conciliatory gestures seemed to backfire. Under relaxed tourism rules, more than 100 thousand Cuban exiles visited the island in 1979, bringing in required amounts of U.S. currency and boosting Cuba's foreign exchange reserves. But the visitors' obvious prosperity undercut the official line about extensive poverty among Cubans in the United States and emphasized the bleak economic situation on the island. Freeing political prisoners created a second source of friction. Unemployable, the ex-prisoners could obtain exit papers, but the emigration opportunities simply were not there. Frustration built up.

Exacerbating the situation, in late 1979 the government began a concerted campaign against economic inefficiency, urban crime, and the black market with a series of extraordinary statements by both Fidel and his

brother Raúl, the country's number two man, to the effect that Cuba's economy was a mess and the party and the people had no one to blame but themselves. Taken together with major crop failures in sugar and tobacco, these shocks to the Cuban social and economic structure produced tremendous incentives for emigration. On April 23, Castro declared Mariel, 40 miles west of Havana, an "open port," and the 1980 Cuban boatlift began in earnest.

U.S. policy toward the boatlift and its human cargo was erratic at best. At first, the United States fined returning boat owners up to \$1,000 per illegal immigrant; then it said it would welcome all refugees with "open hearts and open arms." Then again the U.S. government moved to halt the exodus by fining boat owners and seizing boats returning with refugees. In mid-May, the Coast Guard set up a 10-ship *cordon sanitaire* from Miami to Key West to prevent new excursions to Mariel. But with 1,000 boats still in Mariel and with Cuban officials insisting that boats not return empty to Florida, a continuing refugee influx was assured for another three weeks. By the time Mariel was finally closed on September 26, 125 thousand Cuban citizens had left for the United States. Had the boat lift not been halted at the U.S. end, another quarter million Cubans might have availed themselves of the opportunity to leave.

As the refugee crisis played itself out, the stage was set for another. Cuban influence had been steadily expanding in Nicaragua since the overthrow of Somoza in mid-1979. By the end of 1980, there were an estimated 1,600 Cuban economic technicians and as many as 200 military advisers helping the Sandinista leadership. Moreover, in May 1980 Fidel Castro arranged the creation of an umbrella organization for guerrilla groups opposing the military junta in neighboring El Salvador. Arms deliveries began in 1980, followed early this year by the Reagan administration's new policies toward Central

America. This is the situation that any initiative in U.S.-Cuban relations now must address.

IV

Midway through 1981, the future course of U.S.-Cuban relations looks anything but promising. The 1973 hijacking agreement and the 1977 arrangements, which include the fisheries agreement, the maritime boundaries agreement, and the exchange of Interests Sections, remain more or less effective, but both sides are settling in for a long political siege. Even before the question of arms to El Salvador became a highly visible public issue, prospects for relations were singularly bleak, as evidenced by Secretary of State Alexander Haig's statements at his confirmation hearings: "It would be very difficult for me to support efforts toward normalization of relationships with Cuba just so long as they are spawning, instigating, manning, and conducting terrorist activities in this hemisphere designed to change, by force, legitimate governments." Cuban troops remain in Africa, and the Soviet combat unit remains in Cuba, doing whatever it does and conducting maneuvers every six months. Opening Cuba to unlimited visits by Cuban and other Americans has proved disruptive, and both economic dissatisfaction and anti-American feelings continue to run high. In late 1979, in an interview with *Time* magazine, Castro remained hopeful of improving relations but frustrated by events—"You cannot conceive that a revolutionary government may have friendly relations with the United States . . . For a long time it was said that China was a Moscow satellite, and look how things have turned out. . . ." But late last year, at the Second Cuban Communist Party Congress, Castro once again turned defiant, endorsing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan for the first time and blaming the United States for "provoking" the crisis in Poland. In short, the American swerve to the right sent Castro on a beeline for Moscow.

But though Cuban troops remain in Africa, their operations have not been a smashing long-term success for Castro. Cuban troops reportedly keep to their barracks in Angola rather than face guerrillas from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the bush; in Ethiopia, Castro's refusal to commit Cuban forces in Eritrea along the Red Sea coast has earned him few points with Ethiopian strongman Mengistu Haile Mariam. Cuban aid to Ethiopia did not even rate a mention by Mengistu on the occasion of his 1980 visit to Moscow, even though 12 thousand Cuban military personnel remain in his country. The morale of Cuba's troops overseas is reportedly at rock bottom; simply keeping those forces in place, even with constant rotation, further erodes political stability in Cuba. Cuban expeditionary forces are one-half reservists and repeated deployments of reservists for duty in Angola or Ethiopia, continuing fatalities, and the return of wounded Cuban soldiers further weaken the fabric of Castro's revolution.

Stress on the Cuban revolution also will increase until the Cuban economy comes out of its doldrums, and most likely it will not unless Cuba can attract new investment, generate new markets for its primary products, and build its hard currency reserves. That would require, in turn, freedom to sell its products outside the Soviet economic bloc.

Energy is the key element in Cuba's economic dependency. Cuba annually imports roughly 11 million tons of crude oil and petroleum products on concessionary terms from the U.S.S.R. At the same time, the Soviet Union buys the bulk of the Cuban sugar crop at subsidized prices. Cuba received about 44 cents per pound for its sugar in 1979, when international market prices were about 15 cents. In 1980, Soviet oil cost Havana about \$15 a barrel, whereas the price of contract oil on the international market reached and then exceeded \$30 a barrel. Moreover, Cuba is permitted to sell some sugar to the U.S.S.R. at market prices for hard currency, while it pays for its oil in soft

currencies. For the U.S.S.R., the exchange means enormous opportunity costs in lost hard currency sales. As the spot price of oil exceeds \$40 a barrel, Moscow, in effect, is losing \$3 billion a year in foreign exchange, a substantial fraction of its total export income, by continuing to ship subsidized oil to Cuba.

Because Soviet surplus oil production is expected to dwindle in the 1980s, Castro will be forced to find new sources of energy. Cuba has already signed an agreement with Mexico for joint offshore oil exploration and petroleum product sales, but the chances of finding substantial reserves at this point are unknown. Nuclear power plants are under construction, but will not contribute much to the country's energy needs until the 1990s.

In short, Castro and Cuba are in an increasingly tight economic bind. U.S. technology, investment, and markets could provide the means of revitalizing the Cuban economy, if prerequisite steps were taken allowing both governments to find the development of more normal relations politically acceptable. These steps would include substantial concessions on the part of both. Cuba would have to be willing to withdraw its military forces from Africa, forgo the subversion of existing governments in Central and South America, and bring about the withdrawal of all Soviet military forces and facilities from Cuba itself, all with the understanding that this new status quo would be maintained indefinitely. The United States, in turn, would have to be willing to pledge nonintervention in Cuba's internal affairs, perhaps in a formal treaty, lift the trade embargo and other economic sanctions, and tolerate continued Cuban technical assistance to, and civilian involvement in, whatever nations requested Cuban aid.

Obviously, such an agreement would face considerable political difficulties—in both nations. As described below, however, the U.S. and Cuban governments could take a number of steps unilaterally that would both serve their own interests and increase the prospects for normalization of relations,

without committing either nation to the overall package prematurely.

Turning first to the question of Cuban troops overseas, it seems clear that the only way to induce their return to Cuba, other than an act of war against the island itself, is to remove the perceived need for their presence.

In Angola, continued South African raids into the country in pursuit of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas seeking independence for Namibia and continued South African aid to UNITA jointly provide a continuing rationale for the Cubans' presence. A Namibian settlement would remove the direct South African military threat and should thus be a U.S. priority. The Reagan administration's assurances, conveyed in late March to a high-level Nigerian delegation, that it intends to continue support of the five-power Western efforts to negotiate a Namibian settlement, were a step in precisely the right direction. Continued U.S. deferral of a prospective visit by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi is another encouraging sign. With reduced access to South African support, UNITA might be more disposed to negotiate a settlement with the Luanda government, provided substitute assistance was not forthcoming from Washington. Such aid, now banned by the Clark Amendment, has been contemplated by the administration. In illuminating testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa, the president of the Gulf Oil subsidiary that operates oil production facilities in Angola gave unequivocal endorsement to the Clark Amendment and to improved U.S.-Angolan relations.

Angola continues to seek greater Western involvement not only in its expanding oil sector but in other sectors of the economy as well. For some time now, Angola has been anxious to develop an "opening to the West," and to resolve its problems in central and southern Angola so that economic reconstruction of the country can be undertaken on a rational basis, with Western private assistance; Angola

has also provided significant help in moving forward the negotiations on Namibia, a fact that has been recognized by the Department of State and our European allies. Moreover, during the past year, high Angolan officials have publicly pledged that they would reduce the Cuban presence in conjunction with a Namibian settlement.

In short, a Namibian settlement plus U.S. forbearance in Angola could in turn precipitate an invitation to Cuba from the Angolan government to withdraw its troops, accompanied by all the proper encomiums for saving the revolution and so forth. After that, Angola could set about seriously exploiting its considerable mineral wealth with the help of U.S. firms and doing something about the lot of its people. Cuban economic and medical technicians could stay there, as elsewhere, at the pleasure of the government, continuing to give the Cuban government an opportunity to undertake its "internationalist mission" in ways less inimical to U.S. interests.

In the Horn of Africa, the United States has embarked upon a new relationship with Somalia, including limited military aid and facilities. The best possible outcome for U.S. interests in the Horn would be Somali renunciation of claims to its neighbors' territories, both Ethiopia and Kenya. Barring that, the Ogaden will remain a running sore for years to come, with continuing risk of conflict, and continuing torrents of refugees. Cuba will have no excuse to withdraw, even should it prefer to do so. The United States should thus do all in its power to induce Somali renunciation of its claims, a move which would be welcomed by all of Africa, especially by Kenya, whose fear of Somali aggression has driven it closer to Soviet-backed Ethiopia, even as the United States has begun to make greater use of Kenyan naval facilities.

Of course, any progress toward normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations would come to an immediate halt—indeed, be sharply reversed—should Cuba take part in some new military adventure in Africa; any deal would

have to be predicated on an understanding that Cuban troops in the future would remain at home. This is not to say that Castro would be foreclosed from fulfilling his "internationalist duty"; Cuban medical personnel, technicians, and other civilian advisers could continue to play active roles in whatever nations requested their presence.

A second understanding also would be necessary, one pertaining to Latin America. Here the restrictions on Cuba's activities would have to be more severe. Essentially, Castro would have to forswear the provision of material support to revolutionary movements. Cuba, of course, could maintain whatever relations it chose to with other nations—supporting some, opposing others—but these choices would pertain to the political, economic, and diplomatic relations usually ascribed legitimacy in international affairs. Nothing would more quickly halt whatever steps the United States had taken to ease its sanctions against Cuba than evidence of new Cuban support to movements seeking the violent overthrow of governments in Central or South America.

A sine qua non of normalizing U.S.-Cuban relations, moreover, must be the removal from Cuba of Soviet combat units and other military personnel and the termination of any activities supporting Soviet military operations. The latter category would include operational flights of Soviet aircraft such as the Bear reconnaissance missions and all servicing of Soviet naval forces. In addition, the Castro government must agree to close down Soviet intelligence facilities, which, of all aspects of the Soviet presence in Cuba, pose the most direct threat to U.S. security on a continuing basis.

Unlike 1962 and 1970, these agreements should be made between Washington and Havana. Negotiating limits on Cuban behavior with the U.S.S.R. will not be adequate; U.S.-Soviet understandings with respect to Cuba can only be narrowly applied,

in part because Soviet control of Castro is neither as direct nor as complete as some would like to think and in part because Cuba's resentment of superpower deals that infringe on its sovereignty strictly limit their utility.

Such an agreement would not restrict the normal military aspects of relations between nations. Cuba could buy military equipment from whomever it chose, and host the small numbers of foreign military personnel routinely associated with such transfers. Similarly, Soviet ships could use Cuban ports for brief visits on ceremonial occasions. Nor would such an agreement necessarily affect any aspect of economic relations between Cuba and the U.S.S.R. What would not continue would be the use of Cuba as an extension of the Soviet Union's own military capabilities.

Cuba would be in a better position to invite the Soviets out if its energy dependence on the U.S.S.R. were reduced. Increased energy independence, as well as hard-currency export earnings could be obtained from an unconventional but abundant source within Cuba itself. Up to now, its sugar monoculture has had a stultifying effect on Cuba's economic development. But just under 13 pounds of sugar can be processed into one gallon of ethyl alcohol (ethanol); in a good year Cuba produces about 7 million tons of sugar. Converting a crop of that size could produce 1 million gallons of ethanol, plus more than 1 million tons of ethylene and several million tons—given adoption of suitable processing technology—of cane fibers usable in simulated lumber and plywood products. Brazil already has a substantial sugar cane-to-ethanol energy program, and "gasohol" is making some inroads into the U.S. energy market as well. Clearly, further study of Cuba's energy requirements, the costs of the processing technology, and the availability of foreign markets is required. But conversion of the sugar crop conceivably could make Cuba a net energy exporter, with important consequences for Cuban-Soviet relations: as

ethanol, Cuba's crop might find overseas markets other than the U.S.S.R.

Lifting the U.S. trade embargo would provide a further avenue for Cuban economic development through access to U.S. technology and investment capital. The embargo might be lifted progressively as the Castro government gave signs of limiting the use of its troops overseas and removing the Soviet presence on the island. The United States might also hold out the possibility that as a consequence of the removal of Soviet military forces, the United States would be in a position to consider leaving its naval base at Guantanamo, thus fulfilling a deeply held desire of most Cubans. The United States also may want to consider the relationship between its naval operations in the Black Sea and Soviet naval operations in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. In the context of easing U.S.-Soviet problems, thought might be given to moderating current patterns of naval deployments. Of course, the 1962 and 1970 U.S. pledges not to intervene in internal Cuban affairs would remain in effect and could be formalized between the United States and Cuba itself.

A successful policy also would have to include credible threats of sanctions if incentives did not produce sufficient results. If nothing else, future Cuban military operations abroad could be made more difficult and costly by putting additional pressures on those nations that provide logistical facilities and overflight rights for Cuban troop and equipment shipments. The possibility of more direct military actions against Cuban military movements in the event of future violations of international norms of behavior also should not be ruled out; possibilities would range from sealing off the crisis area from all arms shipments to a quarantine of Cuba itself. Finally, firm U.S. leadership might make possible more severe political and economic isolation of Cuba within the Western Hemisphere, particularly if Cuba continued to support revolutionary movements in Central

America. With proper blandishments, various U.S. allies might be induced to cooperate in existing or new economic sanctions directed at Cuba.

V

The government of Fidel Castro has bedeviled American politics and American policies for more than 20 years. The consequences of Castro's accession to power, the sporadic presence of Soviet military forces on the island, and Cuban military activity in Africa have been profoundly disproportionate to the island's size and to the actual military and political dangers posed by most of these events to U.S. interests. Perhaps more than anything, Cuba and Castro have rubbed salt in U.S. wounds—and put wounds in SALT. They have brought home to the United States, more pointedly than even the war in Southeast Asia, the factors that have transformed international politics since World War II. Among other phenomena, the rise of nationalism in the Third World, the revolutions in communications, in transportation, and in military technology, and the backdrop of political struggle between East and West have combined to curtail drastically the historic ability of the United States to dominate world events.

Castro and Cuba's military activities overseas have taken advantage of these trends and made clear just how far they have progressed.

There is no inevitability about these events, however; the United States has choices. It has considerable potential to influence, if not direct events. It can choose, as in the past, to react in pique, remaining alienated from most of the Third World and blundering from crisis to crisis in a probably futile defense of some romanticized version of the status quo. Or it can choose to move ahead of events, to define policies and relationships that can serve and protect the nation's real interests while facing squarely the realities of the last decades of the twentieth century. Tough rhetoric alone will not rid the Western Hemisphere of Soviet armed forces. Nor will moral outrage alone curtail Cuban expeditions in Africa. If the United States is seriously concerned about these things, it must act with firmness and creativity. The United States must be tough when it comes to its legitimate security concerns, but also be aware of Cuba's perceptions of historic wrongs and seek more normal U.S.-Cuban ties of mutual benefit. In doing so, it would act not out of largesse, but out of self-interest; not from weakness, but from a recognition of U.S. strength.

Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence

August 1982



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Any formulation of U.S. foreign policy, to be complete, would have to devote special attention to the challenge Cuba presents to U.S. interests, especially in the Third World. Cuba has developed an extraordinary capacity to influence events in such diverse regions as sub-Saharan Africa and Central America in spite of serious economic problems at home. Its ability to project power far out of proportion to its size is directly related to its association with the Soviet Union and the Soviet support for the development of its military machine.

This study is being issued in the interests of contributing to better public understanding of the nature of Cuba's massive military buildup and how it contributes to Castro's ability to challenge orderly political and economic development in this hemisphere and elsewhere.

Summary

Cuba has by far the most formidable and largest military force in the Caribbean Basin with the exception of the United States. In all of Latin America, only Brazil—with a population more than 12 times that of Cuba—has a larger military establishment. Increasing Soviet-Cuban military ties and the improvement of the Cuban Armed Forces have enabled Cuba to assume a far more influential world role than its size and resources would otherwise dictate.

Since 1975, the U.S.S.R. has undertaken a major modernization of all branches of the Cuban military, transforming it from a home defense force into the best equipped military establishment in Latin America and one possessing significant offensive capabilities. Equipment delivered to the ground forces has enhanced both their mobility and firepower. The Air Force, with some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG jet fighters, now is probably the best equipped in Latin America. The Navy has acquired two torpedo attack submarines and a Koni-class frigate, which will be able to sustain operations throughout the Caribbean Basin and will enable Castro to project power well beyond Cuba's shores.

As a result of this modernization program and Cuba's combat experience in Angola and Ethiopia, the Castro regime possesses a substantial regional intervention capability. Havana has increased its airborne-trained forces to a level of some 3,000–4,000 troops and also has improved its airlift and sealift capability. Although modest by Western standards, this capability is impressive in the Central American and Caribbean context. It would be employed most effectively in aiding a regional ally against an external invasion or in suppressing internal conflict.

Cuba does not have the ability to conduct an outright invasion of another country in the region except for the Caribbean microstates. Nor does Havana possess sufficient amphibious assault landing craft or aircraft capable of transporting heavy equipment.

On occasion Cuba has been reckless in using its capabilities. The most recent example occurred on May 10, 1980, when Cuban Air Force fighters, in broad daylight, attacked and sank a clearly marked Bahamian patrol vessel inside Bahamian territorial waters, killing four crewmembers. The following day, Cuban MiGs buzzed a populated island belonging to The Bahamas, and a Cuban helicopter carrying Cuban troops landed on the island in pursuit of the surviving crewmembers.

The Cuban Military

Since the mid-1970s, when Cuba intervened in Angola on a large scale and the Soviet Union began to modernize Cuba's Armed Forces, the Cuban military has evolved from a predominantly home defense force into a formidable power relative to its Latin American neighbors. The cost of Soviet arms delivered to Castro since 1960 exceeds \$2.5 billion. These arms deliveries, plus the annual \$3 billion economic subsidy, are tied to Cuba's ongoing military and political role

abroad in support of Soviet objectives. The recent deliveries of Soviet military equipment to Cuba are the latest in a surge of deliveries over the past year. Since January 1981, Soviet merchant ships have delivered some 66,000 tons of military equipment, compared with the previous 10-year annual average of 15,000 tons. These weapons represent the most significant Soviet military supply effort to Cuba since a record 250,000 tons was shipped in 1962. There are several reasons for this increase:

- The beginning of a new 5-year upgrading and replacement cycle;
- Additional arms to equip the new territorial militia, which Cuba now claims to be 500,000 strong but which it expects to reach 1 million;
- Increasing stockpiles, much of which is passed to regional supporters; and
- A convincing demonstration of Moscow's continuing support for the Havana regime.


In addition to major weapons systems, large quantities of ammunition, small arms, spares, and support equipment probably were delivered.

Cuba's Armed Forces total more than 225,000 personnel—200,000 Army, 15,000 Air Force and Air Defense, and 10,000 Navy—including those on active duty either in Cuba or overseas and those belonging to the ready reserves, which are subject to immediate mobilization. With a population of just under 10 million, Cuba has the largest military force in the Caribbean Basin and the second largest in Latin America after Brazil, with a population of more than 120 million. More than 2% of the Cuban population belongs to the active-duty military and ready reserves, compared with an average of less than 0.4% in other countries in the Caribbean Basin. In addition, Cuba's large paramilitary organizations and reserves would be available to provide internal support to the military.

The quantitative and qualitative upgrading of the armed forces and their recent combat experience in Africa give the Cuban military definite advantages over its Latin American neighbors. Cuba is the only country in Latin America to have undertaken a major overseas mili-

Relative Military Strength

For Selected Caribbean Countries



For Selected Latin American Countries

Country	Population (thousands)	People in Military (thousands)	% of Population in Military
Cuba	9,800	227.0	2.32
Argentina	28,000	185.5	.66
Bolivia	5,500	26.6	.48
Brazil	124,780	272.6	.22
Chile	11,180	92.0	.82
Colombia	27,310	70.0	.26
Ecuador	8,250	36.8	.47
Paraguay	3,270	16.0	.49
Peru	18,075	130.0	.72
Uruguay	2,945	29.7	1.01
Venezuela	16,459	40.8	.25
Dominican Republic	5,835	22.5	.39
Guatemala	7,200	15.1	.21
Honduras	3,900	11.2	.29
Mexico	69,000	119.5	.17


Source: *Military Balance*, 1981-1982.

tary effort since World War II, giving both Army and Air Force personnel recent combat experience in operating many of the weapons in their inventories. About 70% of Cuban troops who have served in Africa have been reservists. Reservists generally spend about 45 days per year on active duty and can be integrated quickly into the armed forces. Cuba's civilian enterprises, such as Cubana Airlines and the merchant marine, have been used effectively in support of military operations. Havana has dedicated significant resources to modernize and professionalize its armed forces and to maintain a well-prepared reserve. Cuba has demonstrated that, when supported logistically by the Soviet Union, it has both the capability and the will to deploy large numbers of troops and can be expected to do so whenever the Castro government believes it to be in Cuba's best interest.

Equipment delivered to the Army since the mid-1970s, including T-62 tanks, BMP infantry combat vehicles, BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicles, antitank guns, towed field guns, BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft guns, have begun to alleviate earlier deficiencies in Cuba's mechanized capability and to provide increased firepower. In addition to its qualitative advantage, the Cuban Army has an overwhelming numerical superiority in weapons over its Latin American neighbors.

The Cuban Air Force is one of the largest and probably the best equipped in Latin America. Its inventory includes some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG jet fighters, with two squadrons of FLOGGERS (the exact model of the second squadron recently delivered is not yet determined). The MiG-23s have the range to reach portions of the southeastern United States, most of Central America, and most Caribbean nations. On a round-trip mission, however, Cuban-based aircraft would be capable of conducting only limited air engagements in Central America. If based on Central American soil—a feasible option given the closeness of Cuban-Nicaraguan relations—Cuba's fighter aircraft could be effectively employed in either a ground-attack or air-superiority role. A similar arrangement would be possible in Grenada once Cuban workers complete the construction of an airfield with a 9,000-foot runway there. If the MiG-23s were to stage from Nicaragua and

U.S.S.R. Seaborne Military Deliveries to Cuba



*Approximate figure

Grenada, their combat radius would be expanded to include all of Central America, including the northern tier of South America.

Cuban defenses have been strengthened by the additions of mobile SA-6 launchers and related radars for air defense, SA-2 transporters, SA-2 missile canisters, new early warning and height-finding radar stations, and electronic warfare vans.

The Cuban Navy, with a strength of about 10,000 personnel, remains essentially a defensive force. However, its two recently acquired Foxtrot-class sub-

marines and single Koni-class frigate, once fully integrated into the operational force, will be able to sustain operations through the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Mexico and, to a limited extent, the Atlantic Ocean.¹ The primary vessels for carrying out the Navy's defensive missions are Osa- and Komar-class missile attack boats, whose range can extend well into the Caribbean. They are armed with SS-N-2 STYX ship-to-ship

¹The Koni has an operating range of 2,000 nautical miles without refueling or replenishment. The Foxtrots have a range of 9,000 nautical miles at 7 knots per hour and a patrol duration of 70 days.

missiles. Cuba has received, in addition, Turya-class hydrofoil torpedo boats, Yevgenya-class inshore minesweepers, and a Sonya-class minesweeper. Although not equipped for sustained operations away from its main bases, the Cuban Navy could conduct limited interdiction missions in the Caribbean. Cuba also has a 3,000-man coast guard organization.

By Western standards, Cuba's capability to intervene in a hostile environment using its indigenous transport equipment is modest, but it is considerably more formidable in the Central American context. As in 1975, when a single battalion of Cuban airborne troops airlifted to Luanda, Angola, at a critical moment and played a role far out of proportion to its size, a battle-tested Cuban force interjected quickly into a combat situation in Central America could prove to be decisive. Moreover, since the Angolan experience, Havana has increased the training of airborne forces, which now consist of a special troops contingent and a landing and assault brigade, and has improved its air and sealift capacity. Introduction of sophisticated Soviet weapons geared toward mobility and offensive missions has improved Cuban ability to conduct military operations off the island.

Cuba still lacks sufficient transport aircraft capable of supporting long-range, large-scale troop movements and would have to turn to the Soviets to achieve such a capability. Cuba is able to transport large numbers of troops and supplies within the Caribbean, however, using its military and civilian aircraft. Since 1975, the Cuban commercial air fleet has acquired seven IL-62 long-range jet transport aircraft and some TU-154 medium-to-long-range transport aircraft, each capable of carrying 150-200 combat-equipped troops. By comparison, Cuba conducted the 1975 airlift to Luanda with only five medium-range aircraft, each having a maximum capacity of 100 troops.

Cuba has recently acquired the AN-26 short-range transport. The most effective use of this aircraft from Cuban bases would be in transporting troops or supplies to a friendly country, but it is capable, with full payload, of airdropping troops on portions of Florida and Belize; Jamaica, Haiti, and The Bahamas; and most of the Dominican Republic. If based in Nicaragua, the AN-26s could reach virtually all of Central America in either a transport or airdrop role. In addition, more than 80 smaller military and civilian transport planes, including those used in Angola,

could be used to fly troops and munitions to Central America.

The Soviet military deliveries also could improve Cuban ability to conduct military operations abroad. In Angola, for example, the mobile SA-6 surface-to-air missile system operated by the Cubans could provide a valuable complement to other less effective air defense systems. The new equipment would enable Havana to continue assistance to Nicaragua. The MiG-23 and MiG-21 fighters probably would be most effective in aiding the Sandinista regime. Deployment of a few dozen MiGs would not seriously reduce Cuba's defenses, and Cuban-piloted MiGs would enable Nicaragua to counter virtually any threat from within the region.

In early 1982 Cuba also received some Mi-24 HIND-D helicopters, the first assault helicopters in Cuba's inventory which also includes the Mi-8 HIP. The Mi-24—armed with a 57mm cannon, minigun, and rocket pods and carrying a combat squad—will provide Cuba with improved offensive capability.

Cuba's ability to mount an amphibious assault is constrained both by the small number of naval infantry and by a dearth of suitable landing craft. Cuba would, however, be capable of transporting large numbers of troops and supplies—using ships belonging to the mer-

chant marine and the navy—to ports secured by friendly forces, if the United States did not become involved.

Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations

Cuba's several paramilitary organizations involve hundreds of thousands of civilian personnel during peacetime and would be available to support the military during times of crisis. Although these groups would be far less combat capable than any segment of the military, they do provide the civilian population with at least rudimentary military training and discipline. Their primary orientation is internal security and local defense.

The extent to which the military is involved in the civilian sector is further indicated by its activity within the economic sphere. In addition to uniformed personnel, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) employs more than 30,000 civilian workers in factories and repair facilities in Cuba and in building roads and airfields in Africa. Many of them are employees of MINFAR's Central Directorate for Housing and Construction which, in addition to military construction, builds housing and apartment complexes for military and civilian personnel of both MINFAR and the Ministry of the Interior. The Youth Labor Army also

Strength and Missions of Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations

Organization	Subordination	Strength	Mission
Youth Labor Army	MINFAR (Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces)	100,000	Civic action force, receiving little military training in peacetime. One wartime mission would be to operate and protect the railroads.
Civil Defense Force	MINFAR	100,000	"Military" units would assist in providing local defense; non-military would provide first aid and disaster relief.
Territorial Troop Militia	MINFAR	More than 500,000 at present; still forming	Regional security/local defense.
Border Guard Troops	MININT (Ministry of the Interior)	3,000 full-time, plus unknown number of civilian auxiliaries	Help guard Cuban coastline.
National Revolutionary Police	MININT	10,000, plus 52,000 civilian auxiliaries	Responsible for public order in peacetime; could help provide rear area security during war-time.
Department of State Security	MININT	10,000-15,000	Counterintelligence and prevention of counter-revolutionary activities.

contributes to economic development by engaging in agricultural, industrial, construction, transportation, and other projects.

The Soviet Presence

The Soviet military presence in Cuba includes a ground forces brigade of about 2,600 men, a military advisory group of 2,000, and an intelligence-collection facility. There also are 6,000-8,000 Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba. Military deployments to Cuba consist of periodic visits by Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft and task groups.

Soviet ground forces have been in Cuba since shortly before the 1962 missile crisis. Located near Havana, the ground forces brigade consists of one tank and three motorized rifle battalions as well as various combat and support units. Likely missions include providing a small symbolic Soviet commitment to Castro—implying a readiness to defend Cuba—and probably providing security for Soviet personnel and key Soviet facilities, particularly for the Soviets' large intelligence-collection facility. The brigade almost certainly would not have a role as an intervention force, although it is capable of tactical defense and offensive operations in Cuba. Unlike units such as airborne divisions, it is not structured for rapid deployment, and no transport aircraft able to carry its armed vehicles and heavy equipment are stationed in Cuba.

Cuban Advisers

Nation	Total Number (Estimated)	
	Military	Civilian
Angola	20,000-25,000	6,000
Ethiopia	11,000-13,000	600
Nicaragua	2,000	4,000
South Yemen	200-300	100
Grenada	30	300

The Soviet military advisory group provides technical advice in support of weapons such as the MiGs, surface-to-air missiles, and the FOXTROT submarines; some also are attached to Cuban ground units. The Soviets' intelligence-collection facility—their largest outside the U.S.S.R.—monitors U.S. military and civilian communications.

Since the naval ship visit program began in 1969, 21 Soviet naval task groups have deployed to the Caribbean, virtually all of them visiting Cuban ports. The most recent visit occurred in April and May 1981 and included the first by a Kara-class cruiser—the largest Soviet combatant ever to have visited the island. Soviet intelligence-collection ships operating off the east coast of the United States regularly call at Cuba, as do hydrographic research and space-support ships operating in the region. In addition, the Soviet Navy maintains a salvage and rescue ship in Havana for emergency operations.

Since 1975, Soviet TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft have deployed periodically to Cuba. Typically, these aircraft are deployed in pairs and stay in Cuba for several weeks at a time. The

flights traditionally have been associated with U.S., NATO, and Soviet exercises; the transit of U.S. ships to and from the Mediterranean; and periods of increased international tension.

The Soviets apparently sent a considerable number of pilots to augment Cuba's air defense during two periods—early 1976 and during 1978—when Cuban pilots were sent to Angola and Ethiopia. They filled in for the Cuban pilots deployed abroad and provided the Cuban Air Force with sufficient personnel to perform its primary mission of air defense of the island.

Threat to Hemispheric Strategic Defense

Cuban military ties with the Soviet Union, the Soviet presence in Cuba, a large Soviet intelligence-collection facility, and the periodic Soviet air and naval presence pose not inconsiderable military threats to U.S. security interests in the hemisphere. Because of Cuba's proximity to vital sea lanes, the Soviets or Cubans in wartime could attempt to interdict the movement of troops, supplies, and raw materials in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea and could strike key facilities in the area. ■

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THE USSR, CUBA, AND THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA*

by Jiri Valenta

With the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in July 1979 and the ongoing civil war in El Salvador, Soviet and Cuban strategy and tactics in Central America are being analyzed with new seriousness. According to some observers, the revolution in Nicaragua is transforming that country into a "second Cuba." Meanwhile, the Reagan administration has presented an array of evidence of cautious yet active support (armaments and military instruction) to left-leaning guerrillas in El Salvador. This support is relayed by the Cubans by way of Nicaragua.

These recent developments not only are significant within the context of the Caribbean basin, but they also shed new light on the more crucial issue of Soviet-Cuban strategy in the Third World in general.¹ The Soviet-backed, Cuban-orchestrated support to left-leaning allies in Central America follows a decade of limited Soviet-Cuban military and security assistance to other Third World countries—to Mozambique, Guinea, and Zambia in Africa, to Syria and South Yemen in the Middle East—and comes on the heels of two Soviet-Cuban military interventions on behalf of revolutionary and government forces: in Angola in 1975-1976 and in Ethiopia in 1977-1978. Along with Soviet support for the 1978 intervention in Kampuchea (Cambodia) conducted by the North

*This article is an adaptation of a chapter from *Central America: The International Dimensions of the Crisis*, edited by Richard E. Feinberg, to be published by Holmes & Meier in spring 1982.

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¹See my earlier work on Soviet-Cuban alliance in the Third World: "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1975," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Spring-Summer 1978, pp. 3-33; "Soviet Decision-Making on the Intervention in Angola," in David Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1980); "The Communist States and the Conflict in the Horn of Africa," in J. Valenta and D. Albright, eds., *Communist Countries and Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, forthcoming); "Comment: The Soviet-Cuban Alliance in Africa and Future Prospects in the Third World," *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos*, July 1980, pp. 36-43; and "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola," *U.S. Naval Proceedings*, April 1980, pp. 51-57. For an expanded version of the last article, see Steven Rosefield, ed., *World Communism at the Crossroads: Military Ascendancy, Political Economy and Human Welfare* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980).

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Vietnamese (the "Cubans of the Orient" as the Chinese call them) and the Soviets' own military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, these activities are perceived by many U.S. policymakers as fitting into an overall Soviet plan.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig views developments in Central America as part of "a very clearly delineated Soviet-Cuban strategy," the clear objective of which is "to create Marxist-Leninist regimes in Central America—Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras."² In Haig's view, the Soviet-sponsored interventions in Central America are "an extension of the 'Brezhnev doctrine' [once applying only to Eastern Europe] outside the area of Soviet hegemony." This school of thought was echoed by President Reagan himself, who explained that "the terrorists aren't just aiming at El Salvador," but "at the whole of Central and possibly later South America [and], I'm sure, eventually North America."³ The Reagan administration has apparently decided to counter what it sees as Soviet implementation of the Brezhnev doctrine by acting on the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, whereby the U.S. government announced its intention to oppose outside interference in the Americas. Thus, the crises in Central America in general and El Salvador in particular have become crucial tests of this administration's determination to challenge Soviet-Cuban designs in the Western Hemisphere and perhaps in other areas of the Third World.

The present analysis will be limited to Cuban and Soviet perceptions of and strategies toward Central America and the Caribbean region, and will emphasize the specific tactics employed in Nicaragua and El Salvador. First, however, something should be said about the complex beginnings of the ongoing conflict in the region and the reasons for the revolutionary transformation occurring there. The present crises in Central America cannot be attributed solely to Cuban and Soviet interference. What is happening in El Salvador and to varying degrees in other Central American countries is the rapid decay of long-entrenched and autocratic power.⁴ This process has been witnessed already in other Third World countries, such as Ethiopia. The decay of outmoded political, economic, and social orders is the result of a number of factors internal to the countries themselves. The societies of Central America are polarized by antagonism between a very small upper class and a very poor majority; in most of these countries, the middle class remains weak and underdeveloped. Socioeconomic polarization and past and existing oppressive regimes have contributed significantly to the rise of internal and interregional conflicts in these countries.

²Time, March 16, 1981, pp. 24-25.

³Ibid., p. 10.

⁴For a more detailed discussion, see R. Feinberg's forthcoming volume, *Central America: The International Dimensions of the Crisis* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982).

Moreover, several decades of U.S. hegemony and short-sighted policies, ranging from intervention to benign neglect, have also contributed to the development of nationalist reaction in the region. The prevailing feeling of many nationalists and radicals south of the Rio Grande regarding the United States resembles the traditional attitude of the Poles and Hungarians toward the Soviets. This view was well articulated by prerevolutionary Mexican President Porfirio Díaz, who once lamented "Poor Mexico: so far from God, so near the United States." More recently, the tensions have been exacerbated by Cuba, the USSR, and some other communist and Third World states that have sought to exploit radical currents and capitalize on the tides of revolution.

In this examination of Soviet-Cuban strategies and tactics in Central America, the following questions will guide the discussion: How and why did the Soviets and Cubans become involved in Central America? What are their ties both with the more traditional communist parties and with the guerrilla groups of the region? How does Central America fit into Soviet global strategy? To what degree does Cuba exercise its own strategy in the region? Are Cuba, the USSR, and their allies competing with the United States for influence in Nicaragua and El Salvador, as they have done for several years in Africa, particularly in Angola and Ethiopia? If so, are they prepared to risk further deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations to accomplish this? Are the Soviets motivated merely by the desire to cause problems for the United States, or by more complex aims? Do Soviet and Cuban commitments in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen and the Soviet preoccupation with the war in Afghanistan, the crisis in Poland, and the Iran-Iraqi war limit their ability to become heavily involved in Nicaragua and El Salvador?

A Historical Perspective

Unlike Cuba, which is an integral part of the Caribbean basin (defined here as the area including the Caribbean archipelago and the littoral nations of Central America), the Soviet Union has no long-standing cultural, political, or commercial ties with the countries of Central America. It began to develop such ties only as recently as the 1960s. In contrast to those with Europe and Asia, Soviet interactions with Central and South America have until recently been modest. This is chiefly because of the area's geographic remoteness and therefore marginal importance to the USSR, and the traditional hegemony there of the United States.

The element of geographic remoteness, it should be noted, has been an asset to the Soviet Union in its efforts from the 1960s onward to become involved in the region. Like the United States in Eastern Europe, the USSR does not have a strong imperial record in Central and South

America. Like the American image in Eastern Europe, the Soviet image in some Central American countries has been a conspicuously favorable one. As "enemies of American imperialism," early Bolsheviks were viewed as natural allies by revolutionary and patriotic circles in Mexico. Despite U.S. intervention in favor of revolutionary forces in 1916, two years later the military boss of a Mexican region said, "I don't know what socialism is but I am a Bolshevik, like all patriotic Mexicans—the Yankees do not like the Bolsheviks. They are our enemies; therefore the Bolsheviks must be our friends and we must be their friends. We are all Bolsheviks."⁵

Although revolutionary elements were sympathetic to the Bolshevik revolution and the Soviet regime, the Soviets were ostracized for several decades by the ruling elites of Central America and handicapped by the absence of diplomatic relations. Soviet relations with the countries of the Caribbean basin, with the exception of Mexico, were limited up to the 1960s to relations with their respective communist parties. In fact, until the Cuban revolution, Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina were the only Latin American countries with which the USSR had diplomatic relations. Thus, first-hand Soviet knowledge of the Caribbean basin was effectively limited to Mexico.

Before World War II, Mexico was the principal center for the dissemination of Comintern publications to Spanish-speaking countries in the region. With the help of Mexican Communist party officials, the Comintern was able to supervise the founding of the Communist party of Guatemala and assist with the founding of other communist parties in the region. The communist parties of Central America were illegal, their memberships ranging from several dozen to a few hundred. In Cuba, with Soviet encouragement, the party even entered into a coalition with the government of Fulgencio Batista during the Popular Front era of the 1930s and again briefly in the 1940s. On the other hand, with the notable exception of the Communist party of Costa Rica, the Central American parties have traditionally operated in a conspiratorial or semilegal fashion. Even in Costa Rica the Communist party is weak and has participated in only a limited manner in the politics of the nation.

Comintern officials had traditionally discounted the prospects for communism in Central and South America, displaying, like Marx and Engels, a certain Eurocentric disdain for Latin peoples and viewing the countries within a colonial framework in which the United States was firmly in command. Until the victorious Cuban revolution, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had had only sporadic contacts with the Latin American communist parties through individual party and

⁵M. N. Roy, *Memoirs* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964), p. 154.

Comintern officials. Soviet financial subsidies to these parties have been small, though regular.⁶

Local communist parties have been involved in several unsuccessful insurrections in Central America's past. In 1932 there was an uprising in El Salvador that was crushed by government forces. In Guatemala in 1953-1954, the nationalistic regime of President Jacobo Arbenz attempted a swing toward radicalism with the backing of the Communist party of Guatemala, a small but influential party that was in control of the labor movement. Available evidence suggests that the Soviets provided Arbenz's regime with financial and political support and even shipped 2,000 tons of Czech-manufactured weapons to Arbenz and his supporters. This support was marginal, however, and there is little evidence pointing to direct Soviet involvement. The meager level of support was determined in part by the Soviets' then-limited capabilities and in part by the fact that the United States treated Guatemala as a major issue, thus warding off further Soviet involvement. With covert support from the U.S. CIA, anti-Arbenz forces launched an invasion from Honduras and soon overthrew the regime.⁷

The turning point in Soviet relations with Central America came in 1959-1960 after the Cuban revolution. When U.S.-Cuban differences became unbridgeable and the United States withdrew from Cuba, the Soviets, after a period of hesitation, tried to fill the political and economic vacuum thus created. After the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt, Nikita Krushchev and his colleagues painstakingly went about building a major alliance with Cuba. Despite ups and downs and disagreements about strategies in the Third World and in Latin America, the alliance begun at this time has remained solid.

Initially—at least until the Cuban missile crisis in 1962—the Soviets were exuberant about the success of the Cuban revolution. The revolution spurred Soviet research into Latin American affairs, and in 1961 the Soviet leadership established a new Institute for the Study of Latin America. For a brief time during this period of euphoria, Moscow seemed to believe that the Cuban style of revolution could be exported, with Soviet backing, to Central America. Thus in 1959 and 1960, respectively, the communist parties of Nicaragua and El Salvador tried to over-

⁶For studies dealing with early Soviet relations with Latin American communist parties, see Rolie E. Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America: A History of the Movement, 1917-1963* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1964); Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957); Karl M. Schmidt, *Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1965); Ronald M. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (New York: Praeger, 1959); and Robert J. Alexander, "The Communist Parties of Latin America," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1970, pp. 37-46.

⁷Cole Blasler, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh University Press, 1976).

throw their countries' regimes. The Cuban missile crisis, however, which the Chinese describe as the "Caribbean Munich," soon reminded the Soviets of the limits of their power in the area.

Not surprisingly, Khrushchev's decision to remove the Soviet missiles had some repercussions for USSR-Cuban relationships. In the aftermath of the Soviet capitulation, marching militia in Havana chanted "*Nikita mariquita, lo que se da no se quita* (Nikita, you little braggart — what one gives, one doesn't take away)."⁸ Fidel Castro was naturally worried at this time about the degree of Soviet commitment to protecting Cuba against the United States. Like many others, he did not realize what would become clear only in the 1970s: though humiliated, Khrushchev achieved at least one of his objectives during the missile crisis — while agreeing to remove the missiles from Cuba, he was able to extract an American pledge not to topple the revolutionary Cuban regime. In retrospect, considering the success of joint Soviet-Cuban operations in the Third World in the 1970s, it appears that Khrushchev and not John Kennedy may have been the winner in the 1962 confrontation.

The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis had a sobering effect on Soviet perceptions of the potential for revolution in the Caribbean basin. So did U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, when the motto "Never a second Cuba" became the imperative for U.S. policy in Latin America. The failure of Cuban-backed guerrilla revolutionaries in the 1960s in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and in South America (Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela) further ingrained this Soviet attitude, which Castro did not (at least not immediately) share.

In the 1960s the Soviets and the Cubans had profound disagreements about which strategies to pursue in Latin America. As a result of doctrinal differences, Soviet-Cuban relations in 1966-1967 were strained almost to the breaking point. It was not only their pessimistic assessment regarding "revolutionary potential" in the Caribbean basin nor their realistic appraisal of the U.S. response to Soviet-Cuban-supported guerrilla revolution that restrained the Soviets; there were other internal and external factors as well. Because of their preoccupation with the power struggle after Khrushchev's dismissal in 1964, the course of the Vietnam War, and the deepening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviets in the late 1960s were unwilling and unable to sponsor Castro's call to create "two or three" and even "four or five more Vietnams" for the United States in Latin America. Castro, who was in favor of a "genuine revolutionary road," criticized the USSR for dealing with capitalist governments in Latin America. He even clashed over the issue with pro-

⁸ K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1970), p. 272.

Soviet leaders in some Central American parties, such as those of Guatemala and Venezuela, where young, pro-Castroist elements resisted Soviet advice to proceed gradually and with caution.

After the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara in 1967, however, when most of the guerrillas were wiped out, the Cubans soon came to realize the need for overcoming their differences with Moscow and coordinating their policies with those of the Soviets. As Castro saw it, there were no immediate revolutionary opportunities in Latin America in the 1970s (the case was otherwise in Africa). Thus, he grudgingly approved the Soviet policy of employing diplomatic, commercial, and cultural channels (in addition to revolutionary tactics where feasible) in order to expand relations with "progressive forces" in Latin America. Until very recently, the Soviets and Cubans have been less successful in dispelling traditional anticommunist hostilities from the Caribbean basin than from the South American continent. Besides those in Mexico and Jamaica, prior to the revolution in Nicaragua the USSR had only one other ambassador in the Caribbean region, stationed in Costa Rica. In some other countries of the area, however, the Soviets were able to accredit nonresident ambassadors (Panama and Honduras) and to negotiate trade representation (El Salvador).⁹ The Soviets were also able to promote better economic cooperation with a friendly Mexico by helping to bring about a new cooperation treaty between Mexico and COMECON in 1975.

Soviet diplomatic initiatives in Latin America in the 1970s yielded some political payoffs, among other things helping to invalidate the political and economic blockage of Cuba. Subsequently, Cuba was able to normalize relations with many Latin American countries. It exchanged consuls with Costa Rica, established diplomatic relations with Panama, and extended its influence to the Caribbean countries of Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados, and Trinidad-Tobago.

It is misleading to suggest that because of these trends the USSR and Cuba had given up the notion of supporting revolutionary movements in the region. Although their posture was realistic, it was not one of acquiescence. Neither the Soviets nor the Cubans entirely renounced the efficacy of revolution as a means for overthrowing unfriendly, anticommunist governments. In the mid 1970s, when conditions were not ripe for revolution in Latin America, the Soviets and Cubans were busy supporting their allies elsewhere, particularly in Africa. This situation changed dramatically with the successful revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 and the upswing in guerrilla warfare in El Salvador in 1980.

⁹ Blasier, *Soviet Relations with Latin America in the 1970s* (Washington: The National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1980).

A Strategic Perspective

(1) *The USSR and Central America*

The behavior of the Soviets and Cubans in the Third World is not, of course, motivated solely by historical ties and opportunism. Both the USSR and Cuba have developed a coherent strategic vision with regard to the Third World. Theirs is an integrated, though flexible, plan of action aimed at achieving specific long-term objectives. What are these objectives and how does Central America figure in them? I discern in Soviet strategy four distinct components that can be verified from Soviet sources: ideology, politics, security, and economics.

Ideology

With respect to ideology, the Soviet objective is to create Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World (although in the long run this does not always work to the benefit of the USSR, as was the case with China's conversion to communism). While it is misleading to assume that the Soviets support revolutionary political movements in the Third World chiefly because of an ideological affinity with such movements, ideology cannot be discounted. The Soviets believe that some radical Third World nations will someday embark on a path toward a truly socialist development, as Cuba did in the 1970s. Meanwhile, because of Moscow's bad experience in the 1960s and 1970s—when revolutionary or radical regimes were overthrown, when more moderate regimes substantially reduced Soviet presence and influence in the countries in question—they feel impelled to exercise caution in making commitments to socialist and would-be socialist regimes in developing countries.

Indeed, with the probable exception of Cuba, in the early 1980s the Soviets hardly view the radical regimes of the Third World as truly Marxist-Leninist in the Soviet understanding of the term. Thus, Soviet officials in the Central Committee responsible for dealing with Third World revolutionary regimes refer to them as being "progressive," "anti-imperialist," and "revolutionary-democratic," and at most (when referring to Angola and Ethiopia) as having a "socialist orientation" and pursuing "noncapitalist" (but not "socialist") development. Soviet experts on Latin America such as M. F. Kudachkin, who is responsible for the Latin American section of the Central Committee of the CPSU, appreciate the diversity and unevenness of economic and political development in Latin America. They recognize that the region holds a special place in the Third World because of its success in throwing off the Spanish colonial yoke in the nineteenth century, and because, unlike Africa and most of Asia,

capitalism has reached a high state of development in part of Latin America—particularly in Argentina and Chile, and to a certain degree in Mexico.¹⁰ These countries also possess a significant working class and, in Mexico and Chile (before the anti-Allende coup), large communist parties. In the Soviet view, the situation in the Caribbean basin is different, not only because of a lower level of capitalist development, but also, as stressed, because of a weak communist movement and a more pervasive U.S. hegemony. The Marxist inclination of new regimes in such countries as Nicaragua and Grenada, however, cannot but be appreciated and applauded by the Soviets. Because of it, the Soviets are better able to justify to their domestic constituencies the aid extended to these countries. By the same token, as demonstrated by Jerry Hough, a debate is evolving among Soviet experts over the prospects for revolution in Latin America.¹¹

Politics

The USSR also has political objectives in the Third World. These appear to center on the fermentation and furtherance of "progressive" anti-American and anti-Chinese regimes. By exploiting growing anti-American currents, the Soviets hope to win influence at U.S. expense without directly projecting military power. Moreover, they hope to counter the activity of their other major rival, China, in such areas of the Third World as Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East; China's influence in Latin America is minimal. Although some Marxist groups in the region have sided with Maoism, most communist parties have taken a pro-Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet conflict, identifying Maoism with Trotskyism and adventurism.

Because the Soviets view Central America as the "strategic rear" of the United States,¹² they have until recently exercised caution in forming policy toward the region. From the Cuban revolution onward, however, they have challenged the Monroe Doctrine. As early as 1960, Khrushchev declared that "the Monroe Doctrine has outlived its times." U.S. acceptance of the Cuban revolution was proof that it had died "a

¹⁰M. F. Kudachkin, *Velikii Oktiabr' i kommunisticheskie partii Latinskoi Ameriki* [The Great October and Communist Parties of Latin America] (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978). The "anti-imperialist" strategy has also been argued for in many articles published in *Latinskaia Amerika* in the 1960s and the 1970s. There were, of course, some significant disagreements in formulating this strategy. These are well analyzed in a forthcoming book by Jerry Hough, to whom I am indebted for his comment.

¹¹For a very perceptive analysis, see Jerry F. Hough, "The Evolving Soviet Debate in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 124-143.

¹²S. Mishin, "Latin America: Two Trends of Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), July 1976, p. 450; Leon Gouré and Morris Rothenberg, *Soviet Penetration of Latin America* (Miami, Fla.: Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973).

natural death."¹³ In spite of this new attitude, Soviet strategy in Central America during the past two decades has been refined and subtle. It provides for a revolutionary transformation that can use violent methods while following a "peaceful road" (that is, a prolonged political process during which anti-American "progressive forces" build national coalitions to challenge U.S. hegemony). As pointed out in the Havana Declaration adopted at the 1975 regional conference of Latin American and Caribbean communist parties:

The utilization of all legal possibilities is an indispensable obligation of the anti-imperialist forces. . . . Revolutionaries are not the first to resort to violence. But it is the right and duty of all revolutionary forces to be ready to answer counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary violence.¹⁴

The formulation of Soviet strategy in the 1960s was affected significantly by the Soviet-Cuban dialogue and even by Soviet-Cuban disputes. In this period, the Cubans decided to promote revolution when the Organization of American States levied sanctions against them. They favored and at first even insisted on Soviet-Cuban support of revolutionary guerrilla movements in Latin American countries, with the exception of such friendly states as Mexico. By adhering to Che's and Regis Debray's concept of guerrilla-peasantry insurgency (see Debray's *Revolution in the Revolution?*), Castro's strategy in Central America in the 1960s contradicted and even challenged the Soviet doctrine allowing for diversified roads to socialism. Yet, as Herbert Dinerstein notes, in the late 1960s the Soviets and Cubans arrived at a kind of compromise strategy by making mutual concessions. Thus, the Soviets approved support for guerrilla activities in some Latin American countries with extremely pro-American and anticommunist regimes, while the Cubans gave their blessing to the pursuit of diplomacy with other, friendlier nations.¹⁵ Overall, the Cubans basically accepted the Soviets' more gradual and realistic "anti-imperialist" strategy.

Thus, in the 1970s diplomatic channels were pursued in Panama (where the late Omar Torrijos's dictatorial yet "progressive" regime was avidly courted by the Cubans and the Soviets), in Costa Rica to a certain degree, and rather more intensely in Mexico—both the latter being (in the Soviet view) liberal-democratic regimes. In the Caribbean proper, the Cubans courted the "progressive" Jamaican regime of Michael Manley. Available evidence suggests that the Soviets and Cubans

¹³Tass (Moscow), July 12, 1960.

¹⁴Declaration of the Conference of Communist Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean (Havana: 1975), p. 42.

¹⁵For an excellent analysis, see Herbert S. Dinerstein, *Soviet Policy in Latin America* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, May 1966), pp. 28-30.

have dissuaded the local communist parties and other leftist groups from trying to overthrow these regimes, encouraging them rather to expand their influence and work toward the greater goal of building "anti-imperialist" coalitions.

The Soviet and Cuban strategy in Central American countries having pro-American, anticommunist regimes—that is, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—has been to encourage revolutionary struggle, although not necessarily by fostering terrorism. In the late 1970s more emphasis was placed on revolutionary struggle than on peaceful coexistence. Yet even at that time the party's role was designated as one of gradual coalition-building among all revolutionary forces and of leadership of their struggle (insofar as possible). In the Soviet view, the "correlation of forces" in the 1970s was shifting worldwide because of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. In Central America, this shift manifested itself in a growing wave of radical anti-U.S. sentiment. This and the Soviets' greater military and economic capabilities paved the way for a more mature, assertive globalism in the Third World. Moreover, the 1973 ouster of Allende in Chile seems to have increased Soviet doubts about the feasibility of a "peaceful path" toward socialism in Latin America.¹⁶

Security

Another important component of the Soviet strategic vision regarding Central America and the Caribbean is concern over security. Soviet security objectives in the region fit into the overall "anti-imperialist" strategy of the USSR in the Third World. This strategy includes gradually securing access to and maintaining naval and air facilities in the Caribbean basin to improve the projection of Soviet influence, while undermining the influence of the West—particularly of the United States and its allies. The basin—a geopolitical concept—constitutes a key transit zone for oil and vital raw materials from Guatemala, Venezuela, and the Caribbean islands to the United States, as well as for all seagoing vessels approaching the Panama Canal. In an extreme case, such as wartime, a substantial Soviet military presence in the basin would endanger logistics support for U.S. allies in Europe and the delivery of oil and other strategic materials to the United States. During such times, Cuba, though highly vulnerable, might nevertheless serve as a forward base for submarines and aircraft carriers. In general the Soviets recognize the strategic importance of Latin America as an area of special security

¹⁶ Kudachkin, "The Experience of the Struggle of the Communist Party of Chile for Unity Among Leftist Forces and for Revolutionary Transformation," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 5, May 1976, pp. 72-76.

concern for the United States (much as Eastern Europe is for them). They see it as a sort of hinterland on whose stability freedom of U.S. action in other parts of the globe depends.¹⁷ Thus, Moscow remained passive throughout the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the U.S.-supported anti-Allende coup in Chile in 1973. Likewise, Washington took no action during the Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Thus far, the Soviet military presence in the region is limited by a lack of facilities necessary for permanent deployment. At present, the Soviets do not have sufficient strength in the region to disrupt the flow of oil to the United States, a scenario feared by some analysts. Moreover, they would probably attempt such action only in case of an all-out war.

Despite these limitations, the Soviets were able to establish a military presence in Cuba after 1961, one that has grown considerably in the past two decades. In return for Soviet financial and advanced technical assistance, the Soviets are today permitted to use modern docking facilities, potential submarine facilities in Cienfuegos, air facilities for reconnaissance aircraft, satellite stations, and sophisticated intelligence facilities for monitoring U.S. satellite and microwave conversations as well as NATO advanced weapons testing in the Atlantic. Since 1978, Soviet pilots have been flying MiG-27s on patrol missions in Cuba while Cuban pilots serve in Africa. Meanwhile, Soviet TU-95s conduct regular missions to monitor U.S. naval activities in the Atlantic. Thus, Cuba is a center for close Soviet-Cuban coordination in gathering intelligence information in the basin itself.

Although proceeding with caution, the Soviets would undoubtedly like to see their military presence in the Caribbean basin expanded. Witness the increasing number of Soviet submarine visits to Cuba since 1969, an indication of Soviet plans to make permanent use of the facilities at Cienfuegos, which were partly shelved in 1970 because of vociferous U.S. protests. The Soviets are trying to establish other strategic footholds in the area. In revolutionary Grenada, for instance, Soviet equipment and financial assistance from the USSR and Libya have enabled the Cubans to start building a new international airport capable of handling all types of jet aircraft, including the Soviet Backfire bomber. As the Cubans work to build a revolutionary army, the Soviets assist in developing and promoting a fishing industry on the island. After Sergei Gorshkov, commander-in-chief of the Soviet navy fleet, visited the island in 1980, there were unconfirmed reports about the Soviet intention to

¹⁷L. I. Kamynin, *International Affairs*, no. 3, 1967, p. 27-33.

build naval facilities there as well.¹⁰ The Soviets may be seeking similar facilities in Nicaragua.

Up to the present, in view of the Soviets' awareness of the basin's paramount importance to the United States, Soviet naval activities in the area, including regular visits by warships, seem to have been designed to establish the legitimacy of a Soviet naval presence. There have been twenty such visits by warships to the Caribbean in the past twelve years. During the most recent visit, in April 1981, the force included a cruiser equipped to carry small nuclear weapons. Besides warships, the Soviets deploy intelligence, fishing, and merchant vessels. They have also sponsored joint Soviet-Cuban marine cruises for the purpose of conducting fishery and oceanographic research as well as for gathering and establishing future channels of information. Soviet naval deployment is designed to help encourage long-term political and economic transformation of the area along the lines of what Gorshkov refers to as "progressive changes" offshore. In this respect, the security, political, and economic aspects of Soviet strategy in the region are mutually complementary, for Soviet naval visits to the Caribbean are facilitated by the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations. As the Soviets see it, "progressive changes" offshore make the environment more amenable to Soviet interests in the region.

Economics

Economic calculations also play a role in Soviet strategies in Central America. Soviet trade and investment in the region, although growing, are limited chiefly to Costa Rica, where the Soviets are apparently running a large deficit (like everyone else in Latin America). Since they generally have to pay for imports in hard currency, the Soviets would not be expected to view Central America as a priority interest in strictly economic terms. Soon, however, one may look for the Soviets to establish regular trade relations with the new regime in Nicaragua.

The discovery of natural resources—particularly in Guatemala, Mexico, and the Caribbean proper—have doubtless spurred increasing interest in the basin. Thus, the Soviets are working with the Mexicans on long-term cooperation in oil matters and may be interested in similar cooperation with other oil producers in the region. (Mexico has also agreed to supply crude oil to Cuba, to assist with Cuba's oil exploration efforts, and to help expand Cuban oil-refining facilities.) Soviet bloc

¹⁰Radio Paris, January 21, 1981, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Latin America), January 21, 1981.

trade and economic aid to such "progressive regimes" as the one in Nicaragua encourage the Soviet's overall "anti-imperialist" strategy in the area. The Soviets may calculate that in the long run Central America will offer a more lucrative opportunity for COMECON trade than do many of the much-courted African and Asian countries. A full COMECON member since 1972, Cuba can play a key role in this effort. The Soviets view Cuba as a useful instrument in restructuring the economic base of the Caribbean basin by reducing the preponderance of U.S.-based multinational corporations. Thus, the Soviets applauded Cuba's important role in founding the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) and the Latin American Economic System (SELA), cosponsored by Mexico and Venezuela. With Cuban help, COMECON was able in 1975 to work out a special agreement with Mexico that may soon be followed by a similar agreement with Nicaragua.

(2) *Cuba and Central America*

Two extreme views are current regarding the Soviet-Cuban alliance in the Third World. The first portrays Cuba as a surrogate of the USSR, merely carrying out Soviet orders. The second pictures Cuba as an almost totally unconstrained, autonomous actor, having its own independent strategic vision. As I have argued elsewhere, Cuba is neither of these.¹⁹ The view that Cuban policy is necessarily subservient to that of the USSR is unsophisticated and obscures the existence of mutual constraint and leverage in the alliance. While the USSR plays the dominant role and exercises great influence over Cuban foreign policy, Cuba in turn provides certain inputs into Soviet decisionmaking regarding the Third World. The degree of Cuban autonomy in the Third World seems to vary with the area of involvement. In Africa, Cuba appears to exercise little autonomy; in the Caribbean basin, Cuba's autonomy seems to be significant.

Even Soviet African policy, however, has been dependent to some extent on the willingness of Castro and his colleagues to provide ground forces for joint enterprises in Africa. In Angola and Ethiopia, unlike Afghanistan, the Soviets were cautious about committing their own troops in direct military fashion. The use of Soviet combat units might have elicited a firmer response from the United States, with resulting detrimental consequences for the USSR. Furthermore, the similarity of the physical environment of Africa, particularly in Angola, to that of Cuba and the presence of a substantial number of blacks and mulattos in the Cuban forces, who share a racial and cultural affinity with the black Africans,

¹⁹ See my "Comment: The Soviet-Cuban Alliance in Africa."

make the Cubans much more suitable for the task than the Soviets. Soviet strategic decisions regarding the Third World thus reflect, at least marginally, Cuba's desire to support revolutionary operations there and its willingness to supply the necessary manpower. Castro, who is currently president of the Nonaligned Movement, has exercised some influence on the USSR both directly (by consulting with Soviet leaders) and indirectly (by serving as a broker between Soviet and Third World leaders, many of whom admire Castro's courage, self-confidence, and personal charm). As in Africa, Castro can serve as a useful mediator between the USSR and Central American leaders because he is viewed by many radicals and revolutionaries in the region as a new type of leader, one signally worthy of being emulated and followed—if not as a second Bolívar, as a modern continental liberator.²⁰

Although Castro's foreign policy cannot be viewed as totally subservient to that of the USSR, it would be far-fetched to think of Cuba as an independent or even a semi-independent actor. The basic subordination of Cuban foreign policy to that of the Soviet Union seemed to be acknowledged at the First Cuban Party Congress of December 1975.²¹ Cuba's emergence as a major player in the Third World in the 1970s and early 1980s has been possible mainly because of growing Soviet military and economic power and Soviet willingness to exploit changes in the international system. More specifically, Cuban ascendancy in the Third World—particularly in Africa and the Middle East—in the 1970s and more recently in the Caribbean basin has been possible because of Soviet military-strategic cover and Cuba's expectation that Soviet support and protection will be forthcoming in the event of an attack on the island. Moreover, the Soviets subsidize the Cuban economy with an estimated \$7 million a day. Without this help, Cuba's faltering economy could never have absorbed the cost of the military intervention in Africa. Certainly in Africa the major portion of these expenses has been picked up by the Soviets or by the recipient countries, who in turn have received the money from the USSR.

Another important factor suggesting Soviet preponderance in the Soviet-Cuban alliance is the growing Soviet military and economic presence in Cuba of the 1970s. At present there are some 2,700 Soviet soldiers in Cuba as well as several thousand intelligence personnel, technicians, and other specialists. In addition to protecting sophisticated communications facilities, the Soviets train the Cuban armed forces.

²⁰ Edward Gonzales, *Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 220.

²¹ Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap, 1978), p. 149.

Cuba's dependence on the USSR in carrying out military operations in Africa was first demonstrated during the Angolan crisis of 1975-1976. The view that the Soviet role was confined chiefly to the supply of weaponry is mistaken. It is true that because of initial uncertainties regarding the U.S. response, the Soviets were cautious about committing themselves in a direct military fashion in Angola. Nevertheless, in early November 1975 they took over the Cuban air- and sealfift, transforming the Angolan campaign into a massive operation during which both the Soviet air force and navy were operationally active. A small yet effective Soviet naval task force provided physical and psychological support to the Cuban combat troops, protected the Cuban staging areas against local threats, served as a strategic cover for established sea and air communications, and worked as a deterrent against possible U.S. naval deployment. It is quite possible that if Moscow had not become so involved in Angola and if the South Africans had been encouraged actively by the United States to continue their blitz campaigns, the Cubans would have been defeated.

The alliance between the Soviets and the Cubans was even tighter in the case of the intervention in Ethiopia in 1977. While the Cubans initially functioned independently in Angola, four Soviet generals in Ethiopia ran the entire operation from start to finish. Cuba functioned as a very subordinate actor, if not a Soviet proxy, during the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in the Ogaden. Clearly, the Soviet leadership determines the limits of Cuban options in Africa. Although Cuba could choose not to become involved in a large-scale military operation with the USSR (the war in Eritrea), it could not undertake a substantial military operation without Soviet approval or support. Also, Cuba is highly vulnerable to Soviet politicoeconomic coercion, which the Soviet leaders used to their advantage in the late 1960s when they slowed down the supply of oil and arms in order to encourage Castro to appreciate the subtleties of Soviet "anti-imperialist" strategy. The Soviets are likely to use this leverage again should the need arise.

Cuba and the USSR basically agree regarding the joint coordination and implementation of strategy in the promotion of Soviet global interests and policies. Cuban strategic priorities, of course, are not necessarily identical to those of the Soviets. As a result, subtle and not so subtle differences tend to distinguish Soviet from Cuban policies. This is more the case in the Caribbean basin than in Africa. Although the basin is of marginal geopolitical importance to the USSR, it is of paramount importance to Cuba. The USSR is a superpower with global interests, responsibilities, and capabilities; Cuba, notwithstanding its abundant rhetoric, is basically a regional power, culturally and historically a part of the Latin American community. Nevertheless, Cuba's strategic vision extends

beyond Latin America to the broader spectrum of the Third World, with emphasis on the countries of Africa.

What ideological, political, security, and economic payoffs does Cuba expect for helping to promote a joint "anti-imperialist" strategy? Although Castro has never been renowned for his theoretical conceptualization of Marxism-Leninism, his ideological commitment to the revolutionaries in Africa and Central America would seem to be more genuine than that of the USSR. The Cuban revolution is young in comparison with the Soviets' 1917 October Revolution. Soviet strategic priorities are now forged under the close scrutiny of Central Committee bureaucrats, whereas a Cuban strategic vision arose out of the revolutionary war against Batista. Cuba maintains a strong ideological affinity with the Third World nations, one conditioned by common Latin and African ancestries, colonial legacies, and exploitation by outside powers. Thus, in Castro's words, Cuban support of revolution comes as a natural "result of our principles, our convictions, and our own blood."²² Castro, himself a sort of Red Robin Hood, has been a vehement and long-standing supporter of various revolutionary movements and a close friend of their leaders. Cuban support of revolutionary groups in Africa and Latin America has in most cases been consistent since 1960, without the ups and downs characteristic of Soviet support for some of these organizations.

The joint strategies pursued in Central America are important to Castro's regime for reasons other than ideology and cultural affinity. Although more ideologically motivated than the Soviets, Cuba has already witnessed the passing of an initial revolutionary exuberance and enthusiasm (aptly dubbed by Che Guevara "socialism with the *pachanga* [a Cuban dance]"). Today Castro has strong pragmatic security, political, and economic interests in pursuing a joint "anti-imperialist" strategy with the USSR. His objective in this close association is to ensure the survival of the Cuban revolution and to obtain further security guarantees for his state in the face of continuous U.S. hostility. Further, Castro's regime hopes to rebuild bridges to Central American countries, all of which supported the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States in 1962.

In political terms, Castro wants now more than ever to increase the prestige and influence of his regime in the Third World. Since the unpopular Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, many Third World countries have become less willing to accept Castro as leader of the nonaligned world and defender of progressive Third World regimes. They realize that a "natural alliance" with the USSR, as advocated by Castro, can also lead

²² Castro's speech at the Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, Radio Havana, December 22, 1975.

to an "unnatural death," as in the case of Afghan President H. Amin. Indeed, the situation in Afghanistan has had a detrimental political effect on Cuba's standing in the Third World and on Castro's ambitions for refurbishing the prestige of his regime and his personal image as the recognized leader of the Nonaligned Movement. Proof of this was the withdrawal of support by the nonaligned nations for the election of Cuba as Latin America's nonpermanent representative to the UN Security Council in 1980. It is not surprising, given this turn of events, that although Cuba voted against the UN resolution condemning the USSR, it made little effort to support or defend the Soviet rationale for the invasion, thereby signaling its frustration over Soviet policies there. Obviously displeased with the invasion, the Cuban leadership decided to give only qualified support to the USSR (as in the case of the Czechoslovak invasion of 1968). Unlike other Soviet allies, the Cubans did not object to the UN's right to deal with the Afghan question. This is a good illustration of Cuba's dilemma as both titular leader of the Nonaligned Movement and Soviet ally. Cuban aid to Nicaragua and support of the rebels in El Salvador in 1980-1981 have provided Castro with new opportunities for improving his image as an independent and fearless defender of revolution in the Third World.

Cuba also receives some economic payoffs in the Caribbean basin itself for its pursuit of an "anti-imperialist" strategy. Although economic relations with the Caribbean and Central American countries are modest, Cuban leaders, like their Soviet counterparts, may hope for more substantial relations in the future, perhaps similar to those now in effect with Mexico.

More important than the promise of future dividends are the actual economic payoffs to Cuba for its support of "anti-imperialist" strategies. Because Cuban willingness to deploy regular troops in Africa and to support the revolutionary forces in Nicaragua and El Salvador became indispensable to the implementation of Soviet "anti-imperialist" strategy in these regions, Cuba gained the status of a privileged ally and was able to insist on adjustments in Soviet-Cuban economic relations, although these are difficult to specify. Thus, in the aftermath of the invasion of Angola in 1975 and again after the intervention in Ethiopia in 1978, the Cubans obtained even more favorable agreements from the USSR. These operations and Cuban support for the Nicaraguan revolution and the guerrillas in El Salvador may have ensured continuation into the 1980s of Soviet subsidies of Cuban sugar and nickel production and of prices paid for petroleum. One source estimates that the USSR paid 44¢ a pound for Cuban sugar when the world market price for this commodity was about 10¢. (In 1979 alone Cuba sold four million tons of sugar to the

USSR.) The price that Cuba pays for oil is estimated to be about half that prevailing on the world market.²³

Castro may also expect to be rewarded by increased economic aid from the USSR, such as a rescheduling of repayment terms for the enormous Cuban debt, new credits, and an increase in commerce with the USSR. In addition, as indicated above, the USSR ensures a continuously stable market for a large part of Cuban output. The trade agreement signed in Moscow during the Cuban-orchestrated arms transfer to El Salvador provides for trade between Cuba and the USSR in 1980-1985 amounting to thirty billion rubles—a significant increase over the trade level of 1976-1980. The USSR has apparently pledged to supply all Cuba's oil during this period. To further facilitate the solution to Cuba's energy problems, the Soviets plan to build a nuclear power plant in Cuba from 1981 to 1985.

Another payoff for Cuban assistance in implementing the USSR's Third World policies has been the Soviet modernization of Cuba's armed forces with sophisticated weaponry. The Cuban forces (190,000 active-duty troops, 60,000 reservists) are now more formidable than any others in the basin, including those of Mexico. In the whole of Latin America they are second in size only to the armed forces of Brazil. Of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies, only Poland, which is four times the size of Cuba, has greater forces. Thanks to Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and MiG-23s, Cuba has the best-equipped air force in Latin America. Moreover, the Soviets have helped to build a small but modern and efficient Cuban coastal navy and merchant fleet. In the past few years, they have equipped the Cubans with seven guided-missile patrol boats, more than a dozen Turya-class patrol boats, several landing craft, and one Foxtrot and one Whiskey-class submarine, with another expected. The Cuban army, meanwhile, has been equipped with T-62 tanks of Soviet origin. The Soviet arms transfer to Cuba is relatively advanced in the overall context of the Soviet arms aid program.

In spite of past disagreements and existing differences, the Soviets and Cubans in the 1970s discovered that their strategies in the Third World, a subject of disagreement in the 1960s, were inexorably linked. Moscow has made enormous ideological, political, security, and economic investments in Cuba. To turn its back on Castro's regime now would seriously undermine Soviet strategies in Africa and in Central America. Likewise, Soviet strategic, economic, and political support is essential to Cuba. Cuba is too dependent on the USSR to try to alter the relationship, and it is still too committed to revolutionary change to do so.

²³ "Failure of the Cuban Economy" (editorial), *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), January 15, 1981.

Soviet and Cuban Tactics

(1) *The Nicaraguan Revolution*

For the jubilant Soviets and Cubans, the triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979 signaled an important juncture in the revolutionary transformation of the Caribbean basin, equal in importance only to the victory of the Fidelistas in Cuba twenty years earlier. In both cases, the United States was perceived by the Soviets as suffering a humiliating political defeat. In the view of such Soviet officials as V. Zagladin, deputy head of the international department of the Central Committee, the Nicaraguan revolution was one of the "starlets" of the "anti-imperialist" movement in Latin America. Zagladin has tried, at least implicitly, to link the "victory of Nicaragua" with Soviet-Cuban-supported "anti-imperialist" strategy, and has expressed the hope that Nicaragua will "have its continuators."²⁴ As during the Allende period (1971-1973), revolutionary change in Latin America has become a favorite topic in Moscow.

Was the triumph in Nicaragua indeed the result of coordinated Soviet-Cuban strategies and tactics in Central America, or of a complex interplay of internal and regional as well as external forces? Like the Cuban revolution in 1959, the revolution in Nicaragua was conditioned by various internal forces: the unpopularity of the Somoza regime among all classes, underdevelopment, unequal distribution of wealth, enormous poverty, and other deep social and economic cleavages. Nicaragua has long been dominated by dictators such as Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza (1936-1956) and his son Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza (1967-1979). Also, the great powers have traditionally played a role in national policymaking.²⁵ The fact that Nicaragua contains a promising site for an interocean canal and lies in close proximity to the existing Panama Canal has caused its foreign policy to be of some concern to the United States. Thus, U.S. strategic interests were largely the motivating force behind the U.S. intervention in 1912 and in 1927, when, except for a brief interlude from 1926-1927 until 1933, Nicaragua was virtually a U.S. protectorate.

U.S. interventionism in Nicaragua gave rise to a "Yankeeophobia" characterized by resentment of and even violent resistance to the United States. The human symbol of this resistance in 1927-1933 was Augusto César Sandino, who, like Castro in the 1950s, was a staunch radical nationalist and opposed both the corrupt dictatorship in his coun-

²⁴ Vadim Zagladin, "On the Threshold of the Eighties," *New Times*, January 1, 1980, pp. 5-7.

²⁵ Charles W. Anderson, "Nicaragua: The Somoza Dynasty," in Martin C. Needler, ed., *Political Systems of Latin America* (New York: Litton Educational Publishing, 1978), pp. 108-131.

try and what he saw as U.S. interference. Although the Soviet press exalted him in the early 1980s as an "anti-imperialist" hero, in the 1930s, the Soviets and the Comintern had denounced Sandino and his "rebel bands." The Soviets had condemned the U.S. intervention of 1927, but they had failed to display much admiration for the original Sandinistas; while Sandino had cooperated with the communists in the 1920s, he then denounced their activities in 1936. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Nicaragua, Sandino actually made peace with the Nicaraguan government. The Comintern meanwhile accused him of "capitulation . . . over to the side of the counter-revolutionary government."²⁶

Communism in Nicaragua, as elsewhere in Central America, has traditionally been a weak movement. In the past two decades, three Marxist parties have existed in Nicaragua—all of them illegal and clandestine, or semiclandestine: a very small Maoist group, the anti-Soviet Communist party of Nicaragua, and the pro-Soviet Socialist party of Nicaragua (PSN), a semiclandestine organization founded in 1937 and never boasting more than 250 members. Some members of the PSN had links with the Sandinistas in the 1960s and 1970s, but the PSN was not the main force behind the revolution. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded in 1961 by radical, left-leaning nationalists led by the late Carlos Fonseca Amador, who, though not a communist, had visited the USSR in 1957. The Sandinistas, inspired and supported from the very beginning by Castro, tried to overthrow the Somoza regime but were soon crushed by the National Guard. In time, the FSLN evolved into a conglomerate of Marxist and non-Marxist elements united under an anti-Somoza banner, yet still separate from the PSN. Although Amador later died while fighting Somoza, the Sandinistas continued their struggle in the 1970s, with only limited support from the USSR and Cuba. (Cuba actually sent material aid to the Somoza regime following the earthquake in 1972.) Despite the fact that the revolutionary struggle in Nicaragua coincided with Soviet-Cuban "anti-imperialist" strategy, geographic remoteness and general pessimism about the prospects for revolution in Latin America following the anti-Allende coupe of 1973 caused the Cubans and Soviets to be rather pessimistic about the prospects of the Sandinista struggle. An additional, probable reason for the Soviets' low-keyed support up to 1979 was Soviet and Cuban military involvement in Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in the Third World, as well as events in Afghanistan—all of which occupied the greater part of Soviet attention from 1975 to 1979. Soviet support of the FSLN continued to be modest even as late as 1978,

²⁶ Compare "USSR-Nicaragua: Building Cooperation," *New Times*, March 1980, pp. 13-14, with "Struggles of the Communist Parties of South and Caribbean America," *The Communist International*, vol. 12, no. 10, May 20, 1935, pp. 564-576. See, also, Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, pp. 347-378.

when a unified FSLN directorate brought together in one coalition all the guerrilla factions, whose struggle had begun to assume a genuinely revolutionary character. Even during this high point, the role of the PSN was limited mainly to propaganda support, clandestine radio broadcasts, and some financial aid.

Although by 1978 the Soviets probably knew of Somoza's critical situation, they may have thought that President Carter, despite his human rights rhetoric, would not let Somoza fall. Nevertheless, in the 1970s the Cubans, with Soviet blessings and perhaps even financial help, were training the FSLN in Cuba and providing them with arms (primarily rifles) and money.²⁷ However, the FSLN was securing weapons from elsewhere as well. Evidence at this time is insufficient to suggest that the Soviets and Cubans coordinated arms transfers for the Sandinistas as they were to do for the guerrillas in El Salvador in 1980; still, we do know that some weapons flowed from Cuba to the FSLN by way of such Third World countries as Costa Rica and Panama. We also know that the FSLN used weapons from Venezuela, Panama, the Middle East, and, as the Sandinistas maintain, from Mafia sources in the United States and Europe. Although many guerrillas were trained in Cuba, there is no evidence that Cubans were involved in command and control functions for the Sandinistas before early 1979. The Cuban factor was important but it was not crucial.

The Sandinistas also received active political, economic, and moral support from various groups in Venezuela, Panama, and Mexico, and found sanctuaries and a place to train on the territory of democratic Costa Rica. The Costa Rican capital of San José was the site of the FSLN government in exile. Leftists from other Central American countries, such as the Victoriano Lorenzo Brigade from Panama and various groups from Costa Rica, fought alongside FSLN forces in Nicaragua.²⁸

The Cubans and particularly the Soviets exercised considerable caution prior to the Sandinista victory of 1979. Indeed, the Soviets published few analyses of the Nicaraguan struggle, and only in 1978 did the Soviets and Cubans begin to reassess the chances for a successful revolution. In early 1979 the Cubans finally set up intelligence headquarters in Costa Rica to monitor the anti-Somoza struggle and sent military personnel to advise the Sandinistas. Within months of the Sandinistas' assumption of power on July 19, 1979, Castro sent Cuban specialists in significant numbers to help with the reconstruction of Nicaragua: 1,200

²⁷ See statement of W. H. Duncan, a vice-president with the American Chamber of Commerce of Latin America in Nicaragua, in U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Central America at the Crossroads*, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on American Affairs, September 11-12, 1979, p. 47.

²⁸ James N. Goodsell, "Nicaragua," in R. F. Starr, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, 1979 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), pp. 369-371.

teachers, 250 doctors and health personnel, technicians, some security and propaganda experts, and forces of construction workers to build a road uniting Nicaragua's east and west. At the same time, Castro reportedly cautioned the Sandinistas not to push their socialist program too far or too fast. The Cubans perceived the victory of the Sandinistas as an opportunity for them to pursue their own strategic objectives in Nicaragua as well as elsewhere in the region. Unlike the case in the 1960s, the risks of Cuban involvement seemed to be low both because of apparent U.S. inability to intervene and because the United States basically opposed Somoza and recognized the Sandinistas.

In contrast to the Cubans, the Soviets were typically guarded in their willingness to make commitments to the new Sandinista regime, as they had been in 1959 to Cuba. The only Soviet initiative at this time was the provision of emergency donations in the weeks following the overthrow of Somoza. These were much smaller, however, than U.S., Mexican, and Venezuelan donations during the period. Only after a gradual reassessment of their options did the Soviets decide to become more assertive in Nicaragua. This "new chapter," as the Soviets called it, opened in March 1980 during the first high-level visit of Sandinistas to the USSR since the overthrow of Somoza.²⁹ Subsequently, the Soviets concluded various economic, technical, and trade agreements, mainly in the areas of fishing and marine affairs, water-power resources, mining and geological surveys, communications, and air traffic. The FSLN and the CPSU also agreed on future party-to-party contracts, apparently along the same lines pursued by the Soviets with other revolutionary organizations whom they consider to be reliable, long-term partners, such as the regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. By the spring of 1981 the Soviets, Cubans, and East Europeans (particularly the East Germans and Bulgarians) had concluded several other related agreements with Nicaragua for economic aid (including the donation of 20,000 tons of wheat), scientific and cultural cooperation, and technical assistance in telecommunications, agriculture, and transportation. There were also signs of future military cooperation, as evidenced by the Soviet loan of a few helicopters to the FSLN and by East Germany's credit sale to the FSLN of 800 military trucks. As the crisis in neighboring El Salvador began to mount in late 1980, there were also unconfirmed reports of the influx of additional Cuban military officials into Nicaragua (officials who were supposedly running training camps) and of the transfer of tanks and helicopters, possibly for use in El Salvador. Western reports that the Soviets were building naval facilities in Nicaragua were denied by the Soviet ambassador to Nicaragua, G.

²⁹ See "USSR-Nicaragua: Building Cooperation."

Schlyapnikov. The Nicaraguan government, however, has confirmed that a Soviet floating workshop, designed for repairing ships, will be operating off the Pacific coast of Nicaragua.³⁰

(2) *El Salvador*

How do Soviet and Cuban perceptions of the crisis in Nicaragua (before the overthrow of Somoza) compare with their perceptions of the ongoing crisis in El Salvador? What similarities and differences can be seen in Soviet and Cuban tactics with regard to these two countries? The victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua prompted the Soviets to anticipate a chain reaction of leftist upheavals and revolutions throughout Central America. Thus, in an important speech on October 20, 1980, B. Ponomarev, candidate Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, added the countries of Central America to the list of states in Africa and Asia that could be expected to undergo revolutionary changes of "a socialist orientation." Ponomarev described the revolution in Nicaragua as a "major success" and compared it with the revolution in Angola and Ethiopia.³¹ Professor Viktor Volskii, president of the Soviet Association of Friendship with Latin American Countries, assessed the Nicaraguan revolution as a "triumph for the people of Latin America and the Caribbean" and a "model for all peoples fighting for liberation."³²

After Nicaragua, the Central American country singled out by Soviet writers as being most pregnant with revolutionary opportunities was, of course, El Salvador, which the Soviets see as occupying "an important strategic position in the region."³³ Like Nicaragua, El Salvador has a strong heritage of instability caused by a rigid class structure, unequal distribution of wealth, and 30 per cent unemployment. In El Salvador—the smallest yet most densely populated country in Latin America (400 people per square mile)—the socioeconomic life has been dominated by an oligarchy of wealthy families while military strongmen have controlled the country's politics.

In El Salvador, as in Nicaragua, the communist movement has been very weak. The pro-Soviet Communist party in El Salvador (PCES), founded in 1930, was actively involved in a massive peasant insurrection in 1932, which was crushed by the military and resulted in 30,000 deaths.

³⁰ *Baltimore Sun*, February 26, 1981; *La Prensa* (Managua), July 30, 1980; *The News Gazette* (San Salvador), February 1-7, 1981; *Prela* (Havana), April 26, 1981, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Latin America), April 29, 1981; Managua Radio, March 27, 1981, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Latin America), March 30, 1981.

³¹ Ponomarev's report can be found in *Kommunist*, no. 6, November 1980, pp. 30-44.

³² Moscow Radio, July 17, 1980.

³³ V. Korionov, "El Salvador: The Struggle Sharpens," *Pravda*, December 30, 1980; and Russian Tushnin, "Reign of Terror," *New Times*, April 1980, pp. 9-11.

Since that time, the PCES has been an illegal, clandestine organization. As late as 1979, it had only 225 members. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the PCES, like the PSN, had to compete with more radical and relatively larger groups such as the Maoist-leaning People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Trotskyite Popular Liberation Force (FPL). The latter organizations, and not the minuscule PCES, were responsible for the organized terrorism and guerrilla activities of the 1970s. In fact, the well-known General Secretary of the PCES Schafik Jorge Handal published a severe critique of these groups in the Soviet journal *Latinskaia Amerika* in early 1979, before the fall of Somoza. He accused them of violence and nihilism.³⁴

Unlike those in Nicaragua, the various guerrilla factions in El Salvador have not yet united, in spite of rhetoric to the contrary. In El Salvador there is no Sandinista legacy. In contrast to the meager support given the Nicaraguan party, Soviet public support of the PCES has been strong, particularly of its leader Handal, who seems to be following the Soviets' tactical advice. With the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the increase in political violence in El Salvador, the PCES and the Soviets have become more optimistic about the revolutionary potential of the region, especially in El Salvador. These changing perceptions are certainly shared by the Cubans. Although in their public reports the Cubans continue to be somewhat more cautious than the Soviets, they nevertheless have begun to increase their direct support to the various competing guerrilla factions. In addition, they have played an important role in minimizing factional differences and in trying to unite the various groups.³⁵

The Soviets, for their part, have proceeded with deliberation. Although they promised initially, during a meeting organized by Castro in Havana in December 1979, to supply weapons to the guerrillas, only in the spring and summer of 1980 did they switch completely to the new support tactics, agreeing to provide the military training of a few dozen Salvadoran youths. This change in tactics was reflected by the pro-Soviet PCES endorsement of violent revolution at its Seventh National Congress in May 1980. As noted above, up to that time the PCES opposed armed struggle and terrorism as revolutionary means in El Salvador. In the fall of 1979, though jubilant over the victory in Nicaragua, Handal was cautious about commenting on prospects for revolution in El Salvador. In April 1980, however, he became much more optimistic and, according to

³⁴ Thomas P. Anderson, "El Salvador," in Starr, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, 1979, pp. 347-348. See, also, Anderson's analysis in Starr, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, 1980, pp. 354-355.

³⁵ "Communist Interference in El Salvador," *Special Report*, no. 80 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, February 23, 1981).

Soviet sources, expressed "confidence" in the "defeat of internal reaction, despite the fact that the latter is backed by imperialist forces."³⁶

The example of Nicaragua, however important, was not the only motive for the changing perceptions and tactics of the PCES and the Soviets in the spring of 1980. Both the Soviets and the Cubans probably feared that if the PCES did not use violence to implement its "anti-imperialist" strategy it would soon be overtaken by its more radical rivals, who were quickly gaining popular strength. The PCES, they reasoned, should not be suddenly surprised by successes of the noncommunist guerrillas and deprived thereby of responsibility for the victory, as happened in Nicaragua to the PSN, who were outshone by the Sandinistas. Thus, Cuban and Soviet tactics since the spring of 1980 have been directed at transforming the numerically small PCES into a leading force in the guerrilla struggle in El Salvador.

Soviet assessment of the U.S. ability to maintain hegemony in the region also seems to have changed. Despite the examples of the Cuban revolution, as noted, the Soviets continued to believe throughout the 1960s and 1970s that the United States had the ability and will to challenge outright revolution in Central America. In Nicaragua, however, the U.S. administration made one mistake after another. It failed to break completely with Somoza, and it tried too late to modify the outcome of a Sandinistan victory. A Soviet analyst, quoting an anonymous official in Washington, wrote in July 1980 that the Carter administration was "too late and too indecisive" with its intervention in the Nicaraguan crisis, that it therefore could not prevent the complete victory of the Sandinistas, and that "a different course of action" must be taken by the United States in El Salvador.³⁷ According to this analyst, the situation in El Salvador, which was arousing the "anxiety" of American strategists, was even more "tense" than in Nicaragua before the fall of Somoza.

The main Soviet reason for fomenting turmoil in El Salvador is probably to pin down the United States in its "strategic rear," as the opportunity presents itself. Developments in El Salvador may also be linked to Soviet-perceived changes in Soviet-American relations in the wake of the Iranian and Afghan crises in late 1979. In the Soviet view, as I have argued elsewhere, the U.S. administration was veering toward a dangerous new cold war by encouraging a semialliance with China,

³⁶ Interview with Handal, Tass (Moscow), October 22, 1980; V. Dolgov, "Mounting Struggle," *New Times*, April 1980, p. 11. In November of the same year, the leading theoretical journal of the CPSU published a lengthy article by Handal in praise of the guerrilla struggle. (See "Na puti k svobode" [On the Road to Liberty], *Kommunist*, no. 17, November 1980, pp. 94-103.)

³⁷ Ye. V. Mityayeva, "The United States Interference in El Salvador," *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, no. 7, July 1980, pp. 60-64.

threatening Iran, and sabotaging SALT II negotiations.³⁸ Most grievous in the Soviet view was U.S., Chinese, and Egyptian "allied" support of the Afghan rebels with Soviet-made weapons. (Whether or not this was true in 1979 is still a matter of speculation; the Soviets profess to have believed that it was, and sometimes the perceptions of policymakers are more important than the facts.) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a matter of necessity as the Soviets saw it, was met with retaliatory policies by the zigzagging Carter administration aimed at further punishing the USSR. After Nicaragua, the Soviets may have thought that El Salvador provided an easily exploitable opportunity in the same geographic proximity to the United States as Afghanistan is to the USSR. The idea of making El Salvador an "American Afghanistan" in retaliation for perceived U.S.-Chinese-Egyptian support for the Afghan rebels, and using the issue as a bargaining chip in future negotiations, may have played a part in the Soviet decision to back the Cuban orchestration of support for the guerrilla struggle.

One can only speculate, of course, on the motives for the Soviet decision. Nevertheless, the facts of the story are well known. Unlike the case in Nicaragua, the Cuban orchestration of the supply of armaments from Soviet allied countries has been significant. It appears that the Soviet-backed involvement of Cuba has significantly strengthened the guerrillas in El Salvador. Handal's search for arms in the East, which seems to be well documented by the U.S. administration, began around the time of the Seventh Congress of the PCES, during which a passive line was exchanged for one of organized violence intended to topple a government. After the congress, the Cubans took charge of clandestine operations in El Salvador and Castro actively assumed the role of broker in attempting to unify the various revolutionary groups. In June and July, with the assistance of Soviet officials responsible for Third World affairs in the Soviet Secretariat (such as K. Brutens and his deputy Kudachkin), Handal visited the USSR and certain East European countries, and obtained American-made weapons (M-14 and M-16 rifles, M-79 grenades) from Vietnam and Ethiopia, countries with large stocks of U.S. weapons. Thus, the USSR could, by proceeding with caution, deny its involvement if accused. East European allies (minus Poland and Rumania) promised to provide communications equipment, uniforms, and medical supplies, while the Soviets helped to arrange for the transport of the weapons to Cuba in the fall of 1980. From Cuba, the weapons were conveyed to Nicaragua, and from there directly by ship or air, or by land through Honduras, to El Salvador. Following the U.S. presidential elections, Cuban experts, with cautious yet active Soviet backing, played a key role

³⁸ See J. Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul," *International Security*, Fall 1980, pp. 114-141.

in the arms transfer and the preparation of the "final" guerrilla offensive. A U.S. State Department report concludes: "The political direction, organization, and arming of the insurgency is coordinated and heavily influenced by Cuba—with active support of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Vietnam, and other Communist states."³⁰

Conclusions

The joint strategy for dealing with Third World countries worked out by the USSR and Cuba in the late 1960s and 1970s is not necessarily designed to create Marxist-Leninist regimes in these countries but rather to achieve a variety of "anti-imperialist" ideological, political, security, and economic objectives. Soviet and Cuban strategic visions have not always been identical, particularly in the 1960s when there were serious disagreements regarding doctrine and tactics. As recent Soviet-Cuban policies in Africa and Central America attest, however, most of these differences have now been overcome. Although Cuba is not subservient to the USSR, for a variety of reasons its foreign policies are basically dependent upon Soviet support (Africa) or linked to Soviet foreign policy (Central America). The Soviets and the Cubans seem to have linked strategic visions regarding Central America. Although the Soviets are newcomers there, with Cuban help they have been able to exploit the socioeconomic malaise and anti-U.S. sentiment characteristic of the region. In doing so, they have employed a variety of tactics: peaceful and legal, violent, or often combinations of both.

Undoubtedly, deep socioeconomic cleavages are the main cause of the ongoing crisis in Central America, particularly in the countries located in the northern tier: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and, to a certain degree, Honduras. The more southern countries of Costa Rica and Panama do not have such pronounced social problems, but they face severe economic difficulties (particularly Costa Rica) and are by no means immune to revolutionary change. The civil war in El Salvador could escalate into a regional war, perhaps even leading to the involvement of Mexico and Venezuela, with Guatemala and Honduras assisting the regime, and Nicaragua and Cuba assisting the guerrillas.

Internal forces were the main impetus for local insurgency and revolution in Nicaragua in 1979; the Soviets and Cubans were deeply involved in Africa prior to 1978-1979, when the insurgency peaked, and

³⁰ "Communist Interference in El Salvador," *Special Report*, no. 80. Although several critics have rightly pointed out inconsistencies in this report, none has proved that it is a forgery or that the USSR and other communist countries did not actively support Cuban assistance to the guerrillas of El Salvador. For a critique of the report, see T. Segel, *Washington Star*, May 18, 1981, and James Petras, *The Nation*, March 28, 1981.

their involvement in Nicaragua was marginal. Afterward, however, the Nicaraguan revolution became an inspiration to other revolutionaries in the region and a catalyst in changing the perceptions and tactics of the USSR and Cuba. Both countries seem to have believed that the Nicaraguan "example" could be repeated soon in "strategically located" El Salvador. The dramatic change in Soviet and Cuban tactics in the spring of 1980, after the Nicaraguan revolution, is proof of their flexibility in the implementation of "anti-imperialist" strategy.

Although the socioeconomic problems in Nicaragua and El Salvador are similar, there are profound differences between the political situations in the two countries. Nicaragua's revolution was more genuine, in that it expressed the will of a majority of the people in overthrowing the hated dictatorship of Somoza, while El Salvador's revolution is less genuine, having significant Cuban support with cautious backing from the Soviets. Both Cuba and the Soviet Union supported, if not encouraged beforehand, a dramatic change in the tactics of El Salvador's Communist party in May 1980 and facilitated an impressive arms transfer in the fall of the same year. In late 1980 the guerrillas in El Salvador announced the creation of a united liberation front—the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Front—whose general command includes Handal. Although the so-called final offensive in early 1981 failed, El Salvador may still develop into a "second Nicaragua." Up to now, however, the guerrilla offensive in El Salvador has failed to spark a popular insurrection of the Nicaraguan kind; the majority of the people do not appear to support the leftist guerrillas. One can "spur" revolutionary struggles,⁴⁰ but one cannot sustain them without genuine popular support.

The vigorous Soviet and Cuban support of Salvadoran leftists and the new closer relationship with Nicaragua since last year are the result of more than a preconceived strategy. They also illustrate Soviet and Cuban tactical skill in exploiting opportunities. In the case of Nicaragua, such an opportunity was furnished by the hesitancy of the U.S. Congress in providing aid to that country and U.S. failure to assume a more active role.

The Soviet position in El Salvador may go beyond the desire to exploit revolutionary opportunities. It may be that by taking a tough stand concerning that country, Moscow is trying to pin Washington down and eventually place itself in a position to bargain on other issues, such as Afghanistan and Poland. The internal situations in both of these border

⁴⁰One is reminded of the eloquent words of José Martí, Cuba's national hero: "The Russians are the ship of reform. But these impatient and generous men, darkened as they are by anger, are not the ones who are going to lay the foundation for the new world. They are the spur, and they come in time as the voice of man's conscience. But the steel that makes a good spur will not do for the builder's hammer." (1883)

countries are causing the Soviet Union serious problems, which it has attributed to outside provocation and assistance. It may be, as suggested by some Central American observers, that Soviet tactics in El Salvador are being used to divert Western attention from Soviet domestic failures and the problems faced in Poland and Afghanistan, in order to prepare a hardening of Soviet policies in these countries, perhaps including some kind of intervention in Poland. In exchange for U.S. acquiescence to such hard-line policies, Moscow would change its tactics in El Salvador. The Soviet leadership appears to link the crises in Poland and Central America. Indeed, while delivering an important speech on the Polish crisis on April 7, 1981, Brezhnev unexpectedly concluded his remarks by stressing the Soviets' role as protector of Cuba's security.⁴¹

As of the fall of 1981, any firm conclusions about the outcome of the struggle in El Salvador are, of course, premature. Indeed, a number of internal and external constraints could mitigate assertive Cuban and Soviet implementation of "anti-imperialist" strategy in the Caribbean basin. The Cuban economic situation has reached its lowest level since the revolution, despite massive Soviet economic support. The economic malaise, to which the costly African adventures have certainly contributed, led in early 1980 to a radical reorganization of the Cuban government and the rationing of essentials. Public resentment was further fed by the soaring cost of living, culminating in open dissent in the spring of 1980: more than 10,000 Cuban dissidents sought asylum in the Peruvian embassy in Havana and subsequently emigrated to the United States. Cuban economic difficulties, however, failed to elicit any major antiwar movement, or, for that matter, any visible opposition or even political debate. Despite the difficulties arising from its alliance with the Soviet Union, Cuba in 1980-1981 has succeeded in maintaining its overseas commitments and even in expanding them, as seen in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

Furthermore, local conditions in the Caribbean basin may not always favor revolutionary upheaval and its exploitation by the Cubans and the Soviets. A crucial setback for them was the October 1980 defeat of the left-leaning regime of Manley in Jamaica by the more pro-Western Edward Seaga. In recent years, Soviet economic backing had allowed the Cubans to expand their influence in Jamaica. Like Nicaragua and Grenada, Jamaica was offered financial credits by Cuba (perhaps with Soviet help) and the assistance of several hundred Cuban civilian teachers, technicians, and construction workers, as well as of some security officials to train the Jamaican security forces. Additional setbacks in the region in-

⁴¹ See Brezhnev's speech delivered at the Sixteenth Party Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Prague, in *Pravda*, April 8, 1981.

clude the electoral defeats of other parties with close Cuban ties on the small Caribbean islands of St. Vincent, Dominica, and Antigua.

Vigorous Cuban involvement in Africa and the Caribbean basin can also be constrained by the Soviets themselves, whose support determines the limits of Cuban assertiveness in the Third World. Given Soviet preoccupation with the Polish crisis, the continuing resistance of Muslim rebels in Afghanistan, and the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, Soviet concerns in the next year may be directed toward Eastern Europe and the strategic "arc of instability" to the south of the Soviet borders in Asia (that is, Afghanistan and Iran). A significant shift in Soviet priorities could have a significant effect on Cuban foreign policy. Hence, Castro reportedly believes that Moscow is being too "patient" with Poland; he has repeatedly assaulted the Polish free trade unions, whose activities, he says, are prompted by "imperialistic provocation."⁴² This should come as no surprise. Continuous Soviet preoccupation with Poland and Afghanistan could impose hard choices on the Soviet leadership with regard to its strategy in the Third World, including Cuba. What effect will all this have on Soviet-Cuban commitments in other parts of the Third World, particularly in Angola and Ethiopia, but also in Central America? How long can Soviet-backed Cuban deployment in Angola and Ethiopia be maintained, and how effectively? These questions, for which there are no pat answers, are probably being posed now by foreign policy experts in the Soviet Union who may feel that Caribbean and Central American anti-U.S. nationalism simply cannot be exploited as vigorously as the Cuban leaders believe, at least not in the foreseeable future.

The most important factor affecting Soviet-Cuban strategy in Central America is the future course of U.S. policy vis-à-vis the USSR and Cuba. In the wake of the Vietnam debacle, Cuban and Soviet activities seemed hardly constrained by the United States, because of the unwillingness of the American public and Congress to support a forceful response to such assertive behavior. This point was well demonstrated during the Angolan and Ethiopian interventions. It seems that the political mood in the United States is now changing, as demonstrated in some degree by the election of Reagan, who back in 1980 suggested a naval blockade of Cuba as a response to the invasion of Afghanistan. In early 1981 Reagan and his advisers repeatedly warned that the United States would take all measures necessary to stop the arms transfer to El Salvador, not excluding actions against Cuba. These threats were taken seriously by the Cubans, who in

⁴² Radio Madrid, December 5, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Latin America), December 5, 1980, and Castro's speech at the Twenty-sixth Party Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Latin America), February 24, 1981.

late 1980 had decided to organize a territorial militia defense system. One thing is almost certain: the Soviets themselves are not going to undertake a direct military intervention in Central America. They still do not have the capability to do so effectively, in spite of what they see as a "weakening of U.S. hegemony" in the region.

Although U.S. emergency military aid to El Salvador is justifiable in the light of Soviet-Cuban involvement, the Reagan administration would be well advised to follow military aid to El Salvador with immediate comprehensive economic, financial, and technical assistance not only there but also to several other Central American nations. The roots of the problems in the region are socioeconomic. They call for a kind of "new Marshall Plan" in support of profound structural reforms. The United States should take the initiative in protecting its interests by a variety of means that include—but go beyond—the emergency first-aid measures needed to arrest Soviet-Cuban "anti-imperialist" strategy in Central America.

NON-INTERVENTION: A LIBERTARIAN APPROACH TO DEFENSE

We must realize the world is no longer in our control and adapt accordingly.

by Earl C. Ravenal

The 1976 contest between the two major parties took some strange turns, but it was normal in its indulgence in hypocrisy—the gap between the inevitable promises and the predictable performance. But the really important hypocrisy in political behavior—especially in the conduct of foreign policy—is the suppression of costs and the entertainment of contradictions.

IGNORING COSTS

As for costs, many of us care about what our government does with our money. Many would prefer that we stop defending other countries, for themselves, and put the resources that might

be saved back in the pockets of the people from whom they were taken. This sensible notion is often called simplistic and naive, especially by the captive professors of foreign policy, the average area specialists, and the executives and lawyers and investment bankers of American-based foreign-oriented multinational firms—the reservoirs that provide a disproportionate share of governmental foreign policy advisors. These people gather in their habitual circles and ruminate on the “necessity” of maintaining our expensive alliances with 50 or so countries around the globe, never reckoning or mentioning what it might cost.

Take Korea, for example. One of those tedious foreign policy discussions—by a professor, a Korea specialist—was recently presented to one of those organizations that constitute the foreign policy community. As one might expect, the chances of ever ransoming our troops and weapons from the Korean peninsula, 30 years after their introduction there, were rated as dim. The option of disengagement was mentioned—just long enough to invite something between condemnation and ridicule. Needless to say, there was no mention of the costs of this virtually permanent deployment. And if the professor were invited to estimate the costs, he would undoubtedly understate them by a factor of ten. Well, the full cost of our Korean commitment, including the “tail” of forces that stretches back across the Pacific and the continental United States and including all the overhead, is (in current dollars) \$5 billion a year.

When are we going to have foreign

policy “makers” and advisors who can calculate costs and trade-offs and make elemental investment decisions? And when are we going to have institutions that allow these decisions to be put to the people: Would you rather pay \$100 every year per average family to defend South Korea, or would you rather take the money and buy something you want—assuming the government doesn’t contrive to take it back in some other way?

WHOSE CONSENSUS?

The other hypocrisy is the entertainment of contradiction. The platforms of both major parties are rife with it. One party—the Republican—says that we can suppress inflation and yet increase defense budgets by 10 to 15 billion dollars each year. The other party says that we can have global influence, and even a new license to become the world’s moral policeman, and yet save defense dollars.

During the campaign season and the primary season that preceded it, all sorts of “advisory groups” constituted themselves to influence candidates on foreign policy. The real function of these groups was to re-create the “consensus” of foreign policy elites after the supposed schism of Vietnam. But this revived consensus is built on the spanning of contradictions. It is nothing but a laundry list of predilections, an amalgamation of foreign policy “goals”—nice things that they would like to see happen—that in

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most cases contradict one another.

Here is an example of the goals of one such advisory group (a *New York Times* editorial called them "reassuring"):

"Vigorous pursuit of detente"...but "without making any inequitable concessions to the Soviets."

"Establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China"...but "without abandoning Taiwan."

"U.S. support for defending human rights more vigorously...advocating our own democratic values against competing ideological systems"...but "without being preacher or policeman."

After enumerating these pairs of contradictions, the report exults in the fact that "there is such widespread agreement on principles." But, with a slight twinge of apprehension, it notes that many of the authors of the document "perceive unusual disarray in our foreign policy." It ascribes this "apparent confusion" to the complexity of the issues, the parochialism of foreign policy professionals, and a certain disagreement on the implementation of the principles. It spares us from the thought that "principles" that embody essential contradictions cannot be implemented at all; as soon as they are challenged by events, they are bound to produce "disarray." But the report concludes, happily, that "the most basic foreign policy task of any future administration must be the 'successful management of contradictions' in a manner that elicits public support"—itself a double contradiction, as well as a statement that is breathtaking in its optimism and audacity.

The largest contradiction of all is between our global pretensions and our constitutional system. How to resolve this constitutional problem will not be found in public opinion surveys (Q: "Do you think we should abandon our responsible role in the world and revert to an isolationist, Fortress America posture?" A: "Heavens, no!") Nor will it be found in the wishful thinking of those elites who are not under the stress of real choices. The answer will lie in the logic of national decision—how the real choices of the people filter through our political system. People do not articulate their real

positions verbally, in advance. It may well be that on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays they think about the "threats" and responses; and on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays they count the costs—taxes, conscription, and infringements on civil liberties. But these things do come together, inexorably, in our complex political process.

The trouble is not—as the foreign policy elites are fond of saying—that the people are ignorant and without views. The people do have implicit stands. Most important, they have a sense of limits, in every significant area of foreign and military policy. The trouble is, first, that they don't know, in advance, what things cost—for example, what it really costs to defend Europe, Asia, and other areas of the world. Second, they don't know the wiring diagram—how commitments, contingencies, bases, forces, weapons systems, and costs are related. Third, and perhaps most important, they don't have a sense of their political competence, particularly in the foreign policy area. Much of the blame for this falls directly on the elites, who believe in the autonomy of foreign policy—that it does not, and should not, have anything to do with domestic affairs, and particularly with the expressions of ordinary citizens. What they really mean by a "nonpartisan" or "bipartisan" foreign policy is: don't disturb our monopoly on the discussion, let alone the practice, of international relations.

NONINTERVENTIONISM

The people, if they were allowed to "know" their own views, might turn out to favor a noninterventionist foreign policy, in the sense that they would be unwilling to pay the costs and take the risks of the present interventionist foreign policy. Comparing the costs and benefits of intervention (and of maintaining the capability to execute it) with other objectives, including domestic, does not require experts. It is a political judgment. The American people, and their representatives in Congress, should be encouraged to develop some confidence in making this judgment.

What would a noninterventionist foreign policy be like? What would be its elements, its logic, its implications for domestic affairs such as the Federal budget, the character of our political system, and the integrity of our individual liberties?

There is a certain irreducible basis for our foreign and national security policy: the avoidance of direct conflict between the United States and any antagonist that has a strategic nuclear force sufficient to destroy directly a significant part of our homeland. (At present, there is such an antagonist, and only one—the Soviet Union.) That is our fundamental, "vital" security interest—the source of any others.

There is a derived proposition, which bears on the question of limited conventional war: we should not edge near the substantial possibility of nuclear confrontation. Some think that this implies an extended forward defense, all over the globe. But I would maintain that the avoidance of nuclear war is better served by avoiding lower-level, regional conflicts, since escalation to nuclear war is more likely from regional conflict than from a situation of disengagement. The trouble, for the formulation of national security policy, starts at this point. For most members of the foreign policy "consensus" believe that a wide range of American values are implicated in possible regional challenges.

Here we get down to a point that is deeply imbedded in the notion of foreign policy. What is the purpose of foreign

policy in the first place? Why have a foreign policy at all? This is an impolite, even outrageous, question to the practitioners of this art. But it is a legitimate and necessary question if we are to align our national goals and our national efforts. I would say that the function of foreign policy is to preserve a core of essen-

government in our lives.

Now we must admit that some of our foreign commitments at least run parallel to the interests of the United States. But, contrary to the foreign policy consensus, few of these foreign interests are truly "vital" and few require military defense. After all, we maintain economic relationships with Communist countries.

REAL DEFENSE SAVINGS

But the real point is that we are now beset by tight and unyielding constraints, both international and domestic. We can't get everything we might want. We must make tough substantive choices. Furthermore, we are no longer in a situation where there are many easy cuts to make in the defense budget. Although there is still some "fat"—inflated weapons systems, inefficiencies—the savings here might amount to no more than four or five billion dollars a year. Moreover, as Gene McCarthy said so piquantly during the election campaign: When it comes to the defense budget, the fat isn't so bad; what we have to worry about is the lean.

For impressive and long-lasting savings in the defense budget, we have to cut missions. We can't do the same job in the world—even if we should be doing it—for significantly less. Substantial cuts in the defense budget imply a fundamentally different foreign policy. We have to put limits on our competition with global adversaries and limits on our support for friends. This would amount to a non-interventionist foreign policy.

What would be the military posture, force structure, and defense budget appropriate to such a foreign policy?

In Asia, a noninterventionist policy would entail a mid-Pacific posture: no American forces or bases west of Guam; no military assistance to Asian clients; phasing out all military alliances and defense commitments. The United States would abandon its ability to fight a land war in Asia and could expect an indigenous "balance" to establish itself among the three great territorial powers in this region, China, Japan, and the Soviet Union. The force structure for such a program in Asia would cost about \$13 billion a year, saving about \$12 billion from the structure proposed by the present administration for fiscal year 1978. Withdrawal from Korea alone, saving one division and all associated costs, would be worth about \$5 billion a year.

Europe (including the Mediterranean and the Middle East) is the source of the greatest potential savings, but the application of a policy of nonintervention here would require exacting and patient diplomacy and consequently would take at least a decade to implement. We might hope for an orderly devolution of military

power and defensive responsibility to our present European allies themselves; but we could not insure that they would pick up this burden. Ultimately, they would have to make their own judgments and decisions.

In the Middle East, also, our policy should be one of disengaging from, rather than intensifying, involvement. We have been aggravating the strategic and diplomatic dependency of Israel and other nations on the United States. The present administration seems, if anything, to have picked up the expanding commitment of its predecessor and has no design for the Middle East except to give Israel more extensive and explicit American security guarantees—not particularly welcome or even credible—in return for our distinctly unwelcome pressure to give up territory and accept a Palestinian state on the West Bank. At the same time, however, we seem to have mortgaged our Middle East policy to Saudi Arabia in return for a more flexible attitude toward the price and future delivery of oil. On the contrary, all our moves with regard to the Middle East should be directed toward hedging more

To ask, "why have a foreign policy at all?" is an impolite, even outrageous, question to the practitioners of this art.

seriously against involvement in any future conflict and against the economic effects of another disruption of oil supplies.

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

At the end of a decade of adjustment, there might remain in Europe no American forces and in and around the United States, in some sense oriented to Europe and the Mediterranean, 3 1/3 land divisions with associated forces. This residual force structure would cost about \$23 billion a year (in 1978 terms), saving, ultimately, about \$32 billion from the force structure requested by the present administration for Europe for 1978. (Besides these forces loosely oriented to regions, we would keep a strategic reserve of about 2 2/3 divisions and other related forces—costing about the same as now.)

Actually, the forces retained here still constitute a formidable armed establishment. Prudent instincts counsel that we would still want such a "second-chance"

The "successful management of contradictions" in a manner that "elicits public support"—this is supposed to be our basic foreign policy task.

tial American values that most people would agree are to be preserved, almost unconditionally, as part of the definition of our national identity and the condition of our national sovereignty. Those essential values are our political integrity (the autonomy of our chosen political processes) and the safety of our citizens and their domestic property.

Why think that foreign policy should do anything more in the world than insulate a nation's citizens from harm and avoid the waste of their resources? We ought to challenge the very foreignness of foreign policy. Its ultimate test is how well it serves domestic policy. One might almost call foreign policy an extension, or a limiting case, of domestic policy. It certainly is not autonomous, and it certainly does not have a unique, or a primary, claim on the energies and sacrifices of citizens.

But most members of the foreign policy consensus would go far beyond that core of defensible values. They would assert, for example, that we must also defend and propagate in the world certain democratic or participatory forms of government and certain "human rights" that we enjoy in our own country—that these objectives ought to be assimilated into our foreign policy and, by extension, our national security policy.

It is not hard to see that this larger spectrum of values is more likely to be challenged or threatened by the practices of other nations than is the tighter core of essential values. The more we contrive to defend in the world, the greater will be our exposure to conflict; the greater will be our risk of inviting, under certain circumstances, the destruction of our homeland, the larger will be our defense budget; and the more pervasive and repressive will be the hand of our own

force, as a modest hedge against unknown-unknowns and commensurate with our continuing importance in the world. Quite the opposite of many critics, I would rather have too many forces for a more modest schedule of missions than too few forces to support a continuing global responsibility.

For impressive and long-lasting savings, we have to cut *missions*, not the defense budget per se.

With regard to strategic nuclear forces, we must recognize that the inexorable creep of technology—Soviet accuracy and MIRVed warheads—has begun to render our present fixed land-based missiles vulnerable. Thus, the continuing presence of these missiles on our soil exposes our homeland to destruction and actually diminishes our security. But, instead of trying to remedy this vulnerability by the expensive deployment of mobile land-based missiles (the MX), we should accept this challenge as an opportunity to eliminate our land-based missiles entirely and move to a combination of stand-off bombers and submarines. And even within this set of strategic forces, it makes sense to cancel and stretch out certain very expensive individual weapons systems—respectively, the B-1 bomber (which could cost as much as \$100 billion over its 30-year lifetime) and the Trident submarine (which is costing over \$20 billion just to procure 10 submarines).

Altogether, this noninterventionist force structure would provide 8 land divisions, 19 equivalent tactical air wings, and 6 carrier task forces. It would require 1.25 million men and, at the end of a decade of adjustment, would cost about \$70 billion a year (in 1978 dollars). This contrasts with the present administration's scheme of 19 land divisions, 45 tactical air wings, and 13 carrier task forces, with 2.1 million men, and requested spending authority of over \$120 billion a year. Of course, the cost of a noninterventionist force would rise with inflation, year by year, but so would the administration's force structure. By 1985, the administration will, if not checked, be spending over \$200 billion for "defense" and we could save, from that figure, as much as \$85 billion a year.

No matter how "vital" our elites consider our overseas interests, the American people should be asked whether they

want to lay out the extra two-thirds of a trillion dollars that this will cost in the next decade. Yet there is scarcely a place in our decision-making apparatus where these issues can be raised in this form and presented for popular consideration and judgment.

The standard objection when anyone gestures toward the horizon of nonintervention and defense savings is: "What about the Russians?" It has become traditional for secretaries of defense—and more recently, many others—to cite fearsome increases in Soviet military activity.

There are several answers to these concerns. The first is to point out that the Soviet buildup does not yet add up to the conclusion that the United States is "behind," even if we keep score as the hawks do. Nevertheless, it is quite plausible that next year, or the year after that, the Russians will fulfill this year's hawkish estimates. And what will we say then?

The real answer to the comparative numbers game is: "So what?" National security is not a tennis match. Our defense programs are derived from our foreign policy objectives, which in turn must have something to do with protecting our citizens and their property and their political system. "Second to none" is not the appropriate criterion. "Enough" is enough.

There may well be some "weaknesses" or "imbalances" in our worldwide military posture and our overall force structure. But these conditions are less likely to be rectified by the devotion of more resources than by the curtailment of our global mission.

NONMILITARY POLICY

Of course, in a complex world there are other components of national security than military force. In trying to restore the constitutional balance at home and the balance of resources and goals abroad, this country can still be respon-

sive, compassionate, and effective in many nonmilitary functions without breaching the canons of a noninterventionist policy. But the concept of intervention does place some *limits* on the reach and the fervor of many of our global activities.

We can collaborate, cooperate, align policies with other nations over a wide range of economic, social, and humanitarian issues in a common effort to relieve pressures and grievances that could boil up in aggressive and destructive actions by other nations or peoples. But the very fact that the world is becoming—as the jargon goes—more "interdependent" means that it is even more urgent that all these functional issues be treated in non-interventionist ways in order to contain and localize any conflicts that might arise. The presumption that trouble, of any kind, anywhere in the world, has to be made an item of universal strategic contention must be reversed. What is at stake here is the need to adjust our own nation to living in a world that is out of our control.

Talk about the advent of a multipolar world has become fashionable, at least

The United States can still be responsive, compassionate, and effective without breaching the canons of noninterventionism.

since Henry Kissinger made this point in 1968. Put our foreign policy and our defense preparations have not really taken this fact into account, in practical and tangible terms. We have been sliding into a more confused, less manageable world, where the various forms of power are

more diffuse and less usable. One of the consequences is that we don't know, to the same extent as before, who our friends are and who our enemies are; and even if we know this now, we don't know for how long, and to what extent, and on what issues, friends will be friends and enemies will be enemies.

Yet, so pervasive has been the illusion of control in the past 25 years that a proposal of adjustment to a world that is out of control strikes many observers as, not only aberrant, but irresponsible and even threatening. They cast charges of "Fortress America," "isolationism," "turning our backs on the world." Well, is this "isolationism"? Does that even matter? Isolationism—even if we are willing to call it that—has a long and largely honorable history in our country. Far from being an unstable and aberrant stance, "isolationism," of various types, has been, if anything, the fundamental American orientation toward the world.

When are we going to have foreign policymakers who can make elemental investment decisions?

But the real point is not whether our arguments are congenial or heartwarming. Foreign policy is not a matter of listing preferences and trying to bully the country into supporting them with large donations of resources, blood, and trust. We must take into account the cost side of the equation. Whether we do or not, history will do the accounting for us. And not all of the costs are economic ones.

SECURING LIBERTY

There is a connection—which libertarians recognize more acutely than most people—between what we aspire and pretend to do abroad and the way we are governed at home. It is a myth that democratic political procedures and what our elites are pleased to call foreign policy "effectiveness" reinforce each other, that they run in the same direction. In fact, there is a trade-off between these two.

During the past several years, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has stalked the Western world, reminding us of our values and our obligations to others. Anyone reading or hearing Solzhenitsyn must be impressed with (1) his passionate devotion to liberty, and (2) his imposition of an obligation on the West—particularly the United States—to help establish lib-

erties in the Soviet Union and other countries that do not now enjoy them. (Certainly the Carter administration has taken these injunctions more seriously than its predecessor and has given them a new relevance in the actual conduct of diplomacy.)

But few people detect the practical contradiction in these two propositions, the contradiction with important implications for another concern: the "effectiveness" of our government's foreign policy. For we live in a world of national communities, and to bring about even the most benign effects in other countries implies and requires sustained, concerted national action. In the face of heterogeneous attitudes and different degrees of concern among our individual citizens and groups, we can scarcely have that kind of sustained, concerted foreign policy output. Or worse, as we know from our own recent national experience, we can't have it without mobilization or regimentation or deception or repression, that is, without the negation of the contract between a representative government and its free citizens—in short, without the subversion of our constitution.

Thus, we have what I call the "Wilsonian paradox." It begins with a pretense of expansive concern for the propagation of our ideals in the world, and it ends with stunting and shriveling the very liberties we might have hoped to bring to others.

We have just completed a year of bicentennial reminiscences. But, to many who respect the founders of this country, the celebrations had a hollow ring, because those who were putting on this show didn't understand the statesmen who founded this country. Those founders were smarter than the ones who have been governing our country more recently. Even if they didn't have the ineffable benefits of systems analysis and think tanks, they had certain basic relationships straight. They knew that, in trying aggressively to extend the benefits and the characteristics of our political system abroad, in external adventures, we would not only dissipate our resources and our energies but would wreck the balance of our polity.

In the wake of the excesses of the Nixon presidency, it became a cliché to say that the most important task of a president would be to restore public trust in government. Of course, that begs the question of what a president does with that trust, even if he could restore it. But, in any case, this country was founded on distrust of government. It can survive distrust of government precisely because it was designed to survive and operate very nicely in the face of a healthy skep-

ticism from citizens.

Well, let's test the temper of our times. Let's say that any one of those founding fathers were to return and say: "I hate the notion, the spectacle, of presidential monarchy. I'm more concerned for the integrity of our freedoms than for the political character of some nation halfway across the globe. And, if it came to that, I'd rather take a loss—if you can call it that—somewhere in the international system than compromise or damage the fabric of our society and our

The new "consensus" on foreign policy is nothing but a laundry list of predilections.

constitution. And I would, if I had the chance, work to restore a situation in this country where those principles would prevail."

How many of the self-appointed elites of our present foreign policy community would entrust one of those who founded this country, if he were to appear again, with power? How many—ever among those liberals who, briefly, a few years ago, were complaining about the "imperial presidency"—would consider him fit to hold public office?

That is the constitutional tension that exists today, and that tension defines the primary political task of thinking, caring citizens—not to make the world safe for anything in particular, but to make this country safe for liberty; to make that notion respectable enough to command a hearing again; to reverse the burden of proof of patriotism, honor, and good sense. [E]

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APPENDIX II

INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-1975

(Inclusion of an event in this list does not connote either legality or illegality or significance. Many of these incidents were minor in nature.)

- 1798-1800—*Undeclared naval war with France.*—This contest included land actions, such as that in the Dominican Republic, city of Puerto Plata, where marines captured a French privateer under the guns of the forts.
- 1801-05—*Tripoli.*—The First Barbary War, including the *George Washington* and *Philadelphia* affairs and the Eaton expedition, during which a few marines landed with United States Agent William Eaton to raise a force against Tripoli in an effort to free the crew of the *Philadelphia*. Tripoli declared war but not the United States.
- 1806—*Mexico (Spanish territory).*—Capt. Z. M. Pike, with a platoon of troops, invaded Spanish territory at the headwaters of the Rio Grande deliberately and on orders from Gen. James Wilkinson. He was made prisoner without resistance at a fort he constructed in present day Colorado, taken to Mexico, later released after seizure of his papers. There was a political purpose, still a mystery.
- 1806-10—*Gulf of Mexico.*—American gunboats operated from New Orleans against Spanish and French privateers, such as *La Flitte*, off the Mississippi Delta, chiefly under Capt. John Shaw and Master Commandant David Porter.
- 1810—*West Florida (Spanish territory).*—Gov. Claiborne of Louisiana, on orders of the President, occupied with troops territory in dispute east of Mississippi as far as the Pearl River, later the eastern boundary of Louisiana. He was authorized to seize as far east as the Perdido River. No armed clash.
- 1812—*Amelia Island and other parts of east Florida, then under Spain.*—Temporary possession was authorized by President Madison and by Congress, to prevent occupation by any other power; but possession was obtained by Gen. George Matthews in so irregular a manner that his measures were disavowed by the President.
- 1812-15—*Great Britain.*—War of 1812. Formally declared.
- 1813—*West Florida (Spanish territory).*—On authority given by Congress, General Wilkinson seized Mobile Bay in April with 600 soldiers. A small Spanish garrison gave way. Thus U.S. advanced into disputed territory to the Perdido River, as projected in 1810. No fighting.
- 1813-14—*Marquesas Islands.*—Built a fort on island of Nukahiva to protect three prize ships which had been captured from the British.
- 1814—*Spanish Florida.*—Gen. Andrew Jackson took Pensacola and drove out the British with whom the United States was at war.
- 1814-25—*Caribbean.*—Engagements between pirates and American ships or squadrons took place repeatedly especially ashore and offshore about Cuba, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and Yucatan. Three thousand pirate attacks on merchantmen were reported between 1815 and 1823. In 1822 Commodore James Biddle employed a squadron of two frigates, four sloops of war, two brigs, four schooners, and two gunboats in the West Indies.
- 1815—*Algiers.*—The second Barbary War, declared by the opponents but not by the United States. Congress authorized an expedition. A large fleet under Decatur attacked Algiers and obtained indemnities.
- 1815—*Tripoli.*—After securing an agreement from Algiers, Decatur demonstrated with his squadron at Tunis and Tripoli, where he secured indemnities for offenses during the War of 1812.
- 1816—*Spanish Florida.*—United States forces destroyed Nicholls Fort, called also Negro Fort, which harbored raiders into United States territory.
- 1816-18—*Spanish Florida.—First Seminole War.*—The Seminole Indians, whose area was a resort for escaped slaves and border ruffians, were attacked by troops under Generals Jackson and Gaines and pursued into northern Flor-

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- ida. Spanish posts were attacked and occupied, British citizens executed. There was no declaration or congressional authorization but the Executive was sustained.
- 1817—*Amelia Island (Spanish territory off Florida)*.—Under orders of President Monroe, United States forces landed and expelled a group of smugglers, adventurers, and freebooters.
- 1818—*Oregon*.—The U.S.S. *Ontario*, dispatched from Washington, landed at the Columbia River and in August took possession. Britain had conceded sovereignty but Russia and Spain asserted claims to the area.
- 1820-23—*Africa*.—Naval units raided the slave traffic pursuant to the 1819 act of Congress.
- 1822—*Cuba*.—United States naval forces suppressing piracy landed on the northwest coast of Cuba and burned a pirate station.
- 1823—*Cuba*.—Brief landings in pursuit of pirates occurred April 8 near Escondido; April 16 near Cayo Blanco; July 11 at Siquapa Bay; July 21 at Cape Cruz; and October 23 at Camrioca.
- 1824—*Cuba*.—In October the U.S.S. *Porpoise* landed bluejackets near Matanzas in pursuit of pirates. This was during the cruise authorized in 1822.
- 1824—*Puerto Rico (Spanish territory)*.—Commodore David Porter with a landing party attacked the town of Fajardo which had sheltered pirates and insulted American naval officers. He landed with 200 men in November and forced an apology.
- 1825—*Cuba*.—In March cooperating American and British forces landed at Sagua La Grande to capture pirates.
- 1827—*Greece*.—In October and November landing parties hunted pirates on the islands of Argenteire, Miconi, and Androssa.
- 1831-32—*Falkland Islands*.—To investigate the capture of three American sealing vessels and to protect American interests.
- 1832—*Sumatra*.—February 6 to 9.—To punish natives of the town of Quallah Battoo for depredations on American shipping.
- 1833—*Argentina*.—October 31 to November 15.—A force was sent ashore at Buenos Aires to protect the interests of the United States and other countries during an insurrection.
- 1835-36—*Peru*.—December 10, 1835 to January 24, 1836, and August 31 to December 7, 1836.—Marines protected American interests in Callao and Lima during an attempted revolution.
- 1836—*Mexico*.—General Gaines occupied Nacogdoches (Tex.), disputed territory from July to December during the Texan war for independence, under orders to cross the "imaginary boundary line" if an Indian outbreak threatened.
- 1838-39—*Sumatra*.—December 24, 1838 to January 4, 1839.—To punish natives of the towns of Quallah Battoo and Muckie (Mukki) for depredations on American shipping.
- 1840—*Fiji Islands*.—July.—To punish natives for attacking American exploring and surveying parties.
- 1841—*Drummond Island, Kingmill Group*.—To avenge the murder of a seaman by the natives.
- 1841—*Samoa*.—February 24.—To avenge the murder of an American seaman on Upolu Island.
- 1842—*Mexico*.—Commodore T. A. C. Jones, in command of a squadron long cruising off California, occupied Monterey, Calif., on October 19, believing war had come. He discovered peace, withdrew, and saluted. A similar incident occurred a week later at San Diego.
- 1843—*China*.—Sailors and marines from the *St. Louis* were landed after a clash between Americans and Chinese at the trading post in Canton.
- 1843—*Africa*, November 29 to December 16.—Four United States vessels demonstrated and landed various parties (one of 200 marines and sailors) to discourage piracy and the slave trade along the Ivory coast, etc., and to punish attacks by the natives on American seamen and shipping.
- 1844—*Mexico*.—President Tyler deployed U.S. forces to protect Texas against Mexico, pending Senate approval of a treaty of annexation. (Later rejected.) He defended his action against a Senate resolution of inquiry.
- 1846-48—*Mexico, the Mexican War*.—President Polk's occupation of disputed territory precipitated it. War formally declared.
- 1849—*Smyrna*.—In July a naval force gained release of an American seized by Austrian officials.

- 1851—*Turkey*.—After a massacre of foreigners (including Americans) at Jaffa in January, a demonstration by the Mediterranean Squadron was ordered along the Turkish (Levant) coast. Apparently no shots fired.
- 1851—*Johanna Island (east of Africa), August*.—To exact redress for the unlawful imprisonment of the captain of an American whaling brig.
- 1852—53—*Argentina—February 3 to 12, 1852; September 17, 1852 to April 1853*.—Marines were landed and maintained in Buenos Aires to protect American interests during a revolution.
- 1853—*Nicaragua—March 11 to 13*.—To protect American lives and interests during political disturbances.
- 1853—54—*Japan*.—The "opening of Japan" and the Perry Expedition.
- 1853—54—*Ryukyu and Bonin Islands*.—Commodore Perry on three visits before going to Japan and while waiting for a reply from Japan made a naval demonstration, landing marines twice, and secured a coaling concession from the ruler of Naha on Okinawa. He also demonstrated in the Bonin Islands. All to secure facilities for commerce.
- 1854—*China—April 4 to June 15 to 17*.—To protect American interests in and near Shanghai during Chinese civil strife.
- 1854—*Nicaragua—July 9 to 15*.—San Juan del Norte (Greytown) was destroyed to avenge an insult to the American Minister to Nicaragua.
- 1855—*China—May 19 to 21 (?)*.—To protect American interests in Shanghai. August 3 to 5 to fight pirates near Hong Kong.
- 1855—*Fiji Islands—September 12 to November 4*.—To seek reparations for depredations on Americans.
- 1855—*Uruguay—November 25 to 29 or 30*.—United States and European naval forces landed to protect American interests during an attempted revolution in Montevideo.
- 1856—*Panama, Republic of New Grenada—September 19 to 22*.—To protect American interests during an insurrection.
- 1856—*China—October 22 to December 6*.—To protect American interests at Canton during hostilities between the British and the Chinese; and to avenge an unprovoked assault upon an unarmed boat displaying the United States flag.
- 1857—*Nicaragua—April to May, November to December*.—To oppose William Walker's attempt to get control of the country. In May Commander C. H. Davis of the United States Navy, with some marines, received Walker's surrender and protected his men from the retaliation of native allies who had been fighting Walker. In November and December of the same year United States vessels *Saratoga*, *Wabash*, and *Fulton* opposed another attempt of William Walker on Nicaragua. Commodore Hiram Paulding's act of landing marines and compelling the removal of Walker to the United States, was tacitly disavowed by Secretary of State Lewis Cass, and Paulding was forced into retirement.
- 1858—*Uruguay—January 2 to 27*.—Forces from two United States warships landed to protect American property during a revolution in Montevideo.
- 1858—*Fiji Islands—October 6 to 16*.—To chastise the natives for the murder of two American citizens.
- 1858—59—*Turkey*.—Display of naval force along the Levant at the request of the Secretary of State after massacre of Americans at Jaffa and mistreatment elsewhere "to remind the authorities (of Turkey) * * * of the power of the United States."
- 1859—*Paraguay*.—Congress authorized a naval squadron to seek redress for an attack on a naval vessel in the Parana River during 1855. Apologies were made after a large display of force.
- 1859—*Mexico*.—Two hundred United States soldiers crossed the Rio Grande in pursuit of the Mexican bandit Cortina.
- 1859—*China—July 31 to August 2*.—For the protection of American interests in Shanghai.
- 1860—*Angola, Portuguese West Africa—March 1*.—To protect American lives and property at Kissemba when the natives became troublesome.
- 1860—*Colombia, Bay of Panama—September 27 to October 8*.—To protect American interests during a revolution.
- 1863—*Japan—July 16*.—To redress an insult to the American flag—firing on an American vessel—at Shimonoseki.
- 1864—*Japan—July 14 to August 3, approximately*.—To protect the United States Minister to Japan when he visited Yedo to negotiate concerning some Ameri-

- can claims against Japan, and to make his negotiations easier by impressing the Japanese with American power.
- 1864—*Japan*—September 4 to 14—*Straits of Shimonoseki*.—To compel Japan and the Prince of Nagato in particular to permit the Straits to be used by foreign shipping in accordance with treaties already signed.
- 1865—*Panama*—March 9 and 10.—To protect the lives and property of American residents during a revolution.
- 1866—*Mexico*.—To protect American residents, General Sedgwick and 100 men in November obtained surrender of Matamoras. After 3 days he was ordered by U.S. Government to withdraw. His act was repudiated by the President.
- 1866—*China*—June 20 to July 7.—To punish an assault on the American consul at Newchwang; July 14, for consultation with authorities on shore; August 9, at Shanghai, to help extinguish a serious fire in the city.
- 1867—*Nicaragua*.—Marines occupied Managua and Leon.
- 1867—*Island of Formosa*—June 13.—To punish a horde of savages who were supposed to have murdered the crew of a wrecked American vessel.
- 1868—*Japan* (*Osaka, Hiogo, Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Negata*)—Mainly, February 4 to 8, April 4 to May 12, June 12 and 13.—To protect American interests during the civil war in Japan over the abolition of the Shogunate and the restoration of the Mikado.
- 1868—*Uruguay*—February 7 and 8, 19 to 26.—To protect foreign residents and the customhouse during an insurrection at Montevideo.
- 1868—*Colombia*—April 7—at *Aspinwall*.—To protect passengers and treasure in transit during the absence of local police or troops on the occasion of the death of the President of Colombia.
- 1870—*Mexico*, June 17 and 18.—To destroy the pirate ship *Forward*, which had been run aground about 40 miles up the Rio Tecapan.
- 1870—*Hawaiian Islands*—September 21.—To place the American flag at half mast upon the death of Queen Kalama, when the American consul at Honolulu would not assume responsibility for so doing.
- 1871—*Korea*—June 10 to 12.—To punish natives for depredations on Americans, particularly for murdering the crew of the *General Sherman* and burning the schooner, and for later firing on other American small boats taking soundings up the Sallee River.
- 1873—*Colombia* (*Bay of Panama*)—May 7 to 22, September 23 to October 9.—To protect American interests during hostilities over possession of the government of the State of Panama.
- 1873—*Mexico*.—United States troops crossed the Mexican border repeatedly in pursuit of cattle and other thieves. There were some reciprocal pursuits by Mexican troops into border territory. The cases were only technically invasions, if that, although Mexico protested constantly. Notable cases were at Remolina in May 1873 and at Las Cuevas in 1876. Washington orders often supported these excursions. Agreements between Mexico and the United States, the first in 1882, finally legitimized such raids. They continued intermittently, with minor disputes, until 1896.
- 1874—*Hawaiian Islands*—February 12 to 20.—To preserve order and protect American lives and interests during the coronation of a new king.
- 1876—*Mexico*—May 18.—To police the town of Matamoras temporarily while it was without other government.
- 1882—*Egypt*—July 14 to 18.—To protect American interests during warfare between British and Egyptians and looting of the city of Alexandria by Arabs.
- 1885—*Panama* (*Colon*)—January 18 and 19.—To guard the valuables in transit over the Panama Railroad, and the safes and vaults of the company during revolutionary activity. In March, April, and May in the cities of Colon and Panama, to reestablish freedom of transit during revolutionary activity.
- 1888—*Korea*—June.—To protect American residents in Seoul during unsettled political conditions, when an outbreak of the populace was expected.
- 1888—*Haiti*—December 20.—To persuade the Haitian Government to give up an American steamer which had been seized on the charge of breach of blockade.
- 1888-89—*Samoa*—November 14, 1888, to March 20, 1889.—To protect American citizens and the consulate during a native civil war.
- 1889—*Hawaiian Islands*—July 30 and 31.—To protect American interests at Honolulu during a revolution.
- 1890—*Argentina*.—A naval party landed to protect U.S. consulate and legation in Buenos Aires.
- 1891—*Haiti*.—To protect American lives and property on Navassa Island.

- 1891—*Bering Sea*—July 2 to October 5.—To stop seal poaching.
- 1891—*Chile*—August 28 to 30.—To protect the American consulate and the women and children who had taken refuge in it during a revolution in Valparaiso.
- 1893—*Hawaii*—January 16 to April 1.—Ostensibly to protect American lives and property; actually to promote a provisional government under Sanford B. Dole. This action was disavowed by the United States.
- 1894—*Brazil*—January.—To protect American commerce and shipping at Rio de Janeiro during a Brazilian civil war. No landing was attempted but there was a display of naval force.
- 1894—*Nicaragua*—July 6 to August 7.—To protect American interests at Bluefields following a revolution.
- 1894-95—*China*—Marines were stationed at Tientsin and penetrated to Peking for protection purposes during the Sino-Japanese War.
- 1894-95—*China*—Naval vessel beached and used as a fort at Newchwang for protection of American nationals.
- 1894-96—*Korea*—July 24, 1894 to April 3, 1896.—To protect American lives and interests at Seoul during and following the Sino-Japanese War. A guard of marines was kept at the American legation most of the time until April 1896.
- 1895—*Colombia*—March 8 to 9.—To protect American interests during an attack on the town of Bocas del Toro by a bandit chieftain.
- 1896—*Nicaragua*—May 2 to 4.—To protect American interests in Corinto during political unrest.
- 1898—*Nicaragua*—February 7 and 8.—To protect American lives and property at Suan Juan del Sur.
- 1898—*Spain*—The Spanish-American War. Fully declared.
- 1898-99—*China*—November 5, 1898, to March 15, 1899.—To provide a guard for the legation at Peking and the consulate at Tientsin during contest between the Dowager Empress and her son.
- 1899—*Nicaragua*—To protect American interests at San Juan del Norte, February 22 to March 5, and at Bluefields a few weeks later in connection with the insurrection of Gen. Juan P. Reyes.
- 1899—*Samoa*—March 13, to May 15.—To protect American interests and to take part in a bloody contention over the succession to the throne.
- 1899-1901—*Philippine Islands*—To protect American interests following the war with Spain, and to conquer the islands by defeating the Filipinos in their war for independence.
- 1900—*China*—May 24 to September 28.—To protect foreign lives during the Boxer rising, particularly at Peking. For many years after this experience a permanent legation guard was maintained in Peking, and was strengthened at times as trouble threatened. It was still there in 1934.
- 1901—*Colombia (State of Panama)*—November 20 to December 4.—To protect American property on the Isthmus and to keep transit lines open during serious revolutionary disturbances.
- 1902—*Colombia*—April 16 to 23.—To protect American lives and property at Bocas del Toro during a civil war.
- 1902—*Colombia (State of Panama)*—September 17 to November 18.—To place armed guards on all trains crossing the Isthmus and to keep the railroad line open.
- 1903—*Honduras*—March 23 to 30 or 31.—To protect the American consulate and the steamship wharf at Puerto Cortez during a period of revolutionary activity.
- 1903—*Dominican Republic*—March 30 to April 21.—To protect American interests in the city of Santo Domingo during a revolutionary outbreak.
- 1903—*Syria*—September 7 to 12.—To protect the American consulate in Beirut when a local Moslem uprising was feared.
- 1903-04—*Abyssinia*—Twenty-five marines were sent to Abyssinia to protect the U. S. Consul General while he negotiated a treaty.
- 1903-14—*Panama*—To protect American interests and lives during and following the revolution for independence from Colombia over construction of the Isthmian Canal. With brief intermissions, United States Marines were stationed on the Isthmus from November 4, 1903, to January 21, 1914, to guard American interests.
- 1904—*Dominican Republic*—January 2 to February 11.—To protect American interests in Puerto Plata and Sosua and Santo Domingo City during revolutionary fighting.
- 1904—*Tangier, Morocco*—"We want either Perdicaris alive or Ralsula dead." Demonstration by a squadron to force release of a kidnaped American Marine guard landed to protect consul general.

- 1904—*Panama*—November 17 to 24.—To protect American lives and property at Ancon at the time of a threatened insurrection.
- 1904-05—*Korea*—January 5, 1904, to November 11, 1905.—To guard the American Legation in Seoul.
- 1904-05—*Korea*.—Marine guard sent to Seoul for protection during Russo-Japanese War.
- 1906-09—*Cuba*—September 1906 to January 23, 1909.—Intervention to restore order, protect foreigners, and establish a stable government after serious revolutionary activity.
- 1907—*Honduras*—March 18 to June 8.—To protect American interests during a war between Honduras and Nicaragua; troops were stationed for a few days or weeks in Trujillo, Ceiba, Puerto Cortez, San Pedro, Laguna and Choloma.
- 1910—*Nicaragua*—February 22.—During a civil war, to get information of conditions at Corinto; May 19 to September 4, to protect American interests at Bluefields.
- 1911—*Honduras*—January 26 and some weeks thereafter.—To protect American lives and interests during a civil war in Honduras.
- 1911—*China*.—Approaching stages of the nationalist revolution. An ensign and 10 men in October tried to enter Wuchang to rescue missionaries but retired on being warned away.
- A small landing force guarded American private property and consulate at Hankow in October.
- A marine guard was established in November over the cable stations at Shanghai.
- Landing forces were sent for protection in Nanking, Chinkiang, Taku and elsewhere.
- 1912—*Honduras*.—Small force landed to prevent seizure by the Government of an American-owned railroad at Puerto Cortez. Forces withdrawn after the United States disapproved the action.
- 1912—*Panama*.—Troops, on request of both political parties, supervised elections outside the Canal Zone.
- 1912—*Cuba*.—June 5 to August 5.—To protect American interests on the Province of Oriente, and in Habana.
- 1912—*China*—August 24 to 26, on Kentucky Island, and August 26 to 30 at Camp Nicholson.—To protect Americans and American interests during revolution activity.
- 1912—*Turkey*—November 18 to December 3.—To guard the American legation at Constantinople during a Balkan War.
- 1912-25—*Nicaragua*—August to November 1912.—To protect American interests during an attempted revolution. A small force serving as a legation guard and as a promoter of peace and governmental stability, remained until August 5, 1925.
- 1912-41—*China*.—The disorders which began with the Kuomintang rebellion in 1912, which were redirected by the invasion of China by Japan and finally ended by war between Japan and the United States in 1941, led to demonstrations and landing parties for the protection of U.S. interests in China continuously and at many points from 1912 on to 1941. The guard at Peking and along the route to the sea was maintained until 1941. In 1927, the United States had 5,670 troops ashore in China and 44 naval vessels in its waters. In 1933 U.S. had 3,027 armed men ashore. All this protective action was in general terms based on treaties with China ranging from 1858 to 1901.
- 1913—*Mexico*—September 5 to 7.—A few marines landed at Claris Estero to aid in evacuating American citizens and others from the Yaqui Valley, made dangerous for foreigners by civil strife.
- 1914—*Haiti*—January 29 to February 9, February 20 to 21, October 19.—To protect American nationals in a time of dangerous unrest.
- 1914—*Dominican Republic*—June and July.—During a revolutionary movement, United States naval forces by gunfire stopped the bombardment of Puerto Plata, and by threat of force maintained Santo Domingo City as a neutral zone.
- 1914-17—*Mexico*.—The undeclared Mexican-American hostilities following the Dolphin affair and Villa's raids included capture of Vera Cruz and later Pershing's expedition into northern Mexico.

- 1915-34—*Haiti*.—July 28, 1915, to August 15, 1934.—To maintain order during a period of chronic and threatened insurrection.
- 1916—*China*.—American forces landed to quell a riot taking place on American property in Nanking.
- 1916-24—*Dominican Republic*.—May 1916 to September 1924.—To maintain order during a period of chronic and threatened insurrection.
- 1917—*China*.—American troops were landed at Chungking to protect American lives during a political crisis.
- 1917-18—World War I. Fully declared.
- 1917-22—*Cuba*.—To protect American interests during an insurrection and subsequent unsettled conditions. Most of the United States armed forces left Cuba by August 1919, but two companies remained at Camaguey until February 1922.
- 1918-19—*Mexico*.—After withdrawal of the Pershing expedition, our troops entered Mexico in pursuit of bandits at least three times in 1918 and six in 1919. In August 1918 American and Mexican troops fought at Nogales.
- 1918-20—*Panama*.—For police duty according to treaty stipulations, at Chiriqui, during election disturbances and subsequent unrest.
- 1918-20—*Soviet Russia*.—Marines were landed at and near Vladivostok in June and July to protect the American consulate and other points in the fighting between the Bolshevik troops and the Czech Army which had traversed Siberia from the western front. A joint proclamation of emergency government and neutrality was issued by the American, Japanese, British, French, and Czech commanders in July and our party remained until late August.
- In August the project expanded. Then 7,000 men were landed in Vladivostok and remained until January 1920, as part of an allied occupation force.
- In September 1918, 5,000 American troops joined the allied intervention force at Archangel, suffered 500 casualties and remained until June 1919.
- A handful of marines took part earlier in a British landing on the Murman coast (near Norway) but only incidentally.
- All these operations were to offset effects of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and were partly supported by Czarist or Kerensky elements. No war was declared. Bolshevik elements participated at times with us but Soviet Russia will claim damages.
- 1919—*Dalmatia*.—U.S. Forces were landed at Trau at the request of Italian authorities to police order between the Italians and Serbs.
- 1919—*Turkey*.—Marines from the U.S.S. *Arizona* were landed to guard the U.S. Consulate during the Greek occupation of Constantinople.
- 1919—*Honduras*.—September 8 to 12.—A landing force was sent ashore to maintain order in a neutral zone during an attempted revolution.
- 1920—*China*.—March 14.—A landing force was sent ashore for a few hours to protect lives during a disturbance at Kiukiang.
- 1920—*Guatemala*.—April 9 to 27.—To protect the American Legation and other American interests, such as the cable station, during a period of fighting between Unionists and the Government of Guatemala.
- 1920-22—*Russia (Siberia)*.—February 16, 1920, to November 19, 1922.—A marine guard to protect the United States radio station and property on Russian Island, Bay of Vladivostok.
- 1921—*Panama-Costa Rica*.—American naval squadrons demonstrated in April on both sides of the Isthmus to prevent war between the two countries over a boundary dispute.
- 1922—*Turkey*.—September and October.—A landing force was sent ashore with consent of both Greek and Turkish authorities, to protect American lives and property when the Turkish Nationalists entered Smyrna.
- 1922-23—*China*.—Between April 1922 and November 1923 Marines were landed five times to protect Americans during periods of unrest.
- 1924—*Honduras*.—February 28 to March 31, September 10 to 15.—To protect American lives and interests during election hostilities.
- 1924—*China*.—September.—Marines were landed to protect Americans and other foreigners in Shanghai during Chinese factional hostilities.
- 1925—*China*.—January 15 to August 29.—Fighting of Chinese factions accompanied by riots and demonstrations in Shanghai necessitated landing American forces to protect lives and property in the International Settlement.
- 1925—*Honduras*.—April 19 to 21.—To protect foreigners at La Ceiba during a political upheaval.

- 1925—*Panama*.—October 12 to 23.—Strikes and rent riots led to the landing of about 600 American troops to keep order and protect American interests.
- 1926—*China*.—August and September.—The Nationalist attack on Hankow necessitated the landing of American naval forces to protect American citizens. A small guard was maintained at the consulate general even after September 16, when the rest of the forces were withdrawn. Likewise, when Nationalist forces captured Klukiang, naval forces were landed for the protection of foreigners November 4 to 6.
- 1926-33—*Nicaragua*.—May 7 to June 5, 1926; August 27, 1926, to January 3, 1933.—The coup d'etat of General Chamorro aroused revolutionary activities leading to the landing of American marines to protect the interests of the United States. United States forces came and went, but seem not to have left the country entirely until January 3, 1933. Their work included activity against the outlaw leader Sandino in 1928.
- 1927—*China*.—February.—Fighting at Shanghai caused American naval forces and marines to be increased there. In March a naval guard was stationed at the American consulate at Nanking after Nationalist forces captured the city. American and British destroyers later used shell fire to protect Americans and other foreigners. "Following this incident additional forces of marines and naval vessels were ordered to China and stationed in the vicinity of Shanghai and Tientsin."
- 1932—*China*.—American forces were landed to protect American interests during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai.
- 1933—*Cuba*.—During a revolution against President Gerardo Machado naval forces demonstrated but no landing was made.
- 1934—*China*.—Marines landed at Foochow to protect the American Consulate.
- 1940—*Newfoundland, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad, and British Guiana*.—Troops were sent to guard air and naval bases obtained by negotiation with Great Britain. These were sometimes called lend-lease bases.
- 1941—*Greenland*.—Taken under protection of the United States in April.
- 1941—*Netherlands (Dutch Guiana)*.—In November the President ordered American troops to occupy Dutch Guiana but by agreement with the Netherlands government in exile, Brazil cooperated to protect aluminum ore supply from the bauxite mines in Surinam.
- 1941—*Iceland*.—Taken under the protection of the United States, with consent of its Government, for strategic reasons.
- 1941—*Germany*.—Sometime in the spring the President ordered the Navy to patrol ship lanes to Europe. By July U.S. warships were convoying and by September were attacking German submarines. There was no authorization of Congress or declaration of war. In November, the Neutrality Act was partly repealed to protect military aid to Britain, Russia, etc.
- 1941-45—*Germany, Italy, Japan, etc.*—World War II. Fully declared.
- 1946—*Trieste*.—President Truman ordered the augmentation of U.S. troops along the zonal occupation line and the reinforcement of air forces in northern Italy after Yugoslav forces shot down an unarmed U.S. Army transport plane flying over Venezia Giulia. Earlier U.S. naval units had been dispatched to the scene.
- 1948—*Palestine*.—A marine consular guard was sent to Jerusalem to protect the U.S. Consular General.
- 1948-49—*China*.—Marines were dispatched to Nanking to protect the American Embassy when the city fell to Communist troops, and to Shanghai to aid in the protection and evacuation of Americans.
- 1950-53—*Korea*.—U.S. responded to North Korean invasion of South Korea by going to its assistance, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions. Congressional authorization was not sought.
- 1954-55—*China*.—Naval units evacuated U.S. civilians and military personnel from the Tachen Islands.
- 1956—*Egypt*.—A Marine battalion evacuated U.S. nationals and other persons from Alexandria during the Suez crisis.
- 1958—*Lebanon*.—Marines were landed in Lebanon at the invitation of its government to help protect against threatened insurrection supported from the outside.
- 1959-60—*The Caribbean*.—2d Marine Ground Task Force was deployed to protect U.S. nationals during the Cuban crisis.
- 1962—*Cuba*.—President Kennedy instituted a "quarantine" on the shipment of offensive missiles to Cuba from the Soviet Union. He also warned the Soviet

- Union that the launching of any missile from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would bring about U.S. nuclear retaliation on the Soviet Union. A negotiated settlement was achieved in a few days.
- 1962—*Thailand*.—The 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit landed on May 17, 1962 to support that country during the threat of Communist pressure from outside; by July 30 the 5,000 Marines had been withdrawn.
- 1962-75—*Laos*.—From October 1962 until 1975, the United States played a role of military support in Laos.
- 1964—*Congo*.—The United States sent four transport planes to provide airlift for Congolese troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners.
- 1964-75—*War in Vietnam*.—U.S. military advisers had been in South Vietnam for a decade, and their numbers had been increased as military position of Saigon government became weaker. After the attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson asked for a resolution expressing U.S. determination to support freedom and protect peace in Southeast Asia. Congress responded with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, expressing support for "all necessary measures" the President might take to repel armed attack against U.S. forces and prevent further aggression. Following this resolution, and following a Communist attack on a U.S. installation in central Vietnam, the U.S. escalated its participation in the war.
- 1965—*Dominican Republic*.—Intervention to protect lives and property during a Dominican revolt. More troops were sent as the U.S. feared the revolutionary forces were coming increasingly under Communist control.
- 1967—*Congo*.—The United States sent three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the Congo central government with logistical support during a revolt.
- 1970—*Cambodia*.—U.S. troops were ordered into Cambodia to clean out Communist sanctuaries from which Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacked U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in Vietnam.
- The object of this attack, which lasted from April 30 to June 30, was to ensure the continuing safe withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and to assist the program of Vietnamization.
- 1974—*Evacuation from Cyprus*.—United States naval forces evacuated U.S. civilians during hostilities between Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces.
- 1975—*Evacuation from Vietnam*.—U.S. naval vessels, helicopters, and marines were sent to assist in evacuation of refugees and U.S. nationals from Vietnam.
- 1975—*Evacuation from Cambodia*.—President Ford ordered U.S. military forces to proceed with the planned evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cambodia.
- 1975—*Mayaguez incident*.—President Ford ordered military forces to retake the SS *Mayaguez*, a merchant vessel en route from Hong Kong to Thailand with a U.S. citizen crew which was seized from Cambodian naval patrol boats in international waters and forced to proceed to a nearby island.

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 An attempt to explain the complex factors of Cuba's international behavior: on the one hand pursuing an activist global policy in support of national liberation movements, on the other hand, seeking relations with the United States.
- LeoGrande, William M. Cuba policy recycled. *Foreign policy*, no. 46, spring 1982: 105-119.
 The author contends that "Central America offers a perfect example of what has been wrong with U.S. responses to Cuban initiatives abroad. By treating Cuba as the source of Central America's problems, the United States loses sight of regional dynamics, focusing only on the East-West dimension of local conflicts."

LeoGrande, William M. Cuban-Soviet relations and Cuban policy in Africa. *Cuban studies*, v. 10, Jan. 1980: 1-48.

"The 'internationalist dimension' of Cuban foreign policy has consistently had a dual thrust: to provide aid to national liberation movements fighting against colonial or neocolonial regimes; and to provide support to existing progressive governments. Cuba's policy in Africa includes both components, but the deployment of Cuban troops has come only in response to direct foreign intervention by others against governments friendly to Cuba. Despite close Cuban-Soviet cooperation, Cuban policy is not dictated by the USSR, nor are Cuban and Soviet policies identical."

The article is followed by comments: The consequences of military initiatives, by C. Blasier; Operational goals of Cuban policy in Africa, by E. Gonzalez.

Roche, John P. Confessions of an interventionist: reflections on Cuba. *New leader*, v. 44, May 15, 1961: 5-6.

Scheina, Martin J. The U.S. presence in Guantanamo. *Strategic review*, v. 4, spring 1976: 81-88.

"With Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean on the increase, this is not the time for the United States to contemplate returning Guantanamo to the Cubans," contends the author.

Schroeder, Richard C. Cuban expansionism. [Washington] Editorial Research Reports, 1977. 375-392 p. (Editorial research reports, 1977, v. 1, no. 19)
Contents.--U.S. relations with Cuba today.--America's Caribbean interests.--U.S. response to Cuban challenge.

Schulz, Donald E. The strategy of conflict and the politics of counter-productivity. *Orbis*, v. 25, fall 1981: 679-713.

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Sherwin, Martin J., Peter Winn, and Richard R. Fagen. Cuba. *Wilson quarterly*, v. 2, winter 1978: 57-81.

Two articles review Cuban-U.S. and Cuban-U.S.S.R. relations.

Treverton, Gregory F. Cuba after Angola. *World today*, v. 33, Jan. 1977: 17-27.

Cuba is still tied to the Soviet Union ideologically and economically. Cuban-American relations deteriorated during 1976 because of the Cuban intervention in Angola.

Volsky, George. The Soviet-Cuban connection. *Current history*, v. 80, Oct. 1981: 325-328, 335, 346.

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C. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Books

- Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic Studies. Dominican action, 1965; intervention or cooperation? Washington, 1966. 85 p.
(Its Special report series, no. 2) E183.8.D6G4
- Gleijeses, Piero. The Dominican crisis: the 1965 constitutionalist revolt and American intervention. Translated by Lawrence Lipson. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press [1978] 460 p. F1938.55.G5513
- Gutierrez, Carlos Maria. The Dominican Republic: rebellion and repression. Translated by Richard E. Edwards. New York, Monthly Review Press [1972] 172 p. F1938.55.G8713
- Hammaraskjold Forum, 9th, New York, May 2, 1966. The Dominican Republic crisis, 1965; background paper and proceedings. A. J. Thomas, Jr., and Ann Van Wynen Thomas, authors of the working paper. John Carey, editor. Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., Published for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Oceana Publications, 1967. 164 p. JX1428.D6H3 1966
Bibliography: p. 143-162.
- Knight, Melvin Moses. The Americans in Santo Domingo. New York, Arno Press, 1970 [c1928] 189 p. (American imperialism) F1938.45.K55 1970
- Lowenthal, Abraham F. The Dominican intervention. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972. 246 p. E183.8.D6L6
Bibliography: p. 219-238.
- Martin, John Bartlow. Overtaken by events; the Dominican crisis from the fall of Trujillo to the civil war. New York, Doubleday, 1966. 821 p. F1938.55.M34
- Slater, Jerome. Intervention and negotiation; the United States and the Dominican revolution. Foreword by Hans J. Morgenthau. New York, Harper & Row [1970] 254 p. E183.8.D6S55 1970

Articles

- Bohan, R. T. The Dominican case: unilateral intervention. American journal of international law, v. 60, Oct. 1966: 809-812.
"It shows the possibilities for the misuse of international law as an instrument for the self-righteous justification of illegal acts," contends the author.
- Draper, Theodore. Dominican crisis; case study in American policy. Commentary, v. 40, Dec. 1965: 33-68.
- Dominican crisis; case study in American policy--discussion. National review, v. 18, Feb. 8, 1966: 99-100, 107-114.

- Draper, Theodore. The Dominican intervention reconsidered. *Political science quarterly*, v. 86, Mar. 1971: 1-36.
- Dominican intervention. *National review*, v. 18, Feb. 8, 1966: 107-114.
Contents.--The Myths, by Paul D. Bethel.--The Facts, by J. N. Bender.
- Fenwick, Charles G. The Dominican Republic: intervention or collective self-defense. *American journal of international law*, v. 60, Jan. 1966: 64-67.
- Ferguson, Yale H. The Dominican intervention of 1965: recent interpretations. *International organization*, v. 27, autumn 1973: 517-548.
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- Lowenthal, Abraham F. The Dominican intervention in retrospect. *Public policy*, v. 18, fall 1969: 133-153.
The article is followed by a comment: Is there an alternative to intervention? by Richard M. Alpert.
- Mann, T. C. Dominican crisis: correcting some misconceptions. *Dept. of State bulletin*, v. 53, Nov. 8, 1965: 730-738.
An address, Oct. 12, 1965.
- McCollum, James K. 1965 intervention in Dominican Republic: a successful military power application? *Officer*, v. 54, July 1978: 16-18.
- MacEoin, Gary. A 'successful' intervention. *Commonweal*, v. 97, Feb. 16, 1973: 444-448.
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- Nanda, Ved P. The United States action in the 1965 Dominican crisis: impact on world order. *Denver law journal*, v. 43, fall 1966: 439-479; v. 44, spring 1967: 225-274.
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- Smoldering conflict: Dominican Republic, 1965-1975. *MACLA's Latin America & empire report*, v. 9, Apr. 1975: 1-12, 31.
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D. CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Books

Araujo, Richard. The Nicaraguan connection: a threat to Central America. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1982. 20, A2, B2 p.

Examines the Sandinista government, the rising opposition to it, the faltering economy, the military build-up, and support of subversive activities in Central America. Briefly surveys U.S. policy toward Nicaragua under the Carter and Reagan Administrations, and presents a four-pronged policy for the United States.

Committee of Santa Fe. A new inter-American policy for the eighties. Prepared for the Council for Inter-American Security; Lewis Tambs, editor; foreword by Ronald F. Docksai. Washington, Council for Inter-American Security [1980] 53 l. FI418.C69 1980

"Havana must be held to account for its policies of aggression against its sister states in the Americas. Among those steps will be the establishment of a Radio Free Cuba, under open U.S. government sponsorship, which will beam objective information to the Cuban people that, among other things, details the cost of Havana's unholy alliance with Moscow. If propaganda fails, a war of national liberation against Castro must be launched."

Democracy and dictatorship in Latin America. Edited by Thomas Draper. New York, H.W. Wilson, 1981. 230 p. (The Reference shelf, v. 53, no. 3) FI414.2.D43

Di Giovanni, C., Jr. U.S. policy and the Marxist threat to Central America. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1980. 16 p. (Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. Background no. 128)

Briefly examines the current situation in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala and suggests potential policies which can "promote the continued independence of the nations in the area and protect the vital interests of the U.S. as well."

Dominguez, Virginia R., and Jorge I. Dominguez. The Caribbean, its implications for the United States. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1981. 80 p. (Headline series, 253) E744.H43 no. 253

Contents.--The formation of Caribbean societies.--The Caribbean today.--Contemporary Caribbean economies.--Caribbean politics: stability, violence, and the currencies of power.--Emigration: the Caribbean diaspora.--The Caribbean and United States policy.

El Salvador: Central America in the new cold war. Marvin E. Gettleman, editor. 1st Evergreen ed. New York, Grove Press, 1981. 397 p. FI488.3.E4 1981

Etchinson, Don L. The United States and militarism in Central America. New York, Praeger, 1975. 150 p. (Praeger special studies in international politics and government) FI439.E86

Bibliography: p. 134-144.

Fagen, Richard R. The Nicaraguan revolution. Washington, Latin American Program of the Wilson Center [1980] 59 p. (Latin American Program. Working papers no. 78)

"An attempt to understand the first 15 months of revolutionary rule in Nicaragua. Beginning with a brief history . . . it then assesses the immediate legacies of the way in which Somoza was finally overthrown. The bulk of the paper explores six key interrelated aspects of the contemporary Nicaraguan political and economic situation."

----- The real clear and present danger: a critique from the Left. Caribbean review, v. 11, spring 1982: 18-19, 52-53.

Surveys U.S. policies toward Central America and the Caribbean. Suggests that "an administration that believes that revolutionary unrest can be contained if only Nicaragua and/or Cuba can be 'made to behave' is dangerously out of touch with reality" and that "an administration incapable of formulating an alternative view of the region is inevitably trapped between its analysis of the problem and its seeming inability to act with the decisiveness that its analysis suggests is essential."

Goldwert, Marvin. The constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua: progeny and legacy of United States intervention. Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1962. 55 p. (Latin American monographs, 17)
F1938.45.G6

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Bibliography: p. 259-277.

Martin, John Bartlow. U.S. policy in the Caribbean. With a foreword by M. J. Rossant. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1978. 420 p.
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"A Twentieth Century Fund essay."
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Reprint of the ed. published by Princeton University Press.

Nicaragua in revolution. Edited by Thomas W. Walker. New York, Praeger, 1982. 410 p.
F1528.N498 1982

Perkins, Whitney T. Constraint of empire: the United States and Caribbean interventions. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press [1981] 282 p. (Contributions in comparative colonial studies, no. 8)
F2178.U6P47

Rand, Robert. The USSR's stake in El Salvador. [New York] Radio Liberty Research, 1981. 8 p.

"Radio Liberty Research, RL 126/81, Mar. 20, 1981"

Examines the U.S.S.R.'s relations with Salvadoran leftists and the impact the Soviet role has had on U.S. Soviet relations. Contends that the U.S.S.R. has succeeded in making the pro-Soviet Salvadoran Communist Party a leading faction of the leftist front in El Salvador.

Schlesinger, Stephen C., and Stephen Kinzer. Bitter fruit: the untold story of the American coup in Guatemala. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1982. 320 p. FI466.S.534

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The Soviet Union and Latin America. Edited by J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover. New York, Published for the Institute for the Study of the USSR [by] Praeger Publishers [1970] 190 p. FI416.R886

Papers presented at an international symposium held at the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, Germany, May 20-21, 1968.

Whelan, James R. Through the American looking glass: Central America's crisis. Washington, Council for Inter-American Security [1980] 87 p.

The author attempts "to document the claim that Central America's five republics, to varying but generally comparable degrees, were in 1977 'stable, prospering, progressive--and firmly allied to the United States.' Next . . . he examines the role of the United States in transforming the promise of 1977 into the agony of 1980. . . . He deals in some detail, with recent events in the two countries--Nicaragua and El Salvador--where U.S. 'revisionism' has been applied most badly, with the most catastrophic results so far."

U.S. Government Documents

National Security Affairs Conference, 8th, National Defense University, 1981.

The 1980s: decade of confrontation? Washington, National Defense University, 1981. 312 p.

Partial contents.--The US and USSR: is confrontation inevitable?--Central America and the Caribbean: cockpit of big power conflict?--Global terrorism: what should the US do?

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. Human rights in Guatemala. Hearing before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess. July 30, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 173 p. KF27.F645 1981d

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Assessment of conditions in Central America. Hearings, 96th Cong., 2d sess. April 29 and May 20, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 137 p. KF27.F646 1980

----- Central America at the crossroads. Hearings, 96th Cong., 1st sess. Sept. 11 and 12, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 56 p. KF27.F646 1979b

----- Presidential certification on El Salvador (volume I). Hearings, 97th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 522 p. Hearings held Feb. 2-Mar. 2, 1982.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. U.S. policy options in El Salvador. Hearing and markup, 97th Cong., 1st sess., on H. Con. Res. 197, H. Con. Res. 212. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 173 p. KF27.P6 1981g
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U.S. Congress. House. Special Study Mission to Jamaica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the Guantanamo Naval base. Caribbean nations, assessments of conditions and U.S. influence: report of a Special Study Mission to Jamaica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the Guantanamo Naval Base, January 3-12, 1979, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 48 p. F1741.U54 1979
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Articles

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Contents that the chief threat to the United States in the Caribbean is "economic and social deprivation leading to the creation of political instability that, in turn, provides conditions conducive to Cuban and Soviet influence."

Central America: fire in the 'front yard'? In Great decisions '82. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1982. p. 29-38.

Compton, John G. M. Challenges for the Caribbean. World today, v. 37, Apr. 1981: 142-148.

Critique of U.S. policy toward Latin America. NACLA report on the Americas, v. 15, May-June 1981: 2-5, 7-19, 21-37.

Compares U.S. involvement in El Salvador with U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Surveys U.S. policy toward Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.

Ebel, Roland H. Political instability in Central America. Current history, v. 81, Feb. 1982: 56-59, 86.

Examines sociopolitical changes in Central America which undermined the stability of Central American states. Considers prospects for the future of Central America and implications for U.S. policy toward the area.

Farnsworth, Elizabeth. Keeping the Caribbean safe from Castro. Nation, v. 229, Dec. 15, 1979: 616-618.

"The present Administration's new strategy toward the Caribbean Basin—the islands of the Caribbean Sea and Central America—is directly descended from those dangerous policies of the 1960s. Like the alliance, the new policy has counterrevolutionary, interventionist muscle clothed in reformish garb."

Feinberg, Richard E. Central America: no easy answers. *Foreign affairs*, v. 59, summer 1981: 1121-1146.

Identifies assumptions underlying the Reagan Administration's policy toward Central America and examines the implications of that policy for U.S. relations with Central America and Western Europe. Reviews Cuban and Soviet involvement in Central America. Suggests alternative policies for the U.S., and explores the role regional and Western European powers might play in increasing the political and economic stability of Central America.

Forche, Carolyn. El Salvador: the next Vietnam? *Progressive*, v. 45, Feb. 1981: 27-29.

The author considers the danger of United States military intervention in El Salvador's civil strife.

Forster, Merlin H. US intervention in Mexico: the 1914 occupation of Veracruz. *Military review*, v. 57, Aug. 1977: 88-96.

The author assesses the political and social context of the intervention in support of an abstract, moralistic goal.

Gleijeses, Piero. The elusive center in Central America. *Working papers for a new society*, v. 8, Nov.-Dec. 1981: 30-37.

Examines critiques of the Carter Administration's policies toward Central America. Surveys the Reagan Administration's policies toward the area.

Immerman, Richard H. Guatemala as a cold war history. *Political science quarterly*, v. 95, winter 1980-1981: 629-653.

"Analyzes the United States intervention in Guatemala that took place in 1954, and argues that misperceptions led to that intervention and that those misperceptions later contributed to the Bay of Pigs fiasco."

LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable revolutions. *Atlantic monthly*, v. 249, June 1982: 74-83.

Maintains that the Alliance for Progress has failed in Central America due to the refusal of local elites to initiate socio-political reforms. Reviews the courses of revolutionary movements in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and concludes that "U.S. policies in Central America have encouraged what they were supposed to prevent."

Leiken, Robert. Reconstructing Central American policy. *Washington quarterly*, v. 5, winter 1982: 47-60.

Levis, Vaughan A. The US and the Caribbean: issues of economics and security. *Caribbean review*, v. 11, spring 1982: 6-9, 50-51.

"What the United States policy makers suddenly see as a crisis of regional security--specifically of Cuban communist expansion into a weak area--in the short time perspective of American decisionmaking, can more usefully be seen (and many in the Caribbean prefer to see) as a slowly developing crisis of economic and social (dis)organization implicit in the economic and social development strategies of the 1960's, and maturing at the present time, a crisis not susceptible to military/security solutions, or solutions designed essentially to inhibit the normalization of relations between the Caribbean states and Cuba."

McDermott, Louis M. Guatemala, 1954: intervention or aggression? Rocky Mountain social science journal, v. 9, Jan. 1972: 79-88.

A brief survey of background, events and issues.

Millett, Richard. Central American paralysis. Foreign policy, no. 39, summer 1980: 99-117.

shift the focus of our investments toward labor-intensive industries, toward

"U.S. efforts to respond to revolutionary change in Central America resemble those of a fire brigade during the London blitz. American officials rush frantically from place to place, trying to contain the damage and save what they can of existing structures. . . . To forge a policy capable of dealing with Central America, the United States must drastically revise its approach to the region," concludes the author.

Pastor, Robert A. Our real interests in Central America. Atlantic monthly, v. 250, July 1982: 27-39.

"The strategic challenge the U.S. faces in Central America is difficult precisely because it has less to do with traditional concepts of national security than previous challenges did, and much more to do with trying to influence the process of political change in a sensitive Third World environment."

----- Sinking in the Caribbean Basin. Foreign affairs, v. 60, summer 1982: 1038-1058.

"The CBI [Caribbean Basin Initiative], though no panacea, offers a rare opportunity to grasp the problems of the region more effectively, provided that we also replace a penchant for bilateralism with a commitment to a broader regional approach; balance our interest in promoting a private sector with our understanding of the need for a vigorous public sector; and agriculture, toward an integrated industrial strategy rather than just assembly plants. We should also shift away from an exclusive preoccupation with anti-communism, confrontation and threats which help our enemies and alienate our friends, and begin to pursue the full range of U.S. humanitarian and economic interests."

----- The target and the source: El Salvador and Nicaragua. Washington quarterly, v. 5, summer 1982: 116-127.

Reviews U.S. policy toward Nicaragua and El Salvador. Suggests that "significant U.S. influence in both El Salvador and Nicaragua can be exploited more effectively to encourage a climate of moderation in both countries."

Rangel, Carlos. Mexico & other dominoes. Commentary, v. 71, June 1981: 27-33.

Examines Mexico's attitude toward the problem of Soviet-inspired and Cuban-supported insurgencies in Central America.

Ratliff, William. United States policy toward the Caribbean. Willamette law review, v. 17, winter 1980: 221-230.

Focuses on the following issues: "Why is the area crucial to the United States, what is going on today, what threats to our national security come from existing and emerging conditions, and what might be an appropriate American response?"

Szulc, Tad. Radical winds in the Caribbean. New York times magazine, May 25, 1980: 16-18, 56, 58, 60, 70-73.

"In the wake of growing social unrest, a new wave of revolutionary activity--represented by Grenada's Cuban-backed regime--is developing in a region of strategic importance to the United States and its allies."

Theberge, James D. Rediscovering the Caribbean: toward a U.S. policy for the 1980s. Commonsense, v. 3, spring 1980: 1-20.

"American policy makers rediscovered the Caribbean basin in 1979.

. . . The motives underlying this renewed concern are not hard to discern. The Caribbean has become a focal point of political instability, anti-American radicalization, and social unrest in the Western Hemisphere. Unprecedented revolutionary change, which the U.S.S.R. and Cuba jointly seek to exploit, is taking place in a vital security zone of the United States."

Tierney, John J., Jr. The Nicaraguan experience and United States Caribbean policy. World affairs, v. 132, Dec. 1969: 195-208.

U.S. policy toward Central America. Orbis, v. 26, summer 1982: 305-325.

Contents.--Sustaining a responsible middle course, by J. Bushnell.--Abstention or intervention? by J. Child.--El Salvador: rule by ballot, by M. Novak.--Carter, Reagan, and Central America, by S. Purcell.

Walsh, Edward J. Strategic Guatemala. National defense, v. 66, Oct. 1981: 40-43.

Examines the "strategic importance of Guatemala to the United States as the cornerstone of opposition to the continuing growth of Soviet influence in Central America."

White, Robert E. Central America: the problem that won't go away. New York times magazine, July 18, 1982: 21-25, 28, 32, 43.

"A former U.S. Ambassador charges that the hard-line policies of the Reagan Administration weaken the area's defenses against Communism."

Why we must aid El Salvador. New guard, v. 21, summer 1981: 15-25, 27-29.

Contents.--Aiding El Salvador: a "moral imperative", by J. Kirkpatrick.--The El Salvador protest movement, by P. Flaherty.--Enrique Altamirano on the revolution in El Salvador [interview].

GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES

INTRODUCTION

This research guide identifies for intercollegiate debaters sources of information about the U.S.-Latin American relationship, with emphasis on factors bearing on U.S. military intervention in the Western Hemisphere. The guide permits the researcher to select the scope and types of information of interest. It describes printed indexes and other research tools, and provides appropriate search terms that may be used either separately or in combination when consulting these tools.

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TABLES

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BOOKS

Library of Congress subject headings are used in many library catalogs nationwide. This partial listing of subject headings may be used to identify books on the debate topic.

Intervention (International law)
 Monroe Doctrine
 United States--Military strategy
 United States--Foreign relations--Latin America
 United States--Foreign relations--Central America
 United States--Foreign relations--Caribbean area
 United States--Foreign relations--(Subdivided by the names of countries)
 Pan-Americanism
 United States--Territorial expansion
 United States--National security
 Organisation of American States

JOURNAL ARTICLES

PRINTED INDEXES

Citations to journal articles and other materials about the debate topic can be found in a number of printed indexes. The materials covered by the printed indexes are briefly described here. Search terms can be found in Table 1.

+ ABC POL SCI (A Bibliography of Contents: Political Science & Government)

This is a guide to current periodical literature in the field of political science and government as well as in the related disciplines of sociology, law, and history. Started in 1969 and published five times a year, it reproduces edited tables of contents of about 300 international journals.

+ AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY INDEX TO MILITARY PERIODICALS

The Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals is a subject index to significant articles, news items, and editorials appearing in 73 English language military and aeronautical periodicals not indexed in readily available commercial indexing services. The Index is issued quarterly with annual cumulations.

+ INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS

The index lists articles "of high quality and permanent reference value" in legal periodicals published in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other English language countries. The articles are indexed under author and subject.

♦ INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS

This is a bimonthly collection of abstracts of articles in the field of political science published in journals and yearbooks worldwide. The major journals are covered in full, less important ones, selectively.

♦ MAGAZINE INDEX

Magazine Index provides citations to materials in over 370 popular magazines, focusing on coverage of current affairs and general interest topics. The Index is divided into author and subject sections and is available on microfilm.

♦ PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION SERVICE BULLETIN (PAIS)

PAIS is a subject index of books, pamphlets, government publications, reports of public and private agencies, and periodical articles relating to economic and social conditions, public administration, and international relations.

♦ READERS' GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE

The Readers' Guide is an author and subject index to periodicals of general interest published in the U.S.

♦ SOCIAL SCIENCES INDEX

The Social Sciences Index is a cumulative index to English language periodicals in the fields of area studies, economics, geography, political science, public administration, sociology, and other social science subjects. The Index is published quarterly with a bound cumulation issued each year.

ONLINE BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA BASES

Online bibliographic data bases enable the researcher to locate citations to journal articles and other materials quickly by using a computer terminal to search a machine-readable file. Online data bases allow the researcher to combine search terms in ways that are impossible in a printed index or library catalog and to simultaneously search material that would be contained in printed index volumes covering several years. Data bases with text searching capabilities allow the researcher to use search terms in addition to the controlled searching vocabulary.

♦ PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION SERVICE BULLETIN and MAGAZINE INDEX

PAIS and Magazine Index are available online as part of the Lockheed data base system. Brief descriptions of the contents of both of these files appear in the section on printed indexes.

SELECTED PERIODICALS

The following periodicals contain articles on foreign affairs, and some focus exclusively on Latin America:

General

American journal of international law (quarterly)
 Columbia journal of international studies (3 issues a year)
 Denver journal of international law and policy (semi-annual)
 Foreign affairs (quarterly)
 Foreign policy (quarterly)
 International security (quarterly)
 Journal of international affairs (semi-annual)
 Orbis (quarterly)
 Stanford journal of international studies (semi-annual)
 Strategic review (quarterly)
 Washington quarterly

Latin America

Caribbean review (quarterly)
 Journal of interamerican studies and world affairs (quarterly)
 Journal of Latin American studies (semi-annual)
 Latin America perspectives (quarterly)
 Latin American research review (3 issues a year)
 NACLA [North American Congress on Latin America] report on the Americas (10 issues a year)
 U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS] daily report: Latin America (5 issues a week)

LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION

Congressional activities may be monitored by searching the following printed publications. Search terms for these publications appear in Table 2.

+ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

The Congressional Record provides an edited transcript of the activities on the floor of the House and the Senate. It is published each day Congress is in session. Subject and name indexes are published biweekly and cumulated annually.

+ CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report provides current information on congressional activities, the progress of major bills, and background information on major policy issues. Important recent articles are indexed on the back cover of each issue. Consult this index under the heading "Foreign Affairs." A quarterly and an annual index are also issued. Congressional Quarterly also publishes an annual publication which cumulates material appearing in the weekly reports during that year. This publication is entitled the CQ Almanac.

(text continues following Table 1)

TABLE 1 - SEARCH TERMS FOR PRINTED INDEXES

ABC POL SCI

Latin America--(Subdivided by Politics, Foreign policy, History, Military, Government)
 Caribbean area--(Subdivided by Politics, Foreign policy, History, Military, Government)
 Central America--(Subdi by Politics, Foreign policy, History, Military, Government)
 South America--(Subdivided by Politics, Foreign policy, History, Military, Government)
 See also the names of countries
 Colonialism and imperialism
 Military and strategic policies
 United States--Foreign policy--(Subdivided by Latin America, Caribbean area, Central
 America, names of countries)
 Organization of American States

AIR UNIVERSITY INDEX

Military policy--United States
 National policy--United States
 United States--Foreign relations
 Military missions
 Dominican Crisis, 1965
 Military assistance advisory groups
 Security, international
 Latin America
 Caribbean Region
 Central America
 See also the names of countries

INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS

Latin America
 See also the names of countries
 United States--Foreign relations
 National defense
 Foreign relations

TABLE 1 (continued)

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS

Latin America
 Caribbean
 Central America
 See also the names of countries
 Military and politics
 Political system
 Foreign policy
 United States--(Subdivided by Foreign policy, Imperialism, National interest,
 Strategy, Latin America, Central America, Caribbean, names of countries)
 Organization of American States

MAGAZINE INDEX

Intervention (International law)
 Military policy--United States
 Monroe Doctrine
 Latin America--(Subdivided by Politics and government, International aspects,
 Military aspects, Military policy, Relations with the U.S.)
 Central America--(Subdivided by Politics and government, International aspects,
 Military aspects, Military policy, Relations with the U.S.)
 Caribbean area--(Subdivided by Politics and government, International aspects,
 Military aspects, Military policy, Relations with the U.S.)
 Pan-Americanism
 National defenses--United States
 National security--United States
 Organization of American States
 Military missions
 International relations--(Subdivided by region [Central America, Latin America,
 Caribbean area], names of countries)
 United States--Relations with (Subdivided by region, names of countries)

PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION SERVICE BULLETIN

Intervention (International law)
 Monroe Doctrine
 United States--Military policy
 United States--Foreign relations--(Subdivided by Latin America, Central America,
 Caribbean Region, names of countries)
 Latin America--(Subdivided by Government and politics, Foreign relations)
 Central America--(Subdivided by Government and politics, Foreign relations)
 Caribbean Region--(Subdivided by Government and politics, Foreign relations)
 See also the names of countries
 Pan Americanism
 Organization of American States

TABLE 1 (continued)

READERS' GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Intervention (International law)
 Monroe Doctrine
 United States--Military policy
 United States--Foreign relations--(Subdivided by Latin America, Central America,
 Caribbean Region, names of countries)
 Military missions
 Latin America--(Subdivided by Foreign relations, Politics and government)
 Central America--(Subdivided for Foreign relations, Politics and government)
 Caribbean Region--(Subdivided by Foreign relations, Politics and government)
 See also the names of countries
 Inter-American relations
 Organization of American States

SOCIAL SCIENCES INDEX

Interventionism (International relations)
 United States--Military policy
 Monroe Doctrine
 United States--Foreign relations--(Subdivided by region, names of countries)
 Latin America--(Subdivided by Foreign relations, Politics)
 Central America--(Subdivided by Foreign relations, Politics)
 Caribbean Region--(Subdivided by Foreign relations, Politics)
 See also the names of countries

+ NATIONAL JOURNAL

National Journal provides information on important executive branch and congressional actions. The weekly reports tend to address fewer issues but in greater depth than Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Annual indexes for subjects, personal names, government organizations, and private organizations are available for National Journal. The back cover of each issue of the Journal also contains a brief index to recent articles. Consult this index under the heading "Defense" and "Foreign affairs."

BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

PRINTED INDEXES

+ CONGRESSIONAL INDEX

The Congressional Index, published by the Commerce Clearing House, is a weekly looseleaf service which provides content and status information for bills and resolutions pending in Congress. The progress of the bills and resolutions is reported from the introduction of the legislation to final disposition.

+ DIGEST OF PUBLIC GENERAL BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

The Digest summarizes the essential features of public bills and resolutions and changes made in them during the legislative process. The Digest is compiled by the Congressional Research Service and published during each session of Congress in two cumulative interim issues and a final issue at the conclusion of the session. The Digest has sponsor/cosponsor, identical bills, short title, and subject indexes.

+ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

Bills and resolutions are often printed in the Congressional Record, along with explanatory materials, as they are introduced.

CONGRESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS

Copies of recently issued hearings and committee prints should be requested directly from the issuing committee. Congressional hearings and committee prints may also be found in the collections of Government depository libraries.

PRINTED INDEXES+ CIS INDEX (Index to the Publications of the United States Congress)

The CIS Index, produced by the Congressional Information Service, abstracts all congressional publications with the exception of the Congressional Record. It covers hearings, committee prints, House and Senate reports, documents, and public laws. The Index is published monthly and cumulated quarterly and annually. Each issue is divided into index and abstract portions. Appropriate search terms for this index are published in Table 2.

+ MONTHLY CATALOG OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

The Monthly Catalog lists documents issued by all branches of the Federal Government, including Congress. The Catalog indexes and abstracts congressional publications in less detail than the CIS Index. Appropriate search terms for the Catalog are listed in Table 4.

ONLINE BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA BASES+ CIS INDEX

The CIS Index is available online in the Lockheed and SDC data base systems.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

The following indexes may be used to locate newspaper articles on the debate topic. The search terms to be used with the printed indexes are listed in Table 3.

PRINTED INDEXES+ NEW YORK TIMES INDEX

The New York Times Index provides extensive abstracts for articles appearing in the New York Times.

(text continues following Table 2)

TABLE 2 - SEARCH TERMS FOR LEGISLATIVE INDEXES

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

Latin America
 See also the names of countries
 National defense
 Foreign relations--U.S.
 Caribbean nations
 Organization of American States

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT

Foreign affairs
 National security
 Foreign aid--military
 Latin America and the Caribbean
 See also the names of countries
 Organization of American States

NATIONAL JOURNAL

Foreign affairs (Subject index)
 Defense (Subject index)

CONGRESSIONAL INDEX

Foreign affairs
 Latin America
 Central America
 See also the names of countries
 Armed forces
 Defense Department

TABLE 2 (continued)

DIGEST OF PUBLIC GENERAL BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Foreign relations and policy--Latin America (Subdivided also by names of countries)
National security and intelligence operations
Department of Defense

CIS INDEX

Military policy
Military strategy
Foreign relations
National defense
Latin America
 See also the names of countries
Caribbean area
Organization of American States

+ BELL & HOWELL NEWSPAPER INDEXES

The Bell & Howell Newspaper Indexes list articles appearing in the Chicago Tribune, Chicago Sun-Times, Denver Post, Detroit News, Houston Post, Los Angeles Times, New Orleans Times-Picayune, San Francisco Chronicle, and Washington Post.

ONLINE BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA BASES

+ NEW YORK TIMES INFORMATION BANK

The New York Times Information Bank is a current affairs data base containing citations to 15 daily newspaper and 43 journals. Some public and research libraries have access to the Info Bank, as it is popularly called.

+ NEXIS

The NEXIS library provides access to wire service articles from the Associated Press, United Press International, and Reuters, articles from the Washington Post, and the contents of six journals. The journals indexed include the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report. In addition to providing citations and abstracts of the materials included in the data base, NEXIS makes the full text of the articles available online.

ORGANIZATIONS AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

The following organizations and research institutes were selected from the Encyclopedia of Associations, Washington Information Directory, 1981-1982, and Research Centers Directory as possible sources of information on United States policy toward Latin America. The descriptions of their activities were taken from these sources.

Organizations:

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
1150 17th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 862-5800

A research organization "to assist policy makers, scholars, businessmen, the press, and the public by providing objective analyses of national and international issues." Publications: AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, AEI Economist, and Public Opinion.

(organization listings continue following Table 3)

TABLE 3 - SEARCH TERMS FOR NEWSPAPER INDEXES

BELL & HOWELL NEWSPAPER INDEXES

Foreign policy
Military policy
Latin America
Central America
 See also the names of countries
Military assistance to foreign country
National security
Organization of American States

NEW YORK TIMES INDEX

Military strategy and tactics
International relations--United States
Caribbean area
Latin America
 See also the names of countries
Monroe Doctrine (1823)
United States armament and defense
American States, Organization of

Association of Teachers of Latin American Studies
252-58 63rd Ave.

Little Neck, N.Y. 11362 (212) 428-1237

"Educators, graduate students and others interested in promoting teaching about Latin America in U.S. educational institutions."

Center for Inter-American Relations
680 Park Ave.

New York, N.Y. 10021 (212) 249-8950

"A non-governmental organization of the United Nations. Membership open to persons interested in the Caribbean, Latin America and Canada and in furthering hemispheric cooperation."

Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University
1800 K St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 887-0200

"Studies public policy issues that have international implications."

Publication: Washington Quarterly.

Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th St.

New York, N.Y. 10021 (212) 734-0400

The Council aims "to study the international aspects of American political, economic and strategic problems." Publication: Foreign Affairs.

Council on Hemispheric Affairs

1900 L St., N.W., Rm. 201

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 775-0216

"Education and information council which seeks to monitor the full spectrum of U.S.-Latin American relations and to raise public and governmental understanding and concern with respect to current economic, social and political realities in Latin America."

Council for Inter-American Security
729 8th St., S.E. Suite 200

Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 543-2070

Research and educational organization "specializing in hemispheric defense and security issues."

Foreign Policy Association

205 Lexington Ave.

New York, N.Y. 10016 (212) 481-8450

"Nonpartisan educational organization to stimulate interest in international relations; assists in development of greater understanding for foreign policy issues confronting the United States and encourages citizen expression of opinion on foreign policy." Publications: Headline series, Great Decisions.

Heritage Foundation

513 C St., N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 546-4400

"Publishes research in various formats for the benefit of decisionmakers and the interested public. Programs include: Washington semester in cooperation with participating universities to bring students to Washington for college credit and for an intensive introduction to policy making." Publications: Policy Review, Backgrounder series.

National Referral Center

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540 (202) 287-5670

"A free referral service which directs those who have questions concerning any subject to organizations that can provide the answer. Requests for referral services may be made by letter, telephone, or in person."

North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)

151 West 19th St., 9th Floor

New York, N.Y. 10011 (212) 989-8890

"Independent research organization founded to document U.S. corporate, military and political activities in Latin America." Publication: Report on the Americas.

Organization of American States (OAS)

17th and Constitution, N.W.

Washington D.C. 20006 (202) 789-3621

"International organization created to achieve an order of peace and justice among the American nations." Publication: Americas.

U.S. Department of Defense

Public Information Branch

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301 (703) 697-5737

"Answers written and telephone inquiries from the public about Defense Department policies and programs."

U.S. Department of State

Public Information Service

2201 C St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20520 (202) 655-4000

"Responds to requests for publications, films, and general information about the organization and policies of the Department of State."

Washington Office on Latin America

110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Rm. 404

Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 544-8045

"Coalition of religious and academic groups with a concern for the economic, political and social conditions in Latin America. Focuses on human rights and U.S. policy toward the area."

Research Institutes

Columbia University
 Institute of Latin American Studies
 622 West 113th Street
 New York, N.Y. 10025 (212) 280-4643

Louisiana State University
 Latin American Studies Institute
 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803 (504) 388-5300

University of California at Los Angeles
 Latin American Center
 405 Hilgard Avenue
 Los Angeles, California 90024 (213) 825-4571

University of Florida
 Center for Latin American Studies
 Graduate and International Studies Bldg.
 Gainesville, Florida 32601 (904) 392-0375

University of Illinois
 Latin American Studies Center
 1208 West California, Room 253
 Urbana, Illinois 61801 (217) 333-3182

University of North Carolina
 Institute of Latin American Studies
 Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 (919) 962-3041

University of Notre Dame
 Latin American Studies Center
 Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 (219) 239-7312

University of Texas
 Latin American Studies Association
 Sid Richardson Hall, No. 1
 Austin, Texas 78712 (512) 471-6237

Vanderbilt University
 Graduate Center for Latin American Studies
 Box 1806
 Nashville, Tennessee 37203 (615) 322-2527

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

PRINTED INDEXES

For information on identifying pertinent congressional hearings, committee prints, reports, and documents, see the Congressional Publications section of this research guide.

Search terms for the following indexes are listed in Table 4.

+ MONTHLY CATALOG OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

The Monthly Catalog lists documents issued by all branches of the Federal Government. It provides citations to reports, studies, fact sheets, maps, handbooks, conference proceedings, and congressional publications. The Catalog has monthly, semiannual, and annual indexes by author, title, subject, key words, and series/report title. The Monthly Catalog is also available online through the Lockheed Dialog system.

+ WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents contains statements, messages, and other Presidential materials released by the White House during the preceding week. The Weekly Compilation has weekly, quarterly, and annual indexes.

+ INDEX TO U.S. GOVERNMENT PERIODICALS

The index provides access by author and subject to 182 major periodicals produced by agencies of the United States Government. It is issued quarterly with an annual cumulation.

DISSERTATIONS

Dissertation Abstracts International (DAI) is a monthly list of doctoral dissertations submitted to University Microfilms International by more than 450 academic institutions in the United States and Canada. DAI is divided into two sections: Humanities (A) and Science (B). Keyword title and author indexes are provided each month for each section. The author index is cumulated annually. A retrospective Comprehensive Dissertation Index (CDI) is a subject index and is available, grouped by disciplines of knowledge (e.g., law and political science, history) for 1861-1972 in 32 volumes, and for 1973-1979 in 16 volumes. Direct computer access to Comprehensive Dissertation Database, containing references to more than 600,000 dissertations, is available through DATRIX II.

(text continues following Table 4)

TABLE 4 - SEARCH TERMS FOR GOVERNMENT PUBLICATION INDEXES

MONTHLY CATALOG OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

United States--Foreign relations--(Subdivided by the names of countries)
 United States--Military policy
 United States--Defenses
 Latin America--(Subdivided by Foreign relations, Defenses, Politics and government)
 Caribbean area--(Subdivided by Foreign relations, Defenses, Politics and government)
 United States--National security
 Organization of American States

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

Foreign policy
 Defense and national security
 Latin America
 Caribbean
 See also the names of countries
 State Department
 Defense Department

INDEX TO U.S. GOVERNMENT PERIODICALS

Foreign policy
 Foreign relations, United States
 Defense, United States
 Monroe Doctrine
 Caribbean
 Central America
 Latin America
 See also the names of countries
 Foreign relations--Latin America--(Subdivided by the names of countries)

The following is a partial listing of keywords which may be useful to identify dissertations on the debate topic in the monthly volume *Humanities* (A):

American (policy, aid, etc.)
 Caribbean (area)
 Central (America)
 Foreign (relations, policy)
 Hemispheric
 International (law, relations)
 Intervention
 Latin (America)
 Military (policy, strategy, assistance)
 Monroe (Doctrine)
 Organisation (of American States)
 Policy
 Politics
 Power (politics)

See also the names of countries

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Handbook of Latin American Studies; a Selective and Annotated Guide to Recent Publications is an annual annotated bibliography compiled by the Hispanic Division of the Library of Congress. "First published in 1936, the Handbook has been a cooperative enterprise, designed by scholars as the basic reference and acquisition tool for the area. More than 100 contributing editors, each a distinguished specialist in his or her own discipline, collaborate to provide the descriptive and evaluative comments for the more than 6,000 books and periodical articles that appear in each volume. Since the 26th volume, the Handbook has alternated annually between coverage of the humanities and the social sciences. Approximately 200,000 references to monographs and periodical articles, published anywhere in the world, have been recorded. A cumulative author index to the first 28 volumes was published in 1968." References on the debate topic may be found in the social sciences volumes under the headings: Government and politics, and International relations; and in the humanities volumes under History.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

SUBJECT BIBLIOGRAPHY (SB)

SB-176

August 30, 1982

 * Prices are subject to change without notice. Please include *
 * an additional 25% for orders mailed to addresses outside the *
 * United States. *

PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO THE 1982-83
 COLLEGE DEBATE TOPIC

*Should The United States Be Prohibited From Military Intervention In
 the Western Hemisphere?*

Area Handbook for: (Clothbound.)

Argentina. 1974. 404 p. 11.	D 101.22:550-73/2	S/N 008-020-00536-3	\$12.00
Cuba. 1976. 550 p. 11.	D 101.22:550-152/2	S/N 008-020-00626-2	13.00
El Salvador. 1971. 259 p. 11.	D 101.22:550-150	S/N 008-020-00367-1	10.00
Honduras. 1971, reprinted 1979. 226 p. 11.	D 101.22:550-151	S/N 008-020-00368-9	10.00
Nicaragua. 1970, reprinted 1978. 393 p. 11.	D 101.22:550-88	S/N 008-020-00327-1	12.00
Panama (A Country Study). 1981. 300 p. 11.	D 101.22:550-46/2	S/N 008-020-00868-1	11.00
Venezuela. 1977. 354 p. 11.	D 101.22:550-71/2	S/N 008-020-00676-9	11.00

Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of
 Foreign Policy (The Murphy Report). *A report on the Murphy
 Commission organized to study and recommend changes in the formula-
 tion and implementation of United States foreign policy. 1975.*
 278 p. 11. Y 3.F 76/5:1/975 S/N 022-000-00108-6 7.00

Appendices and Supporting Materials to the above:

Volume 1. *Appendices are entitled Foreign Policy for the
 Future, The Management of Global Issues, and Multilateral
 Diplomacy. Analytical papers describe the world environment
 in which future diplomacy must be carried on and make recom-
 mendations about our international policy. 1975. 295 p. 11.*
 Y 3.F 76/5:2 Or 3/975/v.1 S/N 022-000-00111-6 8.50

Volume 3. *Individual case studies of United States foreign
 economic policy 1866-1874, general information on that policy,
 and the nature of our day-to-day conduct of foreign relations.*
 1975. 300 p. 11. Y 3.F 76/5:2 Or 3/975/v.3 S/N 022-000-00113-2 9.00

Commission on the Organization of . . . Appendices - con.

- Volume 4. *Papers included deal solely with defense management and arms control issues. Gives information on making up the annual defense budget, acquiring weapons, conducting military operations, and limiting exports on grounds of national security.* 1975. 475 p. 11.
Y 3.F 76/5:2 Or 3/975/v.4 S/N 022-000-00114-1 \$11.00
- Volume 5. *Deals with congressional control of foreign and defense policy. Analytical papers include "Congress and Foreign Policy" by former Senator Fulbright and "The President and Foreign Policy" by Arthur Schlesinger.* 1975. 273 p. 11.
Y 3.F 76/5:2 Or 3/975/v.5 S/N 022-000-00115-9 8.00
- Volume 6. *Contains case studies on effective organizational changes in foreign policy, personnel, posts and missions, and comparative foreign practices with Western European nations.* 1976. 472 p. 11.
Y 3.F 76/5:2 Or 3/975/v.6 S/N 022-000-00116-7 11.00
- Commitment in American Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Examination for the Post-Vietnam Era. 1980. 70 p. 11.
D 5.409:80-4 S/N 008-020-00830-3 4.75
- Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951. 1980. 251 p. 11. Clothbound.
D 1.2:C 76/6/948-51 S/N 008-040-00084-2 12.00
- Congress and Foreign Policy, 1980. *Annual report of actions taken by Congress on American foreign policy in the year 1980.* 1981. 157 p.
Y 4.F 76/1:C 76/11/980 S/N 052-070-05598-7 5.00
- Continuity and Change in the Eighties and Beyond: Proceedings of the National Security Affairs Conference, July 23-25, 1979. *Contents of publication: Arms control and defense planning; Politics and the limited contingency force; Mobilization and surge potential; East Asia; and Western Hemisphere.* 1979. 222 p.
D 5.412:979 S/N 008-020-00819-2 6.50
- Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: A Case in National Security Crisis Management. 1978. 55 p.
D 5.410:C 89 S/N 008-020-00765-0 4.50
- Essays on War: 1, The Inconsequence of Superpower War; 2, Quarantine; 3, The Quagmire of Self Defense. 1981. 85 p.
D 5.413:W 19 S/N 009-020-00848-6 4.75
- Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for United States Policymakers. *This National Defense University publication presents nine papers addressing contemporary issues that have significant implications for the security of the United States.* 1980. 222 p.
D 5.402:St 8 S/N 008-020-00828-9 6.00
- Foreign Relations of the United States. *The "Foreign Relations of the United States" series constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes, composed of hundreds of memorandums, telegrams, policy papers, and other official documents (some only recently declassified) provides an intriguing view of many of the reasons behind United States policy decisions concerning Central and South American countries. All publications are clothbound.*
1947, Volume 8, American Republics. 1972. 1082 p.
S 1.1:947/v.8 S/N 044-000-Q1408-4 18.00

Foreign Relations of the United States - con.

- 1949, Volume 2, The United Nations, The Western Hemisphere.
1975. 827 p. S 1.1:949/v.2 S/N 044-000-01577-3 \$17.00
- 1950, Volume 2, The United Nations, The Western Hemisphere.
1976. 1088 p. S 1.1:950/v.2 S/N 044-000-01621-4 18.00
- 1951, Volume 2, The United Nations, The Western Hemisphere.
1979. 1720 p. S 1.1:951/v.2 S/N 044-000-01745-8 24.00
- Future of Conflict. Discusses the potential for conflict during the next two decades, the issue of arms control, various sub-national groups, and more.* 1979. 186 p.
D 5.402:C 76/978-79 S/N 008-020-00793-5 5.50
- Impact of Cuban-Soviet Ties in the Western Hemisphere, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House, 95th Congress, 2d Session, March 14, 15; April 5 and 12, 1978.* 1978. 199 p.
Y 4.In 8/16:C 89/6 S/N 052-070-04587-6 6.00
- International Relations Dictionary, 1980. This Dictionary identifies and provides information about terms, phrases, acronyms, catch words, and abbreviations used in the conduct of foreign affairs.* Rev. 1980. 84 p.
S 1.69:221-2 S/N 044-000-01853-5 5.00
- Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1981:**
- Volume 1, Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders. Contains legislation and related material on foreign assistance, agricultural commodities, the Peace Corps, arms control and disarmament, the Department of State, and information and educational and cultural exchange programs.* 1982. 1052 p.
Y 4.F 76/2:L 52/981/v.1 S/N 052-070-05708-4 11.00
- Volume 2, Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders. Contains legislation and related material and is republished with amendments and additions at the end of each annual session of Congress.* 1982. 1108 p.
Y 4.F 76/2:L 52/981/v.2 S/N 052-070-05709-2 10.00
- Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924. In this pamphlet the record of the Marine occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916-1924 is presented as an example of the active role played by the Marine Corps in the Caribbean region in the first three decades of the 20th century.* 1974. 109 p. 11.
D 214.13:D 71 S/N 008-055-00079-3 5.50
- Military Assistance Programs, Part 1, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.* 1976. 592 p. 11.
Y 4.In 8/16:H 62/v.5 S/N 052-070-03689-3 9.00
- Military Power in a Free Society. Discusses the nature of military power, some of the fundamentals of its organization and use, its interaction with society, and implications for the future.* 1979. 275 p. 11.
D 208.202:M 59 S/N 008-047-00273-4 8.50

- Political Economy of the Western Hemisphere: Selected Issues for United States Policy, Selected Essays. 1981. 229 p.
Y 4.Ec 7:P 75/2 S/N 052-070-05638-0 \$ 6.00
- Rethinking United States Security Policy for the 1980s: Proceedings of the Seventh Annual National Security Affairs Conference, July 21-23, 1980. *Contents of publication: Evolving relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China; Western alliances, Japan, and international security threats; Rethinking essential equivalence; Emerging security issues in the "era of crisis"; Advanced technology and security problems.* 1980. 348 p. 11. D 5.412:980 S/N 008-020-00864-8 9.00
- Selling to Argentine State-Owned Companies. *NOTICE: This report was prepared prior to the Falkland Islands dispute. Consequently, some of the policies and practices referenced may have changed. Please contact the United States Department of Commerce for the latest information on regulations governing United States exports to Argentina.* 1982. 20 p. 11. Issued with perforations. C 61.12:82-11 S/N 003-000-90795-3 3.00
- Statement on El Salvador, March 19, 1981. *This publication is a statement by Walter V. Stossel, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 19, 1981.* 1981. 3 p. S 1.71/4:265 S/N 044-000-01840-3 2.25
- Survey of United States Export Opportunities: Brazil. *Because of rapidly changing needs in the Brazilian economy, as well as a reassessment by public and private Brazilian interests of the country's restrictive policies and attitudes toward imports, Brazil is expected to provide a huge growth market for the sale of United States products and services. The Survey encompasses major Brazilian industrial and service sectors and identifies both short- and long-term business opportunities for United States firms and describes the general business climate in the country.* 1979. 277 p. 11. C 57.2:B 73/2 S/N 003-009-00318-1 8.50
- They Know How. An Experiment in Development Assistance. *Reports on the Inter-American Foundation's experiment in responding to Latin and Caribbean social change initiatives.* 1977. 175 p. 11. Y 3.In 8/25:2 K 76 S/N 022-000-00137-0 5.50
- Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, Volume 6, Canada-Czechoslovakia. 1971. 1346 p. Clothbound. S 9.12/2:6 S/N 044-000-01319-3 23.00
- United States and the Third World, A Discussion Paper. *A State Department analysis of the prospects for the "Third World"—the less-developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—in such areas as population control, energy, trade, and agricultural development. Also discusses United States relations with the Third World.* 1976. 65 p. S 1.71:301 S/N 044-000-01617-6 4.50
- United States Commercial Relations With Cuba: A Survey. 1975. 67 p. 11. C 57.402:C 89 S/N 003-009-00210-9 5.00
- Venezuela, A Survey of United States Business Opportunities. *Discusses opportunities in such areas as transportation, construction, financial institutions, energy, chemicals, food, health care, and six others.* 1976. 154 p. C 57.119:V 55 S/N 003-009-00221-4 6.50

War Powers Resolution, A Special Study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Traces the history of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, why and how it was enacted and what is meant. Includes the text of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, Public Law 93-148, 1982.*
 308 p. Y 4.F 76/1:N 19/11 S/N 052-070-05725-4 \$ 7.00

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